Ansgar Beckermann

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Ansgar Beckermann (born June 20, 1945 in Hamburg ) is a German philosopher and one of the main exponents of the philosophy of mind in Germany. Further areas of work are epistemology and logic .

Beckermann obtained his Abitur at the Sankt Ansgar School and studied philosophy, sociology and mathematics at the universities of Hamburg and Frankfurt am Main from 1964 to 1970 . In 1974 he received his doctorate with the thesis "Reasons and Causes"; from 1975 to 1981 he was a research assistant at the University of Osnabrück . After professorships at the University of Göttingen and the University of Mannheim , Beckermann was professor at the University of Bielefeld from 1995 to 2012 . From 2000 to 2006 he was President of the Society for Analytical Philosophy and has been its honorary member since 2018.

Physicalism and the Metaphysics of Mind

Beckermann describes himself as a representative of a physicalistic monism . Ontological physicalism claims that all entities are physical entities. On the one hand, this means that all objects are composed of the basic physical particles . Beckermann has pointed out, however, that a comprehensive physicalism must be extended to properties . Only when a physicalist asserts that all properties result from the properties of the fundamental physical objects can one adequately distinguish physicalism from property dualism. Through this thesis, however, physicalism seems to be tied to a reductionist theory. Beckermann accepts that such a reductionism is faced with serious objections.

According to Beckermann, the experience content (the qualia ) in particular opposes a reductive analysis. Many mental states have the property of being experienced in a certain way. Beckermann tries to explain this aspect of consciousness with the following example:

“And if someone says that they still don't know what the qualitative character of a taste judgment consists of, we can counter this lack of understanding: We give them a sip of wine, then let them suck a mint and then give them another sip of the same Wein with the comment: What has changed now is the qualitative character of your taste judgment. "

A reductive theory of consciousness would only be complete if the experience aspect could also be made understandable through a scientific analysis. But this does not seem to be possible. The neurosciences , for example, can find neural correlates of consciousness, i.e. explain which processes in the brain are associated with which state of consciousness. But this does not make it clear why something is experienced.

Since such an explanation does not seem possible, reductive approaches threaten to fail. However, it is now plausible to assume that physicalism is fixed on the traceability of consciousness. This problem led Beckermann to discuss positions on emergence theory following CD Broad .

In contrast to the qualia, Beckermann does not consider the phenomenon of intentionality to be a problem of physicalism. The intentional content of mental states can be understood in the course of a measurement-theoretical approach.

Freedom and knowledge

Beckermann thinks that physicalism and determinism are compatible with the idea of ​​free will . Although determinism implies the predetermination of our will, this need not be understood as a refutation of the idea of ​​freedom. Rather, by “freedom” we can understand the correspondence between willing and thinking.

Beckermann also attacked the philosophical concept of knowledge in an influential essay . Traditionally, “knowledge” is defined as a true, justified opinion; Plato had already discussed this definition at the end of Theaetetus . However, in 1963 Edmund Gettier showed that this definition is wrong, as there are cases of true, justified opinions that do not represent knowledge. Since then, countless attempts have been made to find a new definition. Beckermann, however, draws attention to logical errors in this determination of "knowledge":

"If we define knowledge as justified true belief , then we define knowledge with the help of two conditions, one of which - truth - stands for the goal of our knowledge endeavors, while the other - justification - stands for a criterion with the help of which we want to find out whether we have achieved this goal. However, this […] is illegitimate. Because in principle it is not permissible to include a goal and the criteria with which we check whether the goal has been achieved in the definition of one and the same term. In other words: the everyday concept of knowledge is systematically an incoherent hybrid concept - a concept in which two features are summarized which are not on the same level and which therefore must not be combined. "

In contrast, Beckermann proposes to dispense with a definition and to abandon "knowledge" as a central concept in epistemology :

