Polcevera Viaduct

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Coordinates: 44 ° 25 ′ 32 ″  N , 8 ° 53 ′ 22 ″  E

Autostrada A10 Italia.svg Polcevera Viaduct
Polcevera Viaduct
Polcevera Viaduct, 2010
Official name Viadotto Polcevera
use Highway bridge of A10
Crossing of Val Polcevera
place Genoa
Entertained by Autostrade per l'Italia
construction Cable-stayed bridge
overall length 1182 m
width 24 m
start of building 1963
completion 1967
Status tore off
planner Riccardo Morandi
closure 2018
location
Polcevera Viaduct (Liguria)
Polcevera Viaduct

The Polcevera Viaduct ( Italian Viadotto Polcevera or colloquially Ponte Morandi and German Morandi Bridge and Ponte delle Condotte ) was an urban four-lane highway bridge the toll Autostrada A10 in Genoa , Italy . The cable-stayed bridge was planned by Riccardo Morandi and built from 1962 to 1967. On August 14, 2018, the western of the three pylons collapsed along with an approximately 250-meter-long section of the roadway, killing 43 people.

The two remaining pillars were blown up on June 28, 2019.

In addition to its importance as part of the motorway system for transit traffic to France, for example, the bridge was also of great importance for Genoa: It connected the east and west of the city and was part of the access route to the port , the largest in Italy. Up to 1,000 trucks per hour and more than 25½ million cars per year drove over the bridge; many of the residents of Genoa used the bridge on a daily basis. According to the newspaper La Repubblica , the collapse of the bridge not only threatened the regional Ligurian economy, but would also have serious effects on the entire Italian economy.

In November 2019, it was announced that managers from Atlantia , the parent company of the operating company, had known since 2014 that the bridge was in danger of collapsing.

location

The Polcevera Viaduct stood in Val Polcevera between the districts of Sampierdarena and Cornigliano at the end of the A 7 from Milan to Genoa and formed the beginning of the A 10 from Genoa to Ventimiglia and Nice .

description

The cable-stayed bridge with three approx. 90 m high pylons spanned a former marshalling yard at a height of 42 m with the first 212 m long bridge span (from east to west); with the second, 220 m long field, the apartment blocks of Via Enrico Porro, the Turin – Genoa railway line and the northern end of the Genova Sampierdarena Smistamento marshalling yard; and with the outer, 126 m long field, the Torrente Polcevera with its quayside and commercial buildings. The viaduct then crossed an industrial park with elevated ramps and ended in an elongated arch in front of the first tunnel of the A 10.

The pylon collapsed in 2018 with the steel cables embedded in concrete (2008)

The bridge comes after Morandi's bridge over Lake Maracaibo (completed in 1962) in Venezuela and before the bridge over Wadi al-Kuf (1971) in Libya .

Morandi used the same structural elements for these three bridges: The pylons consist of two A-shaped structures made of reinforced concrete , which are arranged next to the roadway and are only connected to one another by crossbars at their top and below the roadway. They have the necessary rigidity to absorb the variable loads that arise when vehicles driving over the bridge first load the bridge deck in front of the pylon and then the part behind it. For the same purpose, the bridge deck is supported by the V-shaped structures made of reinforced concrete rods between the pillars of the pylons.

The diagonal bracing consists of wire ropes that are pre-tensioned and embedded in a square concrete rod, which prevents the ropes from vibrating, which primarily stress the rope connections on the pylons and on the bridge deck. The construction also serves to protect against corrosion and was also chosen by Morandi for aesthetic reasons. Because of the bundling of the stay cables, the bridge is also assigned to the type of bridle strap . In the course of an overhaul of the Polcevera Viaduct, the concrete rods of the eastern pylon were reinforced by external tension cables.

The bridge deck is not continuous. The diagonal bracing of each pylon has a structurally independent prestressed concrete hollow box construction that protrudes only a little over the cable connections. The remaining space to the box girder on the next pylon is closed by a T - beam suspension girder , like a Gerber girder .

The V-shaped structures are also used in a similar form as the stand of the ramp bridge. There they each carry a T-beam that protrudes only a little over the uprights, while the gaps are in turn bridged by a suspension bracket.

