Kornwalzer scandal
The Kornwalzer scandal was a major corruption scandal in the German Empire that preoccupied the public from 1913 to 1914 . For years, Friedrich Krupp AG had bribed officials from the army administration in order to obtain internal information, including about the products of competing companies.
Operations
In order to maintain contact with authorities and ministries, the Essen-based Krupp Group had an office in Berlin. In order to develop relationships, Maximilian Brandt was hired in 1906 as "Bureauvorsteher" for Berlin, who until then had worked at the Essen headquarters. Because of his earlier work in the Berlin depot administration of the artillery examination commission, Brandt seemed particularly suitable for establishing contacts with the army administration.
He succeeded in doing this too. He met at least eight members of the Feldzeugmeisterei , the artillery examination commission and the Department of War for the foot and field artillery regularly in restaurants. He sent the information he received in reports to the Essen directory. To disguise them, they bore the internal name “Kornwalzer” and were usually sent without a signature or address with the inscription “secret” together with other letters in an envelope. In addition to price offers from competitors such as Phoenix AG or Rheinische Metallwaren- und Maschinenfabrik, they also contained information on the designs and demonstrations of competing products. Furthermore, they also described the decision-making criteria of the army administration when placing orders, delivery difficulties of competitors and future needs of the army.
The consideration that the informants received was, according to the judgment in the later court proceedings, comparatively low. Some were only invited to dinner or were given theater tickets. Others received amounts between 10 and 20 marks for interesting news. In addition, Brandt made gifts of up to 100 marks for Christmas and granted loans of up to 1000 marks, which were mostly repaid. The gifts were often not given as a direct consideration, but rather incidentally. According to the historian Frank Bösch, this contributed to taking the forbidden from the process. In addition to the financial benefits, Brandt also offered his informants the prospect of a successful career in business, as he had made. In at least one case, it should also have come about through an expert report prepared by him.
Exposure
At the beginning of November 1912, Karl Liebknecht , a member of the SPD in the Reichstag , received an envelope containing 17 "Kornwalzer" reports and an anonymous cover letter. It most likely came from Wilhelm von Metzen, a former Krupp employee who had been dismissed in September 1912. Although the latter later denied the dispatch in court and accused Brandt, copies of the reports sent to Liebknecht were found with him. Liebknecht first handed the material over to War Minister Josias von Heeringen . As a result, Brandt and several members of the military administration were arrested on February 7, 1913, and the company headquarters in Essen were searched and confiscated. 741 other secret reports were found. In addition, Kaiser Wilhelm was informed early on of the "betrayal of military secrets by criminal methods". However, the public did not learn about the investigations and arrests.
For this reason, Liebknecht announced the affair in the Reichstag on April 18, 1913 during a discussion about the defense budget . At first he was cautious and praised the Minister of War for his crackdown. It was not until the following day he pursed his discussion by saying, "These are a Panama, worse than Panama" to which he's affair with the Panama scandal likened who was a household word for corruption on a larger scale at the time.
Reactions
War Minister von Heeringen admitted the investigation, but denied the betrayal of secrets and praised Krupp's services. In addition, he cannot comment on an ongoing procedure and has no information about it. All parties in the Reichstag agreed that the offenses should, if applicable, be severely punished. The outrage went so far that a resolution introduced by the National Liberals and the Center in July was adopted in the Reichstag, which demanded that the procurement of war materials should be carried out by the Reich's own technical institutes. The government responded to the demands of all parliamentary groups in the Reichstag, with the exception of the conservatives, for an inquiry by creating a commission to examine arms deliveries , which included government and party representatives as well as business representatives.
Both Krupp and the government sent press releases to the newspapers via the WTB news agency on the evening the affair was announced . The government repeated the content of the war minister's statements. Krupp tried to downplay the affair by presenting the processes as customary in the industry and also as insignificant. In addition, the company emphasized that the group management only found out about the events through the police and immediately made all documents available. On the night of the publication, Alfred Hugenberg , the chairman of the Krupp board of directors, traveled to Berlin to organize the counter-campaign. In an interview published a few days later, he too tried to downplay the affair. He also untruthfully denied that he knew the secret reports. He also tried to morally reinterpret the scandal and use personal attacks to turn the "Krupp case" into a "Liebknecht case". Liebknecht answered this directly in Vorwärts , so that the affair seemed like a personal duel between him and Hugenberg. In the leading article on 27./28. August 1913 in the forward appeared, led Liebknecht via Krupp of:
"The idol of cheer patriotism, which Krupp transfigured in the nimbus of unlimited grace, yes, love of the imperial majesty, the ornament and glory of Germany, the holiest national saint, lay in the dust of lower capitalist humanity."
