Austro-French secret treaty

The German Confederation, which was dissolved after the war in 1866, with Austria (orange) and Prussia (blue)

The Austro-French secret treaty of June 12, 1866 referred to the case that there would be a war between Austria and Prussia in the German Confederation . France under Napoleon III. Austria assured neutrality, while Austria made commitments related to the reorganization of the German Confederation. Austria held out the prospect that the Prussian Rhineland would become a new member state indirectly under French rule.

An important point of negotiation was the future of Veneto with the capital Venice . The Italian-speaking area was ruled by Austria. The Kingdom of Italy sought to acquire the area and thus come closer to Italian unity . Austria had to realize that in view of the international situation it would hardly be possible to keep Veneto. In the secret treaty it therefore agreed the transfer of Veneto to France.

In the German War that broke out shortly afterwards , Austria, confident of victory, suffered a defeat. The terms of the agreement therefore became meaningless. With this secret treaty, Austria had violated the constitutional laws of the German Confederation, as had Prussia with its alliance with Italy .

prehistory

In the course of the year two crises in the German Confederation came to a head: the question of federal reform and the Schleswig-Holstein question . After the German-Danish War in 1864, Austria and Prussia jointly received rule over Schleswig and Holstein . In the dispute over the future of these two " Elbe Duchies ", Prussian troops marched into the Austrian-controlled Holstein. Austria therefore applied to the Bundestag on June 14 for the mobilization of the armed forces .

After the establishment of the Kingdom of Italy two major areas had remained outside it: dominated by Austria Veneto (green) and protected by French troops papal Rome, the Papal States (purple).

A war could have been averted in advance if Prussia had lost its Italian ally. To do this, Austria would have had to voluntarily cede Veneto to Italy, as it had already been encouraged by Great Britain. The Austrian Foreign Minister Alexander von Mensdorff-Pouilly told the French government in May 1866:

If war breaks out, Austria transfers Veneto to France. France could pass it on to Italy. However, Italy would have to pay Austria financial compensation for the fortifications in Veneto. With this money Austria would fortify the new border.
Italy must restore the former Papal States and either install the (Habsburg) princes of Modena and Tuscany in their old empires or create new ones for them in Veneto. Otherwise the King of Naples should return.
Austria also demanded the Prussian province of Silesia for itself . In return, Prussia could annex land in the rest of northern Germany.
In return, Bavaria and Saxony would have to be allowed to expand their territory.
Austria's ambassador Metternich saw a possible incentive for France in the fact that France annexed Belgium and the Belgian king was given a new kingdom in the German Rhineland.

The French reaction to these Austrian proposals was cool. For its part, Prussia was very skeptical when it indirectly proposed a proposal by Napoleon III. received: France would support Prussia if it received the Rhineland for it. Only in this way, Napoleon believed, could he win the French public over to his plan. From the Prussian point of view, however, a loss of the Rhineland was quite impossible, if only because of the national feeling in Germany.

So France came back to its Congress proposal, which it wanted to submit together with Great Britain and Russia. France wanted to have the Veneto question, the Schleswig-Holstein question and the German question dealt with at a European congress , without profit for itself, in order to keep the peace. Accordingly, Prussia and Italy should give Austria money for Veneto, with this money Austria would acquire territories of the Ottoman Empire. Schleswig-Holstein should simply become Prussian. Napoleon envisaged a reform of the German Confederation in such a way that Prussia would dominate the north and Austria the south.

However, Austria refused a congress at which area changes would be discussed. Austria could not do without Veneto without losing its status as a great power. There would be no area (except Silesia) valuable enough for exchange, and payment of money would be dishonorable. In the Austro-French negotiations in June 1866, Austria achieved the following result: In the event of war, France would remain neutral. Austria would only cede Veneto if it wins the war. Napoleon was happy to agree, because if Austria were to lose, Veneto would have to cede it (to Italy) anyway. The contract was finally signed on June 12 and expanded through verbal agreements.

content

The secret treaty and the verbal agreements assured Austria that France would remain neutral if it came to war in the German Confederation. France would also try to get Italy to be neutral.

For this, Austria had to accept numerous considerations and claims from France:

If Austria wins against Prussia, it must transfer Veneto to France. Veneto would then have become the bargaining ground between Italy and France.
Should Austria win in Italy, it would not change the status of Veneto as long as the alliance with France exists.
Should it come to a change in the balance of power in the German Confederation, it should be agreed:
- France would allow Austrian territorial gains as long as the German Confederation did not come under the sole supremacy of Austria.
- Austria would come to an agreement with France before there were changes of territory that would have disturbed the European balance of powers.
France should continue to stand up for the remaining Papal States.
The Habsburgs , who had previously ruled in Italian principalities, were to receive compensation outside of Italy. The contract partners were thinking of areas of the Prussian Rhineland.
Orally it was also agreed: The Prussian Rhineland should become an "independent" state. “Independence” meant that the Rhine state could definitely remain a member of the German Confederation. At the same time, however, it was assumed that such a state would de facto be dependent on France.

consequences

The German war broke out in June. Austria and its allies were not only in the field against Prussia, Austria also had to fight off Italian attacks. When it became clear that the war was going badly for Austria, Vienna instructed its ambassador Metternich in Paris to reach an armistice with Italy, which France would broker. Vienna would be ready to hand over Veneto. Napoleon replied that he would only mediate if it was also about the war against Prussia. He had not considered Prussia so strong and now feared that all possibilities were open to Prussia.

Part of the French government wanted to forbid Prussia from conquering territories and was already sending troops to the Franco-Prussian border. Napoleon, however, feared the reaction of public opinion. He had also learned from Prussia and Italy that they did not, at least not immediately, refuse mediation. He suggested to Prussia to incorporate Saxony. The Saxon king could then get a new empire in the Rhineland. Austria should not lose any German territory.

