Predicables

As predicables ( Latin praedicabilia , in the figurative sense: modes of expression, ancient Greek κατηγορόυμενα kategoroumena ), especially in scholastic philosophy, terms are used to describe the way in which an object can be spoken of. In contrast to this are the categories (also predicaments) which are expressed in terms of content about an object.

Porphyry differed in his Isagoge five predicables:

1. Genus (ancient Greek γένος génos , Latin genus ) is what is said of several things, which are different by type, when specifying the what or the essence ( Topic I 5, 102a), for example "Socrates is a living being". Genera can relate to one another hierarchically. Example: mammal, animal, living being (see genus proximum )
2. Kind (ancient Greek εἶδος eídos , Latin species ) is what is said about several individuals, for example "two-legged, speaking mammals are humans".
3. Difference (ancient Greek διαφορά diaphorá , Latin differentia ) denotes the peculiar difference that a genus has compared to a superordinate genus, for example the animal genus is superordinate to the mammal genus. The peculiar difference is that in mammals the young are suckled by the mother.
4. Proprium (ancient Greek ἴδιον ídion , Latin proprium ) is what does not designate the essence of a thing, but only belongs to it and is interchanged with it in the statement (Topic I 5, 102b), for example "man is capable of grammar". A proprium is therefore a predicate that does not express a necessary property, but is extensionally the same as the subject . Since it belongs exclusively to its subject, one can say that it denotes a peculiar characteristic of the thing.
5. Akzidens (ancient Greek συμβεβηκός symbebēkós , Latin accidens ) is that which belongs to one and the same object and cannot (Topik I 5, 102b), for example “a person has a beard”. Commercial work is a random ( contingent ) property. Commercial work is therefore an insignificant characteristic of a thing.

The logical meaning of the doctrine of predicables is the "attempt to analyze the structure of the proposition ... with regard to the relationship between subject and predicate."

History of philosophy

Aristotle already distinguished five types of predicates in statements:

“Everything that is predicted by something [ pan to peri tinos kategoroumenon ] necessarily allows either the inversion of subject and predicate or not. If it allows it, then what is predicted is either definition or proprium: if there is the essence [ to ti en einai ] of the subject, then it is definition, if not, proprium. We considered that to be proprium, which is exchanged with the subject [ antikathgoroymenon ], but does not indicate its essence. But if it does not allow the inversion of subject and predicate, then it is either part of the definition of the subject or it is not. And if it is part of it, it must be genus or difference, since the definition consists of genus and difference; but if it is not part of it, then it is obviously an accident; for as accidental we denote what is neither definition nor genus nor proprium, but belongs to the thing of which one speaks. "

- Aristotle : Topik I, 8, f 103b10.

The following scheme results:

Predications

Inversion of subject and predicate is possible

Inversion of subject and predicate is not possible

Definition indicates the essence of the subject

Proprium does not indicate the essence of the subject

Part of the definition of the subject

Accidental does not form part of the definition of the subject

genus

difference

In the Middle Ages, the discussion of predicables based on the isagogue was part of the standard repertoire of "ancient logic" ( logica vetus ).

Immanuel Kant used the concept of predicables in a different sense to designate general understanding concepts derived from the categories such as power, action, suffering, presence, resistance. With reference to Aristotle, he also referred to his categories as predicaments (cf. KrV B 94, B 107).

literature

• Hans Michael Baumgartner , P. Kolmer: Predicables, predicables theory . In: Joachim Ritter ua (Hrsg.): Historical dictionary of philosophy . Volume 7, Schwabe, Basel 1972, Sp. 1179-1186

Individual evidence

1. ↑ Bocheński, Formal Logic , 2nd edition, 1962, p. 61 f.