Augustan German Wars

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Augustan German Wars
Augustus cameo of the Lothar cross
Augustus cameo of the Lothar cross
date 12 BC Chr. To 16 AD
place Germania between the Rhine and Elbe
output Unsuccessful attempts to bring Germania on the right bank of the Rhine under Roman rule.
consequences Retreat of the Romans to the Rhine border; de facto Roman renunciation of control of the Germania on the right bank of the Rhine.
Parties to the conflict

Roman Empire

Various Germanic tribes and tribal coalitions

Commander

Drusus , Tiberius , Varus , Germanicus

Arminius as well as various, mostly unnamed Germanic princes and leaders

Troop strength
Sometimes up to 80,000 unknown
losses

over 40,000

unknown

The Augustan German Wars were a series of military clashes between 12 BC. BC and AD 16, in which the Roman Empire under Augustus (31 BC to 14 AD) tried - ultimately in vain - to bring the Germanic tribes between the Rhine and Elbe under its rule. Essential events were the Drusus campaigns (12 to 8 BC), the immensum bellum ("mighty war", 1 to 5 AD), the devastating Roman defeat in the Varus Battle (9 AD) and the subsequent ones Attempts at reconquest by Tiberius and Germanicus ; The Germanicus campaigns (14 to 16 AD) are considered the climax and end point of the wars . The Augustan Teutonic Wars was preceded by the conquest of Gaul by Caesar , which led to a confrontation with expanding and predatory Germanic tribal groups.

Germania at the turn of the ages ( Th. Mommsen 1921)

Opponents of the Romans were various Germanic tribal coalitions. Since the year 9 AD, the center of the Germanic resistance was the Cheruscans led by Arminius (* around 17 BC; † around 21 AD) . The Romans found topographical and climatic conditions in the Germanic theaters of war, which made the development of the superior Roman military power difficult and gave the generally inferior Germanic troops decisive advantages.

After heavy Roman losses, the reluctant Germanicus stopped the offensives on the energetic direction of the new Emperor Tiberius (14 to 37 AD). The legions withdrew permanently to the Rhine line. That is why Arminius was considered by the Roman historian Publius Cornelius Tacitus , one of the main sources on the wars, as the “liberator of Germania” (liberator Germaniae) .

Sources

The main sources on the Augustan German Wars were composed by Cassius Dio , Velleius Paterculus (for the time of the immensum bellum ) and Tacitus (for the time from 9 AD).

The Historia Romana ( Roman history , Greek Ῥωμαϊκὴ ἱστορία) of Dio (* around 163 AD; † after 229) is the main source for the Drusus campaigns and the Varus Battle. The work, written in Greek, was written at the beginning of the 3rd century and is believed to be reliable and based on contemporary sources. Archaeological finds such as the Roman city of Lahnau-Waldgirmes on the right bank of the Rhine confirm the high source value of Dio's writings.

Velleius Paterculus (* around 20/19 BC; † after 30 AD) took part in the immensum war as an officer under Tiberius . He wrote his Historia Romana ( Roman history ) around two decades after the events. The work is characterized by great veneration for the general and later Emperor Tiberius and is therefore sometimes distorted. Velleius only touches on the Varus Battle because he wanted to deal with it in another book, which, however, was no longer produced.

Tacitus, Annales beginning of the 12th book in the Florence manuscript, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana , Plut. 68.2 fol. 6v (1st half of the 11th century)

Tacitus (* around 58 AD; † around 120) devoted himself extensively to the campaigns of Germanicus and left behind one of the most detailed descriptions of ancient military campaigns in the first two volumes of his Annales (year books). He is generally considered to be a well-informed and conscientious historian who also evaluated Senate files and other official sources. Nevertheless, the interpretation of the military operations creates difficulties. Tacitus did not provide all the information necessary to understand the course of the war and requires the reader to have extensive knowledge of the context. In addition, the enormous literary concentration often prevents full certainty in understanding the texts.

Today Tacitus and Dio evaluated lost historical works as sources. Presumably they used the 20 book Bella Germaniae ( Germanic Wars ) by the writer Pliny the Elder , who served as an officer in Germania in the middle of the 1st century. The Libri belli Germanici (“Books of the Germanic War”) by the contemporary witness Aufidius Bassus may also have been incorporated.

Other ancient authors provide brief information on the Augustan German Wars. Worth mentioning are the Geographica of Strabo and the emperor biographies of Suetonius , especially those on Augustus, Tiberius and Claudius . From the historical work Ab urbe condita by the contemporary witness Titus Livius only brief details of the contents, the periochae , have been preserved for the period of the German Wars . The source value of the Florus written at the beginning of the 2nd century is controversial .

Important archaeological and epigraphic evidence is the tombstone found in Vetera , today's Xanten , for the Roman centurion Marcus Caelius (“Caelius stone ”) who died in the war of Varus (bello Variano ) and the Tabula Siarensis from Spain, a memorial plaque Bronze, which was made in 19 AD in honor of Germanicus, who died that year, and contains a list of his services.

course

prehistory

In the middle of the 1st century BC BC Roman and Germanic claims to power collided in Gaul . Between 58 and 53 BC Gaius Iulius Caesar defeated and drove out the Suebi , Usipeters and Tenkerites who had advanced into Gaul , and led his legions twice across the Rhine. Germanic incursions and Roman acts of retaliation are for the years 30 to 20 BC. Chr. Handed down. In 16 BC In BC Sugambrer , Usipeter and Tenkeri undertook a raid to Gaul, defeated the 5th Legion ( V Alaudae or V Gallica ) of Marcus Lollius and captured the legionary eagle . This clades Lolliana ("Lollius defeat") gave the impetus for a reorientation of the Roman strategy for Germania: on the Rhine, forts were built , the most important in Xanten ( Vetera ) and Mainz ( Mogontiacum ). The bases were strategically located and allowed an offensive action against the tribes on the right bank of the Rhine. Until 12 BC A total of five legions had arrived from Spain and Gaul. When Sugambrer, Usipeter and Tenkerer crossed the Rhine again that year, Drusus caused them a painful defeat.

Drusus campaigns 12 to 8 BC Chr.

In late summer 12 BC BC Drusus crossed the Lower Rhine. This date marked the beginning of the Augustan German Wars. The legions devastated the territory of the Usipeter and Sugambrer. Then the classis Germanica (Rhine fleet) pushed through the fossa Drusiana (“Drusus Canal”) and the Flevo (today's IJsselmeer ) into the North Sea. In the following years Drusus led the legions repeatedly against Usipeter, Tenker and Sugambrer, from the year 10 BC. BC also against the Chatti , Suebi , Marcomanni and Cherusci . The Weser was 11 BC. Reached. In the same year the legions escaped a military catastrophe by luck in the not localizable place Arbalo .

A barbarian hands a child hostage to Augustus. The representation possibly aims at the submission of the Sugambrer 8 BC. From.

In the year 9 BC Drusus reached the Elbe. There, according to tradition, a “woman of superhuman size” moved the general to repent with the following words: “Where do you still want to go, insatiable Drusus? You are not fated to see all of this. Move away! Because the end of your deeds and your life is near. ”On the way back, Drusus died“ of a broken bone when his horse fell on his lower leg, thirty days after this accident ”, as Livy reports. Posthumously Augustus gave Drusus the hereditary epithet "Germanicus".

The assumption of command by Tiberius brought about a paradigm shift. The risky, sometimes ruthless military campaigns of the Drusus gave way to political and diplomatic measures. Probably in the spring of 8 BC Chr. Succeeded in eliminating the anti-Romance Sugambrian ruling class. Around 40,000 Sugambrers were then settled on the left bank of the Rhine and thus brought under Roman control. The Marcomanni and Quads left their settlement areas around the Main under the leadership of the Marbod and withdrew to Bohemia .

From the Roman point of view, the balance of the almost five-year struggle was positive: the danger of Germanic incursions into Gaul was averted, the armed forces of the tribes were decimated and the military radius of action of the legions extended to the Elbe. The resettlement of the Sugambrers had eliminated the most stubborn and powerful enemy in the vicinity of the Rhine and the withdrawal of the marcomanni and quadrupeds put an end to the pressure of the Suebian tribes.

Immensum bellum 1 to 5 AD

Bust of Tiberius Claudius Nero
Tiberius Claudius Nero

There is hardly any news about the years immediately after the Drusus campaigns. From 3 BC BC Roman order and infrastructure measures by the Roman governor Domitius Ahenobarbus have been handed down. After the replacement of Domitius by Marcus Vinicius in 1 AD, the immensum bellum ("mighty war") so named by Velleius broke out. The military measures of the experienced general Vinicius are in the dark. Velleius merely reports that he waged the war "happily in some areas, but held it off in others".

