HMS Royalist (89)

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For other ships with the same name, see HMS Royalist.

Royalist anchored at Greenock, Scotland, in September 1943
History
United Kingdom
NameRoyalist
BuilderScotts Shipbuilding and Engineering Company, Greenock
Laid down21 March 1940
Launched30 May 1942
Commissioned10 September 1943
Recommissioned1967
DecommissionedNovember 1967
Out of serviceIn reserve from 1946 to 1956 Loaned to the Royal New Zealand Navy from 1956 to 1966
IdentificationPennant number: 89
FateSold for scrap, November 1967
New Zealand
NameHMNZS Royalist
Commissioned1956
Decommissioned1966
Out of serviceReturned to Royal Navy control 1967
General characteristics (as built)
Class and typeDido-class light cruiser
Displacement
  • 5,950 tons standard
  • 7,200 tons full load
Length
  • 485 ft (148 m) pp
  • 512 ft (156 m) oa
Beam50 ft 6 in (15.39 m)
Draught14 ft (4.3 m)
Installed power62,000 shp (46 MW)
Propulsion
Speed32.25 knots (59.73 km/h; 37.11 mph)
Range
  • 1,303 nmi (2,414 km) at 30 kn (56 km/h)
  • 3,685 nmi (6,824 km) at 16 kn (30 km/h)
Complement530
Armament
Armour

HMS Royalist was a Bellona-class (improved Dido-class) light cruiser of the Royal Navy (RN) during the Second World War.

After commissioning in 1943, Royalist was modified with extra facilities and crew for operating as a flagship for aircraft carrier operations. Initially, it operated in the North Sea before transferring to the Mediterranean for the invasion of southern France. Royalist remained in the Mediterranean for actions against German forces in the Aegean to the end of 1944. Then it moved to the Far East in February 1945 where it served until the end of the war.

The Royalist was then put into reserve until 1953 when the RN decided to proceed with plans to refit the ship for a new intended operational role as a fast radar picket. The cost of reconstruction and reactivation of the ship led the RN to transfer the vessel to the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) in 1956 as a replacement for its sister ship HMS Bellona, which had been in New Zealand service since 1947. In return, New Zealand covered the reconstruction costs of the Royalist. After ten years of service with the RNZN, which included involvement in the Suez Crisis in 1956 and the Indonesia–Malaysia confrontation from 1963 to 1965, the ship returned to the United Kingdom where it was scrapped.

Development[edit]

The Royal Navy intended in late 1943 to use the Bellona class as flagships for escort carrier and cruiser groups for the projected invasion of Normandy and of southern France and for operations with the United States Navy and with the RN fleet in the Pacific Ocean. Royalist quickly diverged from the rest of the class from the start being fitted out - within months of commissioning - with further modifications. These modifications gave it two extra rooms for additional communications with aircraft carriers and Fleet Air Arm aircraft and one of the first implementations of an "Action Information Office" (AIO) – an early operations room for plotting and display of the tactical position and associated mechanical computers to make it more effective. Intended to enhance the vessel's role as a command ship in northern Atlantic waters for operations against the German capital ships Tirpitz and Scharnhorst, the extra equipment took the ship to the limit, leaving minimal comfort and sleeping provision for the crew.[1] The wartime development of radar and the requirement to equip Royalist as a "Carrier Flagship"[2] fitted with AIO increased the crew complement from 484 to 600, adding to the problem.[citation needed]

Royalist was built by Scotts Shipbuilding and Engineering Company of Greenock laying down the keel on 21 March 1940. She was launched on 30 May 1942 and commissioned on 10 September 1943. She returned to the dockyard for alterations in November which were not complete until February 1944. Her French motto, Surtout Loyal, translates to "Loyal above all".[2]

Royal Navy career[edit]

A Supermarine Seafire of 807 Naval Air Squadron Fleet Air Arm flying above HMS Royalist during a training flight from the Royal Naval Air Station at Dekhelia, near Alexandria, Egypt in February 1945

Following her commissioning, Royalist spent several months working up, during which time she underwent repairs for trial defects and for alterations and additions. These included modifications for service as a carrier flagship.[2] In March 1944 Royalist joined the Home Fleet and served for a short period in the Arctic theatre. In this capacity, she took part in Operation Tungsten, the carrier raid in April 1944 against the German battleship Tirpitz at anchor in a fjord in Norway, as the flagship of Rear Admiral Arthur La Touche Bisset commanding Force Two (based around five carriers).

After Tungsten Royalist escorted carriers for attacks on shipping off Norway before entering dock for a refit.[3] After completion of the work in June, Royalist was ordered to the Mediterranean to support the Operation Dragoon landings in the south of France in August 1944. Royalist was the flagship (Rear Admiral Thomas Hope Troubridge) of the RN/USN Task Force 88 (comprising carrier groups TG88.1[a] and TG88.2[b]) that was to maintain air superiority over the beaches and support the landing operations.

After Dragoon, Royalist joined the Aegean Force preventing enemy evacuation from the islands in the Aegean Sea. On 15 September, accompanied by the destroyer HMS Teazer, she sank the transports KT4 and KT26 off Cape Spatha. She was then stationed in the Aegean until late 1944 when she was then in the eastern Mediterranean before a refit in early 1945 at Alexandria before transferring to the East Indies and joining the Eastern Fleet.

By April 1945 she was with the 21st Aircraft Carrier Squadron as flagship, supporting the Rangoon landings of Operation Dracula.

From 10 May Royalist was covering a search group of carriers in Operation Mitre looking for Japanese warships carrying out evacuations in the area of Nicobar and Andaman Islands.[c] For the remainder of the war she covered the carrier raids against targets in the East Indies and Sumatra.

Scottish author Alistair MacLean served on Royalist during the Second World War, and used his experiences as background for his acclaimed first novel HMS Ulysses (1955) as well as for some of his subsequent works.

Post war reconstruction[edit]

Royalist was withdrawn from the East Indies after the conclusion of hostilities and returned home to be mothballed and dehumidified in 1946.

