Kamaishi

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Kamaishi-shi
釜 石 市
Kamaishi
Geographical location in Japan
Kamaishi (Japan)
Red pog.svg
Region : Tōhoku
Prefecture : Iwate
Coordinates : 39 ° 17 '  N , 141 ° 53'  E Coordinates: 39 ° 16 '33 "  N , 141 ° 53' 8"  E
Basic data
Surface: 441.29 km²
Residents : 34,118
(October 1, 2019)
Population density : 77 inhabitants per km²
Community key : 03211-5
Symbols
Flag / coat of arms:
Flag / coat of arms of Kamaishi
Tree : Machilus thunbergii
Flower : Lilium maculatum
Bird : White-faced shearwater
town hall
Address : Kamaishi City Hall
3 - 9 - 13 , Tadakoe-chō
Kamaishi shi
Iwate  026-8686
Website URL: http://www.city.kamaishi.iwate.jp/
Location of Kamaishis in Iwate Prefecture
Location of Kamaishis in the prefecture

Kamaishi ( Japanese 釜 石 市 , -shi ) is a city in Iwate Prefecture on Honshū , the main island of Japan .

geography

Kamaishi city center (color aerial photo compiled from 7 aerial photographs from 1977), created by MLIT

Tsunami breakwaters in Kamaishi city and in Ofunato city before the 2011 tsunami.jpg

Kamaishi Bay with record-breaking tsunami breakwaters at the entrance to the bay (before the 2011 tsunami )

Kamaishi is north of Sendai , southeast of Morioka and east of Tōno .

The town and municipality are located on the Pacific Ocean along the Sanriku coast , which, as the Ria coast , has many deep bays. Because of this, and because of the rising mountains near the coast, the effects of tsunamis are intensified.

Kamaishi has four large bays: Ōtsuchi Bay, Ryōishi Bay, Kamaishi Bay and Tōni Bay to the south. The bay of Kamaishi and the bay of Ryōishi (両 石 町), which adjoins it to the north, are partially treated together in tsunami research for calculating tsunami simulations, since the two bays are separated from each other by a short peninsula, but are surrounded by two long peninsulas: in the north from Ryōishi Bay and to the south from Kamaishi Bay.

The urban settlement of Kamaishi itself is located in the east-opening bay of Kamaishi. The urban developed areas are concentrated along the 1.1 km wide valley of the Kasshi River (甲子 川) at the port and are bordered by steep hills in the north and south.

In Tōni-Hongo, after the Chile tsunami of 1960, a tsunami seawall with a height of about 11 m was built to protect the village. In addition, a tsunami regulation forest was created between the seawall and the village to reduce the effects of the tsunami.

The water depth in the middle of Kamaishi Bay resembles that of the north following the Bay of Ryōishi and geometrically similarly shaped bay of Otsuchi . The height of tsunamis therefore has similar values ​​for both locations. This applies both to the tsunami that was triggered by the Shōwa-Sanriku earthquake in 1933 (the flood height measured in Kamaishi Bay was 6.0 meters and in Ōtsuchi Bay 5.4 meters) and to tsunamis expected in the future . In 1978, construction began on a tsunami breakwater dam, located 2.3 kilometers off the coastline and 2.2 kilometers from the mouth of the bay. It was completed in 2006 (or: 2009) with lengths of 990 m (or: 770 m) and 670 m, a 300 m wide opening and a maximum water depth of almost 63 meters as the world's deepest breakwater dam and is said to be the densely populated area protect the town of Kamaishi located in Kamaishi Bay.

During the design phase of the breakwater in Kamaishi Bay, coastal engineers at Tōhoku University were hired to clarify whether the breakwater would deflect tsunami waves from the center of Kamaishi to the north. After four years of experimentation, the researchers found in reports from 1974 and 1975 that the breakwater would amplify the waves towards Ryōishi and Kariyado, a fishing village on an east-facing peninsula. Ryōishi, which until then had no coastal defense structures, was then equipped with a 30-foot seawall along its coast.

history

When the Japanese community was reorganized on April 1, 1889, the village of Kamaishi ( 釜 石村 , - mura ) was merged with the village of Heita ( 平 田村 , -mura ) to form the district town of Kamaishi ( 釜 石 町 , - chō ) in Minamihei County . On May 5, 1937, it was raised to the status of an independent city (shi) .

Kamaishi is considered the birthplace of Japan's modern steel industry and experienced an economic boom for almost a century . The tsuami-prone Kamaishi remained an important center of steel production, a key industry in Japan, and the state government built the world's deepest breakwater at the entrance to the bay, which rises 10 meters above sea level to protect the city. The large breakwater in the bay was not only intended to protect the city from tsunamis, but also lay the foundation for a modern international port that would accommodate container ships and attract new businesses. However, in the early 1970s, the city's main employer, Shinnittetsu Sumikin (Nippon Steel), relocated its steel production to central Japan, where the burgeoning automotive industry was concentrated. When construction of the breakwater began in 1978 and completed in 2008 or 2009, Nippon Steel had closed its two blast furnaces for a long time. Container ships did not call at Kamaishi. The port of Kamaishi remained dependent on extensive subsidies . Many companies and people left the city. Since about 1970, the population of Kamaishi has skyrocketed from 100,000 to 40,000 (before the March 11, 2011 tsunami) in four decades.

Earthquake and tsunami disasters

Comparison of the balance sheets of completely destroyed houses and victims in Kamaishi for the disasters of 1896, 1933, 1960 and 2011
Disaster event Completely destroyed houses Death toll source
Meiji 1896 (earthquake and tsunami) 1192 6487
Shōwa 1933 (earthquake and tsunami) 686 728
Chile 1960 (earthquake and tsunami) 28 0
Tōhoku 2011 (earthquake and tsunami) 3188 1039
Note: The death toll for the 2011 Tōhoku disaster is calculated from the total number of dead and missing in the 153rd FDMA damage report of March 8, 2016, minus the figures for catastrophe-related deaths determined by the Reconstruction Agency (RA).

