Propaganda in the Russian Federation

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Vladimir Putin fishing in Tuva in August 2009. It is typical of Putin's self-portrayal as a strong leader.

As propaganda in the Russian Federation which is propaganda referred to the purposes of the Government of Russia serves. It is therefore often referred to as " Kremlin propaganda ". It is disseminated through print, electronic and social media .

Basics

Vladimir Putin's propaganda is attributed to the earlier Soviet propaganda patterns, which in turn are said to go back to Tsarist traditions. In 2006, coverage of President Putin took up to 80 percent of the news broadcasts. The portrayal of his person is seen as a personality cult . The core message of the propaganda is: Putin is doing the right thing and any government reversal is bad because it endangers Russia's “uniqueness and incomparable superiority over the West”. The media described by Klaus von Beyme , Ulrich M. Schmid and others as "synchronized" ensure the consistency of this message .

The approach that Hugo Mannteufel characterized as “manipulating public opinion ” and “targeted disinformation ” is intended to secure the power of the Putin system . The daily message from the media and the government is that the country is surrounded by hostile nations and these, in line with "internal enemies," often referred to as the Fifth Column , threaten the well-being of the Russian nation. In order to weaken the supposedly hostile countries, liberalism at home and abroad is discredited through disinformation with the intention of "destroying Russia's enemies from within".

According to Marcel H. Van Herpen, the incumbent President of Russia is not only copying previous models, but is also expanding them and professionalizing the propaganda machinery: In addition to television, radio and the press, the Internet and social media are also used to disseminate messages from the Kremlin. The psychological know-how with which this new information war was carried out was far more mature than in Lenin's or Stalin's time. The Kremlin's messages would also be tailored in different ways to recipients in different countries. After all, the Kremlin today could take advantage of the relative openness of the Western media world for the Russian propaganda offensive. This distinguishes the present from the Cold War era , when this propaganda was only possible via the western communist parties .

In addition to the bureaucratic vertical of power, a social vertical has also emerged in the “ Putin system ”. It manifests itself in the restriction of freedom of expression , the manipulation of television and in the creation of artificial "parties of power". As the sociologist Lev Gudkow notes, the principle of autocratic power permeates all forms of social organization and political communication, and this at the cost of the "archaization and sclerotization of social life, which from the outside reminds us of the last years of the Brezhnev era." The political scientist Nikolai Vladimirovich Petrov (* 1958) observed as early as the end of 2004 that “the Russian state was becoming Soviet, both in terms of form and content”.

Roland Haug wrote in 2007: “People talk about Putin in the same way that one usually only talks about the dead: praising or not at all. Why analyze and evaluate? According to the authorities, that only creates unrest and annoyance ”.

In 2008 the tabloid Moskowskij Korrespondent disappeared in late October 2008 after reporting on April 12, 2008 about an alleged liaison with gymnast Alina Kabaeva .

historical development

Shortly after Putin took office in the spring of 2000, violent attacks on the mass media took place parallel to a “blitzkrieg” against regional centers of power in order to bring them under control. The first victim was the media empire Most under the leadership of the oligarch Vladimir Gussinsky , who supported Putin in the 2000 presidential election. After the media mogul Berezovsky showed solidarity with his rival Gussinski, he too became the target of the political leadership, which visibly and explicitly worked towards smashing the existing media empires. In his first message to parliament, Putin had announced that privately financed media were hindering the urgent need to build a strong state and were therefore real "enemies of the state". Ultimately, both Gussinsky and Berezovsky were pushed abroad. In 2003, journalist Anna Polyanskaya reported on the way that "limitlessly loyal" Russian Internet brigades work to accuse anyone of Russophobia who is inconsistent with Russian government policy.

Shortly after the crisis surrounding the Beslan hostage-taking in September 2004, President Putin promoted a Kremlin-funded program to “improve Russia's image abroad”. One of the first significant projects of this program was the Russia Today television channel , which was established in 2005 and is now known as RT . The historian Ilya Yablokov, on the other hand, spoke in 2020 that society had been brainwashed over alleged "external enemies" for 15 years, that is, since 2005. On the occasion of its opening, the Marxist theorist, sociologist and dissident Boris Kagarlizki (* 1958) described the program as a continuation of the old Soviet propaganda. In June 2007 the newspaper Vedomosti published a report according to which the Kremlin had intensified its official lobbying activities in the USA since 2003 and had commissioned communication companies such as Ketchum for this purpose .

In Russia, television is the main source of information for most of the population. After a period of freedom in the early 1990s, television had once again become the central pillar of power. At the same time, a freedom of the press ceased to exist, to which the government would have been accountable and which could have been a pillar of democracy.