The rapid end of the war in the German Confederation in July / August prevented Napoleon from being able to continue to influence the events. Had Napoleon not assumed from the outset that Austria would be victorious, he would have insisted more emphatically on Prussia in return for French neutrality. He had failed to do this, so that later he was left empty-handed.

The well-known French catchphrase " Vengeance for Sadowa " refers to this : The German war was won by the Prussian victory in the battle of Königgrätz , named in France after the nearby Sadowa. In France, people felt they had been disadvantaged. There was a cold war between France and Prussia, in which Napoleon III. permanently strived for territorial acquisitions.

rating

E. Ann Pottinger sees the treaty in the continuity of Napoleonic foreign policy. Napoleon advocated the nationality principle , as he had presented it to the Italians and Prussians. He also wanted to adapt the nationality principle to the principle of balance of power. He hoped to win his own territory, but did not insist. He always had to take into account public opinion in France. After Prussia did not accept Napoleon's proposal and the congress idea failed, all that remained was the treaty with Austria. In this way Napoleon wanted to secure a place at the table of the peace negotiations, although it remained unclear which decisions he would ultimately make there.

With the secret treaty, Austria violated its obligations towards the German Confederation, judges Ernst Rudolf Huber . Foreign policy alliances of this kind were prohibited under the federal constitutional laws because they not only endangered another member state (Prussia), but also the security of the entire federal government. Austria allowed a non-federal state (France) to interfere in German conditions, even to change territory. Above all, Austria is to be blamed for the planned formation of an independent Rhine state.

However, it should be taken into account that Prussia had already signed a secret alliance treaty with Italy on April 8th . This stipulated that in the event of war Italy would declare war on Austria and be rewarded with Veneto.

“Since the Austro-French treaty of June 12, 1866, the two German powers had nothing to reproach each other for in this regard. In the ensuing dispute, they had both violated their federal obligations through agreements with foreign states and sacrificed the federal constitution to their own power-state interests. "

- Ernst Rudolf Huber : German constitutional history

supporting documents

^ E. Ann Pottinger: Napoleon III and the German Crisis 1865–1866 , Cambridge (Massachusetts): Harvard University Press, 1966, pp. 112–114.
^ E. Ann Pottinger: Napoleon III and the German Crisis 1865–1866 , Cambridge (Massachusetts): Harvard University Press, 1966, pp. 120, 141.
^ E. Ann Pottinger: Napoleon III and the German Crisis 1865-1866 , Cambridge (Massachusetts): Harvard University Press, 1966, pp. 128 f., 141.
^ E. Ann Pottinger: Napoleon III and the German Crisis 1865-1866 , Cambridge (Massachusetts): Harvard University Press, 1966, pp. 142, 145-147.
^ According to Ernst Rudolf Huber: German Constitutional History since 1789. Volume III: Bismarck and the Reich. 3rd edition, W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart a. a. 1988, pp. 529/530.
^ E. Ann Pottinger: Napoleon III and the German Crisis 1865–1866 , Cambridge (Massachusetts): Harvard University Press, 1966, pp. 142, 152–155.
^ E. Ann Pottinger: Napoleon III and the German Crisis 1865-1866 , Cambridge (Massachusetts): Harvard University Press, 1966, pp. 142, 160-169.
^ Allan Mitchell: Bismarck and the French Nation . Pegasus, New York 1971, p. 35 f.
^ E. Ann Pottinger: Napoleon III and the German Crisis 1865–1866 , Cambridge (Massachusetts): Harvard University Press, 1966, pp. 142, 149 f.
^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume III: Bismarck and the realm. 3rd edition, W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart a. a. 1988, p. 530.
^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume III: Bismarck and the realm. 3rd edition, W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart a. a. 1988, p. 531.

[1] E. Ann Pottinger: Napoleon III and the German Crisis 1865–1866 , Cambridge (Massachusetts): Harvard University Press, 1966, pp. 112–114.

[2] E. Ann Pottinger: Napoleon III and the German Crisis 1865–1866 , Cambridge (Massachusetts): Harvard University Press, 1966, pp. 120, 141.

[3] E. Ann Pottinger: Napoleon III and the German Crisis 1865-1866 , Cambridge (Massachusetts): Harvard University Press, 1966, pp. 128 f., 141.

[4] E. Ann Pottinger: Napoleon III and the German Crisis 1865-1866 , Cambridge (Massachusetts): Harvard University Press, 1966, pp. 142, 145-147.

[5] According to Ernst Rudolf Huber: German Constitutional History since 1789. Volume III: Bismarck and the Reich. 3rd edition, W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart a. a. 1988, pp. 529/530.

[6] E. Ann Pottinger: Napoleon III and the German Crisis 1865–1866 , Cambridge (Massachusetts): Harvard University Press, 1966, pp. 142, 152–155.

[7] E. Ann Pottinger: Napoleon III and the German Crisis 1865-1866 , Cambridge (Massachusetts): Harvard University Press, 1966, pp. 142, 160-169.

[8] Allan Mitchell: Bismarck and the French Nation . Pegasus, New York 1971, p. 35 f.

[9] E. Ann Pottinger: Napoleon III and the German Crisis 1865–1866 , Cambridge (Massachusetts): Harvard University Press, 1966, pp. 142, 149 f.

[10] Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume III: Bismarck and the realm. 3rd edition, W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart a. a. 1988, p. 530.

[11] Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume III: Bismarck and the realm. 3rd edition, W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart a. a. 1988, p. 531.