Dual concern model

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The dual concern model is a model for mediation and negotiation techniques.

history

It comes from the social psychologists Dean G. Pruitt and Peter Carnevale (1993) and highlights two perspectives of interest when negotiating between parties:

  • High vs. low self-interest
  • High vs. low foreign interest.

Self-interest emphasizes a person's own interests or the interests of their own group, while external interests emphasize those of the other party (see Rubin, Pruitt & Kim, 1994).

Five alternatives for behavior in negotiation situations

The respective perspectives of interest go hand in hand with the corresponding negotiation behavior (see figure):

Model of the two concerns (based on Pruitt & Rubin, 1986)
  • Giving in: Your own concerns are neglected and the negotiating partner is completely accommodated in order to end an existing dispute.
  • Assertiveness: Your own interests are clearly in the foreground. Examples of possible behavior are threats , delays, or coercion.
  • Inactivity / inactivity: Neither side specifically attempts to resolve the conflict . Evasion and distraction are examples of typical behaviors.
  • Problem solving : An active attempt is made to combine one's own interests and those of others.
  • Making compromises : Both one's own concerns and the interests of the other party are moderately pursued.

The extent to which the negotiating parties pursue more self-interest or more external interests depends on various influencing factors such as individual and cultural factors (cf. Faure & Rubin, 1993; Neale & Bazerman , 1991). The dual concern model builds on the ideas of Blake and Mouton (1979).

Fields of application

Fields of application are mediation and other negotiation techniques. The increased weighting of self-interest among the negotiating parties can be due to the fact that the problem, which is taken as the basis for the negotiation, is cognitively placed in a negative context ( framework effect ) in which anticipated alternative results appear as losses.

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Pruitt, DG & Carnevale, PJ (1993). Negotiation in social conflict . Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks / Cole.
  2. ^ Rubin, JZ, Pruitt, DG & Kim, SH (1994). Social conflict. Escalation, stalemate, and settlement (2nd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.
  3. ^ Deller, J., Frey, D. & Schoop, U. (2006). Negotiate. In HW Bierhoff & D. Frey (eds.), Handbook of Social Psychology and Communication Psychology . Hogrefe.
  4. ^ Pruitt, DG & Rubin, JZ (1986). Social conflict: Escalation, stalement and settlement . New York: Random House.
  5. ↑ Janssen, O. & van de Vliert, E. (1996). Concern for the other's goals: Key to (de-) escalation of conflict . The international Journal of Conflict Management, 1996, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 99-120.
  6. ↑ Faure, GO & Rubin, JZ (1993). Culture and negotiation . Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
  7. ^ Neale, MA & Bazerman, MH (1991). Negotiator cognition and rationality . New York: Free Press.
  8. ↑ Blake, RR & Mouton, JS (1979). Intergroup problem solving in organizations: From theory to practice. In WG Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), The social psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 19–32). Monterey, CA: Brooks / Cole.