end of the story

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The term end of the story ( English End of History ) was the political scientist Francis Fukuyama by an article and a book with this title ( The End of History and the Last Man popularized, 1992) and led to controversies to the editorials of various newspapers. In particular, Fukuyama repeats thoughts that Alexandre Kojève had formulated in the 1930s and 40s. He had presented a very idiosyncratic, but in France, epochal Hegel interpretation. Hegel's philosophy of history actually leads to an end in the sense of a final synthesis , where there are no longer any global political contradictions (see article Dialectic ).

To the thesis

Fukuyama argued that after the collapse of the USSR and the socialist states that were dependent on it, the principles of liberalism in the form of democracy and a market economy would soon prevail everywhere. Democracy has established itself as a model of order because, relatively speaking, it satisfies the human need for social recognition better than all other systems. With the victory of this model, the struggle for recognition ends and the driving force of the story is eliminated. Despite all the praise for the western-style democratic model, Fukuyama does not hide the inadequacies of the liberal democratic model, such as social inequality, and he does not forecast a quick and global victory for democracy. He later admitted that in Islamic countries such as B. Saudi Arabia has a different dynamic (see also Islamism ). He wrote in 2008:

"Democracy's only real competitor in the realm of ideas today is radical Islamism. Indeed, one of the world's most dangerous nation-states today is Iran, run by extremist Shiite mullahs."

The end of the story now consists in the integration and assimilation of non-Western cultures into Western culture, giving up their principles in favor of freedom and human rights.

Fukuyama's thesis builds on ideas from Marx , Hegel , Thomas Hobbes and John Locke , among others .

The piquant thing about Fukuyama's book is that he uses the methods of Marxism to justify its downfall. With this blending of two opposing worldviews, however, he met with vehement criticism in both camps.

To the book "The End of History"

Fukuyama shows in the book that liberal democracy has prevailed against all other real state and economic systems. If there are still deficits, it is those of inadequate implementation, but not of the principle itself. He cites Hegel and Marx, according to which history unfolds in struggles and reaches a final state. The end of the story does not mean that “there will be no more great events, but that there will be no further progress in the development of fundamental principles and institutions, since all really big questions would be finally settled.” The Hegel and Marx critics of the 20th Century, according to which history was chaotic and partially destructive, he countered, for example, with the good news of the end of the Cold War. The reason for assuming a universal history is the cumulative natural sciences, the discoveries of which are themselves an inevitable natural thing and which are essential for military and economic interests. The human need for recognition (Hegel) is also universal. The struggle of man against nature and man against each other are the driving forces for progress and find their peaceful end in capitalism and democracy.

Part I: An old question asked again

First, Fukuyama encounters the pessimism of the 20th century that followed the optimism of the 19th due to the ravages of totalitarian systems. The analysis reads that supposedly strong, authoritarian rulers in particular cannot last because their power is not legitimized (which is particularly evident in the case of the problem of succession), reigns of terror cannot be carried out in the long term and the level of prosperity in these states is below expectations remains. Between 1975 and 1990, dictatorial structures were eroded in the Eastern Bloc, Latin America and southern Europe. On the other hand, liberal democracy, i. H. “If the people have the right to elect their government in regular secret, general and equal elections in a multi-party system” and there is the “right to free economic activity and economic movement on the basis of private property and markets”, the model of success on Late 20th century.