Historical tsunami experiences and countermeasures

Historical earthquake and tsunami disasters in Kamaishi
Meiji-Sanriku earthquake 05.jpg
Ozaki shrine washed away by the Meiji Sanriku tsunami in 1896


Predicted and actual extent of the tsunami
Hazard map produced by the village of Toni in Kamaishi City Iwate Prefecture.jpg
Hazard map for Tōni Bay (唐丹 湾) It contains historical and expected flood levels
, lead times, evacuation accommodations and telephone numbers for warnings.
It was prepared by the village of Tōni with church members and distributed to all households in Tōni before the Tōhoku disaster
Kamaishi Inundation areas of the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake Ando et al 2013.jpg
Tsunami in Kamaishi:
red : predicted flood plains based on the union of three earthquake types: the historical Meiji-Sanriku-oki and Shōwa-Sanriku-oki and the hypothetical Miyagi-oki
black numbers : flood or run-up heights [m] of March 11, 2011
blue : floodplains March 11, 2011
column charts : population (left) and dead (right) for ages 0-15 (below), 16-64 (center) and ≥65 (top)


Kamaishi has been repeatedly devastated by tsunamis in the past. Within the city limits alone, 34 tsunami memorial stones point to these historical events. The Meiji Sanriku tsunami in 1896 killed 4,000 of the then 6,500 inhabitants of Kamaishi and destroyed almost the entire city.

Historical earthquake and tsunami disasters in the village of Tōni-Hongo
Toni-Hongo village after the 1933 Showa Sanriku tsunami, before the 2011 Tohoku tsunami, and after the 2011 Tohoku tsunami.jpg
The village after the Shōwa-Sanriku tsunami 1933 (left), before (middle) and after (right) the Tōhoku tsunami 2011
Satellite images of the Toni-Hongo village in May 2010 and in April 2011.jpg
Satellite images of the village in May 2010 (left) and April 2011


The village of Tōni-Hongo was hit by a 14.5 m high tsunami in 1896, which destroyed 224 houses. In 1933 it was hit by a 9.3 m high tsunami that destroyed 101 houses. After the tsunami of 1933, the village was rebuilt on higher ground (20 m above the MSL ). There it survived the approximately 5 m high Chile tsunami of 1960 . After this event, many houses were built in lowland areas to accommodate the growing population. In the village of Tōni (唐丹), which belongs to the city of Kamaishi, parishioners took part in the Jichikai (neighborhood associations) tsunami exercises on March 3, the anniversary of the Meiji-Sanriku tsunami of 1896, although the participation rate in some neighborhoods such as the more populated Kojirahama was low and was very high in others like the lesser and more long-established populated Kerobe. Tōni residents had written books on the effects of past tsunamis that were used by communities as an awareness raising tool. In addition to a tsunami hazard map issued by the Kamaishi City Council with probable information about the floodplain, the height and arrival time of an expected tsunami, there was also a tsunami hazard map created by the community members in Tōni, which also contained local information about the floodplains during the Meiji-Sanriku tsunami in 1896 and the Shōwa-Sanriku-Tsunami in 1933, about the evacuation sites, about the escape routes and about endangered areas. Both tsunami hazard maps had been distributed to all families in Tōni. A number of community festivals were also used to involve local schools in disaster awareness and preparation activities.

After the Second World War, the steep hills behind the port of Kamaishi and the central district, which had long provided natural protection against tsunami in the hilly city with its few flat terrain, were equipped with a sophisticated network of evacuation stairs, paths and rest areas so that most of the people in the tsunami-prone central district were only a few hundred meters away from the nearest evacuation stairs.

2011 Tōhoku disaster

Extent of flooding and damage

Run-up height, inundation height and inundation depth in the Tōhoku tsunami in Kamaishi
1: mean water level
2: tide level at the time of the tsunami
3: simulated inundation height at the level of the local tracks (A): 8.0 m
4: simulated run-up height: 10.0 m
5: Terrain height
6: Flood depth
7: Tsunami height according to GPS ocean wave measurement (B): 6.7 m
8: Simulated tsunami height at the 4 m high tidal breakwater (D)
(C): Tsunami breakwater (63 m deep)

Damage from the tsunami inundation of Kamaishi city with a maximum runup height of 11.7 m -1-6-2011- and of Ofunato city with a maximum runup height of 10.9 m -1-6-2011-.jpg

Damage from the 2011 tsunami flooding in Kamaishi
Devastation in Unosumai (鵜 住居), Kamaishi, after the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami

On March 11, 2011, the Tōhoku earthquake of 2011 occurred, which triggered a tsunami. who ravaged the city and destroyed bridges. The number of completely destroyed residential buildings is put at 2957. One of the city's five hospitals and six of the city's thirteen clinics were damaged by the tsunami.

In the port of Kamaishi (釜 石 港) the container ship Asia Symphony was lifted onto the quay and put with the bow keel on the seawall (quay wall).

The seawall in Ryōishi (Kamaishi, Unozumai) was destroyed. The resettlement area, which had been used in the reconstruction program after the disaster of the Shōwa tsunami of 1933, suffered severe damage. According to the media, the tsunami reached 60 feet in Ryōishi and Kariyado twice as high as in the center of Kamaishi and destroyed both places. Accordingly, the tsunami in Ryōishi killed 45 of the 600 residents of the village and destroyed 215 of the 230 houses.

In Tōni-Hongo, the tsunami overcame the 11 m high seawall despite the upstream tsunami regulation forest and destroyed hundreds of houses in the low-lying area. The houses built in the higher country in Tōni-Hongo, however, were spared from the tsunami. In the bay of Tōni a flood height of 14.8 m (in Tōni-Hongo) was measured, while the measurements of the run-up heights reached up to 21.4 m (in Tōni-Hongo). The case of Tōni-Hongo (唐丹 本 郷), now part of Kamaishi City, is believed to be a good example of the benefits of resettlement and the challenges of zoning regulations related to tsunamis. Those houses in Tōni-Hongo that had been relocated to higher ground after an earlier tsunami were spared the Tōhoku tsunami in 2011, while newly built houses in the unregulated lowland areas were hit hard by the tsunami.