The conveyance of a large number of “ alternative facts ” and partly contradicting messages about events abroad is seen as a characteristic of Russian state propaganda . For example, in the course of the Russian-Ukrainian war since 2014, Ukraine has been defamed as a Jewish and fascist entity, depending on which target group should be addressed abroad and in Russia. The pro-western Euromaidan protests have been described as a gay, Jewish and Nazi conspiracy, Ukraine is nationalist but not a nation, the Ukrainian state does not exist but is repressive, Russians are forced to speak Ukrainian even though there is no Ukrainian language give. Even after Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 was shot down , Russian media presented new versions every day. On the first day, it was said that the Ukrainian armed forces had tried to shoot down Putin's plane. On the second day, it was alleged that the CIA had sent a plane with bodies over Ukraine to provoke Russia. In the days that followed, these stories were replaced by others.

After the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 , it was not just NATO that noticed a significant increase in Russian propaganda. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights wrote in mid-April that the propaganda on television of the Russian Federation had increased significantly in parallel to the developments in the Crimea, including hate propaganda: "Media monitors indicated a significant raise of propaganda on the television of the Russian Federation , which was building up in parallel to developments in and around Crimea. Cases of hate propaganda were also reported. ”After mentioning examples of anti-Ukrainian propaganda, the UNHCHR human rights report in June 2014 once again reminded of the international law prohibition of hate and war propaganda signed by Russia .

According to the New York Times, the Briton Peter Pomerantsev in his book Nothing Is True and Everything Is Possible from 2014 does not see the goals of Russian propaganda in convincing, but in confusing them through lack of clarity so that ultimately none of the parties would be believed. Robert Ortung interprets this strategy as the intention of the Kremlin propagandists to convince us that “everything around us is a big lie.” This type of propaganda is considered part of “ hybrid warfare ”. In April 2015, for example, then NATO General Secretary Anders Fogh Rasmussen warned of a “hybrid war” in which Russia was working to undermine European states from within. It is a mixture of well-known conventional warfare and new, sophisticated propaganda and disinformation campaigns . This also included financial ties to political parties within NATO and relationships with non-governmental organizations to influence public opinion through these institutions.

In addition to RT, the Sputnik portal is also accused of disseminating false information . The crash of the MH17 was on the site Eliot Higgins of Eliot Higgins demonstrated that RT and Sputnik manipulated satellite images of the Russian Defense Ministry had published.

With the advent of new media and especially social media, Russian state propaganda is being used particularly effectively and cost-effectively. Via social networks such as Facebook and Twitter , thousands of false reports can be generated by so-called trolls (see Troll Army ) or automated bots and their reach can be enormously expanded through coordinated sharing by other trolls and bots. On October 31, 2017, executives from Facebook, Google and Twitter testified before the US House of Representatives Committee on Intelligence that their social networks had used Russian material in the 2016 US presidential election .

In March 2018, members of the EU Parliament expressed the opinion that Russian propaganda should be countered in Europe, speaking of Russian interference in the electoral process in Germany, France and Spain and in Brexit .

The decided restrictions on the Internet in Russia up to the development of an isolated runet were explained by Reporters Without Borders in 2019 with the fact that television propaganda was becoming increasingly ineffective among the younger generations.

War plays a central role in the public discourse in Russia; war, empire and militarization also shape the state's politics of remembrance.

Russia's military strength is one of the key statements of propaganda. According to Denis Volkov, the military agenda on television with regular reports on exercises created an atmosphere of war preparation until 2018 , in which propaganda emphasized Russia's potential and strength. With the return to “military-patriotic” rhetoric, militarism became a major theme of the President. Kirill Martinov from Novaya Gazeta also referred to the weapons that (according to the propaganda) terrify the Europeans to death, "although the Europeans who have been softened according to the same propaganda" are obviously not ready to attack Moscow. The miracle weapons presented in 2018 were intended to suggest an invincible Russia, especially domestically. According to editor-in-chief Alexander Malenkov, the “praise of Russian weapons” is a “holy” topic.

Reception within Russia

The Russian Internet newspaper slon.ru declared in 2015 in the “Guide to the New Russian Propaganda”: ​​Russian propaganda is creating a new category that differs in quality and quantity from that of the Soviet Union. If Soviet propaganda was about introducing the “right view”, modern propaganda was all about misleading , confusion and discord . She collects (otherwise unknown) "experts from all marginalized groups " and supports the greatest conspiracy theories.

Julia Latynina writes that even after the Russo-Georgian War in 2008 , the West almost twisted itself in order not to endanger relations with Russia. The image campaign bought by Ketchum was completely useless: After years of accumulated lies and aggression, this consideration would no longer exist that Russia's credibility was at zero. The Kremlin propaganda always finds a so-called “expert” who reinterprets a stag that is recognizable for everyone into a horse, whereupon the propaganda can discuss this “with an important face”.

“Television lies all the time,” said Viktor Erofejew at the beginning of 2016, explaining that the pathos in the lie had become an infection “in the so-called patriotic upbringing in schools, (...) in institutes, in the army, everywhere. The country is not given patriotism, but lies. ” As early as 2014, Lyudmila Ulitskaya complained about the“ unprecedented manipulation ”of the public through propaganda, the lies of which broke all records. Dmitri Bykov called propagandists like Dmitri Kisselev or Vladimir Solovyov the “murderers of the Russian nation” because they unleashed the “ugliest instincts” with their hate propaganda.