In the summer of AD 4, Tiberius took over the high command, subjugated tribes near the Rhine and the Cherusci and for the first time moved into a winter camp with a full army in the middle of Germania. The following year the legions first forced the Chauken back into dependency on Rome and then drove the Lombards across the Elbe. Finally the legions united with a Roman fleet advanced up the Elbe. The apparently perfectly coordinated maneuver is “admirable and without any doubt represents the climax of the Roman Germanic campaigns.” With the conclusion of the campaign, the previous order could be re-established and the immense War could be regarded as ended.

This gave Tiberius a free hand to lead twelve legions against the powerful empire of the Marcomanni king Marbod in Bohemia in 6 AD . However, the attack had to be stopped because of the beginning Pannonian uprising . Between the Rhine and Elbe, the Romans intensified their efforts to make the area a Roman province. Not least because of the "tightened pace" of the governor Varus, the Germanic tribes took up arms again. Four years after the end of the immensum bellum , a new uprising broke out with the Varus Battle.

Varus Battle 9 AD

In the Varus Battle of the year 9 AD, three Roman legions including auxiliary troops and entourage under Publius Quinctilius Varus suffered a crushing defeat against a Germanic army led by Arminius. The Kalkriese region is considered to be the likely location of the last phase of the battle that lasted several days .

Arminius, who had served in the Roman army, had Roman citizenship and had risen to the knighthood , probably succeeded in persuading the tribes of the Martians and Brukterer, and perhaps also the Chatti and Angrivarians, to form an alliance. Arminius was considered a table companion of Varus and lulled him into the belief that he was a loyal ally of Rome. He was so convincing that Varus did not even take seriously the warning of the Cheruscan prince Segestes that Arminius was planning treason.

According to Dio, the starting point of the Roman campaign was the Weser in the Cheruscan region. The news of a supposedly small, regional uprising caused Varus to take a detour through largely unknown territory. The 15,000 to 20,000 soldiers were caught in a carefully planned ambush in rough terrain. The fighting in rough terrain lasted three to four days. Varus eventually killed himself to avoid captivity.

The Legate Lucius Nonius Asprenas secured the Rhine border with the two remaining legions. The Varus Battle marked an important turning point in the Augustan German Wars, but it did not mean the end of the Roman military presence in Germania; Rather, Augustus planned to revise the results of the Varus catastrophe by military means.

Nero Claudius Germanicus

Germanicus campaigns AD 14-16

After the Varus Battle, Tiberius again took command on the Rhine and was able to record his first military successes in 11 and 12 AD. At the end of 12 AD, the designated heir to the throne went to Rome to the side of the aged Augustus - he died in the late summer of 14 AD - and left the command of the Rhine to the Drusus son Germanicus. In the late autumn of 14 AD, Germanicus undertook a campaign against the Martians, who were surprised and slaughtered during a cultic celebration. This was the starting signal for the Germanicus campaigns, which were to mark the climax and end point of the Augustan German Wars.

In the spring of 15 AD, Germanicus attacked the Chatten and then freed Segestes. This was inferior to his son-in-law Arminius in an inner-Cheruscan power struggle, but had previously been able to bring his pregnant wife Thusnelda into his power. Both were brought to the empire. In the summer, a fleet landing in the Ems followed, the recovery of a Varus eagle, the burial of those who fell in the Varus Battle and an undecided battle, presumably not far from the Weser. On the march back to the winter camp, four legions on the pontes longi escaped a devastating defeat with luck.

The new emperor Tiberius disapproved of the risky warfare of Germanicus and insisted that the campaigns be broken off. He relied on diplomatic control of the tribal world. However, Germanicus invoked Augustus' mandate and prepared a decisive blow. A "bloody and merciless offensive war", marked by ruthless severity against the enemy and one's own troops, reached its climax in 16 AD.

Germanicus had a fleet of 1,000 ships ready, which in summer transported all eight legions with cavalry and entourage to the mouth of the Ems. This was followed by a Roman victory at Idistaviso (Idis places meadow), which, however, could not decisively weaken the Germanic resistance. The subsequent battle at the Angrivarian Wall was also unsuccessful. On the way back, the embarked legions suffered heavy losses from autumn storms. Nevertheless, it was possible to recover another Varus eagle from the Martians in autumn. Tiberius now insisted on the end of the campaigns. Germanicus left Germania to celebrate the triumph that had already been awarded last year in Rome. The Germanicus campaigns and with them the era of the Augustan German Wars were over.

Roman warfare

War aims

Source poverty and research controversies

There are only a few sources on the Roman war aims, because after the end of the republic the corresponding discussions were no longer held in public but in the vicinity of the emperor. Dio already complained about the resulting lack of sources. Although Tacitus in his Annales provides clues to the war aims, which were confirmed by the discovery of the Tabula Siarensis in 1981, historical research is nevertheless dependent on conclusions when considering the Roman war aims: intentions and goals of the actors are derived from the structure and course of military actions. This led to widely divergent research views. The historian Jürgen Deininger has identified four key positions:

  1. Protection of Gaul from Germanic raids through military deterrence and demonstrations of power and the creation of large bridgeheads on the right bank of the Rhine. After the Varus catastrophe, the main focus was on reclaiming the bridgeheads.
  2. Development and expansion of the war aims in the course of the Germanic Wars, until at the end the aim was to create a province between the Rhine and Elbe.
  3. From the beginning I wanted to create a province up to the Elbe.
  4. Reaching far east in connection with a Roman ideology of world domination. They wanted to set up a Germanic province far beyond the Elbe, to which other controlled areas would have connected up to the Black Sea and beyond.

Development of the Roman goals in the course of the war

Most recent research assumes that the goals will develop over the course of the war. The Romans seem to have been drawn ever deeper into the entanglements of the Germanic tribal world through their military and diplomatic activity, which went hand in hand with an expansion of Roman engagement. The continuous expansion of ethnographic and geographical knowledge in the course of the campaigns also seems to have enabled and promoted the Roman reach. After the Varus disaster, the punishment of the insurgents and the recovery of the lost legionary eagles were added as goals.

Klaus-Peter Johne sees four phases in the development of the Roman goals: Until AD 4, military deterrence and demonstrations of force to protect Gaul were the focus. Between 4 and 9 AD, the aim was to secure the border on the Elbe and create communication lines from the mouth of the Elbe to the Danube; The Marbod campaign should be seen against this background. After the Varus catastrophe, it was a matter of regaining the Elbe line until 16 AD. After the end of the Germanicus campaigns, the Elbe was finally transfigured as a desirable border of the empire.

Domestic dimension of the war aims

Domestic and personal goals of Augustus may also have played a role. Conferred by the Senate imperium (command) of Augustus had all five, every ten years be extended later (only Tiberius had a imperium for life). Augustus therefore had an interest in portraying himself as the empire's permanent guarantee of security. Germania was the ideal materia gloriae (“object of gaining fame”) “of a ruling dynasty legitimizing itself through victoriousness”, which sought to tie in with Caesar's successes or even to outdo them. Potential heirs to the throne could also recommend themselves for the office in the Germanic theater of war.

After all, the Germanic theater of war also served the army. This did not have to result in conquest or even provincial creation, but on the contrary benefited from repeated breaches of peace by unreliable tribes. Against this background, “the goal was the dynamic itself”.

Troop strengths

At the beginning of the Augustan Teutonic Wars, five legions were stationed in the forts on the Rhine, three of which - Legiones XVII , XVIII and XIX - perished in the course of the Varus catastrophe. Six legions were drawn in, some from other regions, and some were newly established, so that from 10 AD onwards eight legions were stationed on the Rhine. Legions I (Germanica) , V (Alaudae) , XX (Valeria Victrix) and XXI (Rapax) were now on the Lower Rhine, and II (Augusta) , XIII (Gemina) , XIV (Gemina) and XVI (Gallica) on the Upper Rhine . It is uncertain whether Legions I and V were the ones that escaped the disaster the previous year, or the XIII and XIV.

The more recent research assumes the manpower of an Augustan legion (made up of people with Roman citizenship) with up to 6,500 people, of which around 4,800 to 5,300 men are combat troops, the rest special batches (staff soldiers etc.) and non-combatants (supply servants, civilian personnel etc. .). There were also regular auxiliaries . Associated with a legion were an Ala with 500, expanded 800 to 1,000 cavalry, as well as two to three infantry cohorts with usually 500 men, a total of 1,500 to 2,500 auxiliary soldiers. For the release strength, Peter Kehne deducts ten percent of the target strength. The Roman troops were reinforced on campaigns by contingents of warriors at unknown levels, provided by allied tribes.

The sources usually do not provide any information on troop strengths. Exceptions are the Varus catastrophe, the losses of which are repeatedly documented by three legions and auxiliary peoples, as well as the reports of Tacitus, who in several places in the annals mentions the number of legions or cohorts deployed, sometimes also the manpower. For example, Tacitus reports that Germanicus led 12,000 legionnaires, 26 auxiliary cohorts and 8 Alen against the Martians in the autumn of AD 14. Eight legions, two Praetorian cohorts , Gallic and Germanic auxiliaries, and contingents of allies marched to the battle of Idistaviso . In the autumn of 16 AD the Legate Silius marched against the Chatten with 30,000 foot soldiers and 3,000 horsemen.