Victim

The Fire and Disaster Management Agency (FDMA) reported 839 dead and 508 missing in its 124th damage report on May 19. The number of deaths rose to 994 by the FDMA's 157th damage assessment, while 152 people were still missing.

Based on the total population of Kamaishi, which was given as 39,574 in the 2010 census, the casualty rate from the 2011 disaster was 2.9% if all dead and missing persons recorded in the 157th FDMA damage report of March 7, 2018 are included or 2.63% if the victims registered in the 153rd FDMA damage report of March 8, 2016 (993 dead and 152 missing) minus the catastrophe-related deaths reported by the Reconstruction Agency (RA) are taken into account, resulting in a The figure is 1,039 dead and missing. With the same data basis, but based solely on the flood plain of the tsunami in Kamaishi, which covered an area of ​​7 km 2 , the casualty rate was 7.89%, according to other calculations 9%. 13,164 people and thus 33% of the total population of the city of Kamaishi (assuming 39,578 inhabitants in 2010) had their residence in the area flooded by the tsunami on March 11, 2011.

Victims record, population, tsunami wave and distance from evacuation sites to areas of Kamaishi
Area in Kamaishi Fatalities Residents Tsunami Distance to the next evacuation site [m]
Rate [%] number Max. Flooding height [m] Arrival time [min.]
Unozumai 9.15 331 3,618 9.44 20th 554
Hakozakicho 6.20 79 1,274 14.44 24 487
Tadakoe 6.62 45 680 9.62 28 477
Katagishi 4.76 41 862 13.85 20th 297
Shinhama 5.32 10 188 8.38 28 359
Source: Total population according to Statistics Bureau (統計局) and Director-General for Policy Planning (政策 統 括 官), 2010 census; Fatalities according to fire and disaster management agency (消防 庁 = Fire and Disaster Management Agency, FDMA); Maximum flood height and arrival time of the tsunami according to The 2011 Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami Joint Survey Group ; Distance to the nearest evacuation site from the place of residence according to the evacuation site data from the Cabinet Secretariat Civil Protection Portal Site ( http://www.kokuminhogo.go.jp/en/pc-index_e.html ) of the Cabinet Secretariat (内閣 官 房) and the aerial photographs and maps from Geospatial Information Authority of Japan (GSI) from the Tsunami Damage Mapping Team, Association of Japanese Geographers.

Effectiveness of coastal protection structures

During the Tōhoku disaster of 2011, it turned out that in the event of a flooding of the concrete coastal dams and dykes, which were covered with concrete on their front, top and rear, the dyke foot, which lacked such a hard surface layer, was a weak point .

The 10-meter-high seawalls in Kojira-hama (in Tōni) also broke and were destroyed, like many other seawalls investigated in Iwate and Miyagi prefectures and in the northern part of Fukushima prefecture, which were flooded by several meters by the tsunami.

The Kamaishi tsunami breakwaters built in 63 m water depth also failed because of the 2011 tsunami and were destroyed. The tsunami overturned the 990 m long north section of the newly completed offshore breakwater, while the 670 m long south section held out largely intact, but tilted to the left. The Port and Airport Research Institute (PARI) performed physical and numerical model studies of its failure and concluded that a combination of two effects caused by the tsunami washing over the breakwaters was responsible for the failure of the structure . According to these model studies, the tsunami height was 10.8 m on the offshore side, but only 2.6 m on the land side. This difference in water depth created a large hydrostatic force on the breakwater wall and, along with water flowing through crevices between the breakwater blocks, caused the breakwater to collapse.

After the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (MLIT) commissioned an assessment of the breakwater's performance a few days after the disaster, three weeks after the tsunami, the Port and Airport Research Institute (PARI), a semi-public institute that published up to 2001 was subordinate to the MLIT and remained within its area of ​​responsibility, a report based on the tsunami data recorded a few kilometers off the coast by a GPS tracking system. That report found that the breakwater reduced the height of the first wave by 40 percent and delayed its landing by six minutes, saving many lives. Ministry officials confirmed PARI's close ties with the MLIT, but described the report's findings as neutral. The analysis of the flood and run-up heights by Mori et al. (2011) supports these simulation results. The Japan Agency for Marine Earth Science and Technology (JAMSTEC), a semi-governmental institute with no links to the MLIT, concluded that the breakwater did not significantly reduce the height of the tsunami or delay its landing. The height of the tsunami was over 30 meters outside the bay, but the height of the tsunami in Kamaishi Bay was significantly reduced. At the mouth of Kamaishi Bay, the run-up height was initially 22 meters, then fell to 10 meters near the breakwater dam off the coast and then remained roughly constant at 10 meters up to the shoreline. It was thus significantly lower than in Ōtsuchi Bay and a comparison with the tsunami in Ōtsuchi shows that the breakwater dam reduces the tsunami height by around 25 to 40 percent and significantly reduces the damage for Kamaishi resulting from the tsunami compared to places like Ōtsuchi Has. Compared to other areas like Kesennuma , damage to ships remained relatively limited. The mitigation of the tsunami impact through the use of breakwater dams was first verified through the experience during the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake. Kamaishi, with its fishing research boats, was one of the places of the Tōhoku catastrophe 2011, where cases became known in which boats were able to be saved by being brought out to sea quickly. In many other places it was no longer possible to get boats out to sea at short notice. In addition to reducing the impact, the breakwater in Kamaishi Bay also delayed tsunami damage. But although the breakwater dam, despite its severe damage to the population, gave the population a delay of 6 minutes before the tsunami hit the city, and he lowered the tsunami height in the port by 40 percent (from 13.7 m to 8.1 m or 8.0 m ) as well as simulating calculations according to which the maximum run-up height was reduced by 50 percent from 20.0 m to 10.0 m, it ultimately offered no protection for the urban population, who felt they were well protected behind the enormous concrete breakwater barrier. The tsunami flooded an area of ​​7 square kilometers in Kamaishi and 22 percent of the area in the residential areas. The flood height was given as 9.3 m. Other data speak of an inundation height of 8.0 m (based on local tsunami tracks with the tide level at the time immediately before the arrival of the tsunami as the reference level) and a simulated run-up height of 10.0 m.