The modernisation of four Dido-class cruisers including Royalist was approved by the Admiralty board on 30 March 1950 and 6 April 1950.[d][4] Royalist was planned to be the first of four to six Dido- and Bellona-class cruisers to be modernised under the programme, with work planned to begin in January 1953.[5] The decision to prioritise the updating of Royalist and the Didos were for the same reasons the RNZN accepted HMS Black Prince and Bellona as replacements for Gambia in 1946; the Didos were modern, more economical in fuel and manpower,[6] and could be modernised on a realistic timescale and budget by fitting Type 275 radar directors with British adaptions of the US Mk 37 fire control for effective medium range anti-aircraft cover.[7] Previous post war plans to refit the Colony-class and Swiftsure-class cruisers were abandoned in 1950 on cost and time grounds[8][e] The Dido class had the same 5.25-inch guns as the King George V battleships and the battleship HMS Vanguard .

The reconstruction of Royalist from deep preservation with a new superstructure and advanced interim fire control fitted involved major work but was intended to extend the cruiser's life by only six years to cover the period of maximum danger and threat from the USSR.[f]

In March 1953 the reconstruction of Royalist was started [10] The works included new superstructure and electronics, but retained the old engines. However after the Conservatives came to power in the general election of 1951, there was a change of focus. Churchill favoured the RAF and the 1952 Navy Estimates (the budget for the RN) was reduced.[11] The massive expansion in defence spending by the Attlee government which allowed the Dido and Town reconstruction programmes to be fully designed was unaffordable by 1952, and the Type 275 Mk 6 radar (which could have allowed immediate fitting of the in-service cruisers HMS Phoebe, Diadem, Cleopatra and Euryalus to give long range AA capability to the 5.25 DP guns), was unavailable in a UK/RN model until 1955 [12][failed verification] and there was only enough unused stock of earlier equivalent sets[g] to fit the carriers HMS Eagle and Ark Royal.[13][14]

The delays in equipment made completion of the Tiger class cruisers by 1954 impossible and an alternative plan to reconstruct the larger Town-class light cruisers, HMS Liverpool and HMS Glasgow with improved AA to provide self and area defence for convoys and amphibious groups was cancelled in 1952.[15]

The RAF had priority, and the Royal Navy's view of development - centred on frigates and large carriers - was not liked by Churchill[citation needed]. The cruiser reconstruction program was suspended for three years. The radical defence review in June 1953 saw heavy cuts to the navy but Royalist's modernisation continued under a revised defence White paper in February 1954 which restored the RN programme and plans to complete the aircraft carrier Hermes[h] and the Tiger-class cruisers, but rejected starting further Dido/Bellona conversions as they lacked the "dual war and peace, cold war capabilities required for the RN".[16][17][page needed] [i] The other Dido's – HMS Sirius and Phoebe – scheduled in the 1952 program to start reconstruction in April 1954,[19] were inspected in 1954 and declared for scrap due to inadequate mothballing combined with the poor wartime steel used in their construction.[20][21][22] Plans were made in 1952 for a more comprehensive modernisation of Cleopatra and Diadem starting in June and November 1955 with reboilering, full NBC protection,[23] and new radar[j][24] but reconstruction by 1955 at 5-6 million pounds per cruiser was twice that of an AD conversion of Battle-class destroyers which were capable of carrying out some cruiser presence, patrol and GFS roles. The radical reviews of the RN in 1953 and 1954 concluded that the risk of a third world war had lessened. The immediate provision of interim ``AA cruiser conversions and the upgrade of the Type 41, Type 61 and Type 12 frigates then under construction with 3-inch automatic guns and 40 mm guns was cancelled in February 1955 to reduce the cost of the rearmament programme and reallocate the approved 25 3-inch AA turrets to the Tiger cruisers and scheduled large 18,000 ton missile cruisers.[25] The Type 41 design was upgraded in 1954 with extra communications UHF, HF channels, generator capacity and the addition of LRAW 960/965 radar in February 1954 to play the radar picket role intended for Royalist with Commonwealth aircraft carriers and amphibious groups. This meant the Type 41 no longer had the space and weight to take the massive twin 3-inch mounts. The new Type 275 Mk 6 flyplane fire control systems would be refitted to eight Ca-class destroyers instead of the Didos in 1955-59. It was envisaged the destroyers could play a cruiser role, escorting convoys and task forces, destroying enemy trade and attacking enemy heavy units in torpedo and gun attacks as part of RN destroyer and cruiser groups. The unrealism of the role announced for the Ca destroyers nearly saw the 2nd Ca flotilla reconstruction cancelled in 1954-5[citation needed] although it is clear the RN saw their real role in the North Sea and south east Asia.[26] The Royal Navy planned on the incorrect[citation needed] basis that guns would be ineffective for AA from 1963, as air targets were assumed to have increased speed from Mach 0.9 to Mach 2. It was decided by February 1955 that low (55-degree) elevation 4.5-inch guns would be adequate and accurate for GFS and sufficient surface cover [27] for the new Type 81 General Purpose frigates and updated Ca destroyers. A reduction in the naval budget with more standardisation of classes and gun calibre was essential and the 4.7-inch and 5.25-inch gun equipped classes of battleships, cruisers and destroyer were transferred to reserve, sold or scrapped[citation needed].

Five-year life extension refits for Colony-class cruisers Bermuda and Gambia, were completed at half the cost,[28] of a Bellona reconstruction, as was the reconstruction of destroyers as AD/AW picket role planned in 1955 using the 1943 Battle class destroyers completed in 1948. Life extension of the Town-class cruisers, HMS Sheffield and HMS Belfast (which were put into reserve from 1959 and 1963 respectively) was a poor return on expensive refits. HMS Swiftsure was reconstructed in 1957-1959 [29] but never recommissioned. The final cruiser refits were as flagships, NATO command ships and for shore bombardment. The older more spacious Town-class with more compartments were easier to refit with extra electronic systems and more comfortable East of Suez but only because - like the Colony class cruisers - they were crewed to man only one of thre main 6-inch turrets after 1952. The later Colony cruisers (1942), Swiftsureclass (1944-45), Dido class ships rebuilt in the USA (1944) and Bellonas (1943) were, also too cramped for use as flagships or peace time RN diplomacy in the Far East.[30]

