Taklīf mā lā yutāq

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The taklīf mā lā yutāq ( Arabic تكليف ما لا يطاق' DMG taklīf mā lā yuṭāq  ' imposition of the unattainable , obligation to something unworkable ') is a problem in Islamic theology that was discussed intensively among Ash Aarites , Muʿtazilites , Māturīdites and Imamites in the premodern period . Controversial was the question of whether God the people something as duty can impose what this is unable to afford.

The background for the development of the debate was the mujbiritic theory of action of the Jahmīya , which assumed that man never acts himself, but that his actions are brought about by God. This theory was later adopted in a weakened form by other groups such as the Ashʿarites. The Muʿtazilites tried to refute this theory with the argument that God would then impose something on people with the taklīf that they could not fulfill. In return, the Ashʿarites tried in various ways to prove that such an imposition of the unattainable by God was possible and even occurs in the Koran . One of their most important arguments was the example of Abū Lahab : He had been obliged by God to believe in the Koran, which in turn contained statements that show that he would never accept the faith. The Muʿtazilites, Māturīdites and Imamites rejected this argument, arguing that a taklīf mā lā yutāq was shameful nonsense, contradicts divine wisdom and thus cannot proceed from God. They also referred to the Koranic statement, according to which God does not burden a soul with more than it can carry (so sura 2: 286 ). Although the Taklīf mā lā yutāq was regarded as a special Ashʿarite doctrine, opinions on it were in fact divided within the Ashʿarite school. Some Ashʿarite theologians have tried to show that this theorem has purely action-theoretical significance and does not override the rule in Fiqh that in the event of a lack of capacity to act, the believer is released from fulfilling religious duties.

The theological background to the debate

Action theory discussions

The Mujbiritic theory of action

One of the earliest movements that the Taklīf mā lā yutāq taught was the Jahmīya founded by Jahm ibn Safwān , which advocated an extreme form of compulsion doctrine according to which man himself acts only metaphorically when in reality it is God who is his Acts. This position is referred to as Jabritian or Mujbiritic in Islamic doxography . The Muʿtazilite scholar al-Malāhimī (d. 1044) reports: “The Jahmitic Mujbirites taught that everything that God imposes on man is an imposition of the unattainable (taklīf mā lā yuṭāq) , because they believed that God is He who creates human actions. So he has commanded them what he himself does with them and forbids them what he does with them, while they are unable to do it themselves. "

According to al-Malāhimī, the Najārites and Ash Aarites later adopted this theory of taklīf mā lā yutāq from the Jahmites, although they taught that man must acquire the acts created by God. Acquisition ( kasb ) , as al-Malāhimī explains, means the simultaneous occurrence of action and ability to act (muqāranat al-fiʿl li-l-qudra) . If God commands the acquisition of an action, this means for them that He attains it at the same time as the capacity to act occurs. And if he forbids him to do something, then he keeps him from doing it at the same time as he is able to act. So he imposed something on him that he could not fulfill.

The najar doctrine goes back to the Murjiite theologian al-Husain ibn Muhammad an-Najar, who lived in the early 9th century, and was especially widespread in Tabaristan and ar-Raiy . It is also reported from an-Najjar that he assumed that the ability to act only arises with the act and that God could impose on man the impossible. The Zaidite Imam Ibn al-Murtadā (d. 1437) reports of a dispute between him and the Muʿtazilite an-Nazzām about the Taklīf mā lā yutāq.

The third group in which the doctrine of Taklīf mā lā yutāq had an action-theoretical background was the Ashʿarīya. Al-ʿAllāma al-Hillī (d. 1325) writes that the Ashʿarites are of the opinion that God has only burdened man with the unattainable and with what he cannot. Al-Juwainī (d. 1085) opined that the teaching of al-Ashʿarī required that all taklīf obligations occur contrary to the ability to act. He attributed this to two reasons:

  1. The first reason is that, according to al-Ashʿarī, the ability to act (istiṭāʿa) did not precede the act, whereas the command to act is given to the burdened person before it occurs, i.e. at a point in time at which he has no ability to act.
  2. The second reason is that according to al-Ashʿari, the act of man is done by the power of God. Man is consequently required to achieve something that actually happens through the act of God.

Al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) explains the background of the Ashʿari teaching in a similar way . Al-Aschʿarī necessarily had to accept a taklīf mā lā yutāq, because 1. according to his teaching, human actions occur solely through the omnipotence and creative activity of God, i.e. man is called upon to perform the act of another, and 2. after Al-Ashʿari's view that the ability to act occurs only with the act itself. The seated person is not able to get up with him if he is ordered to do so, because the ability to get up is linked to getting up.

Later authors such as al-Āmidī (d. 1233) and Abū ʿUdhba (d. 1757) repeated the statement that it was essentially these two reasons that led al-Ashʿarī to consider the taklīf mā lā yutāq necessary. Al-Ashʿari taught that the human capacity to act has no influence on the action, but that the action is created by God. The imposition of the act of a third party in the event that one is unable to do so is known to be the imposition of the impossible. This is the teaching of most of his followers and individual Muʿtazilites of Baghdad. They taught that man's obligation to act is possible even when God knows that it is forbidden to him.

The Muʿtazilite counterposition

The Muʿtazilite counter-position on this question is mentioned by al-Ashʿarī himself in his doxographic Maqālāt al-islāmīyīn . He reports there that the Muʿtazilites agree that the ability to act (istiṭāʿa) precedes the act, includes the ability to act as well as its opposite and does not make the act absolutely necessary, and that they all deny that God burdened a person with something that he was unable to achieve (mā lā yaqdiru ʿalai-hi) . That the impossibility of Taklīf mā lā yutāq was the doctrinal conception of the Muʿtazilites is confirmed by many authors such as Ibn Burhān (d. 1124) and al-Fadl ibn Rūzbihān al-Chundschī (d. 1520). Al-ʿAllāma al-Hillī writes: “The entirety of the Imamites and Muʿtazilites agree that it is unthinkable that God should impose something that cannot be fulfilled. Only the mujbirites are of a different opinion, because they have declared that to be permissible. "

The Hanafi-Māturīdite counterposition

A number of other scholars, while affirming the impossibility of imposing the unattainable, agreed with the mujbirites that the ability to act occurs at the same time as the act. Al-Baghdādī reports that this was the position of Ibn Suraij and Abū l-ʿAbbās al-Qalānisī (early 10th century) and the teaching of Abu Hanīfa . They took the view that the ability to act (istiṭāʿa) only occurs at the same time as the act, but then enables two opposing modes of action. According to this view, an obligation to the impossible is not possible. In the Hanafi ʿAqīda of at-Tahāwī (d. 933) even a complete correspondence between divine obligation and human agency was postulated: “God only imposed on people what they can achieve. And people can only achieve what he has imposed on them. ”The Hanafi theologian al-Māturīdī understood this to mean that man has an initial capacity to act which allows him to make a free choice, namely between its application and its destruction.

The later official position of Hanafi-Māturidite teaching is recorded in the creed of Abū Hafs an-Nasafī (d. 1142): “The ability to act (istiṭāʿa) occurs with the act. It is the true essence of the capacity to act (qudra) through which the act arises. This name is used for the intactness of the means and limbs. And the validity of the taklīf is based on this ability to act, because a person is not burdened with more than he can bear. "

The Ashʿarit Fachr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī (d. 1209) reports that he was able to dissuade the Hanafis in Bukhara from their doctrine with the following argument and convince them of the Taklīf mā lā yutāq. First he had himself confirmed that according to the teaching of Abū Hanīfa, the ability to act occurs only with the act, not before. Then he said: “According to this doctrine, the ability to believe occurs only at the moment of acceptance of faith. Before the occurrence of faith, however, there is no such ability to believe. However, there is no doubt that before faith occurs, man is obliged to believe. It is thus certain that the command to believe occurred at the time of incapacity to believe. Nothing else is the meaning of the taklīf mā lā yutāq. "

Another reason for the taklīf mā lā yutāq

The only group that did not justify the possibility of taklīf mā lā yutāq in action theory was the Bakrīya, which had its heyday in Basra in the early 9th century . Bakrīya followers believed that although unbelievers were kept from believing by seals on their hearts, they were nevertheless obliged to believe. They needed the teaching of Taklīf mā lā yutāq to explain why the unbelievers are commanded to believe in spite of their hearts being sealed.

The Muʿtazilit Sāhib ibn ʿAbbād (d. 995) said that the Mujbirite Qadarites taught that God obliges people to do things they could not do. They claimed that God creates unbelief in unbelievers, does not give them the ability to believe, but then calls them to believe. Then if they showed the disbelief he created for them, he would punish them. Ibn ʿAbbād rejects this as heresy. God do not impose anything on people that they are incapable of doing. It is quite possible that this criticism was directed against the teachings of the Bakrīya.