Kamaishi's mayor, Takenori Noda, said speakers across the city warned people to flee, but he believes "the presence of the breakwater gave people an unconscious sense of security."

Effectiveness of evacuation exercises

In order to counteract traffic jams during evacuation measures in the city of Ryōishi in the Kamaishi District, the city had introduced a system that identifies certain drivers and vehicles for transporting people at risk to higher terrain in the event of a tsunami. The physical identification of designated vehicles should limit the number of vehicles in use for evacuation and raise awareness of who is responsible for returning to the city. On March 11, 2011, at the time of the tsunami, all designated drivers were out of town and the system could not be performed until the tsunami arrived.

The owner of the Hotel Hōraikan (宝来 館) on the beach in Unosumai had her hotel built as a four-storey building with external stairs and steel scaffolding, which was signposted and used for evacuation in the event of tsunamis on the third floor, based on her experience with a previous evacuation after a tsunami warning could be. However, during the tsunami on March 11, 2011, she led hotel guests up a hill behind the hotel instead of staying in the building. The hotel was flooded up to the ceiling of the second floor and sustained damage to non-load-bearing parts on the ground floor.

"Miracle of Kamaishi"

Evacuation drills and disaster risk management education, which are the cornerstones of schools in the country, are considered to be the reason why children in Kamaishi City remained largely safe (so-called "miracle of Kamaishi"). Repetition exercises, schooling, and hazard maps are cited as contributing factors. While one in fortieth people lost their lives in Kamaishi, the casualty rate among school children in Kamaishi City remained low. Only 5 out of 2,900 students in 14 elementary and secondary schools died. The schoolchildren's survival rate of 99.8 percent was twenty times higher than the general one. For example, Toshitaka Katada, professor at Gunma University in the field of social engineering with a focus on disaster management and tsunami survival, reintroduced the tendenko concept in schools in Kamaishi 8 years before the disaster of 2011 , which propagates pure self-rescue and does not provide for it, that the self-evacuating person takes care of the evacuation of other people such as relatives, neighbors or relatives.

In the Unosumai district (鵜 住居) of Kamaishis, all 580 students and teachers from two schools that were destroyed by the tsunami survived. Although their schools were outside of the expected flood area of ​​the tsunami, the students decided to leave their schools and evacuate to higher ground. Based on the three evacuation principles taught by Katada, the students at the Kamaishi East Junior High School in Unosumai had left their school immediately after the earthquake, had walked to higher ground and with their quick and determined reaction had residents and students and teachers of the neighboring ones Warned elementary school and made them follow their example, saving many lives. These three principles of Katada, which are considered to be the reason for the “miracle of Kamaishi”, prompted the students firstly not to rely on tsunami hazard maps, secondly to do their best in every situation, and thirdly to take the initiative to evacuate the community itself to take. The third principle (Japanese: “ sauces hinansha tare ”) is understood as a modern form of the historical tendenko principle. After the 2011 disaster, these principles were recognized as one of the best practices in disaster education. The responses the children had learned at school had enabled them to overcome a disaster that surpassed any worst-case scenario .

"Tragedy of the Disaster Prevention Center"

In the same area as that of the two schools of the “Miracle of Kamaishi”, however, there were also high casualties as a result of an inadequately conducted evacuation exercise. This evacuation drill was conducted a week before the 2011 Tōhoku tsunami (on March 3, the commemoration of the Shōwa-Sanriku tsunami ), and the city had a two-story reinforced concrete building as a disaster prevention center (a group evacuation shelter located outside of the expected floodplain) instead of other evacuation areas on higher ground because the center was easily accessible for the elderly. The Unosumai Disaster Prevention Center in Unosumai-cho was not designated as an evacuation center in the event of a tsunami. But because the place had been used for the emergency exercise shortly before the disaster, many citizens sought protection there on March 11, 2011.

When on March 11, 2011 most of the participants in the evacuation exercise on March 3 evacuated to the center instead of to higher ground, of the total of 200 evacuees, only 25 (according to other information: 34) people survived, while 54 (according to other information: 69 ) found dead in the center and over 100 believed to be dead or missing. According to other sources, an estimated 120 people died there. The building was destroyed. After the incident at the Unosumai Disaster Prevention Center (V 住居 地区 防災 セ ン タ ー), which is in contact with the city of Ōtsuchi, the “Tragedy of the Disaster Prevention Center” (防災 セ ン タ ー の 悲劇) or the Kama “tragedy " spoken. In March 2014, the more than 100-page report by a commission of inquiry into the incident at the Kamaishi City Disaster Prevention Center in the Unosumai District of Kamaishi City was published.

The demolition of the building, which began at the beginning of December 2013, was completed by February 2014. The site of the former disaster prevention center is to be developed as the Inori no Park memorial park with a memorial for the disaster. On April 11, 2016, a ceremony was held to use the debris from the Disaster Prevention Center for the foundations of the park.

reconstruction

In the Tōni area, where both the elementary school and the middle school had to be rebuilt after the disaster, due to the decline in school-age children, instead of building two school buildings, consideration was given to building a single building that included both the elementary and middle school should also accommodate other public municipal bodies. As part of the reconstruction, the Kamaishi Recovery Memorial Stadium , a rugby stadium and one of the venues for the 2019 Rugby Union World Cup were created .

