Tarnopol offensive

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Tarnopol offensive
date July 19th bis 28. July 1917
place Eastern Galicia
output Occupation of Eastern Galicia by the Central Powers
Parties to the conflict

Russian Republic 1917Russian republic Russia

German EmpireThe German Imperium German Empire Austria-Hungary
Austria-HungaryAustria-Hungary (trade flag) 

Commander

Russian Republic 1917Russian republicLavr Kornilov
Pyotr Balujew
Fyodor Rerberg

German EmpireThe German Imperium Leopold von Bayern
Arnold von Winckler
Felix von Bothmer

Troop strength
Russian Republic 1917Russian republicSouthwest Front:
11th Army 		Army group Winckler
about 12 divisions
on July 19th
92,500 men
2,300 riders
935 guns
Major military operations on the
Eastern Front (1914-1918)

The Tarnopol offensive , scheduled at the end of July 1917 , marks a successful counter-offensive by the Central Powers in the southern section of the Eastern Front of the First World War . The Russian summer offensive launched by Russian Minister of War Kerensky at the beginning of July 1917 failed to reach its target of Lemberg . The counter-offensive was initiated with the breakthrough battle between Zalosce and Zborow on July 19. Evidence of the disintegration of the Russian army favored the attack; on July 25, the border town of Tarnopol fell into the hands of the Central Powers. The attack continued with the recapture of Bukovina and did not end until August 15 with the regaining of the territories of Eastern Galicia that had been lost in September 1914. The troops were the Russian southwestern front to the end of August Zbrucz be pushed back section, here again started the war of position until the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk the war in the East in the spring of 1918 ended.

Prepare to attack

General Ivan Georgjewitsch Erdeli, commander in chief of the Russian 11th Army, was replaced after the failure of the Kerensky offensive

As early as July 18, the Russian commander-in-chief, General Brusilov, realized that his last major offensive had completely stalled and that his days in Kerensky's council of war were numbered. The Russian 11th Army under General Iwan Erdeli in the Brody area covered the western apron of Tarnopol. Opposite the established southern army under General von Bothmer's infantry, the Russian 7th Army stood in the unchanged positions from the beginning of July between Brzezany and Halicz on the Dniester . South of the river, the Russian 8th Army was still attacking in the Kalusz area . In Bukovina and the Forest Carpathians, the following Russian 9th Army under General Georgi Stupin remained defensive.

On July 14th, the German Commander-in-Chief for the East , Field Marshal Leopold von Bayern , and his staff moved their headquarters from Brest-Litowsk to Zloczow in order to be closer to the threatened front. The German army command was planning to launch its own counter-offensive in eastern Galicia while the Russian attacks near Kalusz. For this purpose, six additional divisions had been brought into Galicia from the western front since the beginning of July . The attack took place in cooperation with the Austro-Hungarian Army Group Boehm-Ermolli, which was in command in the attack section . The Prussian General von Winckler , commander of the German I. Army Corps (Zloczow section), took over the leadership of an attack group whose main focus was north of Zborow and which had to break through the Russian front in the direction of Tarnopol. Winckler had eleven German and one and a half Austro-Hungarian divisions with 124.5 battalions, 24 squadrons and 219 batteries at his disposal on the first day of the attack. The Winckler Army Group was introduced between the Austro-Hungarian 4th Army and the Southern Army instead of the Austro-Hungarian 2nd Army and took over the section of the Austro-Hungarian IX defeated in the Kerensky offensive. Corps. After the breakthrough had taken place, the thrust wedge was to be reinforced with around 30,000 men, depending on the position at the front, and the width of the breakthrough was also to be increased by the action of the southern army, which was about 150,000 men strong. Because of a rainy period, the deployment was difficult, as was the poor supply situation - sufficient horse feed was scarce.