The postwar RN programme envisaged that Soviet bombers would be improved Tupolev Tu-4s[k] or Lincolns[clarification needed] flying at 320 mph (510 km/h) at 4.4 mi (7.1 km) height, however, as part of the 1954 May Day parade, the new Soviet Tupolev Tu-16 "Badger" and Myasishchev M-4 "Bison" jet bombers were first shown to the public and the West. Flying 7 mi (11 km) high at 600 mph (970 km/h); it would take 20 seconds for 5.25-inch shells to reach that height. An updated 5.25 cruiser was a possible solution and deterrent to the new Soviet threat, which could not be countered by a frigate with a single 4.5-inch turret.[31]

Transfer to Royal New Zealand Navy[edit]

The New Zealand Prime Minister Sid Holland decided to accept the offer of Royalist in February 1955. By then the cruisers reconstruction was only half completed at a cost of 3 million pounds;[32] New Zealand ultimately paid £4.5 million for the reconstruction. In early 1955 Holland reached the decision after a seven-week visit to the US and UK where he met American vice president Richard Nixon, secretary of state John Foster Dulles, and Churchill. He stressed that a modernised cruiser rebuilt for limited war East of Suez was of more value than modern frigates for escort duties against submarines in broken back war. In Churchill's view, a nuclear war was likely to be a brief exchange of the new thermonuclear weapons and unlikely to last long enough for anti-submarine convoys to be useful. Holland was more influenced by the advice of the British Minister of Defence Harold Macmillan,[33] to refocus NZ defence on the Pacific and shorter lines of communication to South East Asia[34] rather than Middle East. The British First Sea Lord and Admiralty minister stressed the availability of Royalist and that an order of two or three anti-submarine frigates would probably proceed,[35] the Type 12 frigate was untested and unproven and the RN viewed it was desirable to wait for new frigates suitable for NZ conditions with more gunpower and anti-submarine capability.[35]

The cost of Royalist's reconstruction reached £4.5 million.[36] (the same as the cost of two new 2,500-ton frigates). A minority of RNZN opinion, including Captain Peter Phipps, saw it as a policy reversal, stopping the RNZN from maintaining six frigates, good training conditions and commonality with new RN frigates.[citation needed] However Royalist, with massive assistance from the RN and US Navy, was operational, post-refit for nine and half years. After Suez in 1956, the Royal Navy transferred the bulk of the fleet to the Indian and Pacific Oceans from 1957 to 1967. As a result, Royalist could be deployed with the RN carrier fleet.

The ship was handed over to the Royal New Zealand Navy on 9 July 1956. When Captain Phipps went to take command of Royalist in 1955, New Zealand diplomat Frank Corner showed his own view when he noted that Phipps agreed that the ship was a white elephant unsuitable for use in the Pacific. However, The RNZN had operated the Bellona[l] and Black Prince (the same class as Royalist) since 1946 as part of NZ Defence contribution in 1946–54.[37] Phipps claimed the cruiser's range was limited and it could not even reach Panama without refuelling. However, Phipps also stated publicly when the cruiser reached Auckland, that it was updated as a most modern warship with the capability to take "three targets simultaneously and shoot down air targets with reasonable frequency often on the first salvo"[38]

The Type 12 (Whitby-class) anti-submarine frigates proved in use to have only 2/3rds of the projected endurance of 4000 nm at 15 knots. By comparison, the longer-range diesel version Type 41 Leopard-class anti-aircraft frigates, with two twin 4.5 turrets, would have countered the problem of unreliability with the single turret of the Otago-class. The Type 41 (and Type 61 Salisbury-class aircraft direction frigate) original radar and fire control fit was similar to Royalist and the Type 12 [39][40] except the frigates had AC electrics.

The New Zealand Navy Board, which included three RN officers, argued the RN view that the RNZN needed a cruiser in the South Pacific and to support the RAN/RN. The point of Royalist from the RN viewpoint was a powerful interim late 1950s medium-range AA platform. The space and comfort problems were only minimally altered by any economy in the AIO suite or 40 mm light AA and reducing to three main turrets destroyed the cruiser's primary AA value.[citation needed] The cruiser was an RN cruiser on loan, and not renamed "HMNZS New Zealand". The UK did not regard the RNZN as an independent force compared to the RAN and RCN.[citation needed] Phipps demanded some improvements and refused on 6 April 1956, in front of the dockyard superintendent and 40 assembled dockyard and Royalist RN/RNZN officers to sign the standard RN D448 release form for accepting the Royalist refit was completed to a specified standard,[41][42] while in command of HMS Bellona as an accommodation ship. Phipps finally accepted the cruiser three weeks later after the minimum of adjustments; four showers were added; the officers' baths removed and minor ventilation improvements.[citation needed]

The Royal Navy saw Phipps' action as a disruption of the Suez naval preparations by a colonial upstart and an action unfitting of a serious RN senior officer and gentleman.[41] Post-Suez the RNZN view of Phipps, the RNZN, its officers, and men, was unchanged. New Zealand was viewed as having zero capability for strategic assessment[43] and the RN requested confirmation from the New Zealand government that in 1957 the RN East Asian staff would have authority of Royalist.[citation needed]

Royalist lacked the pre-wetting, ABC spraydown equipment, specifically requested by the RNZN in 1955.[44] The Devonport UK dockyard noted that installing spraydown to wash off nuclear fallout was possible, providing a copy of the plan of the pre-wetting system under installation in HMS Sheffield, and suggested the New Zealand dockyard could do the job. In 1957, Royalist like the other Dido-class cruisers had beds only for 47 officers, in a standard cabin; the ratings had only a hammock. Royalist lacked even the single extra room with a sofa for senior rates that the other Dido cruisers had did offer speed and extra communications systems and an Action Information Office (AIO) fitted late 1943. The other Dido-class cruiser fitted with AIO, HMS Scylla, was also seen as valuable post-war. Scylla had detonated a mine on 23 June 1944 off Arromanches. It was deemed uneconomic at the time to return her to wartime service but reconstruction at Chatham began in 1945 with a new fit of two twin Mk 6 3-inch/70 mounts and Type 992 radar approved.[45][page needed][46] In 1947, after £350,000 of work, defence cuts, and delays, the cruiser was written off.[47] AIO-fitted cruisers (usually late Colony class and Minotaur class[48]) doubled the effectiveness of armament in RN postwar assessment,.[49][page needed]