economy

Town twinning

sons and daughters of the town

Neighboring cities and communities

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Anawat Suppasri, Nobuo Shuto, Fumihiko Imamura, Shunichi Koshimura, Erick Mas, Ahmet Cevdet Yalciner: Lessons Learned from the 2011 Great East Japan Tsunami: Performance of Tsunami Countermeasures, Coastal Buildings, and Tsunami Evacuation in Japan . In: Pure and Applied Geophysics . tape 170 , no. 6-8 , 2013, pp. 993-1018 , doi : 10.1007 / s00024-012-0511-7 . (Published online on July 7, 2012), here: p. 997, Figure 3. License: Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic (CC BY 2.0).
  2. ↑ a b c d e f g Nobuhito Mori, Daniel T. Cox, Tomohiro Yasuda, Hajime Mase: Overview of the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake Tsunami Damage and Its Relation to Coastal Protection along the Sanriku Coast . In: Earthquake Spectra . tape 29 , S1, 2013, pp. 127-143 , doi : 10.1193 / 1.4000118 .
  3. ↑ a b c Nobuhito Mori, Nozomu Yoneyama, William Pringle: Effects of the offshore Barrier Against the 2011 Off the Pacific Coast of Tohoku Earthquake Tsunami and Lessons Learned . In: V. Santiago-Fandiño, YA Kontar, Y. Kaneda (Ed.): Post-Tsunami Hazard - Reconstruction and Restoration (=  Advances in Natural and Technological Hazards Research (NTHR, volume 44) ). Springer, 2015, ISBN 978-3-319-10201-6 , ISSN  1878-9897 , chap. 9 , p. 121-132 , doi : 10.1007 / 978-3-319-10202-3 .
  4. ↑ a b c d Kwang-Ho Lee, Koji Kawasaki, Tomoaki Nakamura, Shingo Suzuki: Inundation Phenomena due to Tsunami Disaster in 2011, Tohoku, Japan. In: 2011 년도 한국 해양 과학 기술 협의회 공동 학술 대회, 6 월 2 일 (목) ~ 3 일 (금) 부산 (2011 Joint Conference of the Korean Association of Ocean Science and Technology Societies) (=  대한 조선 학회 학술 대회 자료집 (Proceedings, Korean Association of Ocean Science and Technology Societies) ). Invited presentation (BEXCO, Busan, Korea) June 2, 2011, p. 33-36 .
  5. ↑ a b c d e f g h i Stuart Fraser, Alison Raby, Antonios Pomonis, Katsuichiro Goda, Siau Chen Chian, Joshua Macabuag, Mark Offord, Keiko Saito, Peter Sammonds: Tsunami damage to coastal defences and buildings in the March 11th 2011 Mw9.0 Great East Japan earthquake and tsunami . In: Bulletin of Earthquake Engineering . tape 11 , 2013, p. 205-239 , doi : 10.1007 / s10518-012-9348-9 . (Published online March 27, 2012).
  6. ↑ a b Nobuhito Mori, Tomoyuki Takahashi, Tomohiro Yasudo, Hideaki Yanagisawa: Survey of 2011 Tohoku earthquake tsunami inundation and run-up . In: Geophysical Research Letters . Vol. 38, No. April 7 , 2011, doi : 10.1029 / 2011GL049210 (English, wiley.com [accessed October 9, 2015]).
  7. ↑ a b c d e f g h i j Shunichi Koshimura, Nobuo Shuto: Response to the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami disaster . In: Philosophical Transactions of The Royal Society A Mathematical Physical and Engineering Sciences . tape 373 , no. 2053 , 2015, p. 20140373 , doi : 10.1098 / rsta.2014.0373 . (Published online September 21, 2015).
  8. ↑ a b c d e f g h i j Anawat Suppasri, Nobuo Shuto, Fumihiko Imamura, Shunichi Koshimura, Erick Mas, Ahmet Cevdet Yalciner: Lessons Learned from the 2011 Great East Japan Tsunami: Performance of Tsunami Countermeasures, Coastal Buildings, and Tsunami Evacuation in Japan . In: Pure and Applied Geophysics . tape 170 , no. 6-8 , 2013, pp. 993-1018 , doi : 10.1007 / s00024-012-0511-7 . (Published online July 7, 2012).
  9. ↑ a b c d e Alison Raby, Joshua Macabuag, Antonios Pomonis, Sean Wilkinson, Tiziana Rossetto: Implications of the 2011 Great East Japan Tsunami on sea defense design . In: International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction . tape 14 , no. 4 , 2015, p. 332-346 , doi : 10.1016 / j.ijdrr.2015.08.009 . (Published online September 14, 2015).
  10. ↑ a b c d e f g h Japan Revives a Sea Barrier That Failed to Hold ( Memento from May 27, 2018 on WebCite ) , nytimes.com (print edition: Japan Revives a Sea Barrier That Failed to Hold , New York edition, 3 November 2011, page A1), November 2, 2011, by Norimitsu Onishi.
  11. ↑ a b c d 片 田 敏 孝: 気 象 災害 を 生 き 抜 く た め に 「災害 過 保護」 か ら 脱却 せ よ ( page 1 ( memento of June 27, 2018 on WebCite ), page 2 ( memento of June 27, 2018 on WebCite ), page 3 ( Memento from June 27, 2018 on WebCite )), nippon.com, September 9, 2014. English version: Katada Toshitaka: Addressing Natural Disaster Risks: The Need for Greater Self-Reliance , ( page 1 ( Memento from June 27 2018 on WebCite ), page 2 ( memento of June 27, 2018 on WebCite ), page 3 ( memento of June 27, 2018 on WebCite ), page 4 ( memento of June 27, 2018 on WebCite )), nippon.com, 6 October 2014.
  12. ↑ a b c d e f Tadashi Nakasu, Yuichi Ono, Wiraporn Pothisiri: Why did Rikuzentakata have a high death toll in the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami disaster? Finding the devastating disaster's root causes . In: International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction . tape 27 , 2018, p. 21-36 , doi : 10.1016 / j.ijdrr.2017.08.001 . (Published online August 15, 2017). With reference to: Tadashi Nakasu, Yuichi Ono, Wiraporn Pothisiri: Forensic investigation of the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami disaster: a case study of Rikuzentakata , Disaster Prevention and Management, 26 (3) (2017), pp. 298-313 , doi: 10.1108 / DPM-10-2016-0213.
  13. ^ A b c Rajib Shaw, Yukiko Takeuchi, Shohei Matsuura, Keiko Saito: Risk Communication . In: Federica Ranghieri, Mikio Ishiwatari (Ed.): Learning from Megadisasters - Lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake . World Bank Publications, Washington, DC 2014, ISBN 978-1-4648-0153-2 , Chapter 27, pp. 241–246 , doi : 10.1596 / 978-1-4648-0153-2 ( work accessible online on Google Books ). , License: Creative Commons Attribution CC BY 3.0 IGO
  14. ↑ M. Ando, ​​M. Ishida, Y. Hayashi, C. Mizuki, Y. Nishikawa, Y. Tu: Interviewing insights regarding the fatalities inflicted by the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake . In: Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci. tape 13 , September 6, 2017, p. 2173-2187 , doi : 10.5194 / nhess-13-2173-2013 . , License: Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported (CC BY 3.0); here: 2179, Fig. 2 c) ("Kamaishi").