Deployment of the Central Powers

Four corps groups were provided for the counterattack by the Central Powers:

The German southern army of General of the Infantry Felix von Bothmer was to join the attack later in the south :

Meanwhile, on the south bank of the Dniester, the severely battered Austro-Hungarian 3rd Army fought in the Battle of Kalusz , after being replaced by Karl Tersztyánszky von Nádas , it was led by Colonel General Karl Křitek on July 12th . On the left wing of the 3rd Army in the Kalusz trouble spot, the German Litzmann Corps Group (Generalkommando XXXX. Reserve Corps ) had been standing since July 15, which commanded the German 83rd Division ( Stumpff ) and the Austro-Hungarian 15th Division ( von Ausch ) and now also the 16th Reserve Division ( winner ) and the Bavarian 8th Reserve Division were assigned. On the right the Hungarian group Hadfy (XXVI. Corps) formed a defensive wing with the 42nd Honved Division, the Austro-Hungarian 16th ( von Kaltenborn ) and 36th Division together with the 5th Division ( Felix ), which operated independently up to the Pantyr Pass . This was where the dividing line to the Austro-Hungarian 7th Army under General Kövess took place , which covered the Forest Carpathians with the German Carpathian Corps under Richard von Conta .

Course of the German counter-offensive

Breakthrough battle at Zalosce from July 19th

Arnold von Winckler, leader of the attack group against Tarnopol

On July 19 at 3 a.m., a seven-hour artillery strike with 600 guns and 180 mortars launched the attack by the Winckler attack group between Zborów and Zwyżyn. The German counterattack was set at a width of only 5 kilometers and carried out with 92,500 men, 2,300 horsemen, 935 artillery pieces and 1,173 machine guns.

Around 10 o'clock the powerful infantry thrust of the German XXIII. Reserve Corps. On the left was the Imperial and Royal 33rd Division between the Sereth at Ratyszcze to Zwyzyn, in the middle the 1st and 2nd Guard Divisions at Manajow, the 6th Division behind. Between Perepelniki and about 15 kilometers north of Zborow near Jaroslawice, the Wilhelmi group with the 197th Division joined on the right . The Austro-Hungarian 33rd Division accompanied the attack on the left wing and, after the breakthrough, formed the flank protection to the north to the Sereth. The first breakthrough to a width of about 5 kilometers came in the section of the 6th Grenadier Division in the Russian 11th Army. As a result, the troops of the Russian XXV gave way. Corps back to Zalośce. The German 6th Division took Harbuzów and the heights at Troscianiec and west of Ratyszcze. The 2nd Guard Division stormed Ratyszcze in the afternoon. The 1st Guard Division reached the Brodki forest, by evening the line Troscianec-Zaloczke was reached and crossings over the Smolanka were reached. On the right, the Berrer Corps (5th and 22nd Divisions) was held up by dammings and crossings with the rear of the 6th Division in a swampy Sereth lowland, while the 5th Division managed to advance in a south-easterly direction towards Olejów. The Wilhelmi group had the Russian XVII. Corps wrested the heights at Zborów, they had already taken Zlota Gora and the Wertepy height, the Russian XVII. Corps (3rd and 35th Divisions) was defeated. Supporting attacks in the south by the 223rd division of the Beskid Corps penetrated Koniuchy in battle with the Russian V Corps. By evening the breakthrough was forced to 15 kilometers wide and 6 kilometers deep, the heights on both sides of Olejów and Zalosce had been reached. 2900 prisoners and ten guns were brought in, increasing signs of disintegration among the Russians became visible.

20th of July

Tarnopol Offensive July 1917

On July 20, Winckler's attack continued as planned. The Wilhelmi group and the Berrer corps advanced further towards the southeast on July 20 and achieved a further gain of space of 16 kilometers south of the Sereth. The commander in chief of the Russian 11th Army threw in vain his reserve, the XXXXIX. Corps, into battle. A large part of the Russian soldiers refused to attack again and deserted. The Russian XVII. Corps vacated their positions without offering any resistance and went back to the Sereth . The Russian V Corps was threatened by encirclement on its northern flank and had to go back to the Konjuchi-Kuklince line. The VI, subordinated to the Russian 7th Army. Corps was to withdraw its right wing on Budylov and attack from the south on the flank of the enemy who had broken through. The Russian V Corps had already returned to Myszkowice via Kozlow. A gap of 40 kilometers was opened in the Russian front between Mikulince and the Strypa . Under pressure from the front and from the north, the Russian 7th Army withdrew from the positions west of Halicz in front of the Southern Army . Before the 96th and 223rd divisions , the Russian VI. Corps to vacate its positions, the German Beskid Corps advanced on Augustowka and Jozefowka. At the same time, the kuk XXV. Corps to take back the old position at Byszki on Konjuchibach in order to facilitate the advancement of the German 223rd Division at Konjuchi. During the night General von Bothmer released the 15th Reserve Division from its southern section of the XXV front . Reserve Corps in order to have a reserve available on the left wing of the Southern Army.