The concern of New Zealand naval servicemen and Phipps was on living conditions, recruitment, ammunition resupply in the Pacific and an affordable schedule of new frigates. The New Zealand Department of External Affairs viewed the British Treasury as getting rid of an odd cruiser and getting New Zealand to pay for the warships refit.[50][51] However, as with Bellona and Black Prince in 1946, transferring Royalist would supplement Australian defence. By 1955 the RAN had only light 4.5-inch gun, Battle-class and Daring-class destroyers (building) and light carriers, HMAS Melbourne and Sydney, with obsolete[citation needed] Sea Venom fighters. Royalist could join an RAN task force with Melbourne and Sydney and the cruisers armament gave AA and some deterrence to Sverdlov cruisers. Royalist, had modern two-channel fire control for its guns and radar processing and communications with the RN/ RAN fleet air arms.[52] The Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies was dubious that RN policy in the age of nuclear deterrence, was a "minor fleet to the Far East in peacetime only" and no real counter to piecemeal communist erosion in Southeast Asia.[53][54] The UK defence review released on 10 July 1953, argued that new hydrogen bombs reduced the likelihood of 'long' broken-backed war requiring trans-Atlantic convoys and maintaining cruisers. The RN could not afford new AA gun models to supplement expensive missile developments like the Seaslug missile.[55] Mountbatten publicly defended Royalist as the most modern British cruiser in Auckland when it arrived in December 1956[56][verification needed] and regarded Phipps as inexperienced and unsuitable.[57][page needed] Mountbatten viewed New Zealand's cabinet and officials as out of touch with the Cold War need to maintain ready, broad-based naval and defence capabilities and frequently visited New Zealand to make appeals.[58] [page needed]

Royalist was fitted with a powerful combination of the standard fit of mid-1950s new RN warships radar, fire control and (three) STAAG 2 close-in anti-aircraft systems firing RN 40 mm ammunition. STAAG was a maintenance nightmare[59] withdrawn from the RN in 1959–60.[60] The 5.25-inch DP guns, which were also fitted to Vanguard and at Gibraltar were accurate, unlike the 4-inch AA on the Colony class. Royalist's modernisation for AA/AW and particularly air defence support of RN carrier fighters and strike aircraft would prove useful for Suez, the Malaysian Emergency and the confrontation with Indonesia.[citation needed]

Royalist could escort convoys across the whole distance at a speed of 19 knots (35 km/h; 22 mph), compared with the Type 12's ability to make the long leg from Fiji to Hawaii at 10-15 knots. It was arguable that the traditional cruiser's role in trade defence against Soviet cruisers and raiders was relevant,[61] as was contributing effective AW/AD to RN/ RAN carrier task forces.[62]

HMNZS Royalist at the Devonport Naval Base, 1956

After refitting, Royalist was re-equipped with new equipment as an AA and AD picket for carriers. The cruiser retained 5.25-inch guns, upgraded to RP20 as more powerful high level AA and surface weapons. The refit was to prepare it for all-out hot wars and high-level gun engagement of shadowers.[28] Except for Royalist, this modernisation was cancelled in 1953 on cost grounds.[28] Defence review and RAF assessments that the Sverdlov and Russian air threat in the 1955–58 period was exaggerated. The RAF estimated 300 Badger jet bombers in 1956 - the actual number was 500. The delay in the cruiser programme meant most war legacy cruisers had reached 12 years in service, doubling the cost of structural modernisation and reducing the programme. Only Royalist's update and a ten-year life extension of HMS Ceylon was approved in 1953.[28]

In transferring Royalist to New Zealand, the Royal Navy assumed the RNZN as an extension of the RN and the junior New Zealand service and government followed British command. Around 25% of the officers on Royalist were RN officers on loan or exchange, as were many of the specialist ratings. The RNZN officers on the cruiser were usually of junior experience and had lengthy training with the RN in the UK. Even on the cruiser's final deployment in 1965 on Confrontation patrols in southeast Asia, many RN and RAN officers occupied higher-ranking officer positions on board.[63]

Royal New Zealand Navy career[edit]

Suez[edit]

After working up in UK waters, Royalist was operational with the British fleet in the Mediterranean. From August 1956, NZ Prime Minister Sidney Holland was persuaded by Anthony Eden to maintain Royalist on station in the Mediterranean as an invaluable, 'strategic deployment' and 'deterrent'[64][65] against Egyptian or Israeli aggression; Eden assured Holland that it was purely precautionary move.[65][66] At the same time, Eden and the RN continued the dual strategy[65] while both negotiating with Egypt and preparing war, and attempting to lock Royalist into the strategy through persuasion by the First Sea Lord (and Chief of Naval Staff) Lord Mountbatten and the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Hailsham. Eden and the C-C of the fleet clearly felt [citation needed]Royalist was superior to the RN cruisers available in the Med and provided alternative threat scenarios of possible Israeli air threats to the RN fleet,[67] and used other delaying tactics to avoid releasing Royalist to return to New Zealand. The NZ Cabinet largely supported the British in the Suez Crisis invasion, with only future prime minister Marshall and the Minister of Defence MacDonald dissenting. To order Royalist to simply withdraw and immediately return was too damaging to the RNZN and crew morale and future NZ trade with Britain. The NZ cabinet accepted an intermediate proposal of allowing Royalist to remain with the fleet but to not participate in action though what defined action or inaction was unclear. So Royalist remained with the fleet awaiting the possibility of action against the Egyptian air force during the Suez crisis. Royalist was intended to be mainly a picket and rescue ship offering aircraft direction for RAF English Electric Canberra bombers and RN carrier-based Hawker Sea Hawk and de Havilland Sea Venom aircraft. Royalist had the same long-range air warning Type 960/277Q radar carried by British cruisers in the area, but superior AA gunnery and aircraft direction to the other cruisers and destroyers.[citation needed]