In later cable-stayed bridges by Morandi such as the Viadotto Ansa del Tevere and the Carpineto Bridge , the stay cables were also bundled into belts, but they are anchored in the ground on one side and only connected to the girder on one side. At the Maracaibo Bridge there was no concrete sheathing of the suspension cables, but there was at the Wadi-al-Kuf Bridge. Svensson deals with them in his book about cable-stayed bridges under the chapter Cable-stayed bridges with concrete anchoring (which means the concrete sheathing of the suspension cables, the rein belts). Most cable-stayed bridges were and are made with several cables attached to the girder at different distances from the pylon, but Morandi did not take part in this development in the 1970s either.

Criticism of the construction and measurements on the bridge

Since the 1970s there were problems with the creeping of the concrete , which forced constant readjustments, for example to keep the roadway halfway horizontal. According to the civil engineering professor Antonio Brencich von Morandi, creep was not considered in the design. In addition, the prestressed concrete bars that surround the suspension cables could only be implemented with low pre-tensioning due to their slim structure. The prestress exerts pressure on the bar from both sides and thus counteracts the tensile stress on its underside (concrete can only absorb a small amount of tensile forces, otherwise cracks can easily form). Morandi's bridge over Wadi al-Kuf with the same construction principle in Libya was closed to traffic due to damage in 2017.

Other engineers also identified the prestressed concrete beams around the suspension ropes as a fundamental weak point in Morandi's designs, especially since they withdrew the suspension ropes from direct visual inspection. In addition, the bundling of the stay cables (principle of a rein belt bridge) in the beam means that the entire pylon collapses in the event of a total failure of the beam. In the opinion of bridge building experts, a lack of constructive redundancy was nothing unusual in the 1960s, and the consequence was usually increased maintenance costs in later years. Brencich has been criticizing the construction of the bridge for some time, calling it a “failure of engineering science” in a television interview with Primocanale in May 2016 and advocating demolition because of the age-related deterioration and the high repair costs.

In order to test the integrity of the suspension cables, reflection measurements and potential field measurements were carried out using electrodes on the suspension cables and the concrete surface. In addition, endoscopic visual inspections were carried out on the eastern pylon (No. 11), which revealed severe damage due to oxidation. Individual fibers were loose, which indicated a break further up in the suspension cable. In an expert report by the University of Genoa in the early 2000s on the bridge, the fundamental problem of increased corrosion due to the proximity of the sea and industrial emissions was pointed out. Morandi himself warned in 1979 of corrosion from the proximity of the sea and exhaust gases from a nearby steelworks and urged continuous repairs, but he considered the basic design of the bridge to be solid.

After investigations, renovation work was carried out on the eastern pylon in 1993. Engineer Gabriele Camomilla, director of the research and maintenance department of the motorways, was responsible for the execution and replaced the four suspension cables of the eastern pylon with 48 cables, all of which were controllable and individually replaceable. Consulting engineer Francesco Pisani was then doing the rehabilitation of the eastern pylon and recalled being told in the 1990s that the western pylon (No. 9) had been inspected and was in acceptable condition. However, more detailed investigations as on the eastern pylon were not carried out at that time.

In October 2017, civil engineers at the Milan Polytechnic working with Carmilo Gentile examined the prestressed concrete beams of the suspension cables on the western pylon using a new method: The eigenmodes of the beam's vibrations depend on the internal tension and thus provide indirect information on the condition of the suspension cables. There were considerable deviations from the expected behavior with an intact construction, which - according to the confidential report to the operating company - required further investigations. In particular, there were anomalies in the suspension cables on the south side of the pylon which later collapsed and which initially gave way according to the images from the surveillance cameras. Gentile worked on behalf of a subcontractor from Autostrada - Spea Engineering, which is also part of the Atlantia group - and recommended installing permanent sensors, but did not hear from his clients afterwards. Autostrada confirmed the recommendation, but in their impression it did not seem urgent and the installation of the sensors was planned for the renovation measures decided in June. They also accused the authorities of having processed the permit for the renovation of the bridge with a long delay.