  15. ↑ Anawat Suppasri, Nobuo Shuto, Fumihiko Imamura, Shunichi Koshimura, Erick Mas, Ahmet Cevdet Yalciner: Lessons Learned from the 2011 Great East Japan Tsunami: Performance of Tsunami Countermeasures, Coastal Buildings, and Tsunami Evacuation in Japan . In: Pure and Applied Geophysics . tape 170 , no. 6-8 , 2013, pp. 993-1018 , doi : 10.1007 / s00024-012-0511-7 . (Published online on July 7, 2012), here: p. 1014, Figure 29. License: Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic (CC BY 2.0).
  16. ↑ Anawat Suppasri, Nobuo Shuto, Fumihiko Imamura, Shunichi Koshimura, Erick Mas, Ahmet Cevdet Yalciner: Lessons Learned from the 2011 Great East Japan Tsunami: Performance of Tsunami Countermeasures, Coastal Buildings, and Tsunami Evacuation in Japan . In: Pure and Applied Geophysics . tape 170 , no. 6-8 , 2013, pp. 993-1018 , doi : 10.1007 / s00024-012-0511-7 . (Published online on July 7, 2012), here: p. 1014, Figure 30. License: Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic (CC BY 2.0).
  17. ^ A b c Rajib Shaw, Mikio Ishiwatari, Margaret Arnold: Community-Based Disaster Risk Management . In: Federica Ranghieri, Mikio Ishiwatari (Ed.): Learning from Megadisasters - Lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake . World Bank Publications, Washington, DC 2014, ISBN 978-1-4648-0153-2 , Chapter 6, pp. 65–69 , doi : 10.1596 / 978-1-4648-0153-2 ( work accessible online on Google Books [accessed April 3, 2018]). , License: Creative Commons Attribution CC BY 3.0 IGO.
  18. ↑ a b c d e 国土交通省港湾局(Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, MLIT)独立行政法人港湾空港技術研究所: 釜石港における津波による被災過程を検証( Memento from March 30, 2018 on Webcite ) , pari.go.jp (port and Airport Research Institute, PARI), April 1, 2011, here Appendix別紙2, Figure "釜石港における津波防波堤の効果(シミュレーション結果)" ( PDF ( Memento from the 30th March 2018 on WebCite )).
  19. ↑ 東 日本 大 震災 記録 集 ( Memento from March 23, 2018 on WebCite ) , 総 務 省 消防 庁 (Fire and Disaster Management Agency) des 総 務 省 (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications), March 2013, here in Chapter 2 (第 2 章地震 ・ 津 波 の 概要) subsection 2.2 (2.2 津 波 の 概要 (1)) ( PDF ( Memento from March 28, 2018 on WebCite )), p. 42, Figure 2.2-16 ("波 に よ る 浸水 深 ・ 浸水 高 ・遡 上 高 の 関係 ").
  20. ↑ 津 波 の 基礎 知識 ( Memento of March 28, 2018 on WebCite ) , jwa.or.jp (一般 財 団 法人 日本 気 象 協会; Japan Weather Association), (Without date. Elsewhere the date is January 21, 2013 cited), p. 8, Figure 9 (津 波 に よ る 浸水 深 ・ 浸水 高 ・ 遡 上 高 と 基準面 の 関係).
  21. ↑ Tatsuki Iida, Akira Mano, Keiko Udo, Hioshi Tanaka: Destruction Patterns and Mechanisms of Coastal Levees on the Sendai Bay Coast Hit by the 2011 Tsunami . In: Yev Kontar, V. Santiago-Fandiño, Tomoyuki Takahashi (Ed.): Tsunami Events and Lessons Learned: Environmental and Societal Significance (=  Advances in Natural and Technological Hazards Research ). Springer Science & Business Media, 2013, ISBN 978-94-007-7268-7 , ISSN  1878-9897 , Chapter 16, pp. 309-320 , doi : 10.1007 / 978-94-007-7269-4 ( in Kontar et al. Partially accessible online on Google Books [accessed March 8, 2016]).
  22. ↑ Anawat Suppasri, Nobuo Shuto, Fumihiko Imamura, Shunichi Koshimura, Erick Mas, Ahmet Cevdet Yalciner: Lessons Learned from the 2011 Great East Japan Tsunami: Performance of Tsunami Countermeasures, Coastal Buildings, and Tsunami Evacuation in Japan . In: Pure and Applied Geophysics . tape 170 , no. 6-8 , 2013, pp. 993-1018 , doi : 10.1007 / s00024-012-0511-7 . (Published online on July 7, 2012), here: p. 997, Figure 4. License: Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic (CC BY 2.0).
  23. ↑ Severe earthquake in Japan , Wiener Zeitung (accessed on November 14, 2013)
  24. ↑ a b c 平 成 23 年 (2011 年） 東北 地方 太平洋 沖 地震 （東 日本 大 震災） に つ い て （第 157 報) ( Memento of March 18, 2018 on WebCite ) ( PDF ( Memento of March 18, 2018 on WebCite )),総 務 省 消防 庁 (Fire and Disaster Management Agency), 157th report, March 7, 2018.
  25. ↑ a b Shinichi Omama, Yoshihiro Inoue, Hiroyuki Fujiwara, Tomohiko Mase: First aid stations and patient demand in tsunami-affected areas of Iwate Prefecture following the Great East Japan Earthquake . In: International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction . tape 31 , 2018, p. 435-440 , doi : 10.1016 / j.ijdrr.2018.06.005 . (First available online on June 12, 2018). License: Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
  26. ↑ The 175,000-ton ship lifted up and dumped on the harbor-side like a bit of driftwood by Japanese tsunami ( Memento of 27 May 2018 Webcite ) , dailymail.co.uk, March 19, 2011th
  27. ^ A b Maki Norio: Long-Term Recovery from the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami Disaster . In: V. Santiago-Fandiño, YA Kontar, Y. Kaneda (Ed.): Post-Tsunami Hazard - Reconstruction and Restoration (=  Advances in Natural and Technological Hazards Research (NTHR, volume 44) ). Springer, 2015, ISBN 978-3-319-10201-6 , ISSN  1878-9897 , chap. 1 , p. 1-13 , doi : 10.1007 / 978-3-319-10202-3 . (Published online 23 September 2014).
  28. ↑ Takahiro Sugano, Atsushi Nozu, Eiji Kohama, Ken-ichiro Shimosako, Yoshiaki Kikuchi: Damage to coastal structures . In: Soils and Foundations . tape 54 , no. 4 , August 2014, p. 883-901 , doi : 10.1016 / j.sandf.2014.06.018 .
  29. ↑ a b c d e Overview: Lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake . In: Federica Ranghieri, Mikio Ishiwatari (Ed.): Learning from Megadisasters - Lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake . World Bank Publications, Washington, DC 2014, ISBN 978-1-4648-0153-2 , Chapter 17, pp. 1–21 , doi : 10.1596 / 978-1-4648-0153-2 ( work accessible online on Google Books [accessed April 3, 2018]). , License: Creative Commons Attribution CC BY 3.0 IGO.
  30. ↑ 平 成 23 年 (2011 年） 東北 地方 太平洋 沖 地震 （第 124 報) ( Memento from March 25, 2018 on WebCite ) ( PDF ( Memento from March 25, 2018 on WebCite )), 総 務 省 消防 庁 (Fire and Disaster Management Agency), 124th report, May 19, 2011.
  31. ↑ 東 日本 大 震災 図 説 集 . In: mainichi.jp. Mainichi Shimbun- sha, May 20, 2011, archived from the original on June 19, 2011 ; Retrieved June 19, 2011 (Japanese, overview of reported dead, missing and evacuated).
  32. ↑ 平 成 22 年 国 勢 調査 - 人口 等 基本 集 計 結果 - (岩手 県 ， 宮城 県 及 び 福島 県) ( Memento from March 24, 2018 on WebCite ) (PDF, Japanese), stat.go.jp (Statistics Japan - Statistics Bureau , Ministry of Internal Affairs and communication), 2010 Census, Summary of Results for Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima Prefectures, URL: http://www.stat.go.jp/data/kokusei/2010/index.html .