Ashʿari arguments for the possibility of taklīf mā lā yutāq

Since the Ashʿarites were accused of obliging people to the unattainable with their special theory of action, they tried in return to prove that such an imposition of the unattainable by God was possible. In doing so, they resorted to various arguments. On the one hand, they pointed out that unbelievers are obliged to believe even if God had reported about them in the Koran that they would not believe, which equates to a collapse of opposites (al-ǧamʿ bain an-naqīḍain) . On the other hand, they referred to various verses of the Koran from which, in their opinion, the possibility of a taklīf mā lā yutāq could be derived. Eventually they argued that God's omnipotence did not allow such restrictions. Their arguments and the counter-arguments put forward against them are presented below.

The unbelievers' obligation to believe

The Abū Lahab Paradox

Al-Ashʿari was primarily interested in showing that God can oblige people to a collapse of opposites. As proof of this, he referred to the case of Abū Lahab , who is announced in the Koran (Sura 111, 1–3) that he will be subjected to perdition and will burn in hellfire. Al-Ashʿari is quoted as saying: “God commanded Abū Lahab to believe the prophet and to hold all that he communicated and communicated to be true. What he shared also includes the fact that he (abu Lahab) does not believe in him. So he ordered him to believe that he does not believe. This is a coincidence of opposites. ”Not only al-Ashʿarī himself, but the Ashʿarites as a whole, this was seen as a prime example of the fact that God can commit to something that cannot be fulfilled. “One excludes the accuracy of the other. The coincidence of the opposites is impossible ”, so the Ashʿarit Ibn Burhān gives the conclusion of his teaching direction.

Fachr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī also saw the example of Abū Lahab as striking evidence of the possibility of an obligation to the unattainable. According to his own account, he also used this example in a dispute with the Hanafis of Bukhara in order to defend the Ashʿarite position. Ar-Rāzī reports this argument in his Munāẓarāt . Accordingly, he based his argument on three premises , namely that a) God obliged Abū Lahab to believe, b) belongs to the belief that everything that God reports about him must be believed to be true, and c) what about Abū Lahab is reported to have heard that he does not believe. From this it follows that Abū Lahab was obliged to believe that he did not believe. This is then an obligation to collapse the opposites. Ar-Rāzī reports of his opponents that they tried to override one of the three premises, but were unable to do so: “Whenever one of them raised an objection to one of the three premises, the others jumped up and shouted, that this objection was void. ”The dispute lasted a long time and he did not have to say anything more himself, because every objection raised against one of the three premises was declared shameful by the others.

But the persuasiveness of the Abū Lahab paradox was not that great in reality. Al-Juwainī did not see the example of Abū Lahab as sufficient evidence for the possibility of an obligation to collapse the opposites. God, he said, had only asked Abū Lahab to believe in him and the messengers of God and to adhere to the provisions of religious law, but did not demand a coincidence of opposites in faith. The Shafiite Usūl scholar ʿAbd ar-Rahīm al-Isnawī (d. 1370) objected that the statement in sura 111: 1, "The hands of Abu Lahab be abandoned to destruction!", Does not necessarily indicate a collapse of the opposites, because his depravity, even if it existed at the time of his unbelief, could depart from him. And the statement that Abu Lahab will burn in the fire (sura 111: 3) could be based on the fact that he committed a great sin after accepting Islam.

Abū ʿUdhba, who wrote a treatise on the main differences between the Ashʿarite and the Māturīdite teachings, gives another discussion of this question. A scholar had rejected the evidential value of the Abu Lahab example, arguing that it could not be accepted that God obliged Abu Lahab to believe in all that was revealed after it was revealed that he did not accept the belief because it could be that after this point in time the obligation to believe in the entirety of Revelation was lifted, so that no coincidence of opposites is necessary. Thereupon one replied that the report (sc. About Abū Lahab) would then have to abrogate the order to accept belief , which was unthinkable. Another scholar said, regarding the Abū Lahab example, that Abū Lahab was not commanded to believe in everything that was revealed, but only in that which was connected with the Tawheed and the divine sentiment of Muhammad. But this was also rejected, arguing that Abū Lahab had been obliged to hold everything that the Messenger of God brought to be true, because belief consists of it.

The example of Abu Dschahl

According to the account of Abū ʿUdhba, the Ashʿarites based their view on the example of Abū Jahl . God commanded him to believe in the entire revelation of Muhammad, which also contains the following statement in sura 2: 6: "See, who disbelieve, whether you warned them or not, they do not believe." recognize that Abū Jahl had been commanded the collapse of faith and unbelief. Al-Ashʿari himself is said to have used this argument as well.

Jalāl ad-Dīn al-Mahallī (d. 1459) reports that, in order to ward off the contradiction to this argument, it was replied that the person about whom it was revealed that he did not accept the belief was not the intended addressee of the communication but the others. The Indian scholar Muhibballāh al-Bihārī (d. 1707) reports in his work Musallam aṯ-Ṯubūt that this argument was rejected with the fact that Abū Jahl, if he had known that he would not believe, was no longer obliged to believe because otherwise the statement would be pointless. Al-Bihari denied this objection on the grounds that man would never be released from his obligation.

Abū ʿUdhba said that this argument could be refuted as follows: “We believe in a blanket form that every one of God's messages is true. From this follows the obligation to hold this message true. But that does not entail the obligation to do the unthinkable, because for this an obligation to authenticate in detail would be necessary. ”The Indian Hanafi scholar Ibn Nizām ad-Dīn al-Laknawī (d. 1810) argued in a similar way: For Abū Jahl it only had given the obligation to hold the provisions of the Sharia as true and the communications of God about the resurrection, the garden of paradise, the fire of hell, the torment of the grave, the intercession, etc. But he was not obliged, also the communication of God to the prophet about himself hold true.

The unthinkable reversal of divine knowledge

Fachr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī sums up the evidential value of the examples of Abū Lahab and Abū Jahl on a more abstract level from an Ashʿarite point of view: “God tells about someone that he never accepts the faith. If now faith emanated from him, the true communication of God would have to turn into a lie. But the lie is unthinkable with God. And that which leads to the unthinkable is also unthinkable. So the belief is unthinkable with him. The obligation to believe in him is thus an obligation to the unthinkable (at-taklīf bi-l-muḥāl) . "

Al-ʿAllāma al-Hillī also knows this justification of Taklīf mā lā yutāq. He explains that the Ashʿarites argued that God knew of the unbeliever that he would not accept the faith, but if he did, God's knowledge would have to be turned into ignorance, which is unthinkable. The Imamit Ibrāhīm an-Naubachtī (13th century) replied that knowledge was subordinate and had no influence on the superior. God knows in originality that the unbeliever disbelieves and that it is possible for him to accept the faith. If he now accepted faith, his knowledge would not turn into ignorance, but his assumption of faith would indicate that God already knew in the original that he would accept faith. Otherwise God would always commit to the impossible. However, the knowledge falls out of predestination (al-maqdūrīya) . It has no influence on what is known, but depends on it.

Koranic statements about the depravity of the unbelievers

In his Kitāb al-Lumaʿ al-Ash Aarī states that the Koranic statements that the unbelievers cannot hear (cf. 11:20 and 18: 101 ), together with the fact that they were nevertheless asked and obliged to suggested that the imposition of the impossible was possible. Al-Bāqillānī explains that, according to the unanimous opinion, hearing here means “acceptance” (qubūl) , because the unbelievers certainly heard what was commanded and forbidden to them and also understood the call of God's messengers. You have to understand this in the sense of the saying “someone doesn't hear what you say to them” or “someone doesn't listen to anything we say to them”. In this case one does not mean that he does not understand the sounds, but that he does not accept the speech. Fachr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī refers in this connection to the Qur'anic verse Sura 36: 7: “The word about most of them became true: They do not believe.” This is also evidence for him of the possibility of a taklīf mā lā yutāq.

Text-based requests for the unattainable in the hereafter

Al-Ashʿari resorted to other arguments to prove the possibility of the commitment to the impossible. At one point he explains his Kitāb al-Lumaʿ that the Koranic proof of this is God's invitation to the angels in Sura 2:31 to reveal the names of the creatures to him, although they did not know them and were unable to do so. God also announced in Sura 68:42 that on the day of the resurrection the wrongdoers will be called to fall down, but will not be able to do so. If it is now possible that he obliges them to do something in the hereafter that they cannot, then this is also possible in this world. For example, God ordered fair action, but at the same time said in sura 4: 129 : "You will not be able to treat women fairly, no matter how much you want to do it."

The Yemeni Ashʿarit al-Yāfiʿī (d. 1367) said that in the hadith about the makers of idols who on the day of the resurrection are asked to bring their creatures to life, and cannot do so, further evidence of such an obligation the impossible. Abū l-Yusr al-Bazdawī (d. 1099), who was actually a Māturidit himself, stated that an obligation to the unattainable is not impossible because the hadiths have given us that the day of resurrection is imposed on those who pretend dreams to tie two hairs together. This is an obligation to do something that he cannot fulfill.

