Battle for Nà Sản
| date | November 23 to December 2, 1952 |
|---|---|
| place | Nà Sản , Vietnam |
| output | French victory |
| Parties to the conflict | |
|---|---|
|
|
|
| Commander | |
| Troop strength | |
| 9 infantry battalions around 7,200 men | 3 infantry divisions around 30,000 men |
| losses | |
|
around 500 |
around 6,000 |
.svg){kind=small}
In the Battle of Nà Sản in the Indochina War, French troops defended the isolated base Nà Sản against an offensive by the Viet Minh . The battle began on November 23, 1952 and ended with the withdrawal of the Viet Minh from December 2, 1952.
background
During the Indochina War , the French colonial power tried to use military means to push back the communist independence movement of the Viet Minh, which had controlled large parts of the rural areas of Vietnam since the Second World War . The Viet Minh themselves had around 110,000 soldiers within the regular armed forces thanks to Chinese arms deliveries and training.
The Vietnamese military commander Vo Nguyen Giap formulated the intention in October 1952 to let his regular units infiltrate the impassable and hardly developed highland region northwest of the delta around Hanoi. The area offered the opportunity to create a land connection with Laos . Giap and his Chinese military advisers saw the country as a potential area of operation. Giap assumed that his troops could isolate and fight French units better in the rough terrain than in the delta around Hanoi. The highlands themselves were guarded by a chain of smaller French field fortifications. These bases were cut off from each other and were supplied from the base near Nà Sản, which was equipped with a runway. For the commander-in-chief in Indochina Raoul Salan, the impetus for the significant reinforcement and fortification of Na San came from the loss of the small garrison at Nghĩa Lộ northeast of the central base in September 1952, which at the end of 1951 could still be successfully defended against a week-long attack. In contrast to the predominantly Vietnamese regions, the Viet Minh did not have an extensive network of informants among the Tai population of the highlands. Because of this, Giap only had flawed reports which underestimated the strength of the French troops at Na San by half.
The French armed forces under General Raoul Salan tried to force the Vietnamese troops into an open field battle. For this purpose, Na San, as a base aéro-terrestre, only supplied and fortified by the air, was to attract the Vietnamese attacks and, taking advantage of the French superiority of fire, inflict heavy losses on the enemy through artillery and air strikes. British operations in the battle for Burma in 1944 served as a model. The commander of Na San Jean Gilles had the range of hills surrounding Na San airfield fortified with hedgehog positions. Nine infantry battalions were available to him for this purpose. A total of 3000 tons of supplies were flown in via the airfield - including 300 tons of barbed wire and more than 100 trucks, which were essential for the construction of the French field fortifications in order to transport the large quantities of wood that were felled on site. Some of the air transport flights were taken over by the CIA's own private company Civil Air Transport .
course
Giap opened the battle on November 23, 1952 with an attack by the 308th Division on the French hedgehog positions on the hills. Before the battle began, the Viet Minh intelligence service underestimated the French strength of five battalions. The attack could be repulsed. On the following days, the Viet Minh were able to take individual bases (PA 24, PA22bis) but were repulsed after hours by counter attacks. On December 1st and 2nd, the attacks by Giap's troops were repulsed without conquering a base. Giap began withdrawing his troops on December 2nd.
consequences
The French troops lost around 500 men during the battle. The losses of the Viet Minh are estimated at around 6,000 men. Giap himself drew the lesson from the defeat that a longer battle with significantly greater logistical preparation was necessary to conquer an isolated French base. The battle should be fought in several phases. The final phase with the storming of the base may only be carried out after the use of the runway has been disrupted by the French and extensive field fortifications have been established. Likewise, an attack can only be successful if the neighboring area is conveniently held by one's own forces. The French armed forces viewed the isolated air-based defense base model as a success. The concept became decisive for the planning of the French side for the battle for Điện Biên Phủ . Na San itself was subsequently bypassed by the Viet Minh and evacuated by the French troops in August 1953 without a fight. During the evacuation, large quantities of ammunition and supplies had to be destroyed or left behind. On orders from Giap, the surviving fortifications were studied by Viet Minh intelligence teams on site in order to learn as many lessons as possible from the defeat.
literature
- Frederick Logevall: Embers of War - The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America's Vietnam , New York 2013
- Martin Windrow: The Last Valley - Dien Bien Phu and the French Defeat in Vietnam , Cambridge 2004
Individual evidence
- ↑ Frederick Logevall: Embers of War - The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America's Vietnam , New York 2013, p. 321
- ^ Martin Windrow: The Last Valley - Dien Bien Phu and the French Defeat in Vietnam , Cambridge 2004, p. 147
- ^ Martin Windrow: The Last Valley - Dien Bien Phu and the French Defeat in Vietnam , Cambridge 2004, pp. 56-57
-
↑ Frederick Logevall: Embers of War - The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America's Vietnam , New York 2013, p. 321
Christopher E. Goscha : Historical Dictionary of the Indochina War , Copenhagen, 2011, p. 312 - ^ Phillip B. Davidson: Vietnam at War - The History 1046-1975 , Oxford, 1988, p. 147
- ↑ Frederick Logevall: Embers of War - The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America's Vietnam , New York 2013, pp. 321–322, p. 329
- ^ Martin Windrow: The Last Valley - Dien Bien Phu and the French Defeat in Vietnam , Cambridge 2004, p. 59
- ↑ Christopher E. Goscha: Historical Dictionary of the Indochina War , Copenhagen, 2011, p. 105
- ^ Martin Windrow: The Last Valley - Dien Bien Phu and the French Defeat in Vietnam , Cambridge 2004, pp. 56-57
- ↑ Frederick Logevall: Embers of War - The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America's Vietnam , New York 2013, pp. 321–322, p. 327
- ^ Martin Windrow: The Last Valley - Dien Bien Phu and the French Defeat in Vietnam , Cambridge 2004, p. 63
- ^ Jacques Dalloz: Dictionnaire de la Guerre d'Indochine 1945-1954 , Paris, 2006, p. 43
- ^ Charles R. Shrader: A War of Logistics - Parachutes and Porters in Indochina 1945-1954. Lexington, 2015, p. 290
- ↑ Christopher E. Goscha: Historical Dictionary of the Indochina War (1945–1954) , Copenhagen, 2011, p. 305