The older research assumes for the Germanicus campaigns, especially for the year 16 AD, mostly large numbers of combatants on both sides. For the Roman side, Friedrich Knoke assume 100,000 and Paul Höfer 120,000 fighters. Otto Dahm assumes 120,000 people including non-combatants. On the other hand, the statement “not under 50,000 men” by Hans Delbrück for the battle of Idistaviso seems moderate . This statement is rejected by Wolfgang Jungandreas , who sees 100,000 Romans and allies fighting on the Angrivarian Wall despite previous losses. The more recent research is hardly committed to troop numbers. Klaus-Peter Johne assumes that Germanicus commanded a total of 80,000 men at Idistaviso.

Problems of the Roman warfare in Germania

Mobile Germanic population

The Germanic tribes repeatedly withdrew from the Roman grasp, for example the Cherusci, the Drusus in the year 9 BC. BC could not put even with great military effort. Central places as the seat of the highest tribal hierarchies like in Gaul did not exist in Germania, conquering and controlling such places as a possible means of Roman power was omitted. The Chatti capital Mattium was an exception, the destruction of which in 15 AD did not seem to have any lasting effect on the tribe.

The fragmentation of Germanic society did the rest. Chiefs, followers, or clans did not feel bound by agreements that others had made with the Romans. The Germanic raids in Gaul before 12 BC. Were due to followers who were hardly or not at all subject to control by tribes. Treaties between the Romans and the tribes to contain these raids had to remain ineffective.

Topographical and climatic conditions

The topographical and climatic conditions in Germania offered the Roman military different prerequisites. The Germanic settlement chambers, which often stretched along rivers, were easily accessible, partly via long-distance routes from the Bronze Age. Notions of isolated hamlets and villages hidden in forest or marshland that are barely accessible are considered outdated. Rather, it is to be assumed that there are large and densely populated settlement accumulations on cleared and well-developed areas, for example in the Leinegraben , where Cheruscan settlement areas lay close to one another in an open and extensively populated landscape around 10 by 40 kilometers. Nonetheless, low mountain ranges, extensive forest areas and moorlands formed natural obstacles to the military penetration of the country. Caesar had already described the vastness of Germania and the extensive forest areas as a problem. Strabo reports of major detours that the Romans had to accept because of the swamps and forests.

In difficult terrain, the Roman marching and supply columns stretched on narrow paths over many kilometers and offered the Teutons good selective attack opportunities. Varus had led his army into such a situation, trusting his Cheruscan allies. Tacitus described the long marches and the long drawn-out columns as particularly disadvantageous for the Roman warfare in Germania. This should be remedied by wide limites (lanes) that were cut into the Germanic forests. A military road from the Drusus period was identified under the Holsterhausen camp . At 40 meters, it was wider than a modern six-lane motorway. The Roman Limes would later develop into a strong bulwark from such aisles in several stages of expansion and fortification.

The forests offered the Teutons a refuge in the event of Roman attacks. That is why the destruction of settlement chambers rarely had the effect the Romans had hoped for. At the time, in the fight against mobile tribes in Gaul, Caesar succeeded in undermining the authority of tribal leaderships hostile to Rome through constant destruction. Although Germanicus took this strategy to extremes in the last years of the war, the Germanic resistance could not be broken in this way.

Crossing rivers could also pose problems for the Romans, especially at the beginning of the campaign season. The water levels fluctuated more markedly over the course of the seasons than today. From winter to spring (on the Rhine until early summer), the rivers formed obstacles that were difficult to pass. Particularly dangerous floods occurred with backwater in front of confluences. At the tributary of the Havel, the Elbe was able to grow into a huge lake with a water surface of 40 by 44 kilometers. For the spring of AD 15, Tacitus found it remarkable that there was a great drought and that the troops could cross the rivers quickly and without special preparation.

Troop supply

The topographical situation in Germania made it difficult to supply troops on campaigns. The prevailing subsistence economy limited the legions' ability to support themselves from the land. A soldier needed 0.7 to 1 kg of food per day, a horse 2.5 kg of barley and 7 kg of hay or green fodder (mules a little less). Peter Kehne estimates the daily requirement of an army of three legions at 56 t without and 109 t with hay / green fodder. The logistical effort was considerable. As the reason for the reversion of the Drusus on the Weser in 11 BC Gustav Adolf Lehmann suspects supply problems.

Hedemünden replenishment warehouse, floor plan

The Romans relied on supply camps that were as far forward as possible - the Hedemünden camp played in 9 BC. BC played an important role in the migration of the Drusus to the Elbe - and wherever possible on the transport by water. Even within the Roman Empire, with its extensive network of roads, river transport was at least 10 times more efficient than transport with land vehicles or pack animals. Christoph Schäfer assumes that the offensives in Germania were flanked by hundreds of transport ships that formed the "backbone of the supply". In addition to the early development of the tributaries on the right bank of the Rhine, above all the Lippe , Ruhr , Lahn and Main , later the large North Sea fleet operations also served largely to supply troops via the Ems , Weser and Elbe. Tacitus reports in detail on the great importance of sea and river-based troop and supply transports.

Germanic warfare

Motives of Germanic warfare

General

There are hardly any reliable sources on the motives of Germanic warfare against Rome. Tacitus puts motifs in Arminius' mouth in speeches, but the reality content is unclear, moreover the Germanic motives of warfare are "not to be measured by Roman standards". Klaus Tausend showed that the defense against Rome was the most common motive for the well-known Germanic alliances and wars of that time, followed by political conflicts (a large part of which were factional conflicts within a tribe). Rarely in comparison to other cultures at a similar stage of development was it about land acquisition. However, these frequency distributions are likely to result not least from the sources. In addition, the acquisition of loot always played a more or less important role, because a victory was automatically linked to it.

Fight against Roman rule

Hermann Monument in the Teutoburg Forest

The struggle against Roman rule is reflected in the annals. Tacitus closely connects Arminius with the motif of freedom several times. The Cheruscan prince ridiculed the awards and wages of his brother Flavus, who remained in Roman service, as a "cheap price for bondage" (vilia servitii pretia). He urged his warriors to follow him to fame and freedom and not to follow the escaped Segestes into Roman bondage. In addition, Arminius warned of the oppressive tributes that the Romans were in the habit of imposing on subjects subject to the Romans - in fact, uprisings in connection with Roman tax collections have been handed down from Gaul. Finally, Tacitus emphasizes the Germanic rejection of Roman jurisprudence, the desire to live according to the custom of the ancestors and the “sacred obligation to the fatherland” (fas patriae) . Roman projections are likely to play a role in the fatherland motif in particular.

prey

The prospect of booty was the dominant motif of those Germanic followers who made forays into the areas to the left of the Rhine in the run-up to the Augustan German Wars. Looting was the rule, not only among the Teutons - Aristotle also counted the art of war as the art of acquisition. Later, in the course of the German Wars, Germanic greed for prey repeatedly destroyed or at least endangered military success, for example during the Varus Battle and the subsequent siege of Aliso or the pontes longi .

Above all, the prospect of Roman prisoners of war and iron is likely to have aroused Germanic desires. Prisoners of war brought money - after the naval catastrophe of 16 AD, the Angrivarians bought stranded legionnaires from other tribes on behalf of the Romans - or were used as labor - in 50 AD, former legionnaires were liberated from the Chatten, who had been captured more than four decades earlier during the Varus Battle. Germanic raids on Roman territory have been handed down from later centuries, for example from the year 260 AD, when Roman troops put up a returning Germanic contingent near what is now Augsburg and were able to free Italian prisoners.

Iron, especially high-quality Roman blades, was of great value to the Teutons. The Varus army carried at least 200 tons of iron with them (armor, weapons, tools, fittings, etc.). To produce this amount, the Teutons would have had to build 25,000 to 50,000 one-way kilns for smelting and clear three to six square kilometers of forest to produce charcoal.

Involved tribes and warrior numbers

The proportion of warriors in the Germanic population is generally set at 20%. In addition, if the tribal area is threatened, all those capable of carrying weapons will have strengthened the army. Research assumes that the Germanic warriors were outnumbered by the Roman army. The enormous numbers of "barbarian armies" often reported in ancient reports are mostly of a topical nature. Hans Delbrück already spoke out vehemently against too high an appointment and estimated the number of warriors per tribe to be an average of 5,000 men. These numbers were possibly set too low, as modern settlement research shows. Large settlement chambers in open landscapes resulted in an "astonishingly high population density". Nevertheless, the Romans are likely to have been able to lead a numerical superiority in the battles, especially since the contingents of all opposing tribes were not likely to have gathered at any meeting of the Augustan German Wars. Even with Idistaviso, at least the immediately previously reprimanded attackers, and perhaps also parts of the chats repeatedly held down by spring campaigns, must be deducted.