Most of the Muʿtazilites and Māturīdites rejected such an argument with calls for the unattainable in the hereafter. In doing so, they focused in particular on God's invitation to the angels "Tell me their names" in Sura 2:31. The Muʿtazilit Mankdīm (d. 1034) objected that this request was not a taklīf, but a message to the angels about their inability to announce; and if it had been a taklīf, it would have been an obligation to do something that was not known, which the Ashʿarites thought impossible, even if they thought the taklīf mā lā yutāq possible. Aal-Malāhimī, also Muʿtazilit, objected that the Qur'anic word in Sura 2:31 was not a taklīf, but a challenge (taīaddī) for the angels and an explanation of their inability. That is why, he explains, the angels did not commit any contradiction by not revealing their names. Similarly, the Māturidit Abū l-Barakāt an-Nasafī (d. 1316) argued that God's invitation to the angels in Sura 2:31 is not a taklīf, but an address in which incapacity is established (ḫiṭāb taʿǧīz) , like the invitation on the day of the resurrection to the people to bring the inanimate images to life. In both cases it is not a taklīf, but a kind of punishment for them. It takes place in the space of the hereafter, which is not a “space of obligation” (dār at-taklīf) but a “space of retribution”.

ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī (d. 1037), who is actually counted among the Ashʿarites, but rejected the possibility of Taklīf mā lā yutāq, also rejected the argument with the Koran word in Sura 68:42. He said that the obligation of wrongdoers in the hereafter to do actions that they cannot perform, as witnessed in this word of the Koran, is only a sign for the people of the end-time assembly that they will be inevitably punished, and thus not as evidence of the existence of the Taklīf mā lā yutāq could apply.

The request not to burden the impossible with the impossible (sura 2: 286)

As proof of the correctness of the Taklīf mā lā yutāq, al-Ashʿarī should also refer to the Koran word “Our Lord! Do not burden us with something that we cannot do! ” (Rabbu-nā wa-lā tuḥammil-nā mā lā ṭāqata la-nā bi-hī) in Sura 2: 286 . According to al-Ashʿari, this was a request to God to be spared from such an obligation that cannot be fulfilled. He now argued that such a request would have been nonsensical if God could not impose such an obligation. The Ashharit al-Bāqillānī (d. 1012) argued similarly . He saw in the fact that, according to God's communication, those who praise and praise him ask him not to burden them with something they cannot do, evidence of the correctness of the taklīf mā lā yutāq.

The Māturidit Abū l-Barakāt an-Nasafī in particular opposed this argument. He said that the Koran word “Our Lord! Do not burden us with something that we cannot do! ”Is no evidence of the possibility of taklīf mā lā yutāq, but only a“ request to be spared the burden of things that we cannot carry, but not of the taklīf. ” According to the māturīdite view, as Abū l-Barakāt an-Nasafī explains, it is possible for God to burden man with a mountain that he cannot carry and to die. But it is not possible for him to oblige him to carry a mountain in such a way that he is rewarded for the fulfillment of the duty and its failure to be punished, because that would be folly (safah) .

God's freedom of action

Al-Yāfiʿī quotes an nameless Ashʿarite scholar as saying that the obligation to the unattainable is possible based on the requirement of divinity and servitude of man, since God does what he will: “He torments whoever he will and he spares, Whom he wants. ”The Ashʿarite scholar Fadlallāh ibn Rūzbihān al-Chundschī (d. 1520) opined that an argument for the admissibility of the taklīf mā lā yutāq was that God was not incumbent on God and that he could burden people with whatever he wanted, even if habitual knowledge informs us that this is not happening. [...] He do what he wants and decide what he wants. The Imamit Nūrallāh at-Tustarī (d. 1610), however, said that the argument put forward by al-Chundschī that God is not incumbent on God can be refuted by reason and textual tradition. As proof of the text, he refers to the Quranic word in sura 6:12 , where it is said of God that he has committed himself to mercy.

Arguments against the taklīf mā lā yutāq

Theological arguments

The shamefulness of taklīf mā lā yutāq

The main argument of the Muʿtazilites against the taklīf mā lā yutāq was that it was disgraceful (qabīḥ) and it was part of God's righteousness that he should not do anything disgraceful. In doing so, they concluded a fortiori : Since the taklīf mā lā yutāq is shameful with humans, it must all the more be shameful with God. Reasonable shame was the main reason why the Mu dietazilites excluded the possibility of taklīf mā lā yutāq. The Imamit Ibrāhīm an-Naubachtī also followed this argument: God does not act in a disgraceful manner, and so it is unthinkable that he obliges his servants (= people) to do things that they cannot do. Al-ʿAllāma al-Hillī said that the Ashʿarites had contradicted reason with their conception of man’s obligation to the unattainable, because reason shows the shamefulness of it and God does nothing shameful.

The early Muʿtazilites did not consider the shamefulness of the Taklīf mā lā yutāq to be justified. Mankdīm tells of a dispute between an-Nazzām and a mujbirite in which the latter asked what the evidence was that the taklīf mā lā yutāq was shameful. An-Nazzām is said to have been silent for a long time and then said: "If the speech reaches this level, we must turn away from it immediately." Later Muʿtazilites tried to illustrate the shamefulness and nonsense of Taklīf mā lā yutāq with various examples. Mankdīm himself pointed out that every rational person knows that the obligation of the blind to correctly punctuate a copy of the Koran and of the lame to see is shameful.

According to Saʿd ad-Dīn at-Taftāzānī (d. 1395), some Muʿtazilites referred to the fact that even incomprehensible children and animals disapproved of it, the latter by using non-verbal when it was impossible to make taklīf mā lā yutāq Form with horns, tails and other body parts protested. They pointed out that even bright minds who were indifferent to the prohibitions of religious law and possibly even rejected them entirely, considered it shameful when slave owners burdened their slaves with things they could not do and blamed them for it. In this context, it is also stated that , according to a hadith , Muhammad forbade imposing more on slaves than they can perform.

Al-Malāhimī said that knowledge of the shamefulness of Taklīf mā lā yutāq is immediately apparent (ḍarūrī) . The Muʿtazilites had said that the knowledge of one's shamefulness is immediately evident in the visible and derived from the invisible (muktasab) . The derivation consists in the fact that with the visible one knows that the taklīf mā lā yutāq is disgraceful, and then transfers this to the invisible. According to al-Māturīdī, al-Kaʿbī alias Abū l-Qāsim al-Balchī (d. 931) taught that the obligation to that which "in the immediate insight of the mind" (fī l-ʿaql bi-l-badāha) cannot be fulfilled , is disgraceful (qabīḥ) . Al-Māturīdī (d. 944) did not consider the restriction mentioned by al-Balchī to be necessary. He said that the obligation to do something, the unattainability of which is not immediately evident, is shameful. The same applies to the obligation to do something that cannot be fulfilled for reasons of time.

Ashʿarites, who defended the possibility of taklīf mā lā yutāq, tried to refute the doctrine of his shamefulness and to show that God is not obliged to do or not to do anything. According to Ibn Fūrak (d. 1015), al-Ashʿari taught that God could obligate the incapable, and in the event that he would obligate him, this would not be disgraceful of him. Al-Ghazālī pointed out that what is considered disgraceful in humans cannot be considered disgraceful in God, so he turned against the a fortiori argument. At-Taftazānī also wanted the objection of the Muʿtazilites that it is considered shameful if slave owners burdened their slaves with things that they could not afford. He said that this comes from knowing that people's actions can be explained. With God, on the other hand, it is different, either because his actions are purposeless or because they have a certain meaning or a certain goal that the human mind does not recognize.

The taklīf mā lā yutāq is nonsense

The Muʿtazilit Sāhib Ibn ʿAbbād rejected the taklīf mā lā yutāq, arguing that it was wrong (ẓulm) and nonsense (ʿabaṯ) , things that God does not do. According to at-Taftazānī, the Muʿtazilites also argued that the taklīf mā lā yutāq was folly. Some theologians tried to illustrate the absurdity of taklīf with examples. Al-ʿAllāma al-Hillī argued that he who tells the lame man to fly to heaven or to do the like is considered foolish. It is similarly nonsensical to ask someone to be present at the same time in East and West, to raise the dead, to bring Adam and Noah back, to bring back the previous day, to place Mount Qaaf in the eye of a needle, to drink the Tigris in one sip or to bring the sun and moon down to earth. Even God could not demand all these things from man.

The Ashʿarites seem to have partly unsettled the argument with such examples. Al-Malāhimī (st. 1044) reports an inner-Ashʿarite dissent on this question. Whether God could impose on the incapable and the lame to walk, the blind to puncture copies of the Koran, on humans the creation of bodies or the transformation of the eternal into the non-eternal and the non-eternal into the eternal, they judged differently: some would have ruled this out, others thought it possible.

Al-Ghazālī also dealt indirectly with such objections to the Taklīf mā lā yutāq. He rejected them, arguing that there could be a benefit in the taklīf mā lā yutāq of which only God could be informed. Possibly it lies not in the observance of the duty and the reward, but in the demonstration of the commandment and the consequent belief in the taklīf. For example, the command could be abrogated before it was obeyed , as in the case of Abraham , who commanded God to sacrifice his son, but with whom he revoked the command before it was obeyed.