After hostilities with Egypt commenced, Commonwealth support for the mission was confined to New Zealand and Australia, South Africa viewing it as an issue to be avoided and Canada as irrelevant to its own interest.[68] International opposition and the possibility of being held responsible left Holland (who had a cabinet of old-fashioned British patriots[citation needed]) in the position of wanting both to "stand by the UK" despite their misgivings while not damaging New Zealand's relationship with the US. President Eisenhower viewed the British and French invasion as embarrassing as it coincided with his attempt at reelection as President and the USSR had invaded Hungary.[69] Holland appeared to suffer a mild heart attack on the day of the invasion but on hearing the Anglo-French action had begun remained in his parliamentary office for 48 hours [70] supervising New Zealand's response and the drafting of orders, cables and to the UK Government, Foreign Office and Royalist, after heated exchanges with NZ Foreign Service officers, RNZN and NZDF staff, and his Cabinet on instructions to Cpt Phipps to withdraw Royalist. Hollands health and National government never recovered from the Suez crisis and dissention, within his own staff [71][clarification needed][clarification needed] At that point the only other immediately available replacement cruiser was HMS Jamaica, which lacked modern AA systems and the equipment to process air-warning radar data and "multiple communication channels" with Fleet Air Arm aircraft. [citation needed]Royalist continued on station 40 NM (74 km; 46 mi) off the Egyptian coast with RN destroyers as an emergency picket. There it covered the first Sea Hawk strikes from the carriers Eagle, Bulwark and Albion which were 95 NM (176 km; 109 mi) from the Egyptian coast; the maximum range for the carriers radar and for the Sea Hawks to attack the Egyptian Air Force bases at Cairo and return.[72] The previous afternoon photo-reconnaissance flights had identified 63 MiG fighters and 49 Ilyushin Il-28 "Beagle" bombers there.[73] The night RAF bomber strikes from Malta and Cyprus had failed to destroy any of the Egyptian aircraft on 31 November.[m] Royalist remained on station for possibly 24 hours as AD picket and rescue ship, sometimes assisting the RN fighter bombers to navigate to targets and return to their carriers until HMS Ceylon transferred from shore bombardment duty off Port Said and the risk from Egypt's jet fighters and bombers was suppressed. A day later, Royalist withdrew from a scheduled bombardment mission in support of a RN destroyer squadron, moving further offshore away from the main body of the RN fleet (and changing identity to the RNZN "Black Swan" according to some accounts[citation needed]) but continuing to assist the in its primary air warning and communications role. Holland had officially ordered a withdrawal from operations but allowed the cruiser to stay with the Operation Musketeer fleet.[citation needed] In a lengthy meeting the NZ cabinet had "decided not to decide" and while NZ did not want to embarrass Britain by withdrawing Royalist "there was insufficient time for a decision not to withdraw".[69] The Egyptian Air Force remained a threat to the RN fleet and Royalist was crucial to fleet defence.[75] The reality of the pro-Musketeer sentiments[clarification needed] of the RNZN/RN crew in which most of the key officer and senior rating positions were RN officers and many of the RNZN officers were also essentially professional RN career officers. On the return voyage to New Zealand Phipps told the crew they deserved the recognition given to RN personnel for their involvement in the incident.[76][page needed] In the 2000s the New Zealand Labour Government and the RNZN awarded these personnel battle honours for war service in the Mediterranean. The cruiser's log for the crucial days of the Suez War was destroyed at the time meaning the full account of her Suez service will never be known.[citation needed]

Malaya[edit]

See also: Military history of New Zealand in Malaysia

In early 1957 Royalist was involved in exercises with the Australian aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne.[77] The cruiser made two shore bombardment missions in 1957–1958 during the Malayan Emergency against suspected terrorist areas in southeast Johore, firing about 240 5.25-inch rounds.[78] In AA exercises with the British Far East Fleet in 1956–57, Royalist outperformed the (pre-war) RN Town-class cruisers, shooting down five Gloster Meteor unmanned targets and many towed targets immediately on opening fire.[79]

In 1960 Royalist had a major five-month refit. It was expected the cruiser would only serve another two and a half years; the New Zealand navy board was seeking loan of a third Whitby-class frigate (Type 12) from the Royal Navy[80] However the RN was only just introducing and trialling the improved Rothesay-class (Type 12M) frigates and was short of effective frigates and cruisers. In February 1964 after HMAS Voyager was lost after it collided with the aircraft carrier Melbourne, the UK offered Australia the Daring-class destroyers, Duchess (available immediately) and Defender then in mid-life refit with new MRS3 fire control.[81] Defender was available to replace Royalist from February 1965.[citation needed]

In 1962, Royalist suffered permanent damage in rough weather in the Tasman Sea with the keel twisted out of alignment. The RAN captain, determined to make Auckland for a Rugby Union test between the Wallabies and All Blacks at Eden Park, had been running the ship at excess speed into a head sea.[82] The back of the cruiser was technically broken and it could have been assessed as a 'constructive loss' and, as uneconomic to repair, scrapped.[citation needed] It would never be possible again for the cruiser's gun directors to determine the cruisers datum centreline necessary for accurate targeting.[83]

The cruiser operated with the British Far East Fleet, in three tours of duty in 1963, 1964 and 1965, during the Indonesia–Malaysia confrontation the crews being belatedly awarded General Service Medals for the 1963–64 tours and Operational Service Medals for active service in combat zones in 1956, 1957–1958 and 1965, finally recognised by the New Zealand government in 2000. From mid-1963, reports by the captain of Royalist noted that one of the two Mk 6/275 HALADCTs were often unserviceable, often one or two STAAGs were, while the ship's hull and lower structure was marginal requiring constant work and frequent painting, requiring an extra Asian workforce due to the construction of the cruiser out of "low-quality wartime steel", and the ship's below-deck humidity and constant temperature at a minimum of 85 °F (29 °C). The ship's modernisation had provided only for a lifespan of six years, so these conditions were expected. Effective modernisation of the ship after acquisition from the Royal Navy only amounted to several ECM/ESM updates.[citation needed]