Opponents and allies of Rome during the Augustan German Wars (12 BC to 16 AD)
tribe Warrior number Drusus campaigns immense bellum Varus battle Germanicus campaigns
Ampsivarians 3,000-4,000 Opponent (unsure) Allies (insecure)
Angrivarians 4,500-5,000 Opponent (unsure) opponent
Bataver 4,000 Opponent (unsure) not involved Allies
Brukterer 6,000 opponent opponent opponent opponent
Cananefaten 4,000 Opponent (unsure) not involved
Chamaven 8,000 Opponent (unsure)
Chasuarians 3,000
To chat 8,000-25,000 opponent Opponent (unsure) opponent
Chattuarier opponent opponent
Chauken 6,000 opponent opponent not involved Allies
Cherusci 4,000-16,000 opponent opponent opponent opponent
Dulgubnier 8,000
Friezes 18,000 Allies not involved Allies
Hermundures 11,000-72,000 opponent not involved not involved
Kaulker opponent
Countries opponent
Longobards 5,000-11,000 opponent not involved not involved
Marcomanni 25,000 opponent not involved not involved
Martians 2,500-9,000 Opponent (unsure) opponent opponent
Mattiaker 9,000
Quads 21,000 opponent not involved not involved
Semnones 12,000-18,000 Opponent (unsure) opponent not involved not involved
Sugambrer (until 8 BC) opponent
Sugambrer (from 8 BC) Opponent (unsure) opponent
Tenker 3,000-5,000 opponent Opponent (unsure) opponent
Tubants 2,000 Opponent (unsure) opponent
Usipeter 2,000-4,000 opponent Opponent (unsure) opponent

Balance sheet and outlook

General

After the recall of Germanicus and the suspension of the offensives, the locations on the right bank of the Rhine were abandoned with the exception of a few places on the North Sea coast and in front of Mainz. The troop masses in Xanten and Mainz were reduced, the unified high command over the Rhine Army ended. A strip of wasteland was created to secure the apron on the right bank of the Rhine. Cooperative tribes like the Mattiaker (before Mainz) were tied to the empire through preferential treatment.

Legionary Eagle (replica)

Of the original war aims, only securing Gaul could be considered achieved. The attempt to militarily control the tribal world on the right bank of the Rhine had failed, especially the creation of a province up to the Elbe or beyond. After the Varus catastrophe, revenge goals were added. These were celebrated as having been achieved in Rome after the extensive expeditions of Germanicus and the bringing home of two Varus eagles (Triumph of Germanicus 17 AD).

The Roman losses were considerable, especially during the Germanicus campaigns: The Romans lost almost as many soldiers in AD 14-16 as in the previous war years, including the Varus catastrophe. Peter Kehne puts the Germanicus losses at 20-25,000 men. A total of 40,000 fallen on the part of the Romans should represent an absolute lower limit for the Augustan German Wars. The Germanic losses cannot be estimated.

Reasons for ending the war

The war ended against the resistance of Germanicus on the energetic direction of Tiberius. The emperor had recognized that the war of extermination of his adopted son "in view of G [ermanicus'] almost obsessed bravado always harbored the danger of a second varus catastrophe." The landscape and climatic conditions in Germania increased the military effort and the risk for the Romans, allowed the population to evade the legions' access again and again, and made it difficult to achieve a decisive effect with expeditions of destruction and devastation. Added to this was the size and tenacity of the coalition created by Arminius, whose resistance seemed to increase with the intensity of the attack by the Romans.

Tiberius had a different strategy towards the Teutons: he left them to their notorious aristocratic and tribal conflicts (internis discordiis) and used money, diplomatic means and old contacts (for example to the Ampsivarian prince and Arminius opponent Boiocalus) to influence the tribal world to take. Success came quickly. Larger power blocs within Germania dissolved after a few years. The Marbod empire fell apart when Marbod fled into Roman exile in AD 18. Arminius was murdered in 21 AD by his own relatives, who feared the establishment of a royal rule in the tribe. Another argument of Tiberius may have been the primacy of the Danube border. A strong military engagement on the Danube seemed more necessary than the subjugation of Germanic tribes as far as the Elbe. The relative economic inability of Germania may also have contributed to the decision to end the war.

The Roman public

Tiberius did not undertake the realignment of German policy in secret, as research assumed for a long time. Even his contemporaries saw Tiberius' rejection of further conquering activities. The new line was communicated, for example, on the occasion of the memorial for Germanicus in 19 AD. On the Tabula Siarensis, the war aims are retrospectively reduced to the protection of Gaul and the revenge for the Varus defeat. Tiberius used the opportunity to reinterpret the far-reaching war aims of Augustus and Germanicus after their death in the sense of his own ideas.

Nevertheless, for decades the Roman public hoped for the conquest of Germania and sensibly registered all events north of the Alps. Subsequent emperors used the public expectation for their own purposes. The Germanicus son Caligula (emperor from 37 to 41 AD) led a Germanic campaign in 39 AD, which was not carried out seriously (the actual goal was to suppress a rebellion of the commander in Upper Germany). Claudius (41 to 54 AD), the brother of Germanicus, also used the prestige of his prominent relative, but had to row back quickly in order not to arouse too high expectations with regard to Germania. He finally banned offensives to Germania, had solid stone camps built on the Rhine and shifted the strategic focus to Britain . Domitian (emperor from 81 to 96 AD) attacked the Chatti, led a triumphal procession for the supposedly successful conquest of Germania and took the name Germanicus . In the end, however, he pushed ahead with the construction of the Limes and moved troops to the more important Danube border. “Tam diu Germania vincitur” (“We have been victorious over Germania for so long”) mocks Tacitus in his Germania at the emperors who pretended conquests and victories.

Reception and research history

The preoccupation with the Roman heritage is documented as early as the Middle Ages, but was mostly limited to mystification and "pronounced fables". Otto von Freising's investigations in the middle of the 12th century were an exception . The preoccupation with the Roman-Germanic past received a powerful impetus from the discovery of the writing Germania des Tacitus in 1455 and the annals in 1507. The Renaissance era in Germany received a Germanic note. The history of the Germans seemed equal to or even superior to the Roman history - Tacitus was a Roman of all people. The scholars tried to identify the sites described in the annals and received impulses from the Tabula Peutingeriana , the medieval copy of a Roman map of the world. The enthusiasm for localizing the Varus defeat and other battles remained unbroken through the centuries. Local patriotic attempts to locate the site continue to this day and have produced an abundance of literature, some of which are of a pseudo-scientific nature.

The Arminius reception is a special focus . The Germanization of "Arminius" to "Herrmann" ( Heer-Mann , dux belli ) by Luther proved to be powerful. Political instrumentalizations of the freedom hero followed. During the struggle against Napoleonic France, the Arminius enthusiasm was given a national tinge. After 1871, even scientists and intellectuals could not escape the mystification of the subject.

Limes hiking trail

The year 1945 marked a break in Germanic research, which was to lead to a "painful process of dissolving deeply rooted ideas". A turning point was the appearance of Dieter Timpe's Arminius studies in 1970. Timpe countered the old-rooted ideas of a Germanic popular uprising with the mutiny of Germanic auxiliary units under the leadership of a Roman knight. Partly violent reactions were the result. Even if the reduction of the Varus uprising to a military revolt does not go far enough - tribal resolutions in support of the uprising were certainly available - the Arminius studies ushered in a “new phase of relevant employment”. The careful interpretation of the sources by Timpe and the level of argumentation formed a basis for further academic research.

The general public was gripped by interest in Roman-Germanic history and, in particular, in the Augustan German Wars. Since the 1960s, historical novels have also focused on the actors below the level of the main characters. Limes hiking trails, museums and open-air facilities have made the Roman-Germanic past accessible to a wide audience. A flood of documentaries, in which fictional scenes alternate with expert statements, do the rest. Today the Arminius period is one of the most popular ancient historical topics in Germany.

swell

Source edition

  • Hans-Werner Goetz , Karl-Wilhelm Welwei : Old Germania. Excerpts from ancient sources about the Germanic peoples and their relationship to the Roman Empire. Part 2 (= selected sources on the German history of the Middle Ages. Volume 1a), Darmstadt 1995.
  • Erich Heller: Tacitus Annals. Translated and explained by Erich Heller (1982). Monolingual edition Munich 1991.
  • Dieter Kestermann (ed.): Collection of sources for the Varus defeat. All ancient texts on battle, in Latin, Greek, German. Horn 1992, ISBN 3-88080-063-4 .
  • Rudolf Much : The Germania of Tacitus. 3rd, considerable exp. Ed., Heidelberg 1967.
  • Lutz Walther (Ed.): Varus, Varus! Ancient texts on the battle in the Teutoburg Forest. Latin-Greek-German. Reclam, Stuttgart 2008. ISBN 978-3-15-018587-2 .

