Melierdialog

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Melos 416 BC Between the hegemonic powers Athens and Sparta

The Melierdialog describes a famous episode in the historical work "The Peloponnesian War" by the Greek historian Thucydides . This is the discussion, which is contained in alternating speeches, on the one hand, between the representatives of the hegemonic power of Athens threatened with war , who ultimately demand the submission of the islanders of Melos to the Attic League regime , and on the other hand, the negotiators of the Melier, the Melos for independence from Athens looking to receive.

It was not the military importance of this conflict that Athens had at the time of a peace agreed with Sparta in 415/16 BC. Chr. In temporal proximity to other undertakings, another strategically special location of Melos, which could induce Thucydides to treat these processes in a way that is unique in his work. Because the description of the actual events plays only a marginal role compared to the exchange of motifs on both sides in the dialogue. With regard to the content and form of this dialogue, Thucydides can be understood to mean that he wanted to mark the turning point in the history of the great power Athens. For what followed immediately afterwards was the expedition to Sicily , which ended catastrophically for Athens and initiated its decline in power .

Thucydides, who traced human activity back to certain natural motive constants and claimed with his work to leave "a possession forever", did not reproduce in the Melierdialog, according to Wolfgang Will , what Athenians and Melier actually said to each other, but what they did "Have thought, but otherwise hid it behind diplomatic clichés in a public speech." The dialogue shows completely openly the positions on the one hand the overpowering Athenians and on the other hand the defeated Melier on the "right of the strong".

the initial situation

The Athenians landed on Melos with a fleet of 38 triremes (including allies from Chios and Lesbos ) in order to subdue the island, which until then had been the only one of the Cyclades to behave neutrally and refused to join the Attic League because it was one Was a colony of Sparta . The Athenian generals sent negotiators into the city with the aim of convincing the Melians of the advantages of voluntary submission.

Viewpoints and arguments in dialogue

Contrary to what the Athenians intended and thought to be favorable, their message did not reach the people's assembly of the Melians, but rather the authorities and the council of the nobles of Melos. The negotiation organized by Thucydides comprises 14 contributions from the Athenians and 13 from the Melians up to the resolution of the Meliers, with the Athenians' submissions also being slightly predominant in length. In addition to questions of power and law in intergovernmental relationships, the discussion also deals with the opportunities for benevolent neutrality and determined resistance.

Right and "fine words"

In view of the Athenian armed forces that had arrived, the Melians were skeptical from the start about being able to penetrate their legal grounds, and in the end saw only the choice between war and servitude. In Thucydides, the Athenians explicitly refrain from justifying their demand with “beautiful words” or “endless and incredible speeches”, for example with regard to their services in the Persian Wars . Rather, they point out that the Melians know as well as they do that law only comes into play in human relationships when there is equality of forces, but that otherwise the superior have to assert what is possible for themselves and the weaker have to submit to it.

Stay alive for mutual benefit

The Melians hold against the Athenians for the carelessness of surrendering the law, as they themselves might find themselves in a position again after losing their position of power, having to rely on the legal thinking and actions of others. The Athenians, on the other hand, are unimpressed by a possible loss of power in the future; It is safe to leave them to deal with it. Here and now it is important for them to maintain Melos in order to make it available to the benefit of both sides. For if the Melians submit, the Athenians could spare their forces; but the Melians remained alive and kept their land as subjects.

Controversial neutrality

The Melians asked whether it could not be enough for the Athenians that Melos would not join either of the two warring parties while maintaining a friendly-neutral relationship with them. No, answer the Athenians, because the friendship in question makes them appear weak in their position of power with others, while the hatred of the subjugated emphasizes their strength. When the Melier pointed out that with such action against Melos the Athenians would have to make enemies of everyone who had remained neutral in the conflict up to now, the Athenians said that there was little to fear from the undecided mainland cities in this regard - unlike in the maritime realm of the subjugated as well as the not yet subjugated islands like Melos.

