Nuclear material monitoring

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Nuclear fuel subject to monitoring; End of a fuel rod and unused uranium oxide pellets

The nuclear materials intended for protection against the dangers of nuclear fuel in the wrong sector benefits (for example, by illegally moving such substances in countries which have a nuclear weapons). With their help, the fate of fissile material is controlled.

Legal basis

The most important basis for nuclear material monitoring in the industrialized countries is a corresponding law, for example the German or Swiss Atomic Energy Act or the Euratom Treaty or the Euratom Ordinance. Since all nuclear fuels are - often only weakly - radioactive substances, the respective laws or ordinances also play a role.

Section 70 of the German Radiation Protection Ordinance (StrlSchV) legally regulates the notification obligations on extraction, generation, acquisition, delivery and other whereabouts as well as the inventory of radioactive substances including the required bookkeeping. While this handling (extraction, generation, ...) of radioactive substances has to be communicated to the competent authority within one month, the radioactive substance stock ( inventory ) is communicated at the end of each calendar year.

In addition to national legal provisions, nuclear material monitoring is subject to international obligations. In Germany, the other EU countries and Switzerland, nuclear material monitoring is carried out by Euratom and the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency). The monitoring by Euratom and the reporting obligations on incoming and outgoing nuclear material are regulated in Euratom Regulation 302/2005 and specified in detail in the associated special control provisions for the individual plants.

The measures are related to efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons as far as possible and to detect unauthorized removal. Organizational and physical test methods are used for this.

The monitoring of non-proliferation serves to verify the correctness of the declarations required by a state to be monitored by regional (EURATOM) or international (IAEA) organizations.

The safeguards are based on the following provisions:

1. Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community EURATOM , Chapter VII:

Article 77: The Commission shall… ensure that… special fissile materials are not used for purposes other than those indicated by their users. Article 81: As far as this is necessary for the surveillance, the inspectors ... have access at all times to all places, documents and persons ...

2. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT):

Article II: Refusal to accept, manufacture and purchase nuclear explosive devices Article III: Obligation to accept security measures for non-nuclear-weapon states in accordance with the IAEA statutes, model agreement INFCIRC / 153 corr.

3. Verification agreement INFCIRC / 193 (corresponds to the model agreement INFCIRC / 153 corr.):

Article 28: The objective ... of the security measures is the timely detection of the diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities for the manufacture of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices ... and the deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection.

The mandatory information in the monthly inventory change reports to Euratom include:

  • the sender and recipient,
  • the date of shipment,
  • a material form code specified by the above-mentioned Euratom Regulation, which indicates whether the nuclear material is z. B. powder, liquid waste or fuel,
  • the weight of the nuclear fuel.

For the accuracy of the weight information for the regular reports to Euratom , according to the above-mentioned Euratom Regulation, weight information in grams is sufficient, taking into account the rounding rules .

The IAEA , however, controls on the basis of the verification agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the European Atomic Energy Community. This Agreement and its amendments set out the terms and conditions for control by the IAEA.

Nuclear material accounting

The monitoring of the nuclear material is only possible through an accounting by the holder of a license for handling radioactive substances. Therefore, when handling radioactive substances or nuclear material, in addition to the obligation to regularly report the nuclear material inventory to the competent authority (see above) or Euratom, bookkeeping is required (Section 70 of the German Radiation Protection Ordinance (StrlSchV), Art. 7 Euratom Ordinance No. 302/2005).

The real inventory of nuclear material to be recorded by the bookkeeping is, according to the definition of the Euratom Regulation No. 302/2005, the physically measured or the calculated amount of nuclear material, since the physical recording of the exact amount of nuclear material, e.g. B. is possible by weighing. For example, recognized calculation methods are used to record the weight of different uranium isotopes , which changes due to the use (“burn-up”) of the fuel elements of a nuclear power plant .

Implementation of nuclear material monitoring

Headquarters of the IAEA in Vienna

The core material monitoring uses organizational and physical test methods in regular inspections to monitor the existing material masses. If changes in inventory are discovered, the origin or whereabouts of the material must be proven.

The inspections in Germany are all carried out by international organizations with their own accounting and reporting obligations, namely EURATOM and IAEA .

  • Monitoring by Euratom is regulated in the Euratom Regulation 302/2005 and specified in detail in the special control provisions. It is based on the legal construction that within the EU all nuclear fuels (with the exception of those used for military purposes) are “owned” by the EURATOM supply agency and are formally leased for use by the latter.
  • The International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA, the Federal Republic of Germany and the European Atomic Energy Community have concluded a verification agreement. In this agreement and its supplementary agreements, which contain the facility-specific annexes (facility attachments), the modalities for the control by the IAEA are specified.

In this way, every stock of nuclear fuel in the Federal Republic is monitored independently of one another by EURATOM and the IAEA.

See also

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. Regulation (Euratom) No. 302/2005 of the Commission of February 8, 2005 on the application of Euratom security measures