Part II: The Age of Mankind

The idea of ​​a universal history begins with the great religions, gains secular plausibility with the progressive and successive discoveries of the laws of nature and finds its great philosophical formulation in Hegel. The human desire for power creates security against natural threats and advantages in armed and economic competition as well as pleasant consumption. All of this guarantees him first of all knowledge of the natural sciences; paradoxically, it is precisely the conflict between people that creates unification, as both sides argue and thus draw level. Fukuyama sees an inevitable rationalization here, i.e. industrialization, urbanization, education, division of labor and hierarchical-bureaucratic structuring that dissolves traditional structures. Only states that remain outside of competition or can buy technology through their wealth of natural resources (such as the Islamic oil states) evade this. Fukuyama sees the capitalist principle as the strongest productive force, which therefore generates the greatest amount of military security and economic advancement and displaces other models. Sooner or later, this process will also affect countries that are 'behind', for example in Japan and South Korea after the Second World War. This goes hand in hand with democratization, as the economy needs trained workers who in turn demand participation. However, democracy has a difficult time when the initial situation is characterized by strong economic or ethnic differences. In such cases - in the sense of economic advancement - dictatorships initially have it easier to change severe social inequality (for example through expropriation). One can classify this as necessary teething troubles; Of course, there are also irrational interim anachronisms on the path to progress.

Part III: The struggle for recognition

People not only want prosperity but also freedom. In addition to the materialistic reasons, there is the driving force of the “struggle for recognition” (Hegel). According to Hegel, unlike animals, humans generally have a sense of self-worth and therefore require confirmation from other people. This leads to master-servant relationships. According to Hobbes and Locke, on the other hand, human pride must be tamed to the maximum. The latter leads to sublimation in the separation of powers, "checks and balances", democracy and ventilation in capitalism. Nietzsche condemned this as slave morality and loss of valuable potency. Fukuyama's view of the development towards democracy oscillates between these poles. In any case, the desire for recognition contributes much more to democratization than capitalist ascent.

Part IV. The jump over Rhodes

But there are also special cultural factors that promote democratization:

  • Democracy presupposes a homogeneous people
  • Christianity (especially Protestantism) has advanced democratization, while other religions, especially Islam, have an anti-democratic effect
  • severe economic inequality inhibits democratization
  • an already existing federal structure (e.g. principalities as opposed to the centralized state)
  • an irrational moment of libidinal energy is necessary for the democratic cause

You also need strong personalities, as well as not too little and not too much of continuity of tradition.

There are also cultural benefits for capitalism:

  • a quasi-religious sense of duty that religions such as Protestantism or Shintoism bring with them, while Hinduism, for example, forbids all efforts.
  • a culture of loyalty, of groupthink, as it is strongly developed in Japan, for example.

Fukuyama sees that difference theories, national, religious and ethnic separatisms are increasing and radicalizing in the face of capitalist homogenization. Nationalism initially follows from industrialization and democratization - education and the elimination of autocracy turn natural language borders into national borders. Nationalism stabilizes after capitalist atomization and creates identity and strength. But Fukuyama believes that nationalism and religion become meaningless. Another opposing moment could be that with increasing prosperity, the need for leisure time and self-fulfillment become more important. So far, however, Fukuyama sees this soon overtaken by the periodic uncertainties of capitalism. Fukuyama writes that cultural imprints are very decisive for democratization and capitalization - and since they are extremely dominant, the near future will be shaped by the clash of cultures. The migration from poor to rich countries, which ultimately leads to the expansion of the western world, also plays a major role.

Part V. The last man

After Fukuyama has described the possible path to the end of the story, which will undoubtedly be long and arduous, in the last chapter he starts from questions of the final state. The relationship between freedom and equality remains unresolved, but democracy manages best to balance this out. Just as unsolved is the question of how much humanity as a whole distinguishes itself from other living beings, i.e. to what extent animals also acquire rights.

In addition, the question arises as to whether there is still ambition in a world of universal tolerance and relativity, or if there is only a banal, animal-self-sustaining mediocrity that continues to vegetate. Kojève advocates this, Nietzsche castigates it. According to Fukuyama, it boils down to a society that expends its aggressive energies, which still exist, in the empty formalism of sports of all kinds. The height of the fall remains to degenerate back to war simply out of boredom. But the First World War in particular should be a deterrent example of this.