L'Espresso reported on August 19, 2018 that a state commission of seven engineers met in Genoa in February 2018 to assess the operators' renovation proposals. The motorway operator, represented by two of its engineers, admitted at the time that the suspension cables had a cross-section and thus a load-bearing capacity reduction of 10 to 20 percent. This resulted from measurements with reflectometry and potential field measurement on the west pylon. A renovation was urgently needed, as also emerged from the assessment of other building elements. Antonio Brencich was also a member of the commission, chaired by Roberto Ferrazza, who had also been appointed head of the commission of inquiry into the accident by the Italian government. Brencich objected to the test methods, but these were downplayed. He criticized the fact that no gamma ray fluoroscopy of the concrete rod with the suspension ropes was carried out in situ , and he criticized the in-situ concrete tests carried out by the operators ( SonReb method , combined with Windsor probe ), which were scientifically outdated due to excessive error margins. He also criticized the fact that no core samples were taken of the concrete. Nonetheless, the commission (including Brencich) recommended following the operators' proposals for a renovation, which was put out to tender in May and provided for extensive renovation work on the suspension cable construction on the west and east pylons, similar to the one on the east pylon in the 1990s. A reduction in traffic was not proposed and did not take place.

operator

The operator of the toll motorway and responsible for the maintenance of the bridge since privatization in 1999 is Autostrade per l'Italia , 88% of which is owned by Atlantia in Rome, a listed infrastructure group whose largest shareholder - the Luxembourg Sintonia with 30% - of the business family Benetton is controlled. The Polcevera Bridge was part of the European trunk road network and was therefore subject to special EU testing and safety requirements. However, the Italian authority was responsible for the implementation of the security controls, monitoring the operator with a currently valid license until 2042.

The Polcevera Viaduct (2007). In 2018 the western pylon (left) and around 250 meters of the road collapsed

history

Planning and construction

The bridge was designed by Riccardo Morandi . It was built from 1962 by the Società Italiana per Condotte d'Acqua and inaugurated on September 4, 1967 in the presence of President Giuseppe Saragat . The construction costs amounted to 3.8 billion Italian lira .

Repair work

From 1992 to 1994 repair work was carried out on the steel cables, some of which were severely corroded . In 2014, the Genoese newspaper Il Secolo XIX said it was time for the demolition. In May 2016 Antonio Brencich , professor at the University of Genoa and an expert in reinforced concrete, said: “The moment will come when the cost of maintenance will be higher than the cost of simply replacing the bridge. At the end of the 1990s, spending was 80 percent above the construction costs. ”In May 2018, road works worth 20 million euros were put out to tender. Including a renovation of the suspension cable system on the west pylon and the east pylon, similar to the one on the east pylon in the 1990s. The application period ended in September.

On the morning of the day of the collapse, work was in progress on the bridge near the collapsed pylon (renovation of the deck to the east, work to the west was carried out in 2017). New lateral concrete protection walls ( Jersey barriers ), a bridge carriage and a safety net were installed under the bridge. This was not part of the renovation measures announced in May 2018.

According to the operator, the maintenance costs in Genoa are generally twice as high as in the rest of Italy and, especially for bridges, four times as high, partly because of the outdated infrastructure.

Collapse in 2018 and subsequent demolition

The collapsed area colored in red
The partially collapsed Polcevera Viaduct on August 14, 2018
Detail (on August 19, 2018)
Image of the demolition of the ruins of the Polcevera Viaduct

On August 14, 2018 at 11:36 a.m., the western pylon collapsed together with the suspension girders on both sides, which corresponds to a length of 250 meters. 30 to 35 cars and three trucks fell into the depths, killing 43 people. Several people were in the hospital, some in critical condition. Thirteen of the fatalities were foreigners (four French, three Chileans, two Albanians, two Romanians, one Colombian and one Peruvian). At least two people were injured in adjacent houses that were hit by parts of the bridge. Former professional football goalkeeper Davide Capello survived the crash of his car. On August 19, the search for more people at the scene of the accident was stopped as there were no more missing.

At the time of the collapse there were heavy rain and thunderstorms. An eyewitness reported strong vibrations in the bridge shortly before it collapsed.