By May 1964 the Indonesian Confrontation had escalated with Indonesian forces conducting cross-border raids in Kalimantan and landings in Borneo. The British Minister of Defence Peter Thorneycroft and Mountbatten requested the use of carriers and major units to conduct provocative passages,[84][page needed] to encourage a revolt against Sukarno and his generals. After rest and recreation in Singapore, Royalist took on 580 tons of fuel oil on 14 July 1964 and the following morning took ammunition on from lighters.[85] It left Singapore in the afternoon returning to Auckland from Singapore via the Cairns races in Queensland, transited the Carmat Straits on 15 July, Sapud on 16 July (at ABC state Yankee[jargon], at 2130 reduced to condition X Ray at 2230)[86] in the Java Sea between Jakarta and southwest Kalimantan and then ran along the coast of Java thru the night to arrive off Bail at sunrise about 6.00 am and through the Lombok Strait on 17 July 1964[87][non-primary source needed] on what was described as "routine passage"[citation needed] in the highly confidential communication to Canberra.

The two transits of the straits made the task group led by the aircraft carrier HMS Victorious, a month apart that followed were both also described as routine passage only the second was even notified with a note from the RN naval attaché at the British embassy to the Indonesian Navy, which was a concession the track would be through Lombok not Djakarta and the major Indonesian military bases[clarification needed]. During the transit of the straits, the guns were fully manned with the crews closed up; if the cruiser had been "buzzed" by Indonesia aircraft or patrol craft, the captain was instructed to take "precautionary measures" and not train or elevate the guns or test fire them again during the deployment, a "diplomatic artifact"[citation needed] given a scenario of an undetectable possible threat of surprise long-range air-launched Kh-20 (NATO reporting name "Kangaroo") cruise missile attack from Indonesia bombers[clarification needed][88] and full ABC protection at X-Ray state 9[further explanation needed][89]

The task force was led by Victorious on 19 September 1964, with two[clarification needed] County-class guided missile destroyers (including HMS Hampshire, which replaced the cruiser HMS Lion) and the frigates HMS Dido and HMS Berwick. Victorious's assertion of the right of innocent passage by a carrier caused mass panic in Java,[90] but proved effective in establishing rights for naval passage and that Indonesia's assertion was unlikely to be outright war to stop Malaysian independence.[citation needed][relevant?]

There was considerable doubt among RNZN staff whether Royalist, which had not had a major refit since 1956, could deploy again in 1965.[citation needed] It managed to deploy again after a seven-week refit working round the clock in Devonport dockyard and work up in the Hauraki Gulf, where it managed 27 knots (50 km/h; 31 mph) at half power. The cruiser provided a presence and superficial appearance of capability. It was judged that the fire control systems needed 12 months refit or $140,000 new 275/MK 6 HALCT[clarification needed] of new parts,[91][non-primary source needed] only two STAAG CIWS mounts were serviceable, and the two UA3 ESM systems were unreliable.[92] It was hoped the worn steam turbines could last 15 months to allow a final 1966 visit to all the New Zealand ports if "hope prevailed over fear".[citation needed]

Against most RNZN staff advice it was decided not to inform the Commander of the British Far East Fleet, of the situation as "Commander Far East has enough trouble fitting Royalist in his operational plans now with limitations on his main capability in the Confrontation War."[93][non-primary source needed] The Royal Navy was desperately overstretched during the confrontation, and keeping one carrier fully operational in the theatre at all times was difficult[94][page needed] to provide nuclear deterrence to Jakarta with the threat of potential aerial nuclear strike.[citation needed] The high-maintenance Tiger-class cruisers required far too much human and technical resources to be operated East of Suez in a complementary role for GFS and carrier escort with the Far East Fleet; HMS Lion was withdrawn after a boiler explosion on anti-infiltration patrol, and HMS Blake was put into reserve from December 1963 due to crew shortages in the RN.[citation needed] HMS Royalist was still perceived by the RN as useful and needed in Singapore; while it could not run at 25 knots with RN carrier groups launching aircraft, it could escort the amphibious carriers HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark. The RN decided that Royalist would go to Pearl Harbor for a second workup, rather than a longer refit in Devonport dockyard, before deploying to Hong Kong and Singapore in support of RN forces.

During Royalist stay at Pearl Harbor the USN staff and naval dockyard provided substantial assistance in alleviating some of the cruiser's faults and adjustments to allow the fire control system to be aligned for brief periods.[citation needed] During the subsequent workup Royalist achieved "E Excellent" for Efficiency, meaning maximum efficiency within system capability though, like all peacetime naval or weapon tests, actual effectiveness was not measured.[citation needed] During a brief spell on station at Singapore in 1965, Royalist conducted anti-infiltration patrols, boarding boats, deployed shore patrols, and participated in Exercise Guardrail as the simulated "enemy Sverdlov cruiser"[95] and provided extra men, potential heavy gunfire support, and air defence support for Bulwark on a vulnerable deployment transferring a new helicopter squadron to Borneo.[96][non-primary source needed] For the 1965 Far East tour, the crew were awarded Operational Service Medals. This reflects the general build up in tension with Indonesia, the probable use of weapons by landing parties, the higher grade of main munition preparation and the political support for the mission, but the earlier deployments of Royalist when its system were more effective were much more important in the tactical and even strategic sense.[citation needed]

The 1965 deployment was somewhat marred[citation needed] by the refusal by the New Zealand Ministry of External Affairs and British ambassadors to allow Royalist to dock with RN ships at Tokyo or Yokohama during a Royal visit by Princess Alexandra from the UK.[97] According to the Royal Navy attaché in Tokyo, the RNZN sailors "could not afford the one pound per minute price in the Ginza nightclubs."[98] The captain of Royalist, J.P. Vallant replied to the Deputy Secretary of Defence in Wellington, "..find it quaint that ... the New Zealand navy is persona non grata in Tokyo ."[99] Royalist was allowed, r & r elsewhere in Japan after New Zealand diplomats persuading local police chiefs not to curfew the RNZN crew seeking respite from the awful conditions on the old cruiser and allow the bars to open 24 hours.[100] After further shore leave in Bangkok, Singapore, and Subic Bay, Royalist returned to New Zealand, after a valiant repair of a milking boiler and turbine en route. It was unable to make its final scheduled 1966 visit for Waitangi Day (6 February) and tour of the New Zealand ports, and was effectively paid off five months early.