Reasoning with divine wisdom

Saʿd ad-Dīn at-Taftazānī, who belonged to the Māturīdīya, emphasizes that his teaching relied on a different argument than the Muʿtazilites in rejecting the taklīf mā lā yutāq. In his Talwīḥ he writes: “The impossibility of taklīf mā lā yutāq is based on the Muʿtazilites that God must do what is best for his servants (= people). Now it is clear that not burdening what cannot be done is better. So this is necessary and the burden (with the unattainable) impossible. With us, on the other hand, it is based on the fact that it is not fitting for wisdom (Hikma) and grace (fal) to burden one's servants with something they cannot afford. [...] And what is not appropriate for wisdom and grace is folly and failure to act well towards those who deserve it. And that is something disgraceful that cannot come from God. "

The Imamites also argued with divine wisdom when they rejected the taklīf mā lā yutāq. As al-ʿAllāma al-Hillī writes, they taught that for God it is impossible for God to burden man with something that he cannot do in terms of wisdom. The incompatibility of Taklīf mā lā yutāq with divine wisdom tried to illustrate the Māturīdites or Hanafites with the well-known examples: The obligation of the incapable falls out of divine wisdom as does the obligation of the blind to see and the obligation of the lame to walk. One could not ascribe this to the wise God. The doctrine that God does not oblige man to something unattainable because of his wisdom was also represented outside of Islam by the Jewish religious philosopher Saadia Gaon (d. 942). Saadia Gaon wrote in his Kitāb al-Amānāt wa-l-iʿtiqādāt : "The wise (= God) does not oblige anyone to do anything that is not in his power or that he is unable to" (al-ḥakīm lā yukallifu aḥadan mā laisa fī ṭāqati-hī wa-lā mā yaʿǧizu ʿan-hū) .

As ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Buchārī (d. 1330) writes, the wisdom of taklīf with the Hanafite Māturidites consists in testing (ibtilāʾ) . It can only be realized through what people do in their free choice. If he does, he will be rewarded for it. If, on the other hand, he fails to choose freely, he will be punished for it. If, on the other hand, he is in a state in which the act cannot proceed from him, he is forced to refrain from the act. Then he is excused by the exclusion, and the sense of the test does not come about.

The Ashʿarit al-Bāqillānī (d. 1012), however, said that the Taklīf does not contradict wisdom. He saw in the fact that according to sura 2: 286 those people who praise and praise God ask him not to burden them with something they cannot do, a proof that the taklīf mā lā yutāq righteousness ( ʿAdl) and wisdom (ḥikma) is. For if the taklīf mā lā yutāq had been injustice (ẓulm) , nonsense (ʿabaṯ) and scornful (qabīḥ) , he argued, then these people would have asked God not to treat them unjustly and foolishly and not to impose any commandments on them by the he deviates from wisdom. God could not praise people who thought this was possible with him.

Koranic arguments

"God only imposes on the soul what it can achieve"

One of the most striking arguments against the teaching of Taklīf mā lā yutāq was the Qur'anic word in Sura 2: 286: “God only imposes on the soul what it can achieve ” (lā yukallifu Llāhu nafsan illā wusʿa-hā) . In particular, al-Māturīdī and the Māturīdites based their rejection of the Taklīf mā lā yutāq on this Quranic word. The Māturidit Abū l-Barakāt an-Nasafī (d. 1310) declares in his confession ʿUmdat ʿAqīdat ahl as-sunna wa-l-ǧamāʿa : “The obligation to the unattainable is not possible, contrary to what al-Ashʿarī teaches, because of God's word : 'God only imposes on the soul what it can achieve.' ”The Muʿtazilit ʿAbd al-Jabbār ibn Ahmad (d. 1024) also resorted to this Quranic word in his discussion of the Ashʿari position, but only as an objection and additional argument (ʿAlā ṭarīq al-muʿāraḍa wa-l-istiʾnās) , not according to the type of evidence and reasoning (lā ʿalā ṭarīq al-istidlāl wa-l-iḥtiǧāǧ) .

The Muʿtazilit Sāhib Ibn ʿAbbād argued that if it were indeed possible for God to oblige those whom He did not have the ability to believe, it would also be permissible for the incapable to zakāt and the paralyzed to walk and race. But God said in the Koran that he only imposes on people what he is able to do (Sura 2: 286), because he does not oblige those who do not have the capacity to act before the act. Al-Malāhimī explains this principle with further examples and points out that, according to both Muʿtazilite and Ashʿari teaching, God only obliges those who have the ability to act in the sense of physical integrity. That is why he did not impose on the chronically suffering person to get up when praying , the physically weak did not have to run to Friday prayer , and the paralyzed who could not stand on a mount did not have to perform the Hajj . Those who do not have any wealth do not have to pay Zakāt. Let it be proven that God only obliges those who have the ability and ability to do something to do something. At the end he not only refers to the Qur'anic word from Sura 2: 286, but also to Sura 65: 7 : "God does not ask of anyone more than what he has given him."

According to the Ashʿarites, on the other hand, the Qur'anic statement that God only imposes on the soul (i.e. on man) what it is able to do was not unequivocal evidence of the impossibility of taklīf mā lā yutāq. According to Abū l-Hasan al-Ashʿarī himself, this statement was only to be understood as meaning “that God does not impose anything oppressive on the soul, such as the removal of thoughts that call for evil”. Fundamental to this interpretation was that there is an Asbāb-an-nuzūl tradition for the Koran word, “God only imposes on the soul what it can achieve”. According to this, this Quranic word was a divine answer to the complaint of the Prophet's companions , who through the Quranic word in Sura 2: 284 , “You may reveal what is in you or keep it secret, God will (one day) settle it with you. He then forgives whoever he wants and punishes whoever he wants, ”felt too burdened. When they then said, "We cannot do that", God abrogated this Quranic word and replaced it with the Quranic word from 2: 286.

The Ashʿarit Ibn Burhān took a different approach in his reply to this argument. He said that the word of the Koran only shows that God has not yet imposed anything that cannot be fulfilled. But do not point out everything that God has not done that it is not in his power. For example, God did not impose a year-long fast on Muslims, although it was not impossible. Similarly, al-Fadl ibn Rūzbihān al-Chundschī (d. 1520) saw in this Qur'an only proof that the Taklīf mā lā yutāq in the Sharia never occurred. The Ashʿarit Shihāb ad-Dīn al-Qarāfī (d. 1285) tried to deal with the problem by differentiating between different kinds of the unattainable (mā lā yutāq) :

  1. that which can not be fulfilled according to habit (ʿādīyan) such as flying in the air,
  2. that which can not be fulfilled according to reason (ʿaqlīyan) such as the acceptance of faith by the unbeliever, of whom God knows that he will not accept the faith, and
  3. that which according to habit and reason cannot be fulfilled at the same time, like the collapse of opposites.

In his opinion, the Qur'anic verse only refers to the first and third kind of unattainable, but not to the second.

Other Koranic statements

In addition to sura 2: 286a, the Imamit al-ʿAllāma al-Hillī also cited other Koranic statements as an argument against the Taklīf mā lā yutāq: “And your master is not unjust to his servants” ( Sura 41:46 ), “And today is happening no wrong ”( sura 40:17 ) and“ your Lord does no wrong to anyone ”( sura 18:49 ). Wrong (Zulm) , he explains this, is the unauthorized damage to a person and the greatest possible damage at all. God is far above it.

The Ashʿari position on Taklīf mā lā yutāq

Perception of the Ashʿarites as advocates of Taklīf mā la yutāq

The opponents of the Asharites presented the Ashʿaritic position on Taklīf mā lā yutāq relatively undifferentiated. The Zaidit Ibn al-Murtadā (d. 1437) stated that the possibility of “imposing the unattainable ” (taklīf mā lā yuṭāq) was a fixed tenet of the Ash Aarites . According to Abū ʿUdhba (d. 1757) the Taklīf mā lā yutāq was one of the six content-related issues between Ash Aarites and Māturīdites, with the latter being identified as a follower of Abū Hanīfa. While for the followers of Abū Hanīfa an obligation to the unattainable was not conceivable, al-Ashʿarī had considered it very conceivable.