Resistance between hope and illusion

The latter assessment of the Athenians in the dialogue compiled by Thucydides leads the Melians to the conclusion that in a situation in which the Athenians on the one hand and those who are subject to them on the other are prepared to dare the utmost against each other, “so it would be too low and cowardly of us freemen not to try every path before we become slaves. "The Athenians, on the other hand, counter misleading hopes if the Melians in their situation do not put their position:" and do not do it to the many the same, which, instead of seizing the still possible salvation as soon as the clear hopes leave them in the distress, build on the vague ones: prophecy, sayings of gods and everything that causes mischief with hopes. "

The Melians acknowledge that they would have to take up the fight under very adverse conditions; but in view of their just cause and the assistance that can certainly be expected from the Spartan League , confidence is not unreasonable. The Athenians, in turn, declare their actions to be in accordance with the laws of human nature and scoff at the supposed lack of understanding of the Melians: “But because of your Spartan hope, which you harbor, they would certainly help you for their honor, we praise you blessed for yours Believe in children without envious of your folly. "After three further speeches and counter-speeches to the prospects of assistance in a defensive battle of the Melians against Athens 'demands for submission, the negotiation ends with the Athenians' request to consider the pending decision:" Whoever does not give in to his own kind The stronger ones probably encountered, the weaker ones moderate, he usually drives best. So check while we wait outside, and think again and again: you decide on your fatherland, this one fatherland, and this one decision, which can be made or not, is what matters. "

Fall of the Melier

Siege of Melos
date 416 BC Chr.
place Milos in the Aegean
output Enslavement of the population
consequences Sicilian expedition
Parties to the conflict

Athens , Chios , Lesbos

Melos

Commander

Cleomedes, Teisias; Philocrates

Troop strength
38 ships;
2,700 hoplites , 300 riflemen, 20 mounted men 		low
losses

few men

Execution of all adult men

After the deliberation, the melish oligarchs stated in a brief resumption of the dialogue that they would not give up their 700-year-old freedom, but rather entrust themselves to the support of the gods and the Spartans and resist submission.

The Athenians then began to siege the city. They had crossed 1,200 hoplites , 300 riflemen and 20 cavalrymen in their own troops , as well as 1,500 heavily armed men from the allies. The generals Cleomedes and Teisias first had the place surrounded with a siege wall, and after they had assigned the guards, they left with their main force.

In two nightly outages, the Melians managed to kill some of the guards and bring grain stores into the city. The hopes of the besieged for Spartan relief were dashed, however, and in winter the town suffered severe hunger, which in later centuries became proverbial (“melic hunger”).

After the second sortie, the Athenians again led the siege more energetically and sent a new army under the command of Philocrates. Since there was also betrayal in the end, Melos finally yielded to mercy or disgrace.

The people's assembly in Athens decided on the lot of the prisoners in accordance with Alcibiades' request . Thucydides dedicates a few sentences to her fate:

“The Athenians executed all the adult Melians as far as they came into their hands, the women and children sold them into slavery. They re-founded the place themselves by later settling 500 Attic citizens there. "

Over ten years later, after Athens' final defeat in the Peloponnesian War in 404 BC. BC, Sparta arranged for the last surviving Melier to be returned to their island.

reception

Much of what has been said about Thucydides and his work relates to or includes the Melier dialogue. Jacob Burckhardt saw it as the “most complete philosophy of the might of the strong”. For Friedrich Nietzsche , Thucydides was the “human thinker” of a culture of “the most impartial knowledge of the world” and the Melierdialog the “terrible conversation”.

Wolfgang Will calls the Melierdialog a timeless text, "which is one of the most important in world literature and still shows no signs of age after almost 2500 years". But he evades simple interpretations: “Athenians and Melians speak without comment, and Thucydides does not say which arguments he approves and which he condemns, whether he accepts or criticizes the events as necessary for war, whether he takes the side of the defeated or pledges himself to his hometown sees. ”He masked his opinion by putting it in the mouth of different people in contradicting ways. "Thucydides suggests drawing conclusions, but he does not do the work for the reader."

