Dikaiosyne
Dikaiosyne ( Δικαιοσύνη ) was considered in Greek mythology as the personification of " justice " or " righteousness ", but not of private individuals, but of the state or its government . She has also often been equated with Dike . This interpretation corresponds to their presentation in the Orphic hymns , which Dikaiosyne represent as an expression of state righteousness. At that time, however, these were not yet territorial states, but city-states. In Roman mythology , it corresponds to Justice .
Dikaiosyne as a legal term
In the Orphic hymns, Dikaiosyne is the third historically developed legal term after Nemesis [= assignments] and Dike [= jurisdiction ] but before Nomos [= law ] . In the 64th hymn of " Orpheus ", "The Dikaiosyne", it says of her:
In the context of the context, the “Wetterwendische” mean the same ones that are referred to in the hymn “Der Dike” as “those who want more”. Since the state law is still related to city-states and essentially regulates the market law (see the list of human foods: "Fruits of the field", "living beings" of the "earth" and the "salt flood" that live on the Market), so those are meant who only want to use the state to cover their fraud with wrong measures and weights and for this purpose change the weights and measures as appropriate (depending on whether they buy or sell) to theirs Advantage is. The punishment for them is evidently flagellation and loss of their position (their market place?) Or their reputation (" denouncing "). The designation of the Dikaiosyne as “party lovers” means that the regulation of religious festivals was also part of the state law.
Origin and meaning of state law among the Greeks
The importance of state law and its emergence at a relatively early time is also evident from Plato's dialogue Protagoras :
- “Equipped in this way, people initially lived scattered, because cities did not exist < yet >. Therefore they were exterminated by the wild animals, because they were weaker than these in every respect, and the manufacturing arts were indeed " a " sufficient aid for nourishment, but ineffective for the war against the animals; for civic art - of which martial art is a part - they did not yet have. So they tried to collect himself and by < the rescue> Construction of the cities. But when they had gathered together, they insulted one another because they did not yet have the civic art, so that they were soon wiped out again - again dispersing. So Zeus - worried for our race that it might not go under - sent Hermes to bring shame "[= Aidos]" and justice "[= Dike]" to the people so that these mediators had bonds of affection and Orders of the cities would. Hermes then asked Zeus how he should give people shame and justice:
- Should I also distribute these as the other arts are distributed? Those are distributed as follows: One who has the art of healing is enough for many ignorant people, and so <it is < with > the other artists. Should I now also distribute shame and justice among people or should I distribute them among everyone?
- Among all, - said Zeus - and all should have a part in it, because even if only a few had a part in this - as in other arts -, no states could exist. And give < them > on my part also a law that he who is incapable of appropriating shame and justice is killed like evil damage to the state. "
Regarding the last sentence in the above quotation, compare Aristotle in the first book of his "Politeia":
- “Those who, by their nature and not just by chance, live outside < the community > of the state are either bad (for example, Homer insulted“ without sex, without law and without hearth ”, because they are by nature such < bad person > and at the same time greedy for war, since he - as they say in the board game - is unconnected) or higher than the human being. "
A little later he explains in more detail:
- "But whoever cannot live in community or does not need it in his self-sufficiency is not part of the state, but a wild animal or God."