Al-Ashari was also portrayed as an unqualified advocate of Taklīf mā lā yutāq. According to al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) he was ascribed to teaching every form of obligation to the unattainable, such as the invitation to combine opposites, to transform categories and to annihilate the eternal. The Zaidi scholar al-Maqbalī (d. 1696) contrasted the doctrine of al-Ashʿarī with the statements from the Koran and Sunna: "God says: 'God only imposes on the soul what it can achieve.' But Al-Ashʿari says: 'God has imposed more on every soul than it can achieve. Yes, she can't do anything. This is how God arranged every taklif. '"

The spectrum of opinion within the Ashʿarīya

In reality, opinions on taklīf mā lā yutāq were divided within the Ashʿarite school. On the one hand, there were unreserved supporters like Ibn Burhān al-Baghdādī (d. 1124). He wrote in his work al-Wuṣūl ilā l-uṣūl : "According to the Sunni teaching, it is possible that God burdens his servants with something that they are unable to do." With the Sunnis he means the Ashʿarites. Another, particularly passionate representative of Taklīf mā lā yutāq was Fachr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī. In his work al-Maṭālib al-ʿāliya he included a chapter "on the evidence that the taklīf mā lā yutāq occurs and that, when it does, it cannot be said that God is looking after the interests of men."

Other Ashʿarites, on the other hand, flatly rejected the teaching of Taklīf mā lā yutāq. For example, ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī (d. 1037) declared with reference to the basis (aṣl) of his theological teaching that God did not oblige anyone to do anything that he was unable to do or that was not in his power. He only obliged him to do what he could refrain from doing before the act and what he himself had the ability to do during the act. Al-Juwainī distinguished between two different forms of obligation to do the impossible. If the obligation refers to the request to act, then this is unthinkable for someone who knows that what is required cannot occur. But if this only means a certain formulation, without a request as in the Koran word “Become outcast monkeys!” (Sura 2:65), then this is not impossible, because it is only meant that God made the people in question into outcast apes have.

Some Ashʿarites also wavered in their view of the taklīf mā lā yutāq. For example, two views of al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) have come down to us. In his dogmatic treatise al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād he writes: “We claim that God imposes on his servants what they can and what they cannot do. And the Muʿtazilites deny this. ”In his legal theoretical work al-Manḫūl, on the other hand, he said:“ What we have chosen is the inconceivability of Taklīf mā lā yutāq. ”The later scholars also disagreed on his position. While Shihāb ad-Dīn al-Qarāfī (d. 1285) counted him among those who did not consider the taklīf mā lā yutāq possible, al-Yāfidī (d. 1367) narrated a statement from him that affirmed the taklīf mā lā yutāq. Such statements may have been the background to the statement of Abū Ishāq asch-Shātibī , according to which "a group of rationalists, even the majority of the scholars of the Ash Aarites" declared the Taklīf mā lā yutāq to be impossible.

Al-Ashʿari himself did not unreservedly endorse the taklīf mā lā yutāq either. He took the view that God could not oblige people if the limb concerned was missing or if there was an incapacity (ʿaǧz) , because the person was only asked to accept or to refrain. But if the limb concerned is missing or incapable, there can be no acceptance or omission. Every question regarding the obligation to the unattainable, such as the request to pay zakāt despite a lack of wealth, should be answered according to the same principle. The legal theoretical principle that the ability to act is a prerequisite for the taklīf was not touched by him. Only this was commanded to people, he taught, what they could do. Abū l-Yusr al-Bazdawī (d. 1099) declares that according to the teaching of al-Ashʿarī, God is obliged to do the unattainable in one respect and not in another. Because he had entrusted the person who did not have the ability to do an act with this act, but not the person who did not have the appropriate tools.

Differentiating representations in Ashʿaritic apologetics

The taklīf mā lā yutāq was one of the most conspicuous doctrinal points of the Ashʿarites and played an important role in Muʿtazilite and Imamite attacks on their teaching. In order to defend their school against these attacks, some Ashʿarites tried to relativize the importance of this teaching. The Yemeni Ashʿarit al-Yāfiʿī (d. 1367), who wrote an anti-Muʿtazilite script, stated that, according to the well-known teaching of Abū l-Hasan al-Ashʿarī, his companions and the true Imams, the obligation to the unattainable is possible, however only a visitation (ibtilāʾ) and a declaration of incapacity (taʿǧīz) are meant. Ibn Fūrak had already said that in the law of revelation there was no obligation to do the impossible, but if it were, it would be possible due to the omnipotence of God. What is meant by this is not the performance of an action that has been ordered to them, but a sign of the depravity of unbelievers as in the Koranic statement about the wrongdoers who are called on the day of the resurrection to fall down but are not able to ( Sura 68: 42 ).

The Persian Ashʿarit al-Fadl ibn Rūzbihān al-Chundschī (d. 1520) followed a similar path, who wrote a refutation of the theological treatise Nahǧ al-ḥaqq wa kašf al-ṣidq by the Imamite Shiite al-ʿAllāma al-Hillī, and in it the Ashʿarite doctrine defended against his attacks. In it he stated: “The doctrinal conception of the Ashʿarites is that a Taklīf mā lā yutāq is conceivable (ǧāʾiz) ." With this thinkability, however, only the intrinsic possibility (al-imkān aḏ-ḏātī) is meant. The Ashʿarites agreed, based on induction , that the taklīf mā lā yutāq in the Sharia never occurred. In order to make the Ashʿari position on taklīf mā lā yutāq understandable, al-Chundschī considered it necessary to distinguish three degrees of the unattainable (mā lā yuṭāq) :

  1. The unattainability, in which the action is excluded because of the divine knowledge of its non-occurrence or because the will and communication of God is bound to its non-occurrence. According to al-Chundschī, the burden of this is possible and even occurs according to the consensus, because otherwise the sinner with his unbelief and vice would not be obliged to believe and to refrain from major sins. Al-Chundschī explains that in the case of actions that are excluded because of the divine knowledge of their non-occurrence, the human capacity to act (qudra) cannot be bound to them, but a burden is possible with them.
  2. The impossibility of fulfilling , in which the action cannot occur from its own understanding, such as the connection of opposites (ǧamʿ aḍ-ḍiddain) , the reversal of truths and the destruction of the original. Here one group of the Ashʿarites had negated the possibility of exposure with the argument that what was excluded by his nature was unimaginable. The other group had taught that although this was conceivable, the obligation was basically not possible because this possibility meant the inherent possibility, but the obligation to something excluded was the demand to achieve what does not belong to the essence, and this is void.
  3. The unattainability, which consists in the fact that they are acts that mortals usually have no agency to do, such as creating bodies, carrying a mountain or flying in the sky. According to al-Chundschī, this type of unattainability is the real point of contention between the Muʿtazilites and the Ashʿarites. While the former excluded them because of their rational shamefulness, the latter considered such a burden to be conceivable because of the inherent possibility, but taught that it had not occurred. It behaves with it as with the other possible things which the Ashʿarites thought to be conceivable, like the divine vision. Believing these things to be conceivable does not necessarily mean that they will also occur.

The Imamit Nūrallāh at-Tustarī, who wrote a reply to al-Chundschī's work, accuses the latter of having only reproduced the doctrine of a few later Ashʿarites by restricting the possibility of Taklīf mā lā yutāq to the intrinsic possibility, excluding the real possibility, who evaded the "shameful teachings" of their master, while al-Hillī wanted to talk about the doctrinal views of al-Ashʿari and his early followers. He regards that they also accepted a real taklīf mā lā yutāq as proven because they argued with Abū Lahab's commitment to the faith and al-Ghazālī had pointed out that al-Ashʿarī's position necessarily resulted from his special theory of action . The statement that the Ashʿarites agree that the taklīf mā lā yutāq never occurred in the Sharia, rejects at-Tustarī as an outright lie.

Al-Baghdādī: The Muʿtazilites as advocates of Taklīf mā lā yutāq

Although the Ashʿarites were actually considered to be the advocates of the Taklīf-mā-lā-yutāq doctrine, in the early 11th century there was a theologian, ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī, who tried to prove that the Muʿtazilites were the actual proponents of it Be teaching. Al-Baghdādī was an Ashʿarit himself, but, as shown above, rejected the teaching of Taklīf mā lā yutāq. In one of his works, which actually deals with the theory of abrogation , he explains that the Mu zweitazilites have two different views on taklīf. The one view held by Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbā'ī (d. 916) and his son considered it permissible that the ability to act continues until the act, but also considered it possible that it could be before the act perish through incompetence. If it goes down in such a way, then hold the obligation until the time of the act. Man is now made incapable by the ability to act that he previously possessed. This is the obligation of the incapable (taklīf al-ʿāǧiz) . According to the other view, which was held by al-Kaʿbī (d. 931), the ability to act wanes again after its emergence and does not exist at the moment of the act, whereby the two points in time could be far apart. Since the person is mukallaf between the two points in time , it is a taklīf mā lā yutāq. Al-Baghdādī rejects this idea of ​​the occurrence of an action without the capacity to act as repulsive. It's like someone who thinks it's possible to light a house without a fire. If one assumes the obligation to continue in spite of the loss of the capacity to act, then one is like someone who gives his servant a ladder so that he can go up on the roof three hours later, but take the ladder away from him before the decisive moment and burn it. Al-Baghdādī believes that what he said showed that it was not the Ash Aarites, but in fact the Muʿtazilites, who taught an obligation to the unattainable and an obligation to the incapable, although they inadmissibly accused his own companions of this.