The conservative press also tried to reinterpret the scandal. The Deutsche Zeitung wrote :
"The most unheard of, but the most embarrassing thing, is that the press of the Red and Gold International, which is far too widespread in our country due to the national stupidity of the Germans, dare to treat every patriotic German active in public as a paid agent of the 'armored plate manufacturers', as' Percent Patriots' to inspire. So whoever loves his state, who loves his people with a hot heart [...] can be dragged into the dust of meanness by a loud chorus of miserable yappers [...] without a scream of indignation from the people's community about it! "
The Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger accused the Minister of War of entering into a formal pact with "Herr Liebknecht, this most committed enemy of the Prussian army."
The Krupp director Max Dreger even challenged Liebknecht to a duel.
The reports in the course of the trial against Brandt's informants were particularly indignant about the small sums the military officials are said to have received for their information. So wrote the BZ at noon :
“Nobody thought it was possible that one could buy real state secrets in Prussia at really bargain prices. Mr. Brandt paid ten to twenty marks and occasionally a warm supper in the 'Rheingold' to the witness lieutenant Schleuder and comrades for interesting news from the Ministry of Defense. "
Trial of officers
From July 31, 1913 to August 5, 1913 the first trial of seven army administration officers took place. They were accused of betraying military secrets , bribery and disobedience to military orders in around 900 cases. The process was open to the public, but the meeting room was so small that only twelve selected journalists could take part due to lack of space. According to the historian Frank Bösch, this should emphasize the minor importance of the process. The contents of the “Kornwalzer” reports were only presented in brief excerpts. However, this and the exclusion of journalists from some statements because of military secrecy enhanced the process and increased public interest.
Although the defendants admitted to divulging information, they showed little awareness of wrongdoing. One of the officers testified:
"I only did it because with the whole position at Krupp I had the feeling that Krupp and the state were one."
In addition, Brandt was better informed than her superiors. Therefore, the information did not seem secret to them. Brandt and the responsible Krupp directors only gave evidence in the process. Brandt confirmed the officers' statements by boasting that there were no military secrets for him in Berlin. The directors said the information had not resulted in any financial benefit for Krupp. The statements were rejected by the prosecution. An expert from the army administration emphasized that there were military secrets for Krupp too, which for good reason also included the prices of the competition.
Although the Military Criminal Code provided for up to five years imprisonment for serious corruption and up to three years imprisonment for less serious cases, the officers received sentences of only three weeks of arrest and up to six months in prison, which were below the demands of the prosecution. Three defendants have been dismissed from their service. These penalties were viewed as minor in the press.
Trial against Krupp employees
The trial against the Krupp company took place from October 28 to November 8, 1913. By awarding the Order of the Red Eagle to Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach in the summer of 1913, Kaiser Wilhelm II emphasized the company's support even before this process. The indictment was initially directed against six Krupp directors, including Hugenberg. But Krupp's lawyers succeeded in indicting, in addition to Brandt, only the Krupp director Eccius. Krupp's strategy remained the same as in the previous process. The importance of the "Kornwalzer" reports was downplayed. In addition, they would have been more likely to have contributed to lowering prices. As a result, neither the state was harmed nor the company benefited. In addition, competitors would also spy on Krupp. Instead of corruption, the defense spoke of "chatty". Eccius said he had forgotten who he had spoken to about the reports. The other directors, who only had to testify as witnesses, said they were too busy to read the reports. The court questioned these statements.
Further offenses were prevented from being investigated during the trial. Karl Liebknecht was immediately cut off during his testimony when he wanted to demonstrate that Brandt also received secret information from the Reichsmarineamt and that Krupp was bribing foreign newspapers.
The judgments in this trial were also very mild. Brandt was sentenced to four months in prison for continued bribery, which he had already served with pre-trial detention. The maximum penalty for active bribery was five years. The Krupp director Eccius received a fine of 1,200 marks for aiding and abetting continued bribery. The state assumed the costs of the proceedings.
The Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung ruled: "The Krupp company emerges from this process clean and flawless." The Kölnische Zeitung wrote:
"The military authorities emerged from the negotiations without any flaws, the fairy tales about special relationships between the War Ministry and the Krupp company have been completely eliminated."
consequences
The work of the commission to examine the arms deliveries , which was set up shortly after the scandal became known, was severely hindered by the government and remained largely inconclusive. Liebknecht, who had been proposed by the SPD as a commissioner, was rejected, whereupon the SPD withdrew completely from the commission. Despite discussions in the commission, the government stuck to Krupp as a producer. In 1914 the left wing of the center around Matthias Erzberger also gave up the demand for state military production.
After the second trial, Krupp urged the return of the “Kornwalzer” reports, in order to, according to his own statement, “burn them under supervision in the interests of national defense”. This destruction was also quick.
The affair had no negative consequences for the Krupp employees involved. Eccius resigned from the board of directors because of his poor health, but remained on friendly terms with the company. So Krupp had also taken over his fine and his expenses. During the First World War he worked in the press department of the Great General Staff . Brandt was fired, but generously compensated on the condition that Krupp approve new jobs. He later became head of the hemp clearing office created by the War Ministry and thus returned to a position as an intermediary between administration and business.
The outbreak of the First World War and their drafting gave the convicted officers the chance to start over in the military. The war was also one of the reasons the scandal was soon forgotten.
assessment
According to Bernhard Menne , the events involved the old issue of the fight between monopoly and weaker, but technically more successful, competitors. The supply contracts between the state and Krupp expired and were extended by 5 years in 1902 and 1907. According to Menne, Matthias Erzberger, who is on the supervisory board of Krupp's competitor, Thyssen AG , demanded in the Reichstag that orders be placed “also to companies that are willing to deliver cheaper than the previous ones,” and stated that the prices of Krupp would be 40% above those of the competition.
literature
- Wolfgang Benz : The origin of the Krupp news service . In: Quarterly Issues for Contemporary History Volume 24, Issue 2, Institute for Contemporary History , Munich 1976, pp. 199–212 ( pdf ).
- Frank Bösch : Krupps Kornwalzer, forms and perceptions of corruption in the empire . In: Historische Zeitschrift Volume 281 (2005) special print, pp. 337–379 ( pdf ). (Source for the article)
- Bernt Engelmann : The invisible tradition. Judge between Law and Power 1779-1918 (Vol. 1). Cologne 1988, pp. 319-337
- Werner Otto: Liebknecht versus armament capital, Karl Liebknecht's fight against Krupp, imperialism and the threat of war 1913/1914 . Berlin 1961. (Contains speeches and articles by Liebknecht on the subject)
- Anna Rothfuss: Corruption in the Empire. Debates and scandals between 1871 and 1914 . Göttingen 2019. pp. 255ff.
Individual evidence
- ↑ Bösch, pp. 347-348.
- ↑ Bösch, pp. 351–352.
- ↑ Bösch, pp. 349-350.
- ↑ a b Bösch, pp. 337–338.
- ↑ Manfred Rasch : Noble entrepreneurs at the end of the Wilhelmine era. In Hartmut Berghoff , Jürgen Kocka , Dieter Ziegler (eds.): Economy in the age of extremes. Contributions to the company history of Germany and Austria . Verlag CH Beck , 2010, p. 41 ( online at Google Books ).
- ↑ Bösch, p. 354.
- ↑ a b Bösch, pp. 356–357.
- ↑ Bösch p. 338
- ↑ Bösch, pp. 358–359.
- ↑ Bösch, pp. 359–361.
- ↑ Liebknecht contra armaments capital, p. 63.
- ↑ Klaus Wernecke, Peter Heller: The forgotten leader Alfred Hugenberg . Hamburg 1982, p. 52.
- ↑ Quotation from Georg Honigmann : Capital crime or the case of privy councilor Hugenberg . Berlin 1976, p. 132.
- ↑ Honigmann, p. 133.
- ↑ BZ am Mittag, No. 181, August 5, 1913, quoted in Bösch, p. 364.
- ↑ Bösch, pp. 361–362.
- ↑ Bösch, p. 351.
- ↑ Bösch, p. 363.
- ↑ Bösch, p. 364.
- ↑ Bösch, pp. 367–371.
- ↑ Quotation from Honigmann, p, 142.
- ↑ Quotation from Honigmann, p. 142.
- ↑ Bösch, pp. 372–373.
- ↑ Bösch, p. 375.
- ↑ a b Bösch, pp. 373-375.
- ↑ Bösch, p. 377.
- ^ Bernhard Menne : Krupp. Germany's cannon kings . Zurich 1937, p. 282 ff.