Joint Vision 2010
Joint Vision 2010 (to German roughly: "Perspective for a cross-armed combat in 2010"), abbreviated JV 2010 or Vision 2010 , is a strategy paper of the General Staff of the United States , which in 1996 by John Shalikashvili , its then chairman, published has been. It is one of the most outstanding strategic documents in the recent history of the United States Armed Forces , as the ideas contained therein sparked their greatest restructuring towards combined arms combat . Joint Vision 2010 was replaced by Joint Vision 2020 .
content
The main aspects of the JV - doctrine are decorated in the typical characteristic style of American defense policy so that its main contents are set in terminology tags.
The aim of the Joint Vision 2010 is the " full-spectrum dominance " of the US armed forces, the complete dominance of the military on a broad level in all areas relevant to modern combat management. To this end, four guidelines must be implemented.
Dominant maneuver
The term "dominant maneuver" ("constant superiority in maneuvers") includes the broadest possible application of information, readiness for action and mobility, ie a force that is well trained, equipped and in the picture about the battlefield. Based on the strategic initiative, this ideal armed force should inflict such strong strategic damage on the opponent, especially its neuralgic points ( center of gravity ), that it either immediately gives up the resistance or can no longer win the offensive . In doing so, the advantages that the military has at their disposal must be used effectively.
When JV 2010 was published , this point presented a huge challenge to the armed forces despite the US's superiority in terms of weapons technology, as it implied that units could be relocated as reaction forces as soon as possible, although the greatest possible concentration of military potential was customary up to now. Against this background, the demand to cover up traces of one's own operations in order not to be tracked down by the enemy could hardly be met.
Precision engagement
“Precision engagement” includes above all an increased reaction speed on the battlefield, which should take place in real time if possible. Increased cooperation between the armed forces should also enable all units to be ready for action against any militarily relevant target in the world. The use of appropriate weapon technologies should also be of great importance.
The background to this requirement is the progress in information technology, which has given cyberwar , i.e. electronic warfare, ever greater weight. In addition, the US armed forces as a whole had suffered from obstructive rivalries between the armed forces, which the Goldwater-Nichols Act could only structurally alleviate, but not mentally end.
Full-dimensional protection
The "full-dimensional protection" means the "full protection" of all soldiers and locations of the military all over the world , which is intended to ensure the undisturbed operation of the army. The prerequisite for this is an increased data throughput for the broadest and most fluid communication possible between all nodes and the use of all available active and passive defense measures. For example, Joint Vision 2010 recommends the implementation of a "[global] missile defense architecture".
Focused logistics
“Focussed logistics” (“demand-oriented logistics”) means constantly checking the needs of the associations in action and meeting them as required. This application of just-in-time production for military purposes means more effort, but eliminates several disadvantages: The need to operate huge replenishment stores, prioritize locations and coordinate the speed of operations (OR pace) is eliminated.
Effects
For the final defense-political success of the document, which lay mainly in overcoming the strong resistance from the military, some specifics were required. The President of the United States at the time of the publication of JV 2010 , Bill Clinton , had neither the political will nor sufficient support to implement the proposals contained in JV 2010 after various military reforms such as the relaxed treatment of homosexuals . The command of the army , for example, saw itself at a disadvantage compared to the other branches of the armed forces and opposed the joint vision with the concept of Boots on the Ground , which emphasized the importance of the infantry .
As a presidential candidate in the 1999 election campaign, George W. Bush promised that he would be convinced of the much-cited "revolution in defense policy" and that he would push for its implementation as president. Under the aegis of his first defense minister , Donald Rumsfeld , he kept this promise and expanded Joint Vision 2010 into Joint Vision 2020 , which was published in 2000.
As a result of the Joint Vision 2010 , the individual armed forces developed specific vision doctrines. The best known is the drafting of the army under the name Army Vision 2010 .
At first, the new warfare proved to be a resounding success, strengthening Rumsfeld's authority over the military. His refusal to enlarge the Army, which again promoted Boots on the Ground given the course of the occupation of Iraq from 2003-2011 , was a secondary reason for his release in December 2006.
Web links
- Full text version of Joint Vision 2010 (English; PDF file; 1.67 MB)
- Explanation of the doctrine in the Executive Summary of the Pentagon of 1999
- Article about the Joint Vision in the August 1996 online edition of Air Force Magazine
- Technologies tested in winter 1999/2000 that were to be integrated into the JV concept (English; PDF file; 527 kB)
Individual evidence
- ^ John T. Corell: The Clash of Visions . Article ( Memento of the original from September 30, 2007 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. in Air Force Magazine April 1997. Not published July 18, 2007.