literature

Arabic sources
  • Al-Ḥasan ibn ʿAbd al-Muḥsin Abū ʿUḏba: ar-Rauḍa al-bahīya fī-mā bain al-Ašāʿira wa-l-Māturīdīya . Hyderabad 1904. pp. 53-57. Digitized
  • al-Āmidī : al-Iḥkām fī uṣūl al-aḥkām. Ed. ʿAbd ar-Razzāq al-ʿAfīfī. Dār aṣ-Ṣamīʿī, Riyad, 2003. 4 Vol. Vol. I, pp. 163, 179–201. Digitized
  • Abū l-Ḥasan al-Asarī : Kitāb al-Lumaʿ . Ed. Richard J. McCarthy. Imprimerie Catholique, Beirut, 1953.
  • ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī : al-Nāsiḫ wa-l-mansūḫ. Ed. Ḥilmī Kāmil Asʿad ʿAbd al-Hādī. Amman 1987. pp. 94-96. Digitized
  • al-Bāqillānī : Kitāb at-Tamhīd . Ed. Richard J. MacCarthy. Librairie Orientale, Beirut, 1957. pp. 293-295. Digitized
  • Abū l-Yusr al-Bazdawī: Kitāb Uṣūl ad-Dīn. Ed. Hans Peter Linss and Aḥmad Ḥiǧāzī as-Saqqā. Al-Maktaba al-Azharīya li-t-Tūrāṯ, Cairo 2003. p. 128. Digitized
  • ʿAbd-al-ʿAzīz al-Buḫārī: Kašf al-asrār ʿalā Uṣūl Abī l-Ḥasan ʿAlī ibn Muḥammad Ibn-Ḥusain al-Pazdawī . Vol. I. Istanbul 1889. pp. 191-198. Digitized
  • Abū Ḥāmid al-Ġazālī : Al-Manḫūl min taʿlīqāt al-uṣūl . Ed. Muḥammad Ḥasan Hītū. Damascus, 1970. pp. 21-33. Digitized
  • Abū Ḥāmid al-Ġazālī: al-Mustaṣfā min ʿilm al-uṣūl . Ed. Ḥamza ibn Zuhair Ḥāfiẓ. 4 vols. Beirut, 1413h (1993/1994). Digitized
  • Abū Ḥāmid al-Ġazālī: al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād . Ed. İbrahim Agâh Çubukçu and Hüseyin Atay. Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakanschesi , Ankara, 1962. pp. 174-182. Digitized
  • al-Ǧuwainī : al-Burhān fī uṣūl al-fiqh . Ed. ʿAbd al-ʿAẓīm ad-Dīb. Dār al-Anṣār, Cairo, 1399h (= 1978/79). Vol. I, pp. 101-107. Digitized
  • Al-Ǧuwainī: Kitāb al-Iršād ilā qawāṭiʿ al-adilla fī uṣūl al-iʿtiqād . Ed. Muḥammad Yūsuf Mūsā. Maktabat al-Ḫānǧī, Cairo, 1950. pp. 226–228.
  • Al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī : Anwār al-malakūt fī šarḥ al-Yaqūt . Ed. Muḥammad Naǧmī-Zanǧānī. Intišārāt ar-Riḍā, Qum, 1363 hš (= 1984).
  • Al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī: Nahǧ al-ḥaqq wa-kašf aṣ-ṣidq , Hs. Isfahan 530, p. 55f. Digitized
  • Ismāʿīl Ibn ʿAbbād: al-Ibāna ʿan maḏhab ahl al-ʿadl bi-ḥuǧaǧ al-qurʾān wa-l-ʿaql in Ed. by Muḥammad Ḥasan Āl Yāsīn in Nafāʾis al-maḫṭūṭāt . Baghdad 1963. pp. 7-30. Here p. 22. Digitized
  • Ibn Burhān al-Baġdādī: al-Wuṣūl ilā l-uṣūl . Maktabat al-Maʿārif, Riyadh, 1983. Vol. I, pp. 75-96. Digitized
  • Ibn Fūrak: Muǧarrad Maqālāt aš-šaiḫ Abī l-Ḥasan al-Ašʿarī . Ed. Daniel Gimaret. Dār al-Mašriq, Beirut, 1987. pp. 111f.
  • Abū Muḥammad al-Hasan Ibn Mattawaih: al-Maǧmūʿ fī l-Muḥīṭ. Dar el-Machreq, Beirut, 1981. Vol. II, pp. 56-65, 169-281.
  • Ibn an-Naǧǧār: Sharḥ al-Kaukab al-munīr . Ed. Muḥammad az-Zuǧailī and Nazīh Ḥammād. Maktabat al-ʿUbaikān, Riad, 1993. pp. 483-517. Digitized
  • ʿAbd ar-Raḥīm ibn al-Ḥasan al-Isnawī: Nihāyat as-sūl šarḥ Minhāǧ al-uṣūl . ʿĀlam al-kutub, Cairo, 1343h (1926 AD). Vol. I, pp. 315-369. Digitized
  • Ǧalāl ad-Dīn al-Maḥallī : al-Badr aṭ-ṭāliʿ fī ḥall Ǧamʿ al-ǧawamiʿ . Ed. Abū l-Fidā 'Murtaḍā ʿAlī ad-Dāġistānī. Muʾassasat ar-Risāla, Beirut, 2005. pp. 156–162. Digitized
  • Aḥmad ibn al-Ḥusain Mankdīm: Sharḥ al-Uṣūl al-ḫamsa . Ed. ʿAbd al-Karīm ʿUthmān. Maktabat al-Wahba, Cairo, 1965. pp. 390-402, 509-518.
  • Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī : Kitāb at-Tauḥīd . Ed. Fatḥallāh Ḫulaif. Beirut, 1986. pp. 263-86. Digitized - Ed. Bekir Topaloğlu / Muhammed Aruçi. Ankara, 2005, pp. 349-370. Digitized
  • Abū l-Barakāt an-Nasafī : Sharḥ al-ʿUmda fī ʿaqīdat ahl as-sunna wa-l-ǧamāʿa al-musammā al-Iʿtimād fī l-iʿtiqād . Ed. ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad ʿAbdallāh Ismāʿīl. Al-Maktaba al-Azharīya, Cairo, 2012. pp. 356–358. Digitized
  • Abū l-Barakāt an-Nasafī: ʿUmdat ʿAqīdat ahl as-sunna wa-l-ǧamāʿa . Ed. William Cureton. London 1843. pp. 21f. Digitized
  • Shihāb ad-Dīn al-Qarāfī: Šarḥ Tanqīḥ al-fuṣūl iḫtiṣār al-Maḥṣūl fī l-uṣūl . 2nd, revised edition Dār al-Fikr, Beirut, 2004. pp. 115f. Digitized
  • Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī: al-Maṭālib al-ʿāliya min al-ʿilm al-ilāhī . Ed. Aḥmad Ḥiǧāzī as-Saqqā. Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, Beirut, 1987. Vol. III, pp. 305-316.
  • Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī: Munāẓarāt fī bilād Mā warāʾ an-nahr . Ed. Fathalla Kholeif in A study on Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and his controversies in Transoxiana . Dar el-Machreq, Beyrouth, 1966. Arab. Text p. 51f. Digitized
  • Abū Iṣḥāq aš-Šāṭibī : al-Muwāfaqāt fī uṣūl aš-šarīʿa . Ed. Bakr ibn ʿAbdallāh Abū Zaid. Dār Ibn ʿAffān, al-Chubar, 1997. Vol. II, pp. 171–289. Digitized
  • Saʿd ad-Dīn at-Taftāzānī : Šarḥ al-Maqāṣid ʿĀlam al-kutub, Beirut, 1988. Vol. IV, pp. 296-301 digitized
  • Nūrallāh at-Tustarī: Iḥqāq al-ḥaqq wa-izhāq al-bāṭil . Maktabat Āyatallāh al-Marʿašī, Qom, 1956. pp. 470–484. Digitized
  • ʿAbdallāh al-Yāfiʿī: Marham al-ʿilal al-muʿḍila fī dafʿ aš-šubah wa-radd ʿalā l-Muʿtazila . Ed. E. Denison Ross. Calcutta 1910-1917. P. 97f. Digitized
Secondary literature
  • Robert Brunschvig: Devoir et Pouvoir. Histoire d'un Problème de Théologie Musulmane in Studia Islamica 20 (1964) 5-46.
  • Hans Daiber : The theological-philosophical system of Muʿammar Ibn ʿAbbād As-Sulamī (d. 830 AD) . Orient Inst. the Dt. Morgenländischen Ges., Beirut and Steiner, Wiesbaden, 1975. pp. 102-110. Digitized
  • Moez Dridi: The Theology of Human Actions: Imposing the Impossible. Al-taklīf and its Problems among the Ibāḍīs in Ersilla Francesca (ed.): Ibadi theology: rereading sources and scholarly works . Olms, Hildesheim, 2015. pp. 177-185.
  • Josef van Ess : Theology and society in the 2nd and 3rd centuries of the Hijra. A History of Religious Thought in Early Islam . 6 vols. De Gruyter, Berlin, 1991–97. Vol. IV, pp. 493f.
  • Fathalla Kholeif: A study on Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and his controversies in Transoxiana . Dar el-Machreq, Beyrouth, 1966. pp. 131-138.
  • Abdurrahim Kozali: The elements of obligation (taklīf) in uṣūl al-fiqh in Journal of Religious Culture 151 (2011) 1–11. Digitized
  • Bītā Walādust: Taklīf mā lā yuṭāq in Dāʾirat-i maʿārif-i buzurg-i islāmī . Markaz-i Dāʾirat al-Maʿārif-i Buzurg-i Islāmī, Tehran, 1988ff. Vol. XVI, pp. 96b-98a. Digitized

