Inversion method (law)

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The inversion method is a legal process , especially for legal training . The term was coined by Philipp Heck , who turned against the derivation of new legal clauses that were not expressly standardized in the law from general legal terms . This procedure is characteristic of the systematisation of law established in the 19th century, especially by Georg Friedrich Puchta with his work “Genealogy of Concepts”.

According to Puchta, all legal clauses are in a logical context that serves as a source of knowledge for legal clauses that are still unknown. He then added the demand that jurisprudence should recognize this logical connection between the legal propositions and trace it back to the principle behind them, in order to be able to formulate new legal propositions and concepts on the basis of this principle. This is based on the assumption that every higher-ranking term makes certain statements that are inevitably made by every lower-ranking term that can be subsumed under the higher-ranking ones. The inversion method is therefore ultimately based on a formal legal logic, according to which all lower concepts are derived from a highest concept, the content of which is determined by this. In order to avoid a circular argument, the content of this highest concept must not be derived from the lower concepts. Puchta's content comes from the philosophy of law , more precisely from Immanuel Kant's concept of freedom . Characteristic of the inversion method is therefore the assumption of a strictly deductive system that starts from a philosophically prescribed basic concept and thus an over-positive basis .

This approach is countered by the fact that individual legal clauses are judged neither according to their purpose nor according to their function in the respective regulatory context, but solely according to the rung on an imaginary "ladder of terms". This criticism was prominently presented by Rudolf von Jhering , who, as a corruption for such approaches, coined the battle termconceptual jurisprudence ”. Especially Philipp Heck and Heinrich Stoll later tried to show that a formal-logical system of abstract-general terms is only suitable for the representation of law, but not for the acquisition of new law. In fact, the inversion method is still used today, which is criticized by Bernd Rüthers , among others .

Individual evidence

  1. Philipp Heck : Concept formation and interest jurisprudence , 1932, p. 93 ff.
  2. ^ Karl Larenz : Methodology of Jurisprudence . 6th edition. Springer, Berlin 1991, p. 53 .
  3. a b Georg Friedrich Puchta : Genealogy of the concepts . S. 101 .
  4. a b c Karl Larenz: Methodology of jurisprudence . 6th edition. Berlin 1991, p. 21st f .
  5. ^ Karl Larenz: Methodology of Jurisprudence . 6th edition. Berlin 1991, p. 43-48 .
  6. ^ Karl Larenz: Methodology of Jurisprudence . 6th edition. Berlin 1991, p. 55 f .
  7. Bernd Rüthers : We are rethinking the legal terms ... Weltanschauung as a principle of interpretation . Osnabrück 1987.