  33. ↑ 東 日本 大 震災 記録 集 ( Memento from March 23, 2018 on WebCite ) , 総 務 省 消防 庁 (Fire and Disaster Management Agency), March 2013, here in Chapter 3 (第 3 章 災害 の 概要) the subsection 3.1 / 3.2 (3.1被害 の 概要 /3.2 人 的 被害 の 状況) ( PDF ( memento from March 23, 2018 on WebCite )).
  34. ↑ Tadashi Nakasu, Yuichi Ono, Wiraporn Pothisiri: Why did Rikuzentakata have a high death toll in the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami disaster? Finding the devastating disaster's root causes . In: International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction . tape 27 , 2018, p. 21-36 , doi : 10.1016 / j.ijdrr.2017.08.001 . (Published online on August 15, 2017), here p. 22, table 2.
  35. ↑ 平 成 23 年 (2011 年) 東北 地方 太平洋 沖 地震 （東 日本 大 震災） に つ い て （第 153 報) ( Memento of March 10, 2016 on WebCite ) , 総 務 省 消防 庁 (Fire and Disaster Management Agency), 153rd report, March 8, 2016.
  36. ^ S. Fraser, GS Leonard, I. Matsuo, H. Murakami: Tsunami Evacuation: Lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami of March 11th 2011 . In: GNS Science Report 2012/17 . Institute of Geological and Nuclear Sciences Limited, 2012, ISBN 978-0-478-19897-3 , ISSN  1177-2425 , 2.0, pp. I-VIII + 1–81 ( massey.ac.nz [PDF; accessed on June 29, 2018]). ; here: p. 3.
  37. ↑ Nam Yi Yun, Masanori Hamada: Evacuation Behavior and Fatality Rate during the 2011 Tohoku-Oki Earthquake and Tsunami . In: Earthquake Spectra . tape 31 , no. 3 , August 2015, p. 1237-1265 , doi : 10.1193 / 082013EQS234M . , here table 2.
  38. ↑ Shinji Sato: Characteristics of the 2011 Tohoku Tsunami and introduction of two level tsunamis for tsunami disaster mitigation . In: Proc. Jpn. Acad., Ser. B . tape 91 , no. 6 , 2015, p. 262-272 , doi : 10.2183 / pjab.91.262 .
  39. ↑ Stephanie Chang et al .: The March 11, 2011, Great East Japan (Tohoku) Earthquake and Tsunami: Societal Dimensions . In: EERI Special Earthquake Report . August 2011, p. 1-23 . Earthquake Engineering Research Institute (EERI).
  40. ↑ Mikio Ishiwatari, Junko Sagara: Structural Measures Against Tsunamis . In: Federica Ranghieri, Mikio Ishiwatari (Ed.): Learning from Megadisasters - Lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake . World Bank Publications, Washington, DC 2014, ISBN 978-1-4648-0153-2 , Chapter 1, pp. 25–32 , doi : 10.1596 / 978-1-4648-0153-2 ( work accessible online on Google Books [accessed on April 3, 2018]). , License: Creative Commons Attribution CC BY 3.0 IGO.
  41. ↑ a b Nobuo Mimura, Kazuya Yasuhara, Seiki Kawagoe, Hiromune Yokoki, So Kazama: Damage from the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami - A quick report . In: Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change . tape 16 , no. 7 , 2011, p. 803-818 , doi : 10.1007 / s11027-011-9304-z . (Published online May 21, 2011).
  42. ^ S. Fraser, GS Leonard, I. Matsuo, H. Murakami: Tsunami Evacuation: Lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami of March 11th 2011 . In: GNS Science Report 2012/17 . Institute of Geological and Nuclear Sciences Limited, 2012, ISBN 978-0-478-19897-3 , ISSN  1177-2425 , 2.0, pp. I-VIII + 1–81 ( massey.ac.nz [PDF; accessed on June 29, 2018]). ; here: p. 32.
  43. ^ S. Fraser, GS Leonard, I. Matsuo, H. Murakami: Tsunami Evacuation: Lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami of March 11th 2011 . In: GNS Science Report 2012/17 . Institute of Geological and Nuclear Sciences Limited, 2012, ISBN 978-0-478-19897-3 , ISSN  1177-2425 , 2.0, pp. I-VIII + 1–81 ( massey.ac.nz [PDF; accessed on June 29, 2018]). ; here: pp. 39f, 51-53, 79.
  44. ↑ 1000 年 後 に 残 し た い… 報道 映像 2011 , Nippon TV (日本 テ レ ビ 放送 網), first broadcast: December 23, 2011.
  45. ^ A b The Education Sector . In: Federica Ranghieri, Mikio Ishiwatari (Ed.): Learning from Megadisasters - Lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake . World Bank Publications, Washington, DC 2014, ISBN 978-1-4648-0153-2 , Chapter 8, pp. 77–82 , doi : 10.1596 / 978-1-4648-0153-2 ( work accessible online on Google Books [accessed on April 3, 2018]). , License: Creative Commons Attribution CC BY 3.0 IGO.
  46. ↑ a b c Strategies for Managing Low-Probability, High-Impact Events . In: Federica Ranghieri, Mikio Ishiwatari (Ed.): Learning from Megadisasters - Lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake . World Bank Publications, Washington, DC 2014, ISBN 978-1-4648-0153-2 , Chapter 32, pp. 297–304 , doi : 10.1596 / 978-1-4648-0153-2 ( work accessible online on Google Books [accessed April 3, 2018]). , License: Creative Commons Attribution CC BY 3.0 IGO.
  47. ↑ Japan: Looking to the past for answers - Survivors of Japan's worst natural disaster in decades may be forced to re-consider an old code of self-preservation ( Memento June 27, 2018 on WebCite ) , aljazeera.com, November 23 2011, by Donald Harding. Also available as video as: Witness - Tendenko: Surviving the Tsunami , YouTube, published on the YouTube channel Al Jazeera English on November 22, 2011.
  48. ↑ a b c Katsuya Yamori: Revisiting the Concept of Tsunami Tendenko: Tsunami Evacuation Behavior in the Great East Japan Earthquake . In: Hiroshi Kawase (Ed.): Studies on the 2011 Off the Pacific Coast of Tohoku Earthquake (=  Natural Disaster Science and Mitigation Engineering: DPRI reports (NADISME) ). Springer Japan, 2014, ISBN 978-4-431-54417-3 , ISSN  2196-4394 , chap. 5 , p. 49–63 , doi : 10.1007 / 978-4-431-54418-0 ( Part of the work can be accessed online on Google Books [accessed June 27, 2018]).
  49. ↑ a b c d e Isao Hayashi: Materializing Memories of Disasters: Individual Experiences in Conflict Concerning Disaster Remains in the Affected Regions of the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami . In: Bulletin of the National Museum of Ethnology [ 国立 民族 学 博物館 研究 報告 ] . tape 41 , no. 4 , March 30, 2017, p. 337-391 , doi : 10.15021 / 00008472 .
  50. ↑ 大 槌 町 総 合 政策 課 ・ 但 木 汎: 「防災 セ ン タ ー」 の 悲劇 【岩手 ・ 大 槌 町 か ら】 (17) ( memento June 28, 2018 on WebCite ) , j-cast.com, October 28, 2013.
  51. ↑ 報道 部 ・ 佐藤 将 人: 【記者 の 視点】 釜 石 の 悲劇 を 考 え る 、 間 違 っ た 避難 な ぜ ( Memento from June 28, 2018 on WebCite ) , kanaloco.jp (神奈川 新聞), September 20, 2013 (update: 12 March 2016).
  52. ↑ 釜石市鵜住居地区防災センターにおける東Ukraine Belarus Kazakhstan大震災津波被災調査委員会(ed.): 釜石市鵜住居地区防災センターにおける東日本大震災津波被災調査報告書( Memento of 28 June 2018 Webcite ) (PDF), city. kamaishi.iwate.jp (岩手 県 釜 石 市: Kamaishi City, Iwate Prefecture) March 4, 2014.

