President of Chile

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President of the Republic of Chile
Flag of the president
Standard of the President
Retrato Oficial Presidente Piñera 2018.jpg
Acting President
Sebastián Piñera
since March 11, 2018
Official seat La Moneda Palace in Santiago de Chile
Term of office 4 years (direct re-election not possible)
Creation of office July 9, 1826
Salutation Su excelencia (Your Excellency)
Last choice 2017
website www.gob.cl

The President of the Republic of Chile is both the head of state and the head of government of the Republic of Chile . He is directly elected by the people for a four-year term; a second term is only possible after an interruption by another president. The current incumbent is the entrepreneur Sebastián Piñera , who is supported by the right-wing party alliance Chile Vamos .

Chile has been independent since 1810; a presidential system and the title of President for the head of state had become naturalized since the 1820s . In the constitution of 1833 the president was given a dominant position in the political system. After a period of powerful presidents with ten-year re-elected terms, their influence eroded and the presidency weakened in favor of parliament. Between 1891 and 1925, the President practically only exercised a representative function, despite the same constitution, before the 1925 constitution strengthened him again. After the military couped to power in 1973 , a new constitution came into force under the dictator Augusto Pinochet in 1980, the main features of which are still in force today. A constitutional amendment in 2005 removed some authoritarian enclaves from the constitutional text.

The Chilean President has extensive powers of appointment. The composition of his cabinet is done without the consent of parliament, and he also appoints the directors of the regions, mayors, judges of the Supreme Court, lawyers of the constitutional court and the chief commanders of the armed forces . In the legislative process , the president has sole right of initiative in large parts of economic and financial policy . The budget proposal of the President, Parliament must advise within 60 days, otherwise it will automatically enter into force. It can also use special levels of urgency to accelerate the legislative process or bring topics into focus. Legislative decrees , like those in other Latin American states, which allow the president to govern without parliamentary approval, are limited to one policy area and one year in Chile.

Nevertheless, the office of the Chilean President is often classified as extremely powerful in Latin American and global comparison. The decisive factor for this is its dominant position in the legislative process, although some observers admit that despite everything it is dependent on the support of a parliamentary majority.

The first five presidents of Chile since democratization: from left Ricardo Lagos (2000–2006), Michelle Bachelet (2006–2010, 2014–2018), Sebastián Piñera (2010–2014), Patricio Aylwin (1990–1994) and Eduardo Frei Ruiz -Tagle (1994-2000)

Constitutional development

After independence

Chile had been independent since 1810, but only achieved full independence after the Chilean troops defeated the Spanish royalists in the Battle of Chacabuco in 1817 . The Commander in Chief of the Chilean Army, Bernardo O'Higgins , took over the post of Director Supremo , the country's highest director , after the victory . In 1818 he enforced an authoritarian transitional constitution in which he rose to head of state. With the independent judiciary and the Senate , counterweights to the executive were created, but O'Higgins determined the Senate members. When he sought a constitutional reform that would extend his reign for another ten years, there was a coup in 1823 by General Ramón Freire y Serrano , who became the new Director Supremo, until he was forced to resign by Congress and insurgents in 1826, although it was brief had previously driven out the last Spanish troops within Chile. Thereafter, Congress decided to elect the newly created office of President for the first time, choosing Manuel Blanco Encalada , who became the first President of Chile on July 9, 1826.

In the following years, however, the political situation in Chile remained unstable. Blanco resigned after two months and left his post to Vice President Agustín Eyzaguirre , who in turn was forced to resign in January of the following year by Ramón Freire. Freire was briefly president in 1827 before his vice president Francisco Antonio Pinto succeeded him. General Ramón Freire (1823–1826, 1827) and General Francisco Antonio Pinto (1827–1829) were considered liberal and brought new constitutional projects on the way, which, however, turned out to be useless. Among them, however, the term "President" became commonplace for the head of state. The social split between the liberal and conservative camps ultimately led to a civil war, which the conservatives won after winning the Battle of Lircay in 1830. With the victory of the conservatives, the political system stabilized for the time being.