Jelena Tschischowa wrote of a flood of Newspeak with xenophobic shifted meanings such as the word “ multiculturalism ”, which for propaganda consumers is a synonym for a weak Europe incapable of cultural resistance ; this is in contrast to the term “ friendship between nations ” popular under Stalin . Leonid Gosman wrote that Soviet propaganda had made citizens and even enemies of the system proud; instead, there was only hatred for the world around Russia in 2015. The political scientist Tatjana Vorozejkina wrote of "ideological brainwashing" by state television in the interest of an enriching "parasitic patronage and clientele system".

Also Lyudmila Alexeyeva lamented the Human Rights Council at the Russian President to President Putin the "hysterical hatred" which would kindle the Russian television all (dissenters) against and the rest of the world - unfortunately, the formation of this atmosphere is hatred also successful. The chairman of the President's Human Rights Council, Mikhail Fedotov , also spoke out in favor of “disarming” propaganda in order to avoid dangerous disunity in society and restore respect for human dignity.

Three of the total of six votes at the general meeting of the President's Human Rights Council in October 2017 were about the hatred in society stoked by the propaganda: Stanislaw Kutscher had also known the term “information sabotage” from his training as a journalist and would have been “naive “Hoped it would be useless knowledge. Instead, he experiences the "unprecedented triumph (s) of propaganda over journalism", in his opinion worldwide, but Russia has determined the laws for the course. In October 2017, he pointed out to the President's Human Rights Council that the widespread atmosphere of hatred and persecution of dissent was driving many young people, including the best, out of the country. This is another reason why, according to Alexey Kovalev , the propaganda is looking for friends abroad and finds what it is looking for in fictitious "experts" or friends of authoritarian regimes called "tankies" in Russia's parlance (based on the British communists who called the Warsaw Pact invasion Hungary did not convict).

While the Duma was discussing censorship of fake news on the Internet in March 2019 , Mikhail Kassyanov criticized that the "propaganda spreading lies and hate" would unfortunately not be affected. Lev Gudkov wrote shortly thereafter that the current “militaristic” propaganda should arouse a feeling of collective pride, but more importantly, it leads to state patriotism and an alleged threat from the hostile West addressing the real problems of everyday Russian life with inflation, the shadow economy, and impoverishment of the Majority of the population, cynicism, greed and corruption would be sidelined. Roman Dobrochotow mentioned the difference to China, which despite propaganda does not present itself as at war with the West; the “first association with the situation in Russia” would be “more like North Korea” with its hacker attacks, disinformation campaigns and shameless propaganda.

Effect and criticism outside of Russia

Ukraine

Even after the successful Orange Revolution , Russia had waged a propaganda war against the liberal forces in such a way that President Yushchenko banned Russian TV channels from being fed into the cable network before the 2008 elections in order to “protect viewers from hostile propaganda”. According to Radzichowskij, the anti-Ukrainian propaganda of the Russian media even “turned the Russian-speaking population of eastern Ukraine against Moscow”. A Russian-Ukrainian opinion poll found that the effect of the propaganda was that 93 percent of Ukrainians had positive attitudes towards Russia, but only 33 percent of Russians towards Ukraine.

During the new revolution of 2014, the hateful propaganda would have reached unprecedented levels. Irina Scherbakowa wrote about the period in spring 2014: “After the annexation of Crimea and the beginning of the war, large parts of the Russian population were suddenly susceptible to the most primitive hate propaganda. Somehow all human values ​​seemed swept away. "

The Ukrainian journalist Mykola Ryabchuk spoke of an information war during the Ukraine crisis . At the beginning of the war in Ukraine since 2014 , the historian Andreas Kappeler stated: "An uncanny propaganda machine ... it is just hard to imagine the lies that are being told." The airtime in Russia was filled with bizarre news about political events in Russia was hardly reported anymore. The Putin regime wanted to prevent democratic development in Ukraine.

See also

Germany

The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution states in its annual report for 2018 that the Russian media offerings in Germany are being promoted and expanded by the Russian Federation, with state-owned companies disguised as seemingly independent media in order to conceal their affiliation with Russia and the public in a subtle way to influence. The most important players are the Internet broadcaster RT Deutsch and the Sputnik news agency .

The German journalist and Moscow correspondent Boris Reitschuster considers a collaboration between Putin and his entourage with the AfD to be very likely. The many cross-connections between the party and Putin-friendly networks would speak for this. In Russia, however, one is surprised at the low level of awareness among Germans of Russian propaganda. The Russian media in Germany do not have the reach of the established media on the Internet, but they are amplifiers in social media and in the Twitter communities include Russia and far-right supporters as well as migration opponents. RT Deutsch prefers to take up topics from relevant marginal media. The anti-Americanism “persistently promoted by such groups” would offer “welcome starting points for the Russian leadership elite”.