The text has also cast a spell over contemporary poets, such as Giannis Ritsos , who published the collection of poems Milos in 1969 , or Bob Dylan , who is influenced by it in Chronicles, Volume One . Simon Werle used the Melierdialog as a basis in his drama The Invasion (2001).

See also

Translations

literature

  • Michael G. Seaman: The Athenian Expedition to Melos in 416 BC, in: Historia 46/4 (1997), pp. 385-418.
  • Nicolas Stockhammer: The Dialectic of Political Power. The Melierdialog in the light of current power theories. In: International Journal of Philosophy (IZPh) 15, 2006, pp. 23–43, ISSN  0942-3028
  • Wolfgang Will : The downfall of Melos. (Power politics in the judgment of Thucydides and some contemporaries) . Habelt, Bonn 2006. ISBN 3-7749-3441-X . [The study deals with the three decisive years in the history of the great power Athens, from the successful conquest of Melos to the unsuccessful conquest of Sicily.]
  • Wolfgang Will : Herodotus and Thucydides. The birth of history , Beck-Verlag Munich 2015, pp. 217–227 (on the Melier dialogue). ISBN 978-3-534-26804-7 .

Web links

Remarks

  1. ↑ Will 2015, p. 217. “In the traditional work, the report of the journey to Sicily immediately follows the Melier Dialogue; in the work's history, it precedes it. Thucydides did not record the conversation between the Athenians and Melians until after 404 and connected it with books six and seven, which were already completed at that time. "(Ibid., P. 218)
  2. ↑ Thucydides 1. 22nd
  3. ↑ Will 2015, p. 219.
  4. ↑ "If our words are not supposed to be directed at the people, obviously so that the crowd does not hear tempting and unproven things from us in one go and be infatuated (because this means, we notice, our leadership before the noble council ), so go ahead, you men gathered here, even more carefully: give your answer point by point, not even in a single speech, but interrupt us whenever we say something that does not seem acceptable to you. "(Thucydides 5 . 85; quoted from the translation by Landmann (Munich 1991, p. 434); Will 2015, p. 220.)
  5. ↑ Thucydides pp. 85-111.
  6. ↑ Thucydides 5, 86.
  7. ↑ ancient Greek καλὰ ονόματα
  8. ↑ Thucydides 5:89; Will 2015, p. 221.
  9. ↑ Thucydides pp. 90-93; Will 2015, p. 222.
  10. ↑ "In addition to increasing our rule, you would also bring us security if you submit and especially as an island - and even the weaker one - do not defy the sea power of Athens." (Thucydides 5. 97; quoted from the translation by Landmann (Munich 1991, p. 434))
  11. ↑ “For all those who do not yet belong to any of the leagues, don't you have to make them your enemies if they watch this and say to themselves that you would one day come against them too? And what do you do with it other than to strengthen your previous enemies and bring those who did not think of becoming one to it against their will? ”(Thucydides 5. 98; quoted from the translation by Landmann (Munich 1991, p . 434))
  12. ↑ Thucydides 5.99.
  13. ↑ Thucydides 5,100; quoted from the translation by Landmann (Munich 1991, p. 435).
  14. ↑ Thucydides 5, 103; quoted from the translation by Landmann (Munich 1991, p. 435 f.)
  15. ↑ Thucydides 5, 105; quoted from the translation by Landmann (Munich 1991, p. 436).
  16. ↑ Thucydides 5, 111; quoted from the translation by Landmann (Munich 1991, p. 438 f.)
  17. ↑ Thucydides, pp. 116; quoted from the translation by Landmann (Munich 1991, p. 440.)
  18. ↑ Quoted from Will 2015, p. 217.
  19. ↑ Quoted from Will 2015, p. 243.
  20. ↑ Will 2015, p. 217.
  21. ↑ Will 2015, p. 226. “This [the Melierdialog] appears as a justification and criticism of Attic imperialism, as an attack on Spartan hegemony or a general condemnation of brutal warfare.” (Ibid., P. 227)
  22. ↑ Will 2015, p. 227.
  23. ↑ Will 2015, p. 244 f.