criticism

  • Critics argue that liberal democracy cannot be a stable final state because it is full of internal contradictions and capitalism produces too much suffering. Capitalism does not gradually conquer all countries, but creates inequality in the world, producing winners and losers. The western world has no interest in the democratization of resource-rich countries in the third world ( dependency theory ). Some countries are so economically or culturally so unequal and dependent that they do not get (or do not want) any chance of advancement in competition, and that is also not in the interests of the "stronger". There is no world invisible hand . Jacques Derrida goes into detail on Fukuyama's book in "Specters de Marx". But even 25 years later, Fukuyama still insists that at least no better form of government and economy than liberal democracy has been able to assert itself. It should be noted, however, that many criticisms of Fukuyama's alleged triumphalism ignore the tendency of his book to be critical of decadence and even assume that Fukuyama is euphoric affirming capitalism, although his book is permeated by various bleak assessments and motives that are critical of society and civilization.
  • Traditional tribal cultures and religious fundamentalisms are much more resistant; instead of capitalist-democratic alignment, there is a clash of cultures . With the book of the same name, Samuel P. Huntington wrote an express reply to Fukuyama - the temporary conflict of ideologies gives way again to the older of civilizations. This, in turn, is not expressed in classic wars, but in asymmetrical conflicts (terrorism). Fukuyama himself later admitted that radical Islam in particular represented a far stronger antagonist to the western world than the thesis assumed.
  • Fukuyama (consciously) glorifies capitalism into a quasi-religious doctrine of salvation with a Christian character, Derrida attests in turn. The theses were based on an inevitability in the historical process, which is rejected by all those who, in the spirit of Karl Popper , allow people the freedom to shape history according to their own will. According to this idea, it is impossible to predict future historical developments - therefore calling out the "end of history" is also a failure.
  • The resurgence of authoritarian states such as China or Russia refutes central arguments of Fukuyama. Fukuyama himself admitted in a 2016 interview with ZEIT that China in particular, which is modernizing without democracy, is a challenge for his thesis.
  • Fukuyama writes in "Our Posthuman Future" that the end of history also meant the end of the natural sciences and humanities, the completion of technological inventions. However, this is currently neither foreseeable nor structurally describable.
  • Even after Fukuyama’s end of story, questions of epistemology or the dynamics of love relationships remain unsolved. He mentions the latter, but without going into it any further.
  • Fukuyama describes what a fragile, highly artificial structure liberal democracy is. However, the cycle of life and death means that achievements are repeatedly lost, cumulative knowledge meets non-cumulative life cycles - every newborn person has to learn the rules of democracy and the market economy again, and the whole thing remains accordingly unstable.
  • In 2016, in a conversation with Michael Thumann and Thomas Assheuer , Francis Fukuyama emphasized the problem already touched on in his book, that modern liberal democracy has a fundamental problem: It offers economic success and security, but it does not create pride, community or identity. These are produced much more strongly by religions and ethnic groups and therefore form an ideological alternative that people have a deep need.

literature

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Samuel Salzborn (Ed.): Classics of the Social Sciences - 100 Key Works in Portrait , Springer VS Fachmedien, Wiesbaden, 2014, p. 349 and 350
  2. ^ Francis Fukuyama: They Can Only Go So Far ; in Washington Post on August 24, 2008
  3. ↑ Samuel Salzborn (Ed.): Classics of the Social Sciences - 100 Key Works in Portrait , Springer VS Fachmedien, Wiesbaden, 2014, p. 349 and 350
  4. ^ Francis Fukuyama: The end of the story , from the American by Helmut Dierlamm, Ute Mihr and Karlheinz Dürr, Kindler, Munich 1992, pp. 80 and 81
  5. ↑ Jacques Derrida (1994). Specters of Marx: State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International. Routledge. ISBN 0-415-91045-5 .
  6. ↑ a b "Democracy does not create identity". Conversation with Francis Fukuyama. In: Die ZEIT of March 31, 2016
  7. ↑ Sebastian Huhnholz: Farewell to Change? On the post-democratic status of the "end of history" topos . In: Olaf Briese et al. (Ed.): The topicality of the apocalyptic. Between cultural criticism and cultural promises . Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2015.
  8. ^ Francis Fukuyama: They Can Only Go So Far ; in Washington Post on August 24, 2008