Drusus campaigns

immense bellum

  • Cassius Dio, Historia Romana book 55,10a; 28
  • Suetonius, Divus Tiberius 16.1
  • Velleius Paterculus, Historia Romana 2,104-107

Varus battle

  • Cassius Dio: Historia Romana book 56,18,1-56,24,5.
  • Florus, Epitoma de Tito Livio bellorum omnium annorum DCC libri duo 2.30, 29-39.
  • Frontin , stratagems 2,9,4; 3,15,4; 4.7.8
  • Manilius , Astronomica 1,896-903.
  • Seneca, Epistulae 47.10
  • Suetonius, Divus Augustus 23
  • Suetonius, Divus Tiberius 17.1.
  • Tacitus, Annales Book 1.60.3 to 62.1.
  • Velleius Paterculus, Historia Romana 2,117-119.

Germanicus campaigns

  • Cassius Dio, Historia Romana book 54,33,3-4; Book 56.18; 24.6; 25.2-3; Book 57,6,1; 18.1
  • Ovid, Tristia 3, 12, 45-48; 4,2,1-2; 37-46
  • Strabon, Geographica 7,1,3-4
  • Suetonius, Gaius 3.2
  • Suetonius, Divus Tiberius 18-20
  • Tabula Siarensis , Fragment I , lines 12-15
  • Tacitus, Annales Book 1,3,5-6; 31; 49-51; 55-72; Book 2.5-26; 41; 88.2; Book 13,55,1
  • Velleius Paterculus, Historia Romana 2,120-121; 122.2

literature

Monographs

  • Armin Becker : Rome and the chat. Darmstadt 1992.
  • Boris Dreyer : Arminius and the fall of the Varus. Why the Teutons did not become Romans. Stuttgart 2009.
  • Klaus-Peter Johne : The Romans on the Elbe. The Elbe river basin in the geographical view of the world and in the political consciousness of Greco-Roman antiquity. Berlin 2006.
  • Marcus Junkelmann : The Legions of Augustus. Revised edition Munich 2015.
  • Gustav Adolf Lehmann : Imperium and Barbaricum. New findings and insights into the Roman-Germanic disputes in north-west Germany - from the Augustan occupation phase to the Germanic procession of Maximinus Thrax (235 AD) . Vienna 2011.
  • Klaus Tausend : Inside Germania. Relations between the Germanic tribes from the 1st century BC BC to the 2nd century AD (= Geographica Historica. Volume 25). Stuttgart 2009.
  • Dieter Timpe : The triumph of Germanicus. Investigations into the campaigns of 14-16 AD in Germania. Bonn 1968.
  • Dieter Timpe: Arminius studies. Heidelberg 1970.
  • Reinhard Wolters : Roman conquest and rulership organization in Gaul and Germania. On the origin and significance of the so-called clientele-fringe states . Bochum 1990.
  • Reinhard Wolters: The battle in the Teutoburg Forest. Arminius, Varus and Roman Germania. 1st, revised, updated and expanded edition. CH Beck, Munich 2017, ISBN 978-3-406-69995-5 (original edition: Munich 2008; 2nd revised edition: Munich 2009).
  • Reinhard Wolters: The Romans in Germania. 6th revised and updated edition. Munich 2011.

Articles and lexicon contributions

  • Heinrich Beck et al. (Ed.): Germanen, Germania, Germanic antiquity (= RGA, study edition Die Germanen ). Berlin 1998.
  • Jürgen Deininger : Germaniam pacare. To the more recent discussion about the strategy of Augustus against Germania. In: Chiron . Volume 30, 2000, pp. 749-773.
  • Klaus Grote : The Roman military installations of the August German campaigns and references to later advances in the Werra-Leine-Bergland around Hedemünden. In: Gustav Adolf Lehmann, Rainer Wiegels (ed.): "Over the Alps and over the Rhine ...". Contributions to the beginnings and the course of the Roman expansion into Central Europe. Berlin 2015, pp. 191–224.
  • Peter Kehne : Limited offensives. Drusus, Tiberius and the policy of Germania in the service of the Augustan principate. In: Jörg Spielvogel (Ed.): Res publica reperta. On the Constitution and Society of the Roman Republic and the Early Principate. Festschrift for Jochen Bleicken on his 75th birthday. Stuttgart 2002, pp. 297-321.
  • Peter Kehne: On the strategy and logistics of Roman advances into Germania: The Tiberius campaigns of the years 4 and 5 AD. In: Johann-Sebastian Kühlborn et al. (Ed.): Rome on the way to Germania. Geostrategy, roads of advance and logistics. International colloquium in Delbrück-Anreppen from November 4th to 6th, 2004 (= Soil antiquities of Westphalia. Volume 45). Mainz 2008, pp. 253-302.
  • Gustav Adolf Lehmann : Hedemünden and the ancient historical background. The era of the Drusus campaigns. In: Klaus Grote , Gustav Adolf Lehmann (ed.): Römerlager Hedemünden. The Augustan base, its outdoor facilities, its finds and findings (= publications of the archaeological collections of the Landesmuseum Hannover. Volume 53). Dresden 2012, pp. 280–299.
  • Dieter Timpe: Drusus' reversal on the Elbe. In: Rheinisches Museum für Philologie (RhMus). Volume 110, 1967, pp. 289-306.
  • Dieter Timpe: Roman geostrategy in Germania during the occupation period. In: Johann-Sebastian Kühlborn et al. (Ed.): Rome on the way to Germania. Geostrategy, roads of advance and logistics. International colloquium in Delbrück-Anreppen from November 4th - 6th, 2004 (= Soil antiquities of Westphalia 45). Mainz 2008, pp. 199-236.
  • Dieter Timpe: The “Varus Battle” in its contexts. A critical review of the 2009 Bimillennium. In: Historische Zeitschrift. Volume 294, 2012, pp. 593-652.
  • Konrad Vössing et al. (Ed.): The Teutons and the Roman Empire. Historical-archaeological lexicon (= The New Pauly , Supplements 14). Stuttgart 2017.

Anthologies

  • Rudolf Aßkamp, ​​Kai Jansen (ed.): Triumph without victory. Rome's end in Germania. Zabern, Darmstadt 2017.
  • Ernst Baltrusch , Morten Hegewisch et al. (Ed.): 2000 Years of the Varus Battle. History - Archeology - Legends (= Topoi. Berlin Studies of the Ancient World 7). Berlin / Boston 2012.
  • Bruno Krüger (ed.): The Germanic peoples. Volume 1. Berlin 1978.
  • Johann-Sebastian Kühlborn et al. (Ed.): Rome on the way to Germania. Geostrategy, roads of advance and logistics. International colloquium in Delbrück-Anreppen from November 4th - 6th, 2004 (= Soil antiquities of Westphalia 45). Mainz 2008.
  • Gustav Adolf Lehmann , Rainer Wiegels (eds.): "Over the Alps and over the Rhine ...". Contributions to the beginnings and the course of the Roman expansion into Central Europe. Berlin 2015.
  • Wolfgang Schlueter , Rainer Wiegels (eds.): Rome, Germania and the excavations of Kalkriese. Osnabrück 1999.
  • Dieter Timpe: Roman-Germanic encounter in the late republic and early imperial era: requirements - confrontations - effects. Collected Studies (Contributions to Antiquity, Volume 233). Munich 2006.
  • Michael Cell (Ed.): Terra incognita? The northern low mountain range in the field of tension between Roman and Germanic politics around the birth of Christ. Mainz 2008.

Literature until 1945

  • Otto Dahm : The campaigns of Germanicus in Germany. In: West German Journal for History and Art, Supplement XI. Trier 1902.
  • Hans Delbrück : History of the art of war in the context of political history. Part 2: The Teutons. Berlin 1902.
  • Paul Höfer : The campaign of Germanicus in 16 AD Bernburg 1884.
  • Gerhard Kessler: The tradition about Germanicus. Dissertation, Franz Rosenthal, Berlin 1905 ( online ).
  • Friedrich Knoke : The war campaigns of Germanicus in Germany. Berlin, 2nd, redesigned several times. Edition 1922.
  • Theodor Mommsen : Roman history. Volume V, The Provinces from Caesar to Diocletian. Berlin, 9th edition, 1929.