Constitution of 1833

Diego Portales, namesake of the Portuguese constitution

In 1831, Interior Minister Diego Portales convened a constitutional congress, which in 1833 created the "Portalian" constitution, an unusually long-lasting constitution that took into account the supremacy of the conservatives. The constitution was formally based on the US presidential system . The president should be elected every five years, with re-election permitted. Officially, it was a representative democracy , but since the right to vote was linked to property, only a few Chileans were allowed to vote. As a counterbalance to the President, the bicameral parliament was given sovereignty over the budget and taxes. In practice, however, the position of the president was overwhelming: he appointed the provincial directors, through whom he controlled the administration to the most remote parts of the country. In addition, he was able to buy votes and assign offices to his followers, so that the formation of an opposition in parliament did not occur. By playing in the cards of the president through emergency laws , parliament helped to overthrow its own power. In the following 40 years, General José Joaquín Prieto Vial (1831–1841), General Manuel Bulnes Prieto (1841–1851), Manuel Montt (1851–1861) and José Joaquín Pérez (1861–1871) ruled only four presidents.

From the middle of the 19th century the rise of the Chilean bourgeoisie emerged, which increasingly demanded political participation. In the 1870s the modernization approaches of the liberal middle class finally broke ground. Fundamental constitutional changes were made after the 1870 congressional election. The direct re-election of the president was canceled, ending the presidential decade. In 1871, Federico Errázuriz Zañartu became the first Liberal President again. During his term of office there was a change in the right to vote, which from now on all men aged 21 and over who could read and write were entitled to. Although this new right to vote still excluded large sections of the population, electoral fraud became more difficult; However, corruption and interference in the electoral process continued. Direct elections were introduced for the Senate, which further restricted the power of the president.

The strengthening of parliament ultimately led to a constitutional conflict because the liberal presidents did not agree to their power being restricted either. In the 1880s, the Chilean economy flourished and President José Manuel Balmaceda wanted to reinvigorate the role of President to push through large construction projects. When Chile was hit by an economic crisis in 1890, a conflict arose between the President and Congress . Congress refused to endorse the Balmacedas budget, whereupon the latter declared its budget to remain valid. Parliament finally accused him of breaching the constitution and instructed the navy under Jorge Montt Álvarez to restore constitutional order. The army fought on Balmaceda's side, leading to a civil war in 1891 , which the government troops finally lost. Balmaceda fled to the Argentine embassy and committed suicide the day his tenure ended. With his death, a process ended in which Parliament had won more and more rights to the detriment of the President.

The predominance of the Congress over the executive lasted until the 1920s and is commonly referred to as the phase of the "Parliamentary Republic" . The 1833 constitution remained in force but was interpreted differently. The president's influence declined because he needed the approval of parliament on issues relating to the budget, administrative expenses and the military budget, which he could no longer dissolve. In 1891 Jorge Montt Álvarez was promoted to the highest office in the state. He and his successors understood their role to be more representative and left most of the decisions to Congress.

1925 Constitution

In the presidential election in 1920 , Arturo Alessandri Palma, the candidate of the working class and the middle class, was able to prevail. The initial enthusiasm soon turned into dissatisfaction because Alessandri was unable to implement the hoped-for reforms due to a stalemate in parliament and resistance in his own ranks. The dissatisfaction with the political situation was paired with economic uncertainty, which ultimately led to a coup in 1924.

Under pressure from the military, Alessandri worked out a new constitution with the participation of all political parties, which was supposed to end the deadlock of previous years. A connection point to the Portuguese constitution of 1833 was the renewed strengthening of the executive branch. The president was given powers of appointment in administration, the army and the judiciary, he was allowed to pass emergency laws, and the centralized state order extended his sphere of influence to the provinces. One term of office was extended to a period of six years. If a candidate failed to achieve an absolute majority in the first ballot, Congress chose between the two candidates who had received the most votes. The alliance of President Alessandri and the military Carlos Ibáñez , who served as Minister of War, broke up over the question of who should run for president in the 1925 presidential election. Over the next few years an authoritarian military regime developed, headed by Carlos Ibáñez. When the Chilean economy collapsed as a result of the global economic crisis , riots broke out across the country, which brought the regime down. Alessandri returned as president in 1932 and ushered in a period of stability. This phase lasted until 1973 and meant that during this period Chile was considered a stable democracy in Latin American comparison. During this time, the powers of the president were expanded to include greater influence in the legislative process.