Individual evidence

  1. ^ W. Montgomery Watt: Dj ahmiyya in The Encyclopaedia of Islam. New Edition Vol. II, p. 388b.
  2. ↑ al-Malāḥimī: Kitāb al-Fāʾiq fī uṣūl ad-dīn . 2010, p. 279.
  3. ↑ al-Malāḥimī: Kitāb al-Fāʾiq fī uṣūl ad-dīn . 2010, p. 279.
  4. ↑ See Daiber: The theological-philosophical system. 1975, p. 104.
  5. ↑ Cf. Ibn al-Murtaḍā: Kitāb Ġāyat al-afkār wa-nihāyat al-anẓār . Ms. Princeton ymdi_03_26, p. 176, last line, to p. 177, lines 1-4. Digitized
  6. ↑ Al-ʿAllām al-Ḥillī: Nahǧ al-ḥaqq . Ms. Isfahan, p. 55.
  7. ↑ Al-Ǧuwainī: al-Burhān fī uṣul al-fiqh . 1399h, p. 103.
  8. ↑ al-Ġazālī: al-Mustaṣfā . Vol. I, p. 288.
  9. ↑ al-Ġazālī: al-Manḫūl . 1970, p. 23.
  10. ↑ Abū ʿUḏba: ar-Rauḍa al-bahīya . 1904, p. 56f.
  11. ↑ al-Āmidī: al-Iḥkām fī uṣūl al-aḥkām. 2003, p. 179.
  12. ↑ Cf. al-Ašʿarī: Maqālāt al-islāmīyīn wa-ḫtilāf al-muṣallīn . Ed. Hellmut Ritter . Steiner, Wiesbaden, 1963. p. 230, lines 12-14.
  13. ↑ Ibn Burhān: al-Wuṣūl ilā l-uṣūl . 1983, Vol. I, pp. 81f.
  14. ↑ Quotation from at-Tustarī: Iḥqāq al-ḥaqq . 1956, p. 472.
  15. ↑ Al-Ḥillī: Anwār al-malakūt fī šarḥ al-Yāqūt . 1984, p. 152.
  16. ↑ al-Baghdādī: al-Nāsiḫ wa-l-mansūḫ. 1987, p. 96.
  17. ^ Brunschvig: Devoir et Pouvoir. Histoire d'un Problems of Theology Musulmane. 1964, p. 24f.
  18. ^ Brunschvig: Devoir et Pouvoir. Histoire d'un Problems of Theology Musulmane. 1964, p. 26.
  19. ↑ Abū Hafs an-Nasafī: ʿAqāʾid . Ed. William Cureton. London 1843. p. 2, lines 18-21 ( digitized version ).
  20. ↑ Ar-Rāzī: al-Munāẓarāt . 1966, p. 51f.
  21. ↑ Cf. to her Josef van Ess : Theology and Society in the 2nd and 3rd Century Hijra. A History of Religious Thought in Early Islam. Volume II. Berlin-New York 1992. pp. 108-118.
  22. ↑ al-Āmidī: al-Iḥkām fī uṣūl al-aḥkām. 2003, p. 180.
  23. ^ Van Ess: Theology and Society in the 2nd and 3rd Century Hijra. 1992, Vol. II, p. 110.
  24. ↑ Cf. Ibn ʿAbbād: al-Ibāna ʿan maḏhab ahl al-ʿadl bi-ḥuǧaǧ al-qurʾān wa-l-ʿaql . 1963, p. 22.
  25. ↑ al-Ǧuwainī: al-Iršād . 1950, p. 228.
  26. ↑ al-Ǧuwainī: al-Iršād . 1950, p. 228.
  27. ↑ Ibn Burhān: al-Wuṣūl ilā l-uṣūl . 1983, Vol. I, p. 84.
  28. ↑ Ar-Rāzī: al-Maṭālib al-ʿāliya . 1987, Vol. III, p. 305.
  29. ↑ Ar-Rāzī: al-Munāẓarāt . 1966, p. 51.
  30. ↑ Ar-Rāzī: al-Munāẓarāt . 1966, p. 52.
  31. ↑ Ar-Rāzī: al-Munāẓarāt . 1966, p. 52.
  32. ↑ Al-Ǧuwainī: al-Burhān fī uṣul al-fiqh . 1399h, p. 104.
  33. ↑ Al-Isnawī: Nihāyat as-sūl šarḥ Minhāǧ al-uṣūl . 1926, Vol. I, pp. 368f.
  34. ↑ Abū ʿUḏba: ar-Rauḍa al-bahīya . 1904, p. 56.
  35. ↑ Abū ʿUḏba: ar-Rauḍa al-bahīya . 1904, p. 55.
  36. ↑ Al-Ġazālī: Al-Manḫūl min taʿlīqāt al-uṣūl . 1970, p. 23.
  37. ↑ Cf. al-Maḥallī: al-Badr a-ṭāliʿ . 2005, p. 158.
  38. ↑ Ibn Niẓām ad-Dīn al-Laknawī: Fawātiḥ ar-raḥamūt bi-šarḥ Musallam aṯ-ṯubūt . Dār al-kutub al-ʿilmīya, Beirut, 2002. Vol. I, p. 102 digitized
  39. ↑ Abū ʿUḏba: ar-Rauḍa al-bahīya . 1904, p. 55.
  40. ↑ Al-Laknawī: Fawātiḥ ar-raḥamūt . 2002, p. 102.
  41. ↑ Ar-Rāzī: al-Maṭālib al-ʿāliya . 1987, Vol. III, p. 305.
  42. ↑ Al-Ḥillī: Anwār al-malakūt fī šarḥ al-Yāqūt . 1984, p. 153.
  43. ↑ Al-Ḥillī: Anwār al-malakūt fī šarḥ al-Yāqūt . 1984, p. 152.
  44. ^ Al-Ašarī: Kitāb al-Lumaʿ . 1953. p. 58., engl. Transl. 82.
  45. ↑ Al-Bāqillānī: Kitāb at-Tamhīd . 1957, p. 294.
  46. ↑ Ar-Rāzī: al-Maṭālib al-ʿāliya . 1987, Vol. III, p. 305.
  47. ^ Al-Ašarī: Kitāb al-Lumaʿ . 1953. p. 68., engl. Transl. 95.
  48. ↑ al-Yāfiʿī: Marham al-ʿilal al-muʿḍila . 1910/1917, p. 98.
  49. ↑ Al-Bazdawī: Kitāb Uṣūl ad-Dīn. 2003, p. 128.
  50. ↑ Mankdīm: Sharḥ al-Uṣūl al-ḫamsa . 1965, p. 401.
  51. ↑ al-Malāḥimī: Kitāb al-Fāʾiq fī uṣūl ad-dīn . 2010, p. 298.
  52. ↑ Abū l-Barakāt an-Nasafī: ʿUmdat ʿAqīdat ahl as-sunna wa-l-ǧamāʿa . 1843. p. 22.
  53. ↑ an-Nasafī: Sharḥ al-ʿUmda . 2012, p. 357.
  54. ↑ al-Baghdādī: al-Nāsiḫ wa-l-mansūḫ. 1987, p. 95.
  55. ↑ al-Ǧuwainī: al-Iršād . 1950, p. 228.
  56. ↑ Al-Bāqillānī: Kitāb at-Tamhīd . 1957, p. 294f.
  57. ↑ Abū l-Barakāt an-Nasafī: ʿUmdat ʿAqīdat ahl as-sunna wa-l-ǧamāʿa . 1843, p. 21.
  58. ↑ an-Nasafī: Sharḥ al-ʿUmda . 2012, p. 357.
  59. ↑ al-Yāfiʿī: Marham al-ʿilal al-muʿḍila . 1910/1917, p. 98.
  60. ↑ Quotation from at-Tustarī: Iḥqāq al-ḥaqq . 1956, p. 472.
  61. ↑ Mankdīm: Sharḥ al-Uṣūl al-ḫamsa . 1965, p. 390.
  62. ↑ Ibn Mattawaih: al-Maǧmūʿ fī l-Muḥīṭ. 1986, p. 56.
  63. ↑ Quoted from Nūrallāh at-Tustarī: Iḥqāq al-ḥaqq . 1956, p. 472.
  64. ↑ Al-Ḥillī: Anwār al-malakūt fī šarḥ al-Yāqūt . 1984, p. 152.
  65. ↑ Al-ʿAllām al-Ḥillī: Nahǧ al-ḥaqq . Ms. Isfahan, p. 55.
  66. ↑ Mankdīm: Sharḥ al-Uṣūl al-ḫamsa . 1965, p. 400.
  67. ↑ Mankdīm: Sharḥ al-Uṣūl al-ḫamsa . 1965, pp. 397, 400.
  68. ↑ At-Taftazānī: Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid . 1998, Vol. IV, p. 296.