The equivalent in Rousseau
The necessity and the meaning of the treatment of outsiders who refuse to fit into the state community, demanded by Protagoras from Zeus, is most clearly dealt with by Rousseau in the first book of his " Social Contract ":
- "In fact, every person as an individual can have a special will that runs counter to or differs from the common will - which he has as a citizen:
- His special interest can tell him < something > quite different from the common interest,
- His independent and naturally independent existence can make him regard what he owes to the common cause as a useless tax, the loss of which harms others less than it burdens him to provide,
- and he could even claim his rights as a citizen without wanting to fulfill the duties of a subject, since he regards the moral person represented by the state as a < pure > thought because he is not a human being,
- an injustice the spread of which would cause the downfall of the political body. "
The people as the whole of the individuals are sovereign and their will becomes the law in the social contract that applies to each individual but can be revoked and changed by the whole at any time. This act of the people creates the order of society [the constitution], which makes it a state or community, and to which the individual is subject as a subject. The people in their entirety exercises power, which is expressed in the legislation (legislature), whereby the individual acts as a citizen. According to Rousseau, the government is merely the executive organ of the will of the people, i.e. the highest organ of administration. The function of the subject is therefore only valid for the individual in relation to the social order of the state or community [the constitution] established by the collective will of the people until revoked, but impossible in relation to the government. Only when there has been such a social contract on the basis of the free decision of each individual can one speak of “civilization” and a “constitutional state” and only when this condition exists can the state or the community demand obedience from the individual, otherwise everyone is his own master and, as in natural law, decides himself as sovereign.
Rousseau then continues at the quoted passage:
- "But that the social contract now is not a hollow phrase, it closes implied that agreement < with > one, the only other < conventions > authorized that whoever < and > always refuses to follow the general will, forced by the entire body to becomes, …".
And in the second book he elaborates:
- “Besides, every wrongdoer who attacks social law becomes a rebel and a traitor to < his > fatherland through his iniquity ; by violating its laws, he ceases to be his member, yes, he is even at war with him. Now the preservation of the state is incompatible with its preservation, one of the two must succumb, and if one kills the guilty it is less as a citizen than as an enemy ”.
The limitation in Aristotle
The abuse of this definition is arguably as old as she is and did not stop at such great people as Socrates. However, in the above quotations from Aristotle - as far as the assessment of outsiders in the state is concerned - a restriction is made which was also not mentioned in the quotation from Plato's "Protagoras" (but not made by Rousseau) and in the third Book of "Politeia" by Aristotle is explained in more detail:
- “If one or more individuals - but they cannot make up a whole state for themselves - are so distinguished in virtue that the virtue and also the political ability of all others do not coincide with that of the one - if if there is one person - or that several - if there are several - can be compared, they should no longer be understood as part of the state, because they would be wrong if they were put on an equal footing with others, even though they were in virtue and in political terms Ability so outstanding. Such a < or such > will < or will > have to work among people like a god < or gods "".
Remarks
- ↑ See [1]
- ↑ Quoted from: "Orpheus Ancient Greek Mysteries" Taken from the original text and explained by JO Plassmann, published as part of Diederich's Yellow Series, Eugen Diederichs Verlag Cologne 1982, page 105, text edited, insertions in angle brackets.
- ↑ Quoted from Schleiermacher: “Platon Werke” Volume I.1, pp. 179–180, text edited, insertions in angle brackets.
- ↑ See [2]
- ↑ See [3]
- ↑ The confusion in the representation of Protagoras, which is of course even greater in the part not cited here, is due to the fact that Protagoras is a sophist, not a philosopher!
- ↑ Aristotle "Politeia" (German: "Politics"), 1st book 1253a a2 - 5, text edited and insertions in angle brackets.
- ↑ Aristotle "Politeia" (German: "Politics"), 1st book 1253a 27-29, text edited.
- ↑ Jean-Jacques Rousseau “The Social Contract”, Book 1, Chapter 7 “From the Sovereign”, text edited and inserted in angle brackets.
- ↑ This is called popular sovereignty . The right of constitution and amendment is therefore a right of the people, not of parliament!
- ↑ Compare also the statement of Frederick the Great: "I am the first servant of my people"
- ↑ Rousseau therefore also describes this state as a "separate natural state" ("separated" not in the sense of "isolated", but in the sense of "everyone is sovereign").
- ↑ Jean-Jacques Rousseau “The Social Contract”, Book 1, Chapter 7 “From the Sovereign”, text edited and insertions in angle brackets.
- ↑ Jean-Jacques Rousseau “The Social Contract”, Book 2, Chapter 5 “On the Law of Life and Death”.
- ↑ Aristotle "Politeia", 3rd book 1284a 5 - 10, text edited and insertions in angle brackets.