The victory of Salvador Allende in the 1970 presidential election marked a decisive turning point in the history of Chile. The dedicated Marxist Allende always had to contend with the distrust of the political right and the military. Domestically, Allende was not very successful because its economic policy was marked by failures and numerous workers' uprisings destabilized the situation in the country. In the summer of 1973 the parties were irreconcilable, and the executive and legislative branches, dominated by the right, accused each other of violating the constitution. On September 11, 1973, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Augusto Pinochet, put himself at the head of the state. In late 1974, Pinochet assumed the title of President.

1980 Constitution

When the military junta took office, the constitution of 1925 de facto ceased to be in force, but the regime continued to invoke the emergency provisions anchored in it, with which it ruled in the following years. Provisions that did not comply with these emergency provisions were made constitutional amendments. In 1977 Pinochet began drafting a new constitution, which basically aimed at a return to a representative democracy. In an undemocratic plebiscite controlled by the military , the constitution, which is still basically valid today, was adopted in 1980. Its most important features were the strengthening of the President in the legislative process, the introduction of appointed senators and the creation of the National Security Council COSENA , which was to act as a fourth instance alongside the executive, legislative and judicial branches. Transitional articles made it possible for Pinochet to continue to govern until 1989 without having to stand in an election.

Pinochet wanted a referendum on October 5, 1988 to secure another eight-year term in office. Surprisingly, however, a large part of the Chileans spoke out against it, so that the provisions for elections for the President and Congress for 1989 took effect. In July 1989 there was a first reform with 54 constitutional amendments. a. Restricted the president's emergency rights and forbade him to dissolve Congress. For the presidential election in 1989 three candidates competed: The opposition party alliance Concertación agreed on the Christian Democrats Patricio Aylwin , the rights relied on Hernán Buchi and the millionaire Francisco Javier Errazuriz ran as independent. With Aylwin's victory, the dictatorship ended in Chile and the country returned to democracy.

After a transition phase of four years, the following two presidents Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle and Ricardo Lagos were each elected for six years. The constitutional reforms discussed for years always failed due to the resistance of the right-wing opposition, which was favored by the binomial electoral system , since the necessary majority in the two parliamentary chambers could not be achieved. It was not until 2004/2005 that the Concertación received the necessary two-thirds majority in the Senate. The 58 constitutional amendments, which came into force on August 26, 2005, provided, among other things, that presidents would no longer have the right to a seat in the Senate for life, that the commander-in-chief of the armed forces would report to the president and that the president's term of office would be four years is shortened. While some are speaking of a new constitution in light of these and other changes, critics complain that there was no constituent assembly and that problems such as the recognition of the Mapuche and the abolition of binomial suffrage have not been resolved.

choice

Presidential candidate Eduardo Frei casting his vote

Term of office

The election of the Chilean president takes place every four years. There is no possibility of direct re-election. An outgoing president can, however, take part in the next but one presidential election. The 1980 constitution provided for a term of office of eight years, which was corrected during the 1989 constitutional reform. Instead of eight years, the transition's first presidency should be a transition phase of four years. The following two terms of office each lasted six years. Since the 2005/2006 presidential election, Chileans have been voting again every four years. The new change was made so that presidential and parliamentary elections take place in parallel, thus minimizing the risk of different majority relationships, which can lead to a divided government . If no candidate succeeds in obtaining an absolute majority of the votes in the first ballot , a second ballot is necessary in which only the two candidates compete against each other who received the most votes in the first ballot. This runoff election takes place 30 days after the first election.

Suffrage

The right to vote is granted to citizens over 18 years. In the past, this required registration in the electoral roll. Registration in the electoral register was voluntary, but voting was then compulsory. In the 2009/2010 presidential elections, however, only 86 percent of those registered for the election made use of their voting rights. In addition, many young Chileans had not even entered the electoral register, so that in total around 40 percent of the potential voters did not take part in the election. In the run-up to the Chilean local elections in 2012, the electoral law was reformed. From then on, every eligible voter was automatically listed in the electoral register and voting was voluntary. This was intended to counter the trend of declining voter turnout. The number of potential voters rose by 5.3 million to 13.4 million, but the turnout in the following local elections fell to a historic low of almost 40 percent.