Remarks

Web links

Commons : Kamaishi  - collection of pictures, videos and audio files

Videos

Unedited video recordings of the March 11, 2011 tsunami in the port of Kamaishi, recorded by the Kamaishi Port Office, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT), provided by EERI member Shunsuke Otani.

cards

The tsunami hazard map with its tsunami flood information is based on three tsunami simulations (1st historical Meiji-Sanriku tsunami, 2nd historical Showa-Sanriku tsunami and 3rd predicted Miyagi-Oki earthquake tsunami). The map of the Kokudo Chiriin (国土 地理 院, Geographical Survey Institute = GSI) has been created on a scale of 1: 25000 and is intended for printing on A3 paper . The damage prediction study was carried out by Iwate Prefecture in 2003 and 2004.
  • 10 万分 1 浸水 範 囲 概況 図 , 国土 地理 院 ( Kokudo Chiriin , Geospatial Information Authority of Japan, formerly: Geographical Survey Institute = GSI), www.gsi.go.jp: 地理 院 ホ ー ム> 防災 関 連> 平 成 23 年 (2011年） 東北 地方 太平洋 沖 地震 に 関 す る 情報 提供> 10 万分 1 浸水 範 囲 概況 図:
The GSI published here a map with Kamaishi ( 浸水範囲概況図7 ), on which the 2011 flooded areas are drawn on the basis of reports of aerial photographs and satellite images from the Tōhoku tsunami, as far as was possible.