“We should be a little braver [...] and completely dispense with the concept of knowledge. There is no interesting question and no interesting thesis in epistemology that we could not formulate without this term. What is the goal of our knowledge endeavors? Truth. How can we determine which of our statements and beliefs are true? For example, by checking whether these statements and beliefs are justified. We are interested in the truth of statements and beliefs and in the justification of statements and beliefs for various reasons. But the question of whether statements and beliefs are true and justified does not play a role in our endeavors for knowledge, for good reasons. In other words: If one understands knowledge in the sense of true and justified conviction , then this term is not only incoherent, but - fortunately - also uninteresting and dispensable. "

Publications

  • Ansgar Beckermann (ed.): Analytical theory of action. Volume 2 (declarations of action). Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1977, ISBN 3-518-06399-5 ; 1985, ISBN 3-518-28089-9
  • Reasons and causes. On the supposedly fundamental difference between mental explanations of action and scientific-causal explanations. Scriptor-Verlag, Kronberg 1977, ISBN 3-589-20395-1 (dissertation)
  • Descartes on the real difference between body and soul - an investigation into Cartesian dualism. Faculty 2 of the University of Osnabrück, 1982
  • Descartes' metaphysical proof of dualism. Analysis and criticism. Alber, Freiburg / Munich 1986, ISBN 3-495-47608-3
  • with Hans Flohr and Jaegwon Kim (eds.): Emergence or Reduction? Essays on the prospects of nonreductive physicalism. de Gruyter, Berlin / New York 1992, ISBN 3-11-012880-2
  • Introduction to logic. de Gruyter, Berlin / New York 1997, ISBN 3-11-014774-2 ; 2nd revised and expanded edition 2003, ISBN 3-11-017965-2
  • Analytical introduction to the philosophy of mind. de Gruyter, Berlin / New York 1999; 2nd revised edition 2001, ISBN 3-11-017065-5 ; 3rd revised edition 2008, ISBN 978-3-11-020424-7
  • with Dominik Perler (ed.): Classics of Philosophy Today. Reclam, Stuttgart 2004, ISBN 3-15-010557-9

Web links

Footnotes

  1. ^ Society for Analytical Philosophy eV - Organization. Retrieved July 10, 2020 .
  2. ↑ An argument for physicalism. In: Geert Keil, Herbert Schnädelbach (Ed.): Naturalism. Philosophical contributions. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 2000, ISBN 3-518-29050-9 , pp. 128-143
  3. ^ Property physicalism. In: Journal for Philosophical Research. No. 50 (1996), pp. 3-25
  4. ↑ Analytical Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. Walter de Gruyter, Berlin 1999
  5. ↑ What makes consciousness a problem for philosophers? In: Logos. No. 4 (1997), pp. 1-19.
  6. ↑ The reductive explainability of phenomenal consciousness - CD Broad on the explanatory gap. In: Michael Pauen, Achim Stephan (ed.): Phenomenal consciousness. Return to identity theory? Mentis, Paderborn 2002, ISBN 3-89785-094-X , pp. 122-147
  7. ↑ Is there a problem of intentionality? In: Ulrike Haas-Spohn (Ed.): Intentionality between subjectivity and relation to the world. Mentis, Paderborn 2003, ISBN 3-89785-065-6 , pp. 19-44
  8. ↑ Biology and Freedom. In: Heinrich Schmidinger and Clemens Sedmak (eds.): The human being - a free being? Autonomy - personality - responsibility. Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 2005, ISBN 3-534-17502-6 , pp. 111-124.
  9. ↑ On the incoherence and irrelevance of the concept of knowledge. Plea for a new agenda in epistemology In: Journal for Philosophical Research. No. 55 (2001), 571-593
  10. ^ Plato: Theätet. 201d-206b
  11. ↑ On the incoherence and irrelevance of the concept of knowledge. Plea for a new agenda in epistemology In: Journal for Philosophical Research. No. 55 (2001), p. 576f.
  12. ↑ On the incoherence and irrelevance of the concept of knowledge. Plea for a new agenda in epistemology In: Journal for Philosophical Research. No. 55 (2001), p. 578f.
personal data
SURNAME Beckermann, Ansgar
BRIEF DESCRIPTION German philosopher and professor at Bielefeld University
DATE OF BIRTH June 20, 1945
PLACE OF BIRTH Hamburg