Nomination of the candidates

To run for president, you must be at least 35 years old and born in Chile. Presidential candidates are usually nominated by a party or a party alliance. In contrast to other Latin American countries, there are no regulations in Chile as to how the election process must take place, so that clear differences can be identified between the two political blocs: Within the Concertación, the selection process has become more and more democratic since the end of the Pinochet regime and for outsiders open. In 1989 the candidate was still determined in leadership circles, in 1993 there were closed primaries in which supporters of the Concertación could take part, and in 1999 there were open primaries. Since 2005, the parties of the Concertación have standardized and institutionalized their open nomination practices. The selected candidates can all be described as loyal supporters or people close to the party.

In the right-wing party alliance, on the other hand, the presidential candidates have been determined by the party elites since 1989, who above all ensure that the candidate is charismatic, has good poll numbers and has already had election successes. In contrast to the Concertación, the party-political background of the candidates of the right-wing alliance is different. With Arturo Alessandri Besa and Sebastián Piñera it nominated candidates who were loyal to the party, but with Hernán Büchi and Joaquín Lavín candidates were also selected who decidedly distanced themselves from the party apparatus or even denied being politicians.

To compete as an independent is much more difficult, because by collecting signatures you have to prove the support of 0.5 percent of the voters who cast their votes in the last parliamentary election. The same guidelines apply to parties that are not registered in all regions of the country , but only in those regions where they do not exist.

Competencies

Powers of appointment

Sebastián Piñera appoints Rodrigo Pérez Mackenna as Minister for Housing and Urban Development

The President of Chile is the head of the Chilean government. Regarding the formation of a government, it is a purely presidential system , so it is up to the President alone to appoint or dismiss ministers. Parliament cannot reject any of the ministers nominated by the President. The ministers are responsible for the area assigned to them. In addition, the President can appoint or dismiss deputy ministers, artistic directors and mayors at any time.

The judges of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court are appointed by the President since the constitutional reform of 2005 for life. To select judges for the Supreme Court, a list of proposals is presented to the President by the Supreme Court. The selected judges must then receive the approval of the Senate. In the subordinate courts, the president selects the judges from such a list, the subsequent approval must be provided by the next higher court.

For the Constitutional Court, which consists of three judges from the Supreme Court and seven attorneys, the President appoints three of the attorneys in addition to the judges from the Supreme Court. Of the four remaining lawyers, two are selected by the Senate and two by the House of Representatives, but the Senate has yet to approve them.

legislation

The Chilean President has the right to introduce laws in Congress. In the areas of financial policy of the state, minimum wages and collective bargaining , social security systems , state administration and territorial organization, he is even responsible for the exclusive legislative initiative. Such legislative initiatives that affect the finances of the state can only be approved by Congress, rejected or proposed a reduction in spending. Parliament, however, has no means of increasing expenditure.

When the President brings his draft budget to Parliament, it has a maximum of 60 days for discussion and approval. If there is no agreement within this period, the President's draft will automatically come into force. The same applies to the budget that Parliament cannot determine any increases in expenditure.

If a law that the president has introduced in one of the two chambers of parliament is rejected by the latter, he can immediately introduce it in the other chamber. If the latter finally approves the law with a two-thirds majority, the other chamber also needs a two-thirds majority to reject it again. Bills of law from parliamentarians, on the other hand, may only be re-introduced after one year if they have been rejected once in a chamber.

The President has the ability to speed up the legislative process by calling for urgent advice at every stage of the legislative process. This urgent consultation consists of three stages: In the case of simple urgency (simple urgencia) , the relevant chamber of parliament still has 30 days to discuss and vote on the respective law, in the case of the highest urgency (suma urgencia) another ten days and in the case of immediate discussion (discusión inmediata ) three more days. However, there are no sanctions if Parliament fails to meet the deadlines set. Even after the deadlines have expired, the laws require the approval of Parliament, so no law automatically comes into force. With urgency, the President can steer the work of Parliament in order to set priorities. However, it is not suitable as an instrument of presidential dominance with which the president can fully control the work of parliament.