Econ-Verlag had already removed a review from its homepage in 2007 after reviews of a book critical of the Kremlin not only matched in tone, but also in part in terms of wording. The passages were also deleted on Amazon. According to Nikita Petrov von Memorial, Russians living abroad were, in contrast to the Soviet era, willing to engage in “targeted propaganda cooperation” in order to influence public opinion and to restore Russian “honor” abroad.

In 2012, RT founded the video agency Ruptly in Berlin and offered "supposedly journalistic material" at discount prices .

Germany is the focus of an international media campaign by Russia. It was featured in Russian media in 2016 as a country on the verge of collapse. Markus Ackeret described Russian allegations about the German state as "malicious" in the NZZ. The intention is to shatter trust between citizens and the state, and thus to destabilize the state.

An automated Twitter follow-up of Sputnik-related accounts was also used to establish support for the AfD in Germany before the elections. The investigator said that "the most extreme left-wing and right-wing statements were selected and reinforced". The aim is to question the democratic society.

Great Britain

The media supervisory authority Ofcom found violations of the media Sputnik and RT against journalistic due diligence on several occasions . In a report from December 2018, seven out of ten contributions were criticized and sanctions were justified.

In 2017, the Times described the interference of Russian propaganda in the political processes of Western democracies as a "crime".

A main topic of Russian propaganda had been to support Brexit to stir up disagreement in Europe - Russian accounts continued to tweet the message of the propaganda, also known as the result of the vote. After the attack on Westminster Bridge in 2017, a pro-Kremlin troll campaign stoked anti-Islamic sentiments, claiming that a Muslim woman would have been indifferent to the victims. The photographer of the picture compared the Russian propaganda with the terrorists who aim to destabilize the West. The Express drew attention to the opponents of vaccination , who were also supported in their opinion by Russian propaganda.

Since November 2017, Alex Salmond has hosted his own program on Russia Today (RT). The Times and other media outlets were horrified when it became clear that Alex Salmond was going to do a show on RT. In an editorial, The Times wrote: “Salmond's commitment to the propaganda of an aggressive foreign autocracy shows a lack of judgment, self-respect and shame. This decision is an insult to the victims of a murderous kleptocracy. "

See also

literature

  • Margareta Mommsen , Angelika Nussberger : The Putin System. Directed democracy and political justice in Russia. Beck, Munich 2007, ISBN 3-406-54790-7 .
  • Igor Eidman : The Putin system. Where is the new Russian empire headed? Ludwig Verlag, Munich 2016, ISBN 978-3-453-28083-0 ( publisher's website ).
  • Katja Gloger : Putin's World: The New Russia, Ukraine and the West. Piper Verlag, Munich 2016, ISBN 978-3-8270-1296-8 .
  • Katja Gloger: Putin's World: The New Russia and the West. Piper, Munich 2017, ISBN 978-3-492-31040-6 .
  • Stephan Berndt: What does Putin want? How disinformation is supposed to provoke a major conflict in Europe. Kopp Verlag, Rottenburg 2015. ISBN 978-3-86445-257-4 .
  • Marcel H. Van Herpen: Putin's Wars. The rise of Russia's new imperialism. Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham 2014, ISBN 978-1-4422-3138-2 .
  • Marcel H. Van Herpen: Putin's propaganda machine. Soft power and Russian foreign policy. Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham 2016, ISBN 978-1-4422-5362-9 .
  • Douglas E. Schoen, Evan Roth Smith: Putin's master plan: to destroy Europe, divide NATO, and restore Russian power and global influence. Encounter Books, New York, 2016, ISBN 978-1-59403-889-1 .
  • Todd C. Helmus, Elizabeth Bodine-Baron, Andrew Radin, Madeline Magnuson, Joshua Mendelsohn, William Marcellino, Andriy Bega, Zev Winkelman: Russian Social Media Influence: Understanding Russian Propaganda in Eastern Europe Verlag Rand Corporation, 2018, ISBN 978-0- 8330-9958-7 .