Remarks

  1. ↑ Tacitus, Annales 2,88,2.
  2. ↑ Livy, periochae 139–142.
  3. ↑ Dieter Timpe: Roman geostrategy in Germania of the occupation time. In: Johann-Sebastian Kühlborn et al. (Ed.): Rome on the way to Germania. Geostrategy, roads of advance and logistics. International colloquium in Delbrück-Anreppen from November 4th to 6th, 2004 (= Soil antiquities of Westphalia. Volume 45). Mainz 2008, pp. 199–236, here p. 208.
  4. ↑ Some researchers name six legions, e.g. B. Gustav Adolf Lehmann: Hedemünden and the ancient historical background. The era of the Drusus campaigns. In: Klaus Grote, Ders. (Ed.): Römerlager Hedemünden. The Augustan base, its outdoor facilities, its finds and findings (= publications of the archaeological collections of the Landesmuseum Hannover. Volume 53). Dresden 2012, 280–299, here p. 282.
  5. ↑ Reinhard Wolters: "Tam diu Germania vincitur". Roman German victories and German victory propaganda up to the end of the 1st century AD (= small notebooks of the coin collection at the Ruhr University in Bochum. No. 10/11). Bochum 1989, p. 33.
  6. ^ Cassius Dio, Historia Romana 55,1,3. Translation after Hans-Werner Goetz, Karl-Wilhelm Welwei: Old Germania. Excerpts from the ancient sources about the Germanic peoples and their relations to the Roman Empire, part 2 (= selected sources on the German history of the Middle Ages. Volume 1a). Darmstadt 1995, p. 23.
  7. ^ Livius, Periochae 142. Translation by Hans-Werner Goetz, Karl-Wilhelm Welwei: Altes Germanien. Excerpts from the ancient sources about the Germanic peoples and their relations to the Roman Empire, part 2 (= selected sources on the German history of the Middle Ages. Volume 1a). Darmstadt 1995, p. 35.
  8. ^ Suetonius, divus Tiberius 9.2.
  9. ^ Peter Moeller:  Drusus (maior). In: Reallexikon der Germanischen Altertumskunde (RGA). 2nd Edition. Volume 6, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin / New York 1986, ISBN 3-11-010468-7 , pp. 204–215, here p. 212.
  10. ^ Dieter Timpe: History. In: Heinrich Beck et al. (Hrsg.): Germanen, Germania, Germanische Altertumskunde (= RGA, study edition "Die Germanen" ). Berlin 1998, pp. 2–65, here p. 37.
  11. ↑ Velleius Paterculus, Historia Romana 2,104,2.
  12. ↑ Velleius Paterculus, Historia Romana 2,104,2. Translation after Hans-Werner Goetz, Karl-Wilhelm Welwei: Old Germania. Excerpts from the ancient sources about the Teutons and their relationship to the Roman Empire, part 2. Darmstadt 1995, p. 39.
  13. ↑ Klaus-Peter Johne: The Romans on the Elbe. The Elbe river basin in the geographical view of the world and in the political consciousness of Greco-Roman antiquity. Berlin 2006, p. 141.
  14. ↑ Critical to this, however, Torsten Mattern: Regional differentiations in the Augustan German campaigns. In: Kai Ruffing, Armin Becker, Gabriele Rasbach (eds.): Kontaktzone Lahn. Studies on cultural contact between Romans and Germanic tribes. Wiesbaden 2010, pp. 67–77, here p. 71.
  15. ↑ General on the question of the planned and achieved degree of provincialization of Germania by the Romans Reinhard Wolters: The battle in the Teutoburg Forest. Arminius, Varus and Roman Germania. 2nd revised edition. Munich 2009, pp. 71-75.
  16. ↑ Boris Dreyer: Places of the Varus catastrophe and the Roman occupation in Germania . Darmstadt 2014, p. 18. Cassius Dio reports that Varus endeavored to “completely transform the Germanic peoples more quickly; he generally gave them orders as if they were already in bondage, and collected tributes from them (...); then they could no longer bear this treatment ”. (Cassius Dio, 56,18,3–4. Translation after Hans-Werner Goetz, Karl-Wilhelm Welwei: Altes Germanien. Excerpts from the ancient sources about the Germanic peoples and their relations to the Roman Empire, part 2. Darmstadt 1995, p. 55.).
  17. ↑ Also "Battle in the Teutoburg Forest" or "Hermannsschlacht", referred to by Roman writers as clades Variana ("Varus defeat").
  18. ↑ Cassius Dio, Historia Romana 56,18,5; 56,19,3; Velleius Paterculus, Historia Romana 2,118,4.
  19. ↑ Cassius Dio, Historia Romana 56,18,5.
  20. ↑ Wolfgang Schlueter: The Varus Battle. Archaeological research in Kalkriese near Osnabrück. In: Detlev Hopp, Charlotte Trümpler (ed.): The early Roman Empire in the Ruhr area. Colloquium of the Ruhrland Museum and the city archeology / monument authority in cooperation with the University of Essen. Essen 2001, pp. 17–24, here p. 17.
  21. ↑ Reinhard Wolters: The battle in the Teutoburg Forest. Arminius, Varus and Roman Germania. Munich, 2nd complete Edition 2009, p. 129.
  22. ↑ Reinhard Wolters: Revenge, claim and renunciation. The Roman politics of Germania after the Varus catastrophe. In: LWL-Römermuseum in Haltern am See (ed.): 2000 years Varus battle: Imperium . Stuttgart 2009, pp. 210–216, here p. 211.
  23. ^ Corinna Scheungraber, Friedrich E. Grünzweig: The old Germanic toponyms and un-Germanic toponyms of Germania. A guide to their etymology . Philologica Germanica 34, Vienna 2014, pp. 191–193.
  24. ^ A b Gustav Adolf Lehmann: Imperium and Barbaricum. New findings and insights into the Roman-Germanic disputes in north-west Germany - from the Augustan occupation phase to the Germanic procession of Maximinus Thrax (235 AD) . Vienna 2011, p. 31. Reinhard Wolters: The battle in the Teutoburg Forest. Arminius, Varus and Roman Germania. 1st, revised, updated and expanded edition. Munich 2017, p. 37.
  25. ↑ Cassius Dio Historia Romana 53,19,2.
  26. ↑ Jürgen Deininger: Germaniam pacare. To the more recent discussion about the strategy of Augustus against Germania. In: Chiron . Volume 30, 2000, pp. 749-773, here pp. 758-763.
  27. ↑ Cf. Dieter Timpe: On the history and tradition of the occupation of Germania under Augustus. In: Saeculum 18, 1967, pp. 278-293. Critical to this: Boris Dreyer: Arminius and the fall of the Varus. Why the Teutons did not become Romans. Stuttgart 2009, p. 79f.
  28. ↑ Reinhard Wolters: The battle in the Teutoburg Forest. Arminius, Varus and Roman Germania. Munich, 2nd complete Edition 2009, p. 49.
  29. ↑ Klaus-Peter Johne: The Romans on the Elbe. The Elbe river basin in the geographical view of the world and in the political consciousness of Greco-Roman antiquity. Berlin 2006, pp. 109-113.
  30. ↑ A detailed overview of domestic and power politics as well as personal motives in Boris Dreyer: Arminius and the downfall of the Varus. Why the Teutons did not become Romans. Stuttgart 2009, pp. 35-68.
  31. ↑ Reinhard Wolters: The battle in the Teutoburg Forest. Arminius, Varus and Roman Germania. 2nd revised edition. Munich 2009, p. 52. Fundamental to the subject: Peter Kehne: Limited offensives. Drusus, Tiberius and the policy of Germania in the service of the Augustan principate. In: Jörg Spielvogel (Ed.): Res publica reperta. On the Constitution and Society of the Roman Republic and the Early Principate. Festschrift for Jochen Bleicken on his 75th birthday. Stuttgart 2002, pp. 297-321.
  32. ↑ See Jürgen Deininger: Germaniam pacare. To the more recent discussion about the strategy of Augustus against Germania. In: Chiron. Volume 30, 2000, pp. 749-773, here p. 771.
  33. ↑ Jochen Bleicken: Augustus. A biography. Berlin 1998, p. 569.
  34. ↑ Reinhard Wolters: The battle in the Teutoburg Forest. Arminius, Varus and Roman Germania. Munich, 2nd complete Edition 2009, p. 52.
  35. ↑ Peter Kehne: Limited offensives. Drusus, Tiberius and the policy of Germania in the service of the Augustan principate. In: Jörg Spielvogel (Ed.): Res publica reperta. On the Constitution and Society of the Roman Republic and the Early Principate. Festschrift for Jochen Bleicken on his 75th birthday. Stuttgart 2002, pp. 297-321, here p. 318.
  36. ↑ Klaus-Peter Johne: The Romans on the Elbe. The Elbe river basin in the geographical view of the world and in the political consciousness of Greco-Roman antiquity. Berlin 2006, p. 184.