The President can exercise a partial or total veto against laws passed in both chambers. The partial veto means that the parts of the law against which the president has not voted come into force. He can propose changes, but these only come about if both chambers of parliament agree. If Congress opposes the President and wants to enforce the original law against the President's veto, a 2/3 majority in both chambers is necessary.

Legislative Decrees

Unlike some other Latin American presidents, the Chilean president cannot govern by means of legislative decrees that are comparable to laws. However, he can ask Congress to pass legislative decrees in certain areas for a maximum of one year. These must be countersigned by the responsible minister. The areas of fundamental rights , voting rights and organic laws are excluded from these regulations. So far, the Chilean President has not asked Congress to pass legislative decrees.

Role of the military

President Michelle Bachelet visits the armed forces

The Chilean military assumed a special role in the political system under Pinochet's dictatorship. While it was described by some observers as "depoliticized" after the 1973 coup, it soon became apparent that it was a misjudgment. In the constitution of 1980, the Chilean military was granted numerous special rights that affected all three state powers, which are unrivaled anywhere in the world: The military was assigned the independent guardian function of the constitutional order, which was institutionalized through its participation in the National Security Council. The armed forces participated in the staffing of the legislature and the constitutional judiciary. Senior military officials received posts in the Senate. The military were directly involved in imposing and maintaining states of emergency. Political criminals could be convicted by a military court.

The end of the dictatorship brought no change for a long time. In the 1990s, not a single military privilege could be dismantled or at least weakened. After international criminal proceedings against Pinochet were opened in 1998, the military began tentatively to distance itself from the former dictator. As a result, there were expressions of remorse and convictions of former military personnel for human rights violations, as well as a voluntary commitment by the military not to interfere in political matters, but to limit themselves to the task of national defense. The constitutional reform of 2005 finally eliminated the special role of the military. Appointed senators were abolished, the powers of the National Security Council were severely restricted, and the president was given the right to appoint the chief commanders of the armed forces for four years and to dismiss them before their term of office expires.

Official seat

The President receives state guests in the Blue Salon
La Moneda - the official residence of the President

The official residence of the Chilean President is in the La Moneda Palace in downtown Santiago . The neoclassical building was built from 1784 to serve as a mint in Chile. The Italian Joaquín Toesca acted as the client. Toesca drew inspiration from the Peruvian Mint for his design, but was forced to vacate his post in 1797 because the political elite did not believe that the building's function and appearance went together. Toesca returned a short time later as a builder, but fell victim to an assassination attempt in 1799, so that he did not see the completion in 1805. When the governor of the General Capitanate of Chile , Luis Muñoz de Guzmán , opened the mint after 21 years of construction, the total cost had been one million US dollars.

La Moneda was only used as a mint for around 40 years. Starting with Manuel Bulnes in 1848, La Moneda served as the residence of the Chilean presidents and seat of government. Carlos Ibáñez ended this phase in 1958; since then the palace has only served as the seat of government. During the 1973 coup, President Salvador Allende and his bodyguard holed up in the presidential palace. After he refused to surrender unconditionally, the military bombed the palace and destroyed it in the process.

Assessment of the office

Strength of the president

The Chilean presidency is one of the strongest in Latin America and worldwide. This is primarily attributed to the role of the president in the legislative process, where he has a prominent position vis-à-vis the legislature. As early as the early 1990s, Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey ranked the Chilean president in a comparative study after the Paraguayan as the second most powerful president in Latin America, but they had not yet taken into account the constitutional amendments of 1989, which included, among other things, that the president should Parliament can dissolve.

Peter M. Siavelis used the Shugart and Carey criteria, but came to the conclusion that the President of Chile deserved an even more powerful rating in some cases. As a result, after Siavelis' lineup on the power scale, it rises significantly.

In an analysis of eleven Latin American constitutional texts, Heinrich-W. Krumwiede and Detlef Nolte come to the conclusion that the Chilean president is the most powerful head of government under the 1980 constitution. The authors themselves admit, however, that essential aspects that lead to this assessment have since been revised. The high ranking of the Chilean president according to the Pinochet constitution is not surprising to them.

Mark Payne et al. came to the conclusion in a study from 2002 that the Chilean president had strong reaction power, but only moderate action power. This is expressed in the fact that he has a strong veto position, but is only moderately equipped in the areas of legislation and legislative decrees compared to the other Latin American presidents.