Antonio Brencich, who was appointed an expert member of the government's commission of inquiry after the collapse, attributes the collapse to "signs of deterioration". As a precautionary measure, after the collapse, over 600 people had to leave their homes near the bridge indefinitely. After suspicious noises were heard from the bridge, residents were no longer allowed to enter their apartments for a short time. The regional president of Liguria, Giovanni Toti, promised all evacuees new apartments in a maximum of eight weeks. The Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte declared a state of emergency for the northern Italian city for a period of twelve months .

In September 2018, the first evaluations of the bridge's surveillance cameras became known. Then the southern suspension ropes on the collapsed pylon 9 gave way. That was probably also the source of the rumbling heard by ear witnesses. As a result, the suspension girders on both sides of the pylon collapsed, then the northern suspension ropes gave way, and finally the pylon collapsed. These events happened within a few seconds.

A preliminary court opinion by the Eidgenössische Materialprüfungs- und Forschungsanstalt (Empa) published in December 2018 blames the lack of maintenance of the steel cables on the 9th pillar for the collapse. The steel cables are said to have rusted halfway through there on average.

The demolition work began on February 8, 2019 with a small state act. On June 28, 2019, the two main pylons still standing were blown up at the same time. Previously, the suspension girder still in the bridge field between the eastern pylons had been lowered to the ground using temporary auxiliary piers and broken off there.

On July 1, 2019, another video of the collapse of the Ponte Morandi was released by the Italian authorities. In contrast to the previously published material, this shows the collapse from a very close position. The video shows how the southwestern cable breaks first and the entire pylon with the vehicles driving on it collapses within seconds.

Legal processing

The public prosecutor's office announced in September 2018 that it was investigating 20 people and the motorway operator for negligent homicide and disregard of safety regulations. As of December 2018, charges are being brought against the operator, the company SPEA, which is also part of Atlantia, and which is responsible for the control and maintenance of the bridge, and 21 people, in addition to employees of the two companies, as well as those of the Ministry of Transport.

Political reactions and consequences of the collapse

Immediately after the collapse, politicians from the 5-star movement and the Lega Nord attacked and blamed the operating company Autostrade per l'Italia . In the past, politicians of the 5-star movement themselves had intensely opposed the Passante di Genova traffic concept, which was intended to relieve the traffic . On the blog of the Party for Genoa, authors wrote in a post from 2013 about the “regularly warmed up fairy tale of the imminent collapse of the Morandi Bridge”. When rejecting the relief project in a council meeting, a local politician of the party relied on statements by the operator that “the bridge will still be in 100 years” if it would be regularly maintained. Also Beppe Grillo wrote that the Morandi Bridge still some 50 years will make their service. These and similar announcements were deleted from social networks after the bridge collapsed.

With the public criticism of Autostrade and its parent company Atlantia , there were also voices calling for the license to be withdrawn. The share price of Atlantia was temporarily suspended from stock exchange trading and temporarily fell by up to 26 percent on the following trading day. All maintenance had been carried out in accordance with the contract, said Atlantia immediately after the accident and thus contradicted the government. Giovanni Castellucci, CEO of Atlantia, said that the company wants to build relief roads, provide other relief measures totaling around 500 million euros and build a new steel bridge within eight months, provided that the necessary permits are in place. Nevertheless, the Italian Interior Minister Matteo Salvini (Lega Nord) wanted to withdraw the concession for their entire Italian network from Autostrade , as he said the following day.

Matteo Salvini also criticized the European Union for restrictions imposed by Italy, u. a. because of its budget deficit , demanded. He compared these to the “security of the Italians” and the “right to life, health and work” and announced that those “restrictions of the EU” would in future be given lower priority. It is "unacceptable to die this way in Italy". EU Commissioner Günther Oettinger and the spokesman for the European Commission, Christian Spahr, rejected Salvini's allegations. Rather, the EU approved the Italian investment plan for transport projects in April 2018; How the money is used or where they generally set the priorities in their investments is a decision of the member states. The EU has also provided 2.5 billion euros in the current budget for Italian transport projects.