Decommissioning and fate[edit]

Royalist was paid off on 4 June 1966 and, after eleven years in the RNZN, Royalist reverted to Royal Navy control in 1967. She was sold for scrap to the Nissho Co, Japan, in November 1967 and was towed from Auckland to Osaka on 31 December 1967.

Notes[edit]

  1. ^ five British escort carriers - Attacker, Emperor, Khedive, Searcher, and Pursuer
  2. ^ two more British escort carriers and two US carriers and supporting British cruisers and US destroyers
  3. ^ As part of Mitre, in the Battle of the Malacca Strait a force of five Royal Navy destroyers intercepted the Japanese cruiser Haguro and the destroyer Kamikaze evacuating troops from Port Blair in the Andaman Islands
  4. ^ the other three were HMS Diadem, Sirius and Cleopatra
  5. ^ In 1950 the Colony class cruisers, other than HMS Newfoundland under extended refit in 1950-1, were scheduled for disposal by 1955 as they were too cramped and uncomfortable for East of Suez service. With the modern operations rooms and AIO added in 1946-51 there was insufficient space for the gun crews needed to man more than one of the three 6-inch turrets [9]
  6. ^ Diadem was better preserved and was offered to the RNZN as an alternative in 1955
  7. ^ supplied under Lend Lease in 1944-45
  8. ^ Laid down during the war, work on Hermes had been suspended until 1952 when she was launched to free up the slipway
  9. ^ By mid 1954, Cleopatra had served 12.5 years which was the limit for starting economical reconstruction on wartime Dido and Colony cruisers which had been built with a design life of 20 years.[18][page needed].
  10. ^ Type 992TA and 982 Air Warning
  11. ^ a direct copy of the US Boeing B-29 Superfortress strategic bomber of late World War II
  12. ^ Phipps had been an executive officer on HMS Bellona while it was on loan to New Zealand post-war
  13. ^ The planned attack on Cairo West Air Base airport had been cancelled as too close to the civilian airport: the eight Vickers Valiant heavy bombers had been recalled to Malta, and the seven Canberra diverted to strike Almaza airbase instead[74]

Citations[edit]