Instability of the presidential system

In the late 1980s, political scientists debated the instability of presidential systems. This debate was initiated by Juan J. Linz , who identified two main weaknesses in the Latin American presidential system. On the one hand, both the executive and legislative branches are democratically legitimized, which makes it unclear who should decide in the event of a conflict. On the other hand, he assumed that a presidential system would be more rigid and inflexible compared to a parliamentary one. As a prime example, he cited the situation in Chile in 1973, in which a president was overthrown by the military who could only rely on 37 percent of the vote. Linz and his pupil Arturo Valenzuela assumed that Allende would not have been overthrown in a parliamentary system and therefore favored a transition from the presidential systems of Latin America to parliamentary ones.

Dieter Nohlen and Bernhard Thibaut criticized Linz's argument. Nohlen objected that there was a presidentialist tradition in Latin America that was not only reflected in institutions. Rather, this tradition is rooted in the values ​​and behavioral patterns of Latin American societies. Nohlen and Thibaut also criticized Linz's view that Allende would not have been overthrown in a parliamentary democracy is highly hypothetical. The unity of the Latin American systems of government suggested by Linz also conceals the fact that they actually have major differences. In this respect, it is an ideal discussion. In addition, Linz ignores the fact that political parties and political elites are capable of learning.

The conflicting positions have now converged. According to Nolte, the assumption that Chilean presidential democracy is unstable is based on a misunderstanding of how the system works. The position of the president is not so overpowering, as shown in several publications, but is dependent on the support of a party coalition in his ability to govern. Since democratization, the need for qualified majorities in the legislative area has led to a “coalition presidentialism” based on relatively stable government coalitions.

Presidential clans

Arturo Alessandri (seated) and his son Jorge Alessandri (standing behind) were both presidents of Chile

Characteristic of Chilean politics is the formation of so-called “presidential clans”, that is, influential families who have shaped the country's fate for decades. They include the Errázuriz ', the Montts, the Alessandris and the Freis. The liberal Federico Errázuriz Zañartu served as president from 1871 to 1876, his son Federico Errázuriz Echaurren from 1896 to 1901. Manuel Montt Torres held this office between 1851 and 1861, his nephew Jorge Montt Álvarez after the civil war from 1891 to 1896, his son Pedro Montt Montt from 1906 until he died in 1910. Arturo Alessandri, who initiated the constitution in 1925, was in office from 1922 to 1925 and from 1932 to 1938, his son Jorge Alessandri from 1958 to 1964. He was followed by Eduardo Frei Montalva , who was president from 1964 to 1970. His son Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle ruled between 1994 and 2000 and ran unsuccessfully for a second term in 2010.

See also

literature

  • David Altman: Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection in Chile, 1990 to 2006: The Executive Branch . In: Peter M. Siavelis / Scott Morgenstern (eds.): Pathways to Power: Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection in Latin America. University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania University Press 2008, ISBN 978-0-271-03375-4 , pp. 241-270.
  • Heinrich-W. Krumwiede, Detlef Nolte: The role of parliaments in the presidential democracies of Latin America . Hamburg: Institute for Ibero America customer 2000, ISBN 3-926446-65-X .
  • Juan J. Linz: Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference? In: ders./Arturo Valenzuela (ed.): The Failure of Presidential Democracy. Volume 2: The Case of Latin America. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press 1994, ISBN 0-8018-4784-2 , pp. 3-89.
  • Detlef Nolte: The political system: constitution and constitutional practice . In: Peter Imbusch (Hrsg.): Chile today: Politics, Economy, Culture. Frankfurt am Main: Vervuert 2004, ISBN 3-89354-590-5 , pp. 333-378.
  • Mark Payne et al .: Democracies in Development: Politics and Reform in Latin America . Washington DC 2002, ISBN 1-59782-036-9 .
  • Michael Radseck: Military and Politics in Chile . In: Peter Imbusch (Hrsg.): Chile today: Politics, Economy, Culture. Frankfurt am Main: Vervuert 2004, pp. 309-332.
  • John L. Rector: History of Chile . Gordonsville: Palgrave Macmillan 2005, ISBN 140396257X .
  • Stefan Rinke : The political system of Chile . In: Klaus Stüwe (Ed.): The political systems of North and Latin America. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften 2008, ISBN 3-531-14252-6 , pp. 137–166.
  • Stefan Rinke: A Little History of Chile . Munich: Verlag CH Beck 2007, ISBN 978-3-406-54804-8 .
  • Peter M. Siavelis: The President and Congress in Postauthoritarian Chile: Institutional Constraints to Democratic Consolidation . University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press 2000, ISBN 0271019484 .
  • Nikolaus Werz : Latin America: an introduction . 2nd Edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2008, ISBN 3-8329-3586-X .