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Helena Goscilo: Putin as Celebrity and Cultural Icon . Routledge, 2013, ISBN 978-0-415-52851-1 ( here in Google Book Search [accessed December 20, 2018]).
  2. ^ S Abrams: Beyond Propaganda: Soviet Active Measures in Putin's Russia . In: Connections: The Quarterly Journal . 15, No. 1, 2016, pp. 5-31. doi: 0.11610 / Connections.15.1.01 .
    TP Gerber, J Zavisca: Does Russian Propaganda Work? In: The Washington Quarterly . 39, No. 2, 2016, pp. 79-98. doi: 10.1080 / 0163660X.2016.1204398 .
    J Aro: The cyberspace war: propaganda and trolling as warfare tools . In: European View . 15, No. 1, June 2016, pp. 121-132. doi: 10.1007 / s12290-016-0395-5 .
    P Pomerantsev: The Kremlin's Information War . In: Journal of Democracy . 26, No. 4, 2015, pp. 40–50. doi: 10.1353 / jod.2015.0074 .
  3. ↑ a b Marcel H. Van Herpen: Putin's propaganda machine. P. 3.
  4. ↑ a b Russia's media - aligned democratically , papers for German and international politics, December 2006; "Reporting on the daily work of the Kremlin chief , on factory tours , receiving foreign guests or instructing one's own submissively nodding cabinet members takes up more than 80 percent of the time in the news broadcasts."
  5. ^ Walter Laqueur: Putinism: Where is Russia drifting? , Verlag Ullstein, 2015 ISBN 978-3-8437-1100-5 ; Section "The State Party"
  6. ↑ In the faith of Putin , ARD, description published on September 25, 2017
  7. ↑ Expert: The unwillingness of the authorities to carry out reforms and give people the opportunity to express themselves threatens with the “Mexican scenario” , rosbalt.ru, August 25, 2017; "The population was led (to believe) by the methods of state propaganda that any state reversal is bad and that one must concentrate on stability"
  8. ↑ a b From Amulets , Novaya Gazeta , March 25, 2020; "Propaganda usually rhymes everything bad, including a pandemic, with liberalism." "The rapture from themselves, their rulers, successes, uniqueness, and unparalleled superiority over the West reached its climax."
  9. ↑ Klaus von Beyme: The Russia Controversy: An Analysis of the Ideological Conflict Between Russia Understanders and Russia Critics Springer-Verlag, 2016 ISBN 978-3-658-12031-3 , page 66
  10. ↑ a b Ulrich M. Schmid : The Putin Show , NZZ, June 3, 2014
  11. ↑ Putin's Propaganda , ARTE, September 8, 2015, minute 46; "The printing presses are synchronized"
  12. ↑ a b c The Kremlin on All Channels How the Russian State Controls TV , Reporters Without Borders, October 2013.
  13. ↑ a b Alissa Arkadjewna Ganijewa : “You feel suspicious” , TAZ, March 23, 2015; Quote: Here (in Germany) you can choose between dozen different channels, in Russia they are all synchronized.
  14. ↑ Manfred Quiring: Putin's Russian World: How the Kremlin Divides Europe, pages 16 and 23, Ch.Links Verlag 2017, ISBN 978-3-86153-941-4
  15. ↑ Jerzy Macków: Authoritarianism in Central and Eastern Europe , Springer-Verlag, 2010, ISBN 978-3-531-91615-6 , page 248
  16. ^ Too critical for Russia , NZZ, May 17, 2016; "Russia's media landscape is dominated by state and government-related media that have been brought into line"
  17. ↑ Putin has the right message for everyone , FAZ, March 1, 2016; "Methods of this targeted disinformation and manipulation of public opinion were initially used in Russia to secure the power of President Vladimir Putin."
  18. ↑ Manfred Quiring: Putin's Russian World: How the Kremlin Divides Europe, page 23, Ch.Links Verlag 2017, ISBN 978-3-86153-941-4
  19. ↑ Russia sees itself surrounded by enemies again , Die Welt, July 6, 2012
  20. ↑ a b “I'm afraid we will have a global pandemic of conspiracy theories” , Novaya Gazeta, April 24, 2020; "And this constant distrust of the other - the enemy within, the enemy outside - was continuously part of the daily agenda of the authorities and the media"
  21. ^ Paul Baines, Nicholas O'Shaughnessy, Nancy Snow (eds.): The SAGE Handbook of Propaganda Verlag SAGE, 2019, ISBN 9781526486257 , p. 493
  22. ↑ Putin's Long War Against American Science , New York Times, April 14, 2020; "Analysts say that President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia has played a principal role in the spread of false information as part of his wider effort to discredit the West and destroy his enemies from within."
  23. ^ A b Roman Dobrochotow: "Information war" is a term used by the Kremlin to justify disinformation , Stopfake.org, October 23, 2019; "The main aim is to discredit the enemy or to cause discord in the enemy camp"
  24. ↑ Hans-Henning Schröder: Analysis: “People” and “Power” - The weak anchoring of the Putin system in society | bpb. Retrieved December 20, 2018 .
  25. ↑ Matthes Buhbe, Gabriele Gorzka: Buhbe, Russia . Springer-Verlag, 2007, ISBN 978-3-531-15269-1 ( here in the Google book search [accessed December 20, 2018]).