21 July

On July 21, Field Marshal Leopold von Bayern made the 92nd Division available to the attack group under General Winckler for flank protection on the Sereth and also sent the 42nd Division to the XXIII who had broken through. Reserve Corps after. Winckler's attack between Strypa and Sereth in a south-easterly direction continued. Winckler's troops advanced along the road to Tarnopol and on the southern bank of the Sereth and broke the opposing resistance. The 5th and 6th divisions, the 22nd, 42nd, 92nd, 96th and 223rd divisions pursued side by side and in a deep staggered manner. The corps groups Kathen, Wilhelmi and Berrer had already advanced on the Budylow, Kozlow line into the western apron of Tarnopol. The retreated Russian V Corps stopped again on the east bank of the Sereth for renewed resistance. The commander of the Russian 8th Army , General Lawr Kornilow , now directed his reserve in Eastern Galicia, the XXXIV. and XXXXV. Corps, into the rift between the 7th and 11th Armies.

Political interlude

General Lawr Kornilov

In mid-July were in Petrograd riots ( July Days broke out) against the government troops of the Western Front had to be taken to protect the capital from the front. The strong current of the Bolsheviks had already carried away the proletariat . The government troops used machine guns against the radical demonstrators, and hundreds were killed. Prime Minister Lvov resigned and was replaced on July 21 by Kerensky as the new head of the Provisional Government. Kerensky also remained Minister of War and was able to assert himself for the time being. Mass executions took place on the breakthrough front, and notes with the words “deserter” were affixed to the bodies of those shot as a deterrent. Kerensky replaced General Gutor as Commander in Chief of the Southwest Front, now Lavr Kornilov got his place, the 8th Army was now transferred to General Cheremisov . General Erdeli, the leader of the defeated 11th Army, took command of the Northern Special Army , while its previous leader, General Pyotr Baluev , took over the 11th Army and prepared the defense of the threatened Tarnopol. The southern wing of the 8th Army (XI., XXIII. And XVIII. Corps) in the Forest Carpathians joined the newly inserted 1st Army under General Wannowski on July 23 . The new Commander-in-Chief of the Southwest Front, General Kornilov, called on the Provisional Government to introduce the death penalty in the fighting armies.

Assault battle on Tarnopol

22nd of July

The Russian 11th Army had withdrawn via the Kozowa-Tarnopol railway line. The German divisions were temporarily held up by strong rear guards 32 kilometers south of Brody. On the western bank of the Sereth three Russian corps (XVII., XXIV., XXXXIX.) Gathered between Zalośce and Tarnopol for renewed resistance. The 1st Guard Corps under General Mai-Majewski held a heavily manned bridgehead at Tarnopol on the western bank of the Sereth.

The Winckler Army Group carefully prepared the attack on Tarnopol: in addition to the newly formed Melior Group (kuk 33rd Division) and the German 92nd Division , the XXIII. Reserve Corps (6th Division, 1st and 2nd Guard Division) and the Berrer Corps (22nd and 5th Divisions) was followed by the 42nd Division (von Estorff). The 2nd Guard Division (Friedeburg) took over the flank protection to the northeast on the west bank of the Sereth, the 92nd Division covered both sides of Zalośce. On the far left, the Imperial and Royal 33rd Division under General Iwanski had to build defensive positions against Russian attacks from the north between Ratyszcze and Zwyżyn. The Russian V Corps assembled at Myszkowice south of Tarnopol; between him and the right wing of the 7th Army (VI. Corps) the front was still wide open. The XXXXV ordered from Trembowla . Corps reached the Tarnopol area. The Wilhelmi group and the Beskid Corps pursued sharply via Kozłow and Budylow and also crossed the Kozowa-Tarnopol railway line. The AOK 7 tried in vain with the XXXIV brought from the Podhajce area . Corps to close the gap between the Sereth and the Strypa .