Web links

Commons : Presidents of Chile  - Collection of images, videos and audio files

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Stefan Rinke: Small history of Chile . Munich: Verlag CH Beck 2007, p. 36f.
  2. ^ Stefan Rinke: The political system of Chile . In: Klaus Stüwe (Ed.): The political systems of North and Latin America. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften 2008, p. 148.
  3. ^ Stefan Rinke: Small history of Chile . Munich: Verlag CH Beck 2007, p. 37.
  4. ^ John L. Rector: History of Chile . Gordonsville: Palgrave Macmillan 2005, p. 73.
  5. ^ Stefan Rinke: Small history of Chile . Munich: Verlag CH Beck 2007, p. 38.
  6. ^ Stefan Rinke: Small history of Chile . Munich: Verlag CH Beck 2007, p. 44ff.
  7. ^ John L. Rector: History of Chile . Gordonsville: Palgrave Macmillan 2005, p. 110.
  8. ^ Stefan Rinke: Small history of Chile . Munich: Verlag CH Beck 2007, p. 67f.
  9. ^ Stefan Rinke: Small history of Chile . Munich: Verlag CH Beck, p. 78f.
  10. ^ Stefan Rinke: The political system of Chile . In: Klaus Stüwe (Ed.): The political systems of North and Latin America. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften 2008, p. 145.
  11. ^ Stefan Rinke: Small history of Chile . Munich: Verlag CH Beck 2007, p. 144.
  12. ^ Stefan Rinke: Small history of Chile . Munich: Verlag CH Beck 2007, p. 150.
  13. a b Stefan Rinke: Little History of Chile . Munich: Verlag CH Beck 2007, p. 157f.
  14. ^ Stefan Rinke: The political system of Chile . In: Klaus Stüwe (Ed.): The political systems of North and Latin America. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften 2008, p. 149.
  15. ^ Stefan Rinke: The political system of Chile . In: Klaus Stüwe (Ed.): The political systems of North and Latin America. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften 2008, p. 146.
  16. ^ Stefan Rinke: Small history of Chile . Munich: Verlag CH Beck, p. 172ff.
  17. ^ Stefan Rinke: The political system of Chile . In: Klaus Stüwe (Ed.): The political systems of North and Latin America. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften 2008, p. 147.
  18. a b Detlef Nolte: The political system: Constitution and constitutional practice . In: Imbusch, Peter (ed.): Chile today: politics, economy, culture. Frankfurt am Main: Vervuert 2004, p. 345f.
  19. Winfried Jung / Martin F. Meyer: Clear victory for Piñera in the first round of the Chilean presidential election. In: KAS country report. December 15, 2009, accessed February 21, 2012 .
  20. Winfried Jung: Bitter defeat for the Piñera government. In: KAS country report. November 5, 2012, accessed September 12, 2013 .
  21. ^ A b David Altman: Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection in Chile, 1990 to 2006: The Executive Branch . In: Peter M. Siavelis / Scott Morgenstern (eds.): Pathways to Power: Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection in Latin America. University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania University Press 2008, pp. 243ff.
  22. ^ David Altman: Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection in Chile, 1990 to 2006: The Executive Branch . In: Peter M. Siavelis / Scott Morgenstern (eds.): Pathways to Power: Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection in Latin America. University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania University Press 2008, pp. 254f.
  23. ^ David Altman: Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection in Chile, 1990 to 2006: The Executive Branch . In: Peter M. Siavelis / Scott Morgenstern (eds.): Pathways to Power: Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection in Latin America. University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania University Press 2008, p. 243.
  24. ^ A b Stefan Rinke: The political system of Chile . In: Klaus Stüwe (Ed.): The political systems of North and Latin America. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften 2008, p. 163