  26. ↑ quoted from: Margareta Mommsen, Angelika Nussberger: The Putin system: controlled democracy and political justice in Russia . CHBeck, 2007, ISBN 978-3-406-54790-4 ( here in the Google book search [accessed December 20, 2018]).
  27. ↑ a b c d quoted from: Margareta Mommsen, Angelika Nussberger: Das System Putin. Directed democracy and political justice in Russia. P. 46 Partial view in Google Book search
  28. ^ Roland Haug : Die Kreml AG: Putin, Russland und die Deutsche Verlag Hohenheim, 2007 ISBN 978-3-89850-153-8 , p. 136.
  29. ↑ На WikiLeaks опубликован материал о Путине и Кабаевой , yuga.ru, February 9, 2011
  30. ↑ Friedrich Schmidt in: Wladimir Putin: From KGB agents to the strong man of Russia , ed. Reinhard Veser, Verlag Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung GmbH, 2015, ISBN 978-3-89843-390-7 .
  31. ^ Jason C. Vaughn: A Socio-Political Model of Lies in Russia: Putin Against the Personal , UPA Verlag, 2016, ISBN 978-0-7618-6764-7 , page 119; Quotation correspondingly: "In retrospect, the achievement of control over the mass media is not as developed as in 2015." Page 120: "The state's re-implementation of control over the media in 1999 and 2000 (...) was a notable characteristic of this transition to the untruths prevalent in the Putin era. "
  32. ↑ Margareta Mommsen, Angelika Nussberger: The Putin system: controlled democracy and political justice in Russia. Beck, Munich 2007, ISBN 978-3-406-54790-4 , p. 47, received by Roger Blum , Loudspeakers and Opponents: An Approach to Comparing Media Systems. Herbert von Halem, 2014, ISBN 978-3-86962-152-4 , p. 128, as well as by Jerzy Maćków (ed.), Authoritarianism in Central and Eastern Europe. Springer, Heidelberg 2010, ISBN 978-3-531-91615-6 , p. 248 and Johannes Schuhmann in: Governance structures in the regional environmental policy of Russia: Negotiations between the state, business and civil society. Springer, Heidelberg 2012, ISBN 978-3-531-19560-5 , p. 60.
  33. ↑ CNN: Internet brigades in Russia - "Web Brigade's" , March 21, 2009; ( Boundless loyalty to Vladimir Putin and his circle. / Accusation of Russophobia against everyone who disagrees ) ( Memento from March 13, 2014 in the Internet Archive )
  34. ↑ Peter Finn: Russia Pumps Tens of Millions Into Burnishing Image Abroad , in: The Washington Post , March 6, 2008.
  35. Jump up ↑ Todd C. Helmus, Elizabeth Bodine-Baron, Andrew Radin, Madeline Magnuson, Joshua Mendelsohn: Russian Social Media Influence: Understanding Russian Propaganda in Eastern Europe . Rand Corporation, 2018, ISBN 978-0-8330-9958-7 ( here in Google Book Search [accessed December 20, 2018]).
  36. ↑ Marcel H. Van Herpen: Putin's Propaganda Machine: Soft Power and Russian Foreign Policy . Rowman & Littlefield, 2015, ISBN 978-1-4422-5362-9 ( here in Google Book Search [accessed December 20, 2018]).
  37. ↑ Vera Slawtschewa-Petkowa: Russia's Liberal Media: Handcuffed but Free , Verlag Routledge, 2018, ISBN 978-1-315-30017-7 , introduction.
  38. ↑ Russia's Nongovernmental Media Under Assault , Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, No. 22 (2), 2014, pp. 179 ff.
  39. ↑ Klaus von Beyme , in: Per-Arne Bodin, Stefan Hedlund, Elena Namli (Eds.): Power and Legitimacy: Challenges from Russia , Routledge contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe series, Vol. 39, 2013, ISBN 978-0-415 -67776-9 , p. 24: "The final task of the ambition to achieve an 'autoritarian restoration' was that of ensuring that no independent media would work to undermine the efforts of the executive."
  40. ^ A b The Great Russian Disinformation Campaign . In: The Atlantic , July 1, 2018.
    Timothy Snyder : The Road to Unfreedom in Google Book Search. Tim Duggan Books / Penguin Random House, New York 2018, ISBN 978-0-525-57448-4 , pp. 155, 184.
    The Road to Unfreedom by Timothy Snyder review - chilling and unignorable . In: The Guardian , April 15, 2018.
    Russian propaganda over Crimea and the Ukraine: how does it work? In: The Guardian , March 17, 2014.
  41. ↑ NATO says it sees a sharp rise in Russian disinformation since Crimea , Reuters , February 11, 2017.
  42. ^ Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in April (doc file).
  43. ↑ Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, June 15, 2014 , Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, June 15, 2014; "Misinformation adds to the instability and fear which affect the lives of people in the region, and all sides should refrain from using it, especially to the extent that it amounts to advocacy to national hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence, which is prohibited under Article 20 of the ICCPR. "
  44. ↑ Book review of Peter Pomerantsev: 'Nothing Is True and Everything Is Possible' , The New York Times , November 30, 2014.
  45. ↑ "Russian disinformation is successful because it is entertaining" , Tagesanzeiger, September 11, 2018
  46. ↑ Russian Propaganda: Putin's Message for Everyone , FAZ , March 1, 2016.