July 23

West of Tarnopol, the 1st Guard Division was unable to overcome the strong resistance of the Russian Guard Corps immediately. The Sereth was reached by the German 6th Division south of Tarnopol, and troops of General Command 51 were already establishing themselves on the right bank at Mikulince-Strusow. While the south wing of the Austro-Hungarian 2nd Army was facing east between Strusow and Ratyszcze against stiffening Russian resistance, the Wilhelmi group and the Beskid Corps swung south between the Sereth and the Strypa. The opposed XXXIV. Corps under General Skoropadski , reinforced by the 104th Division, was unable to hold the Germans between Mikulińce and Burkanów for long; thousands of Russian soldiers have already left their trenches without a fight. The XXXIV. Corps fled back to Trembowla, whereupon the remaining parts of the 7th Army, the VI., The XLI., The VII. Siberian and the XXII. (Finnish) corps continued their retreat via Burkanow and Podhajce to Olesza and Monasterzyska. The Wilhelmi group and the Beskid Corps came under the command of the Southern Army that evening.

24th July

On July 24th Kornilov ordered the armies north of the Pripyat to stop all relief attacks. The Commander-in-Chief of the Western Front hastily had the Xth Corps and the Romanian Front the XXIX. Corps to reinforce the beleaguered front to Galicia. Kornilov tried to send his reserves against the breakthrough point, but given orders were no longer obeyed: the bulk of the Russian army did not want to continue fighting. In the Woloczysk area alone, 12,000 deserters had marched off and carried out looting and atrocities on their retreat. On the left wing of the Southern Army, the 197th Division now fighting there broke the enemy resistance south of Darachów. The Beskid Corps rejected Russian counter-attacks east of Burkanow and near Chmielowka.

July 25-27

While the left wing of the Russian 7th Army and the right wing of the 8th Army were retreating to the Budzanów — Buczacz — Niżniów line, the 11th Army had rallied to resist the Sereth. The day before the Berrer Corps had already crossed the Sereth between Trembowla and Ostrów, now General Balujew threw his reserve, the 151st Division, at it. The German 42nd Division, assigned to the south wing of the Berrer group, pushed the left bank of the Sereth and on that day pushed the Russians back north of Trembowla via the railway line.

On July 25, the German Beskid Corps had to repel strong Russian advances in the area south of Trembowla and ran stuck west of Budzanow. In the Wilhelmi group, parts of the 197th and 237th divisions crossed the Sereth and occupied Janow. The body hussar brigade was deployed against Czortków to cut off the railway line to Buczacz .

On the morning of July 25th the German 1st Guard Division tried in vain to force the Sereth crossing at Czystylow. On the right wing of the XXII. The 6th Division, which preceded the reserve corps, advanced over the Sereth at Trembowla and gained the heights southeast of Tarnopol. When the Russian I. Guard Corps became aware of the evasion of the V Corps to the Gniezna sector, it vacated the Tarnopol bridgehead and left the city to the enemy. The goal set for the Zloczów General Command (IAK) was achieved, the next day the heights north of Tarnopol were occupied and a bridgehead was created.

On July 27th Trembowla was taken and the Gniezna section forced. Only the southern wing of the Winckler army group followed the southern army, which was still advancing further to the south. On the line Hleszczawa - Czystylow (northwest of Tarnopol) Winckler stopped his advance.

Finale

By July 28, the Russian 8th and 11th Armies had been pushed back across the Zbrucz almost to the border of Bessarabia . On July 29, Kerensky held a conference with the commanders-in-chief of the fronts at the Mogilev headquarters . Three days after this conference, General Brusilov, in chief, was removed from his post on August 2nd and replaced by General Kornilov. On July 26th, the Russians took a counter-offensive and stopped the advance of the southern army in heavy fighting on the Sereth. Meanwhile, strong counter-attacks by the Romanian 2nd Army in the Verezker Mountains threatened the front of the Austro-Hungarian 1st Army in Moldova.

literature

  • Reichsarchiv: The World War 1914–1918 . Volume XIII, ES Mittler and Son, Berlin 1942, pp. 159-168.
  • Hermann Stegemann : History of the War . Fourth volume, Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, Stuttgart 1921.

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Anton Wagner: The First World War, Carl Uberreuter Verlag, Vienna 1981, p. 260.
  2. ↑ Hermann Stegemann's History of War Volume 4, Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, Stuttgart 1921, p. 383 f.