  1. ^ Raven & Roberts 1980, pp. 294, 324.
  2. ^ a b c Mason 2004
  3. ^ Mason, 2011
  4. ^ ADM 116/5632. p 124-9 & 175-93, Friedman 2010 p 284, Walters, 2019 p.233
  5. ^ Friedman 2010, p. 284
  6. ^ M. Wright. Blue Water Kiwis. NZ Naval Story (2001) Reed. Auckland, p146-8.
  7. ^ Friedman, N (2015). British Battleships 1906-1946. Barnsley: Seaforth. pp. 338–9.
  8. ^ Walters 2019, pp. 231–3
  9. ^ Walters 2019, pp. 231–3 and Table 7.1
  10. ^ McDougal, R. J. (1989). NZ Naval Vessels. GP Books. p. 32.
  11. ^ Seldon, 1981. pp 314–20
  12. ^ Barnett, Corelli (2001). The Verdict of Peace. Britain between Yesterday and the Future. London: MacMillan. pp. 122–131, 347.
  13. ^ Hodges, Peter; Friedman, Norman (2003) [1979], Destroyer Weapons of World War 2, London: Conway, pp. 101–03
  14. ^ Marland, P (2014), "Post War Fire Control in the RN", Warship 2014, London: Conway, p. 14
  15. ^ Walters 2019, pp. 228–232
  16. ^ Seldon, 1981, p. 315
  17. ^ T. Benbow. The RN & Sea Power British Strategy 1945-55. Inst Historical Research. University of London (2018)
  18. ^ A. Raven & J. Roberts. 1980. Ch, Postwar
  19. ^ Friedman 2010, pp. 284–7
  20. ^ D. Van Der Vat. Standard of Power. RN in the Twentieth Century. Pilmco. London (2001) p327
  21. ^ D.K. Brown. (2000) p 206
  22. ^ Preston. (1982) p135
  23. ^ Friedman 2010, p. 287
  24. ^ Walters 2019, p. 232
  25. ^ Friedman (2008) p205
  26. ^ Brown & Moore (2013), p 46-47 & Friedman.(2008) p 230-1
  27. ^ Friedman.(2008) pp 176-77, 243-247
  28. ^ a b c d Grove 2006, p. 225.
  29. ^ Gardiner and Preston. (1982) p 136
  30. ^ Walters, Town Class cruisers (2019)
  31. ^ Marland, P. (2013), "The Vickers N(R)", Warship 2013, London: Conway, pp. 174–6 & "Post War Weapons in the RN" in Warship 2015, p 148.
  32. ^ McIntosh papers, A36 folder, letter 5/7/1956, NZ London HC diplomat Frank Corner letter to NZ Foreign Affairs, CE McIntosh in Tempelton, Malcolm (1994). Ties of Blood and Empire: New Zealand's Involvement in Middle East Defence and the Suez Crisis. Auckland: AUP. pp. 124, p253, footnote 8/(5).
  33. ^ New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, Hansard, 24 March 1955, pp. 21–22
  34. ^ Holland. New Zealand Parliamentary Debates 24 March 1955, pp. 12-21
  35. ^ a b T.A McDonald, NZ Minister of Defence. New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, 27 April 1955, pp. 575, 579
  36. ^ Pugsley. 2003 p. 46
  37. ^ Pugsley 2003, p. 422, note 41
  38. ^ "Royalist home for Christmas", NZ Weekly News, Auckland: Wilson & Hooton, p. 31, 26 December 1956
  39. ^ G. M. Stephen. British Warship Design since 1906. Ian Allan. London (1985) p 76-84
  40. ^ Brown, David K; Moore, George (2013). Rebuilding the Royal Navy: Warship Design Since 1945. Seaforth. p. 74.
  41. ^ a b P. Dennerly. First to the Flag. Biography of Vice Admiral Peter Phipps in Maritime Dimensions in the Asian Pacific Region. RNZN Museum. 2004. Auckland, pp. 122-3
  42. ^ RY257/182 9 April 1956
  43. ^ Pugsley. 2003, p. 47
  44. ^ Royalist Proceeding 1956–65. NZ National Archives. Wellington. NZ
  45. ^ Friedman 2010.
  46. ^ Friedman British Destroyers & Frigates: The Second World War & After (2006) pp. 163–67
  47. ^ W A Crumley. "Scrapped after 350,000 repairs & 3 years work. Cruiser, HMS Scylla". photo -cutting/1947 UK press article in G. Smith. HMS Scylla. Naval-History.Net.
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  49. ^ Raven & Lenton, 1973
  50. ^ McGibbon, 1999, p. 186
  51. ^ Templeton, 1994, p. 124
  52. ^ Raven & Roberts 1980, pp. 364–365
  53. ^ Hack, K. (2001), Defence and Decolonisation in SE Asia, Surrey: Curzon Press, p. 148
  54. ^ Def 5/52, COS (54)136. The Redeployment of the Far East Fleet in War 24/4/1954
  55. ^ G. Moore. "Postwar Cruiser Design for the RN 1946-1956" in Warship 2006. Conway Maritime (London) 2006, pp. 51–55
  56. ^ RNZ. Yesterdays. Sat Evening. NZ Sound Archives
  57. ^ McGibbon, 1999
  58. ^ Mountbatten, 1979
  59. ^ G. M. Stephens. British Warship Design. Ian Allan. London (1986) p. 84
  60. ^ P. Hodges & N. Freidman. British Destroyer Weapons Conway Maritime. London (1979) pp. 97–8.
  61. ^ Clarke, Alex (12 May 2014), "Sverdlov Class Cruisers and the Royal Navy Response", GlobalMaritimeHistory.com, retrieved 3 November 2015
  62. ^ Pugsley, 2003, pp. 46, 422 (note 41)
  63. ^ Pugsley, 2003, p. 38
  64. ^ PRO:CAB 134//216.E(56) 12/8/56
  65. ^ a b c Pearson, J (2005). Antony Eden and the Suez Crisis. Reluctant Gamble. Palgrave MacMillan. pp. 49–56.
  66. ^ AP 20/25/7 PMPT T331/56/ no353 Eden to Holland 4 Aug 1956
  67. ^ ADM 116/6097 of 22-26 Oct 1956 correspondence of PM Eden with first Lord Hailsham and Holland
  68. ^ P. Lyons. "The old Commonwealth. The first four Dominions" in M. Howard & R. Louis. The Oxford History of the 20c, OUP (1998) Oxford, p300
  69. ^ a b Kyle 1991, pp. 394–395
  70. ^ Gustafson, Barry (1986). The First 50 Years : A History of the New Zealand National Party. Auckland: Reed Methuen. p. 70. ISBN 0-474-00177-6.
  71. ^ Gustafson (1998). History of the NZ National Party. Wellington. p. 70.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  72. ^ Hobbs 2015, pp. 173–4 & 187
  73. ^ Hobbs 2015, pp. 173–4
  74. ^ Varble, Derek (2003). The Suez Crisis 1956. Essential Histories. London: Osprey. p. 53. ISBN 978-1841764184.
  75. ^ Holland, James (2018). Royal Air Force, The Official Story. London: Welbeck. p. 174. and Hobbs (2015) p 173-4
  76. ^ Pugsley, 2003
  77. ^ "HMAS Melbourne (II)". Sea Power Centre. Archived from the original on 12 December 2013. Retrieved 15 September 2008.
  78. ^ Pugsley. 2003, p. 50
  79. ^ Pugsley, 2003, p. 49
  80. ^ D. Fairfax. "Frigates" & G. McLean "RNZN History" in I. McGibbon. Companion to NZ Military History. OUP.(2000) Auckland, pp. 186-7 & 467
  81. ^ HMAS Duchess. Australian Seapower History. RAN. Retrieved 6-5-2020. Canberra.
  82. ^ Bradley, I. (2004). Don't Rock the Boat. Auckland. pp. 122–3.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  83. ^ Carl, Captain C. (RNZN) (retd) (2002). Throw me a Line. Auckland: Holos Books (OTM). p. 112.
  84. ^ D. Easter. Britain and the Confrontation with Indonesia, 1960-66. Taurus. NY. London (2012)
  85. ^ Log HMNZS Royalist 14/07/1964. NZ Nat Archives. Wellington
  86. ^ Log HMNZS Royalist 16/7/1964
  87. ^ NCB 083-PL 70R 18762 RLA 8-7-64
  88. ^ Log of HMS Royalist. 1964. NZ National Archives and ret Rear Admiral Hunter (notes) re 1964 Potential OP service Award NZMDF 2006 report
  89. ^ Log of HMS Royalist 1964
  90. ^ Roberts, 2009, p. 51
  91. ^ Reports and Returns. Mod Pre & Post refit trials ;(1) 1955–64 & (2) 1965 Rc 72/1/10,
  92. ^ Reports & Returns, Mod & Refit.1965. 72/1/10,
  93. ^ Reports & Returns. Mod & Refit. 1955-64 & 65. 72/1/10
  94. ^ Twiss & Bailey, 1996
  95. ^ Pugsley 2003, p. 245
  96. ^ HMNZS Royalist 1965 Log & Pugsley. 2003. notes 121 &122. HMS Royalist Proceedings 1965. RNZN Museum, Devonport, Auckland
  97. ^ Reports & Returns. HMNZS Royalist. R 72/1/10 1965. NZ National Archives, Wellington, NZ (Open access)
  98. ^ Reports & Return. HMNZS Royalist. 1965. NZ National Archives. R 72/1/10 Wellington, NZ.
  99. ^ Cpt. J. P. Vallant. HMNZS Royalist. Reports & Returns. 1965. 72/1/10.
  100. ^ Reports & Returns. HMNZS Royalist. 1965. R 72/1/10

Bibliography[edit]

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External links[edit]

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