  37. ^ Armin Becker: Rome and the chat. Darmstadt 1992, p. 187.
  38. ↑ Peter Kehne: Literature report - On the logistics of the Roman army from the middle republic to the end of the high imperial era (241 BC - 235 AD): Research and tendencies. In: Militargeschichtliche Zeitschrift 2004, issue 1, pp. 115–152, here p. 273.
  39. ↑ Marcus Junkelmann: The Legions of Augustus. Revised edition Munich 2015, p. 140.
  40. ↑ Peter Kehne: Literature report - On the logistics of the Roman army from the middle republic to the end of the high imperial era (241 BC - 235 AD): Research and tendencies. In: Militargeschichtliche Zeitschrift 2004, Issue 1, pp. 115–152, here p. 272.
  41. ↑ a b Peter Kehne: Literature report - On the logistics of the Roman army from the middle republic to the end of the high imperial period (241 BC - 235 AD): Research and tendencies. In: Militargeschichtliche Zeitschrift 2004, Issue 1, pp. 115–152, here p. 276.
  42. ↑ Tacitus, Annales 1,49,4.
  43. ↑ Tacitus, Annales 2,16,3.
  44. ↑ Tacitus, Annales 2,25,1.
  45. ^ Friedrich Knoke: The campaigns of Germanicus in Germany. Berlin, 2nd, redesigned several times. Edition 1922, p. 368.
  46. ^ Paul Höfer: The campaign of Germanicus in the year 16 AD. 2nd edition Bernburg 1885, p. 68.
  47. ↑ Otto Dahm: The campaigns of Germanicus in Germany. In: West German Journal for History and Art, Supplement XI. Trier 1902, p. 98.
  48. ↑ Hans Delbrück: History of the art of war in the context of political history. Part 2: The Teutons. 3rd, newly worked through and completed edition, Berlin 1921., p. 123.
  49. ↑ Wolfgang Jungandreas: The Angrivarian Wall. In: Journal for German Antiquity and German Literature, Volume 81, Issue 1/2 (1944), pp. 1–22., Here p. 14.
  50. ↑ Klaus-Peter Johne: The Romans on the Elbe. The Elbe river basin in the geographical view of the world and in the political consciousness of Greco-Roman antiquity. Berlin 2006, p. 189.
  51. ^ Peter Moeller: Drusus (maior). In: Reallexikon der Germanischen Altertumskunde (RGA). 2nd edition, Volume 6, 1986, pp. 204-215, here p. 212; see also Heiko Steuer: landscape organization, settlement network and village structure in Germania in the decades around the birth of Christ. In: Gustav Adolf Lehmann, Rainer Wiegels (ed.): "Over the Alps and over the Rhine ...". Contributions to the beginnings and the course of the Roman expansion into Central Europe. Berlin 2015, pp. 339–374, here p. 339.
  52. ↑ Armin Becker: Germanicus and the chats. Waldgirmes and the campaign 15 AD In: Commission for Archaeological Research in Hessen (Hrsg.): Chattenland. Research on the Iron Age in Hesse. Dedicated to Otto-Herman Frey on the occasion of his 80th birthday (= reports of the Commission for State Archaeological Research in Hesse. Volume 10, 2008/09). Rahden 2010, pp. 47–56, here p. 52.
  53. ^ Stefan Burmeister: Rise of Germanic warlords. Interaction between Germanic warfare and Roman military policy. In: Varus Battle in Osnabr. Land GmbH (Ed.): 2000 years of the Varus Battle: Conflict Stuttgart 2009, pp. 392–403, here p. 396.
  54. ↑ Reinhard Wolters: External Images. The Germanic warrior from the point of view of ancient authors. In: Varus Battle in Osnabr. Land GmbH (Hrsg.): 2000 years Varus battle: conflict. Stuttgart 2009, pp. 83-88, here p. 85.
  55. ^ Heiko Steuer: Landscape organization, settlement network and village structure in Germania in the decades around the birth of Christ. In: Gustav Adolf Lehmann, Rainer Wiegels (ed.): "Over the Alps and over the Rhine ...". Contributions to the beginnings and the course of the Roman expansion into Central Europe. Berlin 2015, pp. 339–374, here pp. 340 and 365.
  56. ↑ Caesar, De bello Gallico 6,10,4 f.
  57. ↑ Strabo, Geographica 7,1,4.
  58. ↑ Tacitus, Annales 2,5,3.
  59. ^ Johann Sebastian Kühlborn: Between securing power and integration. The testimonies of archeology. In: Rainer Wiegels (Ed.): The Varus Battle. Turning point in history? Stuttgart 2007, pp. 65–94, here p. 78.
  60. ^ Heiko Steuer: Landscape organization, settlement network and village structure in Germania in the decades around the birth of Christ. In: Gustav Adolf Lehmann, Rainer Wiegels (ed.): "Over the Alps and over the Rhine ...". Contributions to the beginnings and the course of the Roman expansion into Central Europe. Berlin 2015, pp. 339–374, here p. 366.
  61. ↑ Helmut Jäger: The natural geographic conditions in the area of ​​Germania during the Tacite period. In: Günter Neumann, Henning Seemann (eds.): Contributions to the understanding of the Germania of Tacitus, Part II (= treatises of the Akad. D. Wiss. Zu Göttingen, Phil.-Hist Klasse, volume 3, 195). Göttingen 1992, pp. 124–152, here p. 143.
  62. ↑ Tacitus, Annales 1,56,2.
  63. ↑ Peter Kehne: Literature report - On the logistics of the Roman army from the middle republic to the end of the high imperial period (241 BC-235 AD): Research and tendencies. In: Militargeschichtliche Zeitschrift 2004, Issue 1, pp. 115–152, here pp. 270f.
  64. ↑ According to Polybios (Polyb. 6,39,13; SB III, 6,967; 9,248) and Papyrus Oxyrhynchus IV, 735, Christoph Schäfer estimates the food needs of a legion without auxiliaries (6,000 men) to be 4.2 tons per day or 126 tons per day Month (Christoph Schäfer: Old and new ways. The opening up of Germania for Roman logistics. In: LWL-Römermuseum in Haltern am See (Ed.): 2000 years of Varus Battle - Imperium. Stuttgart 2009, pp. 203-209, here p. 206). Peter Kehne assumes just under one kilogram per man per day. (Peter Kehne: Literature Report - On the Logistics of the Roman Army from the Middle Republic to the End of the High Imperial Era (241 BC-235 AD): Research and Trends. In: Militargeschichtliche Zeitschrift 2004, Issue 1, p. 115–152, here p. 274).
  65. ↑ Peter Kehne: Literature report - On the logistics of the Roman army from the middle republic to the end of the high imperial period (241 BC-235 AD): Research and tendencies. In: Militargeschichtliche Zeitschrift 2004, issue 1, pp. 115–152, here p. 274.
  66. ^ Gustav Adolf Lehmann: Hedemünden and the ancient historical background. The era of the Drusus campaigns. In: Klaus Grote, Ders., (Ed.): Römerlager Hedemünden. The Augustan base, its outdoor facilities, its finds and findings (= publications of the archaeological collections of the Landesmuseum Hannover. Volume 53). Dresden 2012, pp. 280–299, here p. 285.
  67. ↑ cf. Gustav Adolf Lehmann: Hedemünden and the ancient historical background. The era of the Drusus campaigns. In: Klaus Grote, Ders., (Ed.): Römerlager Hedemünden. The Augustan base, its outdoor facilities, its finds and findings (= publications of the archaeological collections of the Landesmuseum Hannover. Volume 53). Dresden 2012, pp. 280–299, here p. 291.
  68. ↑ Reinhard Wolters: The battle in the Teutoburg Forest. Arminius, Varus and Roman Germania. Munich, 2nd complete Edition 2009, p. 42.
  69. ↑ Christoph Schäfer: Old and new ways. The opening up of Germania for Roman logistics. In: LWL-Römermuseum in Haltern am See (ed.): 2000 years of the Varus Battle - Imperium. Stuttgart 2009, pp. 203–209, here p. 207. Fundamental to Roman supply in Germania Peter Kehne: Literature report - On the logistics of the Roman army from the Middle Republic to the end of the High Imperial Era (241 BC-235 AD. Chr.): Researches and Trends. In: Militargeschichtliche Zeitschrift 2004, Issue 1, pp. 115–152.
  70. ↑ Christoph Schäfer: Old and new ways. The opening up of Germania for Roman logistics. In: LWL-Römermuseum in Haltern am See (ed.): 2000 years of the Varus Battle - Imperium. Stuttgart 2009, pp. 203-209, here p. 206.
  71. ↑ Tacitus, Annales 2.5.
  72. ↑ Tacitus, Annales 1.59; 2.15.
  73. ↑ Dieter Timpe: The Triumph of Germanicus. Investigations into the campaigns of 14-16 AD in Germania. Bonn 1968., p. 4.