  47. ^ Douglas E. Schoen, Evan Roth Smith: Putin's master plan. Pp. 51-52.
  48. ↑ Michael Crowley: Putin's Russian Propaganda , in: TIME , May 1, 2014.
  49. ^ S Abrams: Beyond Propaganda: Soviet Active Measures in Putin's Russia . In: Connections: The Quarterly Journal . 15, No. 1, 2016, pp. 5-31. doi: 0.11610 / Connections.15.1.01 .
    J Aro: The cyberspace war: propaganda and trolling as warfare tools . In: European View . 15, No. 1, June 2016, pp. 121-132. doi: 10.1007 / s12290-016-0395-5 .
    J Fedor: Introduction: Russian Media and the War in Ukraine . In: Journal of Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society . 1, No. 1, 2015, pp. 1–12.
    S Al-Khateeb, N Agarwal: Understanding strategic information maneuvers in network media to advance cyber operations: a case study analyzing pro-Russian seperatists' cyber information operations in crimean water crisis . In: Journal of Baltic Security . 2, No. 1, 2016, pp. 6–27. doi: 10.1515 / jobs-2016-00228 .
  50. ↑ Facebook, Google, and Twitter Executives Testify on Russia's Influence on 2016 Election , C-SPAN.org
  51. ↑ EU needs to increase its resilience to Russian propaganda, say MEPs , EU Parliament, March 5, 2018 (English).
  52. ^ Ruler of Transport , Novaya Gazeta, May 4, 2019; "The President Signed the Sovereign Internet Law"
  53. ↑ Russians Fight for Free Internet , arte, March 13, 2019
  54. ↑ Russia fell back to 149th place in Reporters Without Borders' list of press freedom , Novaya Gazeta, April 18, 2019
  55. ↑ Ulrich Schmid : Technologies of the Soul: On the production of truth in contemporary Russian culture, Volume 2702 by Edition Suhrkamp, ​​2015, ISBN 978-3-518-12702-5 , p. 162
  56. ↑ Manfred Quiring: Putin's Russian World: How the Kremlin Divides Europe, pages 217 and 219, Ch.Links Verlag 2017, ISBN 978-3-86153-941-4
  57. ↑ Ulrich Schmid : Technologies of the soul: On the production of truth in contemporary Russian culture, Volume 2702 by Edition Suhrkamp, ​​2015, ISBN 978-3-518-12702-5 , p. 164, cf. also page 11: "Right at the top of the political agenda is the involvement of the citizens in the project of a powerful Russia."
  58. ↑ russian on-air attack sparks propaganda debate , propagandamonitor.com, August 4, 2017; Praise for Russia's military might is a key topic on state TV
  59. ↑ Russia expert Orenstein: “Putin wants the fall of NATO and the EU” , Watson, December 30, 2015; “If Russia wants to influence international politics, it has to rely on its trump card: military strength. (...) At the same time he started a propaganda campaign against the West, ... "
  60. ↑ More than half of Russians saw a real threat of war with other countries. , RBC, January 30, 2019
  61. ↑ The President Elected the People , Novaya Gazeta, December 6, 2017
  62. ↑ Putin and the Military , SPON, May 7, 2018
  63. ↑ Winter War , Novaya Gazeta, November 29, 2017; “The propagandists speak more eagerly than before about our newest weapons, which are said to scare Europeans to death. The Russians have to believe that others are responsible for our problems. Mobilization in this sense is excellent psychotherapy. "
  64. ↑ “The Pentagon is thrilled!” Novaya Gazeta, January 14, 2019 (Russian)
  65. ↑ Russia's Avangard hypersonic boost-glide system , January 9, 2019; "Beyond a somewhat militant demonstration of 'Russian national achievement' for domestic audiences"
  66. ↑ Who caresses the Kremlin? , Novaya Gazeta, July 24, 2018
  67. ↑ 24-hour Putin people: my week watching Kremlin 'propaganda channel' RT , The Guardian, November 29, 2017
  68. ↑ slon.ru: Guide to the New Russian Propaganda , slon.ru, September 29, 2015
  69. ↑ Agent Simonyan's feat , Novaya Gazeta, November 14, 2017; "Most of the RT content is a collection of identical opinions from little-known" political scientists "who claim the West is broken and Russia is a great power"
  70. ↑ How We Have Become an Enemy in the Eyes of Russia , Wilfried Martens Center for European Studies, March 2017; "Another instrument that is used to sow doubt and confusion is the promotion of conspiracy theories."
  71. ^ RT, Sputnik and the new Russian war , El pais, January 2, 2018
  72. ↑ Knight of the Urine and the Dagger , Novaya Gazeta, November 30, 2017; "What happened to Russia, why did the sympathy and influence system fail?"
  73. ^ "Saving" cathedral with a clockwork , Novaya Gazeta, September 13, 2018
  74. ^ "Lies are being given to the country" , Die Zeit, January 25, 2016
  75. ↑ Ludmila Oulitskaïa: "Les dissidents de la période soviétique sont aujourd'hui présentés comme des demons" , Le Monde, 11/12. June 2014
  76. ^ The propagandists and their lust for lies , FAZ, May 5, 2015
  77. ↑ Jelena Tschischowa: Russians first and second choice , NZZ , November 5, 2018, page 8
  78. Jump up to dictatorship , Cultural Exchange , Russia III / 2015