  69. ↑ Ibn Naǧǧār: Sharḥ al-Kaukab al-munīr . 1993, p. 487f.
  70. ↑ al-Malāḥimī: Kitāb al-Fāʾiq fī uṣūl ad-dīn . 2010, p. 297.
  71. ↑ Al-Maturīdī: Kitāb at-Tauḥīd . 2005, p. 351f.
  72. ↑ At-Taftazānī: Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid . 1998, Vol. IV, p. 296.
  73. ↑ Ibn Fūrak: Muǧarrad . 1987, pp. 334f.
  74. ↑ al-Ġazālī: al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād . 1962, p. 179.
  75. ↑ At-Taftazānī: Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid . 1998, Vol. IV, p. 296.
  76. ↑ Cf. Ismāʿīl Ibn ʿAbbād: al-Ibāna ʿan maḏhab ahl al-ʿadl bi-ḥuǧaǧ al-qurʾān wa-l-ʿaql in Ed. by Muḥammad Ḥasan Āl Yāsīn in Nafāʾis al-maḫṭūṭāt . Baghdad 1963. pp. 7-30. Here p. 22. Digitized
  77. ↑ At-Taftazānī: Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid . 1998, Vol. IV, p. 296.
  78. ↑ Quoted from Nūrallāh at-Tustarī: Iḥqāq al-ḥaqq . 1956, p. 473.
  79. ↑ Al-ʿAllām al-Ḥillī: Nahǧ al-ḥaqq . Ms. Isfahan, p. 55.
  80. ↑ al-Malāḥimī: Kitāb al-Fāʾiq fī uṣūl ad-dīn . 2010, p. 296.
  81. ↑ al-Ġazālī: al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād . 1962, p. 180.
  82. ↑ Saʿd ad-Dīn at-Taftāzānī: Šarḥ at-Talwīḥ ʿalā t-Tauḍīḥ . Dār al-kutub al-ʿilmīya, Beirut, Vol. I, p. 198. Digitized
  83. ↑ Al-ʿAllām al-Ḥillī: Nahǧ al-ḥaqq . Ms. Isfahan, p. 55.
  84. ↑ Abū ʿUḏba: ar-Rauḍa al-bahīya . 1904, p. 54.
  85. ↑ Daiber: The theological-philosophical system. 1975, p. 105.
  86. ↑ Saʿadja b. Yūsuf al-Faiyūmī: Kitāb al-Amānāt wa-l-Iʿtiqādāt. Ed. Samuel Landauer. Brill, Leiden 1880 p. 150f. Digitized
  87. ^ Al-Buḫārī: Kašf al-asrār . 1889, p. 192.
  88. ↑ Al-Bāqillānī: Kitāb at-Tamhīd . 1957, p. 294f.
  89. ↑ Cf. al-Maturīdī: Kitāb at-Tauḥīd . 1970, p. 269.
  90. ↑ Abū l-Barakāt an-Nasafī: ʿUmdat ʿAqīdat ahl as-sunna wa-l-ǧamāʿa . 1843, p. 21.
  91. ↑ Mankdīm: Sharḥ al-Uṣūl al-ḫamsa . 1965, p. 402.
  92. ↑ Cf. Ismāʿīl Ibn ʿAbbād: al-Ibāna ʿan maḏhab ahl al-ʿadl bi-ḥuǧaǧ al-qurʾān wa-l-ʿaql in Ed. by Muḥammad Ḥasan Āl Yāsīn in Nafāʾis al-maḫṭūṭāt . Baghdad 1963. pp. 7-30. Here p. 22. Digitized
  93. ↑ al-Malāḥimī: Kitāb al-Fāʾiq fī uṣūl ad-dīn . 2010, p. 296f.
  94. ^ Al-Ašarī: Kitāb al-Lumaʿ . 1953. p. 64., engl. Transl. 90.
  95. ↑ Ibn Naǧǧār: Sharḥ al-Kaukab al-munīr . 1993, p. 486f.
  96. ↑ Ibn Burhān: al-Wuṣūl ilā l-uṣūl . 1983, Vol. I, p. 88.
  97. ↑ Quoted from Nūrallāh at-Tustarī: Iḥqāq al-ḥaqq . 1956, p. 472.
  98. ↑ Al-Qarāfī: Sharḥ Tanqīḥ al-fuṣūl . 2004, p. 115.
  99. ↑ Al-ʿAllām al-Ḥillī: Nahǧ al-ḥaqq . Ms. Isfahan, pp. 55f.
  100. ↑ Cf. Ibn al-Murtaḍā: Kitāb Ġāyat al-afkār wa-nihāyat al-anẓār . Ms. Princeton ymdi_03_26, p. 177, lines 11f. Digitized
  101. ↑ Abū ʿUḏba: ar-Rauḍa al-bahīya . 1904, p. 53.
  102. ↑ al-Ġazālī: al-Mustaṣfā . Vol. I, p. 288.
  103. ↑ Ṣāliḥ ibn Mahdī al-Maqbalī: al-ʿAlam aš-šāmiḫ fī īṯār al-ḥaqq ʿalā l-ābāʾ wa-l-mašāyiḫ . Cairo 1328h. P. 224. Digitized
  104. ↑ Ibn Burhān: al-Wuṣūl ilā l-uṣūl . 1983, Vol. I, pp. 81f.
  105. ↑ Ar-Rāzī: al-Maṭālib al-ʿāliya . 1987, Vol. III, p. 305.
  106. ↑ al-Baghdādī: al-Nāsiḫ wa-l-mansūḫ. 1987, p. 95.
  107. ↑ Al-Ǧuwainī: al-Burhān fī uṣul al-fiqh . 1399h, p. 104.
  108. ^ Brunschvig: Devoir et Pouvoir. Histoire d'un Problems of Theology Musulmane. 1964, p. 33.
  109. ↑ al-Ġazālī: al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād . 1962, p. 178.
  110. ↑ al-Ġazālī: al-Manḫūl . 1970, p. 24.
  111. ↑ Al-Qarāfī: Sharḥ Tanqīḥ al-fuṣūl . 2004, p. 115.
  112. ↑ al-Yāfiʿī: Marham al-ʿilal al-muʿḍila . 1910/1917, p. 97.
  113. ↑ aš-Šāṭibī: al-Muwāfaqāt . 1997, p. 204.
  114. ^ Brunschvig: Devoir et Pouvoir. Histoire d'un Problems of Theology Musulmane. 1964, p. 21.
  115. ^ Al-Ašarī: Kitāb al-Lumaʿ . 1953. pp. 59f., Engl. Transl. 84f.
  116. ^ Brunschvig: Devoir et Pouvoir. Histoire d'un Problems of Theology Musulmane. 1964, p. 22.
  117. ^ Al-Ašarī: Kitāb al-Lumaʿ . 1953. p. 64., engl. Transl. 90.
  118. ↑ Al-Bazdawī: Kitāb Uṣūl ad-Dīn. 2003, p. 128.
  119. ↑ al-Yāfiʿī: Marham al-ʿilal al-muʿḍila . 1910/1917, p. 98.
  120. ↑ al-Yāfiʿī: Marham al-ʿilal al-muʿḍila . 1910/1917, p. 98.
  121. ↑ Quoted from Nūrallāh at-Tustarī: Iḥqāq al-ḥaqq . 1956, p. 472.
  122. ↑ Quotation from at-Tustarī: Iḥqāq al-ḥaqq . 1956, p. 473.
  123. ↑ Quotation from at-Tustarī: Iḥqāq al-ḥaqq . 1956, p. 472.
  124. ↑ Quotation from at-Tustarī: Iḥqāq al-ḥaqq . 1956, p. 473f.
  125. ↑ Quoted from Nūrallāh at-Tustarī: Iḥqāq al-ḥaqq . 1956, pp. 474f.
  126. ↑ Quotation from at-Tustarī: Iḥqāq al-ḥaqq . 1956, p. 475.
  127. ↑ Quoted from Nūrallāh at-Tustarī: Iḥqāq al-ḥaqq . 1956, p. 475f.
  128. ↑ At-Tustari: Iḥqāq al-Haqq . 1956, p. 476.
  129. ↑ al-Baġdādī: al-Nāsiḫ wa-l-mansūḫ. 1987, p. 95.
  130. ↑ al-Baġdādī: al-Nāsiḫ wa-l-mansūḫ. 1987, p. 95.