  25. ^ Stefan Rinke: The political system of Chile . In: Klaus Stüwe (Ed.): The political systems of North and Latin America. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften 2008, p. 162f.
  26. Detlef Nolte: The political system: Constitution and constitutional practice . In: Peter Imbusch (Hrsg.): Chile today: Politics, Economy, Culture. Frankfurt am Main: Vervuert 2004, p. 346f.
  27. a b Detlef Nolte: The political system: Constitution and constitutional practice . In: Peter Imbusch (Hrsg.): Chile today: Politics, Economy, Culture. Frankfurt am Main: Vervuert 2004, p. 347.
  28. Detlef Nolte: The political system: Constitution and constitutional practice . In: Peter Imbusch (Hrsg.): Chile today: Politics, Economy, Culture. Frankfurt am Main: Vervuert 2004, p. 347f.
  29. Detlef Nolte: The political system: Constitution and constitutional practice . In: Peter Imbusch (Hrsg.): Chile today: Politics, Economy, Culture. Frankfurt am Main: Vervuert 2004, p. 348.
  30. Detlef Nolte: The political system: Constitution and constitutional practice . In: Peter Imbusch (Hrsg.): Chile today: Politics, Economy, Culture. Frankfurt am Main: Vervuert 2004, p. 348f.
  31. Michael Radseck: Military and Politics in Chile . In: Peter Imbusch (Hrsg.): Chile today: Politics, Economy, Culture. Frankfurt am Main: Vervuert 2004, p. 309f.
  32. Michael Radseck: Military and Politics in Chile . In: Peter Imbusch (Hrsg.): Chile today: Politics, Economy, Culture. Frankfurt am Main: Vervuert 2004, p. 311.
  33. ^ Stefan Rinke: The political system of Chile . In: Klaus Stüwe (Ed.): The political systems of North and Latin America. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften 2008, p. 158.
  34. above: Palacio de La Moneda. May 18, 2010, Retrieved March 11, 2012 (Spanish).
  35. ^ Andrew Benson / Melissa Graham: The Rough Guide to Chile , p. 94.
  36. Detlef Nolte: The political system: Constitution and constitutional practice . In: Peter Imbusch (Hrsg.): Chile today: Politics, Economy, Culture. Frankfurt am Main: Vervuert 2004, p. 343.
  37. Peter M. Siavelis: The President and Congress in Postauthoritarian Chile: Institutional Constraints to Democratic Consolidation . University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press 2000, pp. 14f.
  38. Heinrich-W. Krumwiede / Detlef Nolte: The role of parliaments in the presidential democracies of Latin America . Hamburg: Institute for Ibero America customer 2000, p. 88.
  39. ^ Mark Payne et al .: Democracies in Development: Politics and Reform in Latin America . Washington DC 2002, p. 204.
  40. ^ Juan J. Linz: Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference? In: ders./Arturo Valenzuela (ed.): The Failure of Presidential Democracy. Volume 2: The Case of Latin America. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press 1994, pp. 6ff.
  41. Heinrich-W. Krumwiede / Detlef Nolte: The role of parliaments in the presidential democracies of Latin America . Hamburg: Institute for Ibero America customer 2000, p. 32.
  42. ^ Nikolaus Werz: Latin America: an introduction . 2nd Edition. Baden-Baden: Nomos 2008, p. 282.
  43. Heinrich-W. Krumwiede / Detlef Nolte: The role of parliaments in the presidential democracies of Latin America . Hamburg: Institute for Ibero America customer 2000, p. 34.
  44. ^ Nikolaus Werz: Latin America: an introduction . 2nd Edition. Baden-Baden: Nomos 2008, p. 283.
  45. Detlef Nolte: The political system: Constitution and constitutional practice . In: Peter Imbusch (Hrsg.): Chile today: Politics, Economy, Culture. Frankfurt am Main: Vervuert 2004, p. 359ff.
  46. ^ Stefan Rinke: The political system of Chile . In: Klaus Stüwe (Ed.): The political systems of North and Latin America. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften 2008, p. 149.