  74. ^ Stefan Burmeister: Rise of Germanic warlords. Interaction between Germanic warfare and Roman military policy. In: Varus Battle in Osnabr. Land GmbH (Ed.): 2000 years of the Varus Battle: Conflict Stuttgart 2009, pp. 392–403, here p. 394.
  75. ↑ Klaus Tausend: Inside Germania. Relations between the Germanic tribes from the 1st century BC BC to the 2nd century AD (= Geographica Historica. Volume 25). Stuttgart 2009, p. 88.
  76. ↑ Klaus Tausend: Inside Germania. Relations between the Germanic tribes from the 1st century BC BC to the 2nd century AD (= Geographica Historica. Volume 25). Stuttgart 2009, p. 79.
  77. ↑ Tacitus, Annales 1,59,4-6; 2,15,3; 2.88.
  78. ↑ Tacitus, Annales 2,9,3, translation Hans-Werner Goetz, Karl-Wilhelm Welwei: Altes Germanien. Excerpts from the ancient sources about the Germanic peoples and their relations to the Roman Empire, part 2 (= selected sources on the German history of the Middle Ages. Volume 1a). Darmstadt 1995, p. 101.
  79. ↑ a b Tacitus, Annales 1,59,6.
  80. ↑ Tacitus, Annales 1,59,5.
  81. ↑ Tacitus, Annales 1,59,4.
  82. ↑ Tacitus, Annales 2,10,1, translation Erich Heller: Tacitus Annalen. Translated and explained by Erich Heller (1982). Monolingual edition Munich 1991, p. 87.
  83. ↑ M. Springer: Warfare, II. Historical. In: Reallexikon der Germanischen Altertumskunde (RGA). 2nd edition, Volume 17, 2000, pp. 336-343, here p. 337.
  84. ↑ Cassius Dio Historia Romana 56,21,4.
  85. ↑ Cassius Dio Historia Romana 56,22,3.
  86. ↑ Tacitus, Annales 1,65,6.
  87. ↑ Tacitus, Annales 2,24,3.
  88. ↑ Tacitus, Annales 12,27,3.
  89. ↑ Michael Meyer: hostium aviditas. Booty as a motivation for Germanic warfare. In: Ernst Baltrusch, Morten Hegewisch et al. (Ed.): 2000 Years of the Varus Battle. History - Archeology - Legends (= Topoi. Berlin Studies of the Ancient World 7). Berlin / Boston 2012, pp. 151–161, p. 158.
  90. ↑ Günter Stangl: Population sizes of Germanic tribes in the 1st century AD In: Klaus Tausend: Inside Germaniens. Relations between the Germanic tribes from the 1st century BC BC to the 2nd century AD (= Geographica Historica. Volume 25). Stuttgart 2009, pp. 227-253, here p. 230.
  91. ↑ Hans Delbrück: History of the art of war in the context of political history. Part 2: The Teutons. 3rd, newly worked through and completed edition, Berlin 1921, p. 14.
  92. ^ Heiko Steuer: Troop strengths. In: Reallexikon der Germanischen Altertumskunde (RGA). 2nd edition, Volume 29, 2005, pp. 274-283., Here p. 277.
  93. ↑ Information according to Günter Stangl: Population sizes of Germanic tribes in the 1st century AD In: Klaus Tausend: Inside Germaniens. Relations between the Germanic tribes from the 1st century BC BC to the 2nd century AD (= Geographica Historica. Volume 25). Stuttgart 2009, pp. 227-253, here p. 236 f.
  94. ↑ The Ampsivarians are likely to have been allies of Rome (cf. Tacitus, Annalen 13,55,1), but they are possibly to be equated with the tribe of the "Ampsans" mentioned by Strabo (Strabo, Geographica 7,1,4). From this prisoners were carried along on the triumphal procession of Germanicus (17 AD), which speaks for the opposition of the tribe during the Germanicus campaigns.
  95. ↑ cf. Reinhard Wolters: The battle in the Teutoburg Forest. Arminius, Varus and Roman Germania. Munich, updated edition 2017, p. 122.
  96. ↑ a b c d e cf. Klaus-Peter Johne: The Romans on the Elbe. The Elbe river basin in the geographical view of the world and in the political consciousness of Greco-Roman antiquity. Berlin 2006, p. 137.
  97. ↑ a b Due to corrupt tradition, it is uncertain whether the Cananefats or the Chamavers were involved.
  98. ↑ Armin Becker: Germanicus and the chats. Waldgirmes and the campaign 15 AD In: Commission for Archaeological Research in Hessen (Hrsg.): Chattenland. Research on the Iron Age in Hesse. Dedicated to Otto-Herman Frey on the occasion of his 80th birthday (= reports of the Commission for State Archaeological Research in Hesse. Volume 10, 2008/09). Rahden 2010, pp. 47–56, here p. 51 f.
  99. ↑ a b c d after Strabon, Geographica 7,1,4.
  100. ↑ a b c Possibly the landers and marsers are different names for those after 8 BC. Remains of the Sugambres remaining on the right bank of the Rhine. Cf. Klaus-Peter Johne: The Romans on the Elbe. The Elbe river basin in the geographical view of the world and in the political consciousness of Greco-Roman antiquity. Berlin 2006 and Klaus Tausend: Inside Germania. Relations between the Germanic tribes from the 1st century BC BC to the 2nd century AD (= Geographica Historica. Volume 25). Stuttgart 2009, p. 26.
  101. ↑ Klaus-Peter Johne: The Romans on the Elbe. The Elbe river basin in the geographical view of the world and in the political consciousness of Greco-Roman antiquity. Berlin 2006, p. 100.
  102. ↑ Relocation of a large part of the tribe to the left bank of the Rhine by Tiberius 8 BC. Chr.
  103. ↑ Klaus Tausend: Inside Germania: Relations between the Germanic tribes from the 1st century BC. Until the 2nd century AD Stuttgart 2009, p. 21.
  104. ↑ Boris Dreyer: Arminius and the fall of the Varus. Why the Teutons did not become Romans. Stuttgart 2009, p. 190.
  105. ↑ Reinhard Wolters: The battle in the Teutoburg Forest. Arminius, Varus and Roman Germania. Munich, 2nd complete Edition 2009, p. 168.
  106. ↑ a b Peter Kehne: Germanicus. In: Reallexikon der Germanischen Altertumskunde (RGA). 2nd edition, Volume 11, 1998, pp. 438-448, here p. 444.
  107. ↑ Tacitus, Annales 2,26,3.
  108. ↑ Boris Dreyer: Arminius and the fall of the Varus. Why the Teutons did not become Romans. Stuttgart 2009, p. 189.
  109. ↑ Dieter Timpe: Roman geostrategy in Germania of the occupation time. In: Johann-Sebastian Kühlborn et al. (Ed.): Rome on the way to Germania. Geostrategy, roads of advance and logistics. International colloquium in Delbrück-Anreppen from November 4th to 6th, 2004 (= Soil antiquities of Westphalia 45). Mainz 2008, pp. 199–236, here p. 229.
  110. ↑ Jürgen Deininger: Flumen Albis. The Elbe in Ancient Politics and Literature (= reports from the meetings of the Joachim Jungius Society of Sciences, Vol. 15, 1997, Issue 4), Göttingen 1997, p. 37.
  111. ↑ Boris Dreyer: Arminius and the fall of the Varus. Why the Teutons did not become Romans. Stuttgart 2009, p. 187.
  112. ↑ Reinhard Wolters: The battle in the Teutoburg Forest. Arminius, Varus and Roman Germania. Munich, 2nd complete Edition 2009, p. 203. Detailed presentation by Boris Dreyer: Arminius and the downfall of the Varus. Why the Teutons did not become Romans. Stuttgart 2009, pp. 183-211
  113. ^ Tacitus, Germania 37, translation by Arno Mauersberger : Tacitus Germania. Bilingual edition (1942). Edition Cologne 2013, p. 113.
  114. ↑ Reinhard Wolters: The Romans in Germania. 6. through u. actual Edition Munich 2011, p. 111.
  115. ↑ Reinhard Wolters: The Romans in Germania. 6. through u. actual Edition Munich 2011, p. 112.
  116. ↑ Boris Dreyer: Arminius and the fall of the Varus. Why the Teutons did not become Romans. Stuttgart 2009, p. 243.
  117. ↑ Boris Dreyer: Places of the Varus catastrophe and the Roman occupation in Germania. The historical-archaeological guide. Darmstadt 2014, p. 104.
  118. ↑ a b Reinhard Wolters: The Romans in Germania. 6. through u. actual Edition Munich 2011, p. 116.
  119. ^ Dieter Timpe: Arminius studies. Heidelberg 1970.
  120. ↑ Boris Dreyer: Places of the Varus catastrophe and the Roman occupation in Germania. The historical-archaeological guide. Darmstadt 2014, p. 107.
  121. ↑ Boris Dreyer: Places of the Varus catastrophe and the Roman occupation in Germania. The historical-archaeological guide. Darmstadt 2014, p. 108.
  122. ↑ Boris Dreyer: Places of the Varus catastrophe and the Roman occupation in Germania. The historical-archaeological guide. Darmstadt 2014, p. 109.