The EU Parliament President Antonio Tajani also rejected the criticism and stated that the Italian problems were due to a homemade blockade of investment projects. Of the structural funds made available by the EU by the end of 2020, amounting to 73.6 billion euros, Italy had only spent three percent by the end of 2017. Italian contractors complained that infrastructure projects worth € 21 billion were blocked in Italy in 2018.

The Swiss Re is the primary insurance the highway.

Cultural reception

The composer Ennio Morricone , known for his film music, wrote as the last piece before his death a four-minute homage to the 43 victims of the bridge collapse with the title Tante pietre a ricordare (German Many stones as a memory ). In doing so, he complied with a request from the theater manager of Genoa. The piece for orchestra and choir was performed at a concert at the Teatro Carlo Felice on August 2, 2020, one day before the opening of the replacement building for the Polcevera Viaduct.

New building under the name Genova San Giorgio

Construction sign during construction

The Genoese architect Renzo Piano was commissioned to plan the new building, and he prevailed against Santiago Calatrava . Piano's design consists of a simple, minimalist beam bridge . The 1067 meter long bridge girder has 19 fields. 14 are 50 meters long, three in the middle above the Polcevera river are 100 meters and one each is 40.9 meters and 26.27 meters at the edge. The cross-section of the steel composite structure is reminiscent of a ship's hull; it is supported by elliptical reinforced concrete pillars. There is a tall street lamp on the bridge for each of the 43 victims. Calatrava had submitted three designs: a cable-stayed bridge, an arched bridge and also a simple design with continuous girders.

The construction company Salini Impregilo and the Italian state-controlled companies Fincantieri and Italferr (a subsidiary of the Italian State Railways ) built the new bridge with a budget of 202 million euros . The cost of demolition and new construction, estimated at 430 million euros , was to be paid by the operator of the bridge, Autostrade per l'Italia , by state decree , which was also excluded from participating in the demolition and construction work. This announced that he wanted to take legal action against it.

According to Mayor Marco Bucci, work was carried out on the new building 24 hours a day, but the original deadline for approval in April 2020 could not be met. 17,000 tons of structural steel were used for the more than one kilometer long section of the bridge. The last section of the track was used on April 28, 2020. Due to restrictions to contain the COVID-19 pandemic , there was only one small ceremony that day. Stability tests took place in July 2020, during which the bridge was loaded and checked by trucks with a total weight of more than 2500 tons. The inauguration of the new bridge, named Genova San Giorgio ( Saint George's Bridge), took place on August 3, 2020 and it was opened to traffic on August 5. The relatives of the people who died when the previous bridge collapsed did not take part in the inauguration ceremony.

In 2018, Bucci had also announced an international competition for the rebuilding of the district, which was partially destroyed by the collapse. The jury decided on the project of a planning team led by the Milanese architecture firm Stefano Boeri Architetti. The main structure of his master plan is "Il Cerchio Rosso" ("The Red Ring"). A 1½ km long pedestrian and bicycle path will lead through the planning area, optically marked by a bright red circular steel band, under the new bridge, which will connect the places of the accident and the settlement areas on both sides of the river. The path also links a system of open spaces of different characters, the "Parco del Polcevera", also called "Parco del Ponte", designed by Petra Blaisse by the Dutch planning office Inside Outside . The core of the park and the first to be realized is a memorial installation called “Genua nel bosco” (“Genoa in the forest”), conceived by the Genoa artist Luca Vitone, who lives in Berlin is planted. The architectural concept for the redevelopment of the area was developed by the Milan office Metrogramma . The concept developed with the participation of the Stuttgart energy technology office Transsolar provides, among other things, that all buildings generate renewable energy and a 120 meter high wind tower. The blocks of flats standing diagonally under the bridge are to be demolished; 266 families are affected.

See also

Web links

Commons : Polcevera Viaduct  - Collection of Images, Videos and Audio Files

Individual evidence

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  72. How money should mend the crack through Genoa , Spiegel Online, January 27, 2019.

Remarks

  1. When converted at the official exchange rate of the lira to the euro, this corresponds to around EUR 1.96 million (without adjustment for cost of living)