  79. ↑ https://www.zeitschrift-osteuropa.de/hefte/2018/8-9/parasitaerer-autoritarismus/ Parasitic Authoritarianism - Regime and Society in Russia, Eastern Europe 8–9 / 2018
  80. ↑ a b c Meeting of the Council for the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights on October 30, 2017 on the website of the Russian President
  81. ↑ Triumph of Propaganda over Journalism , Kommersant, February 17, 2017; "There is war, the days of impartial journalism are over", ... Because after years of militarization of social consciousness, the thesis of the "fatherland surrounded by enemies" was already a basic principle for the majority in the country.
  82. ↑ Those Speaking for the West , Decoder, November 13, 2015
  83. ↑ Michail Kassyanow : Censorship Out of Fear , Echo Moskwy, March 9, 2019
  84. ↑ Lev Gudkov: The Era of Developed Militarism , Novaya Gazeta, May 8, 2019
  85. ^ Winfried Schneider-Deters: The Ukraine: Power Vacuum Between Russia and the European Union , BWV Verlag, 2014 ISBN 9783830529415 , page 148
  86. ↑ Winfried Schneider-Deters: The Ukraine: Power Vacuum Between Russia and the European Union , BWV Verlag, 2014 ISBN 9783830529415 , page 80
  87. ↑ Winfried Schneider-Deters: The Ukraine: Power Vacuum Between Russia and the European Union , BWV Verlag, 2014 ISBN 9783830529415 , page 81
  88. ^ In the Internet of Russian Propaganda , NZZ, March 20, 2015
  89. ^ Karl Schlögel , Irina Scherbakowa : The Russia Reflex: Insights into a Relationship Crisis , Verlag edition Körber Foundation, 2015, ISBN 978-3-89684-492-7 , section title: "Disillusionment".
  90. ↑ Andreas Kappeler: Foreign rule burdens the Ukrainian population. Audio file SRF May 13, 2014, minute 5:00.
  91. ^ "We are not soldiers" , WOZ Die Wochenzeitung , January 15, 2015.
  92. ^ Robert Guyver: Teaching History and the Changing Nation State: Transnational and Intranational Perspectives , Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016, ISBN 978-1-4742-2586-1 , p. 49.
  93. ↑ Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2018, Berlin 2019, page 287
  94. ↑ Putin's propaganda war in Germany is so perfidious , Focus , March 5, 2016.
  95. ^ The Kremlin's Amplifiers in Germany - The activists, bots, and trolls that boost Russian propaganda , Medium.com, June 22, 2017
  96. ↑ She is Putin's beautiful face for Germany , merkur, November 14, 2014
  97. ↑ Walter Schilling: The decline of Europe ibidem-Verlag / ibidem Press, 2015, ISBN 978-3-8382-6736-4 , section "Europe's vacillations in foreign policy"
  98. ^ The virtual arm of the Kremlin , taz.de, January 15, 2007
  99. ↑ The Image of Ukraine in Germany: The Role of the Russian Media - How Russia Influences Public Opinion in Germany , Russia Analyzes 317, June 3, 2016
  100. ↑ [1] , Handelsblatt, January 23, 2016
  101. ↑ Russian media do propaganda with German problems , rp-online, January 23, 2016
  102. ↑ The fruit of distrust , NZZ, January 28, 2016
  103. ^ How the Kremlin is destabilizing German democracy , Die Welt, December 5, 2017; "Senation-seeking lies click well and attract customers"
  104. ↑ Real-time tracking system measures Russian interference in German elections , Times of Israel, September 24, 2017
  105. ↑ Ofcom Broadcast and On Demand Bulletin , Ofcom, December 20, 2018, report number 369
  106. ↑ Putin's Propaganda , The Times, May 5, 2017; "The regime of Vladimir Putin has methodically murdered domestic critics inside and beyond Russian borders. Those crimes may not be matched in brutality but they are exceeded in blatancy by the Kremlin's interference in the political processes of western democracies. "(" The regime of Vladimir Putin systematically murdered opponents inside and outside Russia. These crimes are not in the The degree of brutality, however, was surpassed by interference in the political processes of Western democracies. ")
  107. ↑ NICK ROBINSON: Vladimir Putin is using fake news just like tanks and missiles ... and from Brexit to Catalonia his goal is to weaken the West , Dailymail, November 26, 2017
  108. ↑ Man who posted image of Muslim woman 'ignoring Westminster terror victims' was a Russian troll , The Independent, November 13, 2017
  109. ↑ Photographer reveals how his photo of Muslim woman 'ignoring' Westminster attack was hijacked by Russian trolls , The Evening Standard, November 17, 2017; "We thought then it was only the terrorists who want to disrupt our democracy. But were the Russians trying to do the same? "
  110. ↑ UK lives in DANGER because of Russian propaganda and fake news over MMR jabs , express.co.uk, November 27, 2017
  111. ↑ From Prime Minister to Propaganda Spokesperson. In: sueddeutsche.de. November 21, 2017. Retrieved May 9, 2018 .
  112. ↑ Putin's Propaganda , The Times, November 11, 2017; "Mr Salmond's service for the propaganda outlets of a hostile foreign autocracy does indeed evince a lack of judgment, self-respect and shame. The decision is an insult to the victims of a murderous kleptocracy. "