Practical freedom
Practical freedom is a term coined by Immanuel Kant in philosophy , which describes the self-understanding of a reasonable being , to decide according to self-raised principles and thus to understand oneself as free. According to Kant, this ability distinguishes humans from animals, whose arbitrariness "is determined not other than by sensual impulses, ie pathologically". As a being gifted with reason, humans, on the other hand, have the ability to act “independently of sensual impulses, therefore through causes of movement which are only presented by reason” (KrV, A 802 / B 830; Academy Edition, Vol. III, p. 521).
Practical freedom is to be distinguished from the analogously shaped by Kant concepts of psychological freedom (the strictly determined inner chain of motives) and transcendental freedom (the ability to start a causal chain independently, i.e. to cause something without being caused by oneself ) which, in contrast to practical freedom, cannot be empirically verified for Kant. In contrast to transcendental freedom, which for Kant appears to be in contradiction to determinism (see Kant's Third Antinomy ), practical freedom seems to Kant to be compatible with determinism. Thus he writes in the canon of his Critique of Pure Reason :
“Practical freedom can be proven through experience. For it is not just that which stimulates, that is, that directly affects the senses, that determines human arbitrariness, but we have a capacity to overcome the impressions on our sensual desire through ideas of what is even more distantly useful or harmful. But these considerations of what is desirable, that is, good and useful, with regard to our entire condition, are based on reason. This therefore also gives laws which are imperatives, that is, objective laws of freedom, and which say what should happen, even if it may never happen, and in this they differ from natural laws that only deal with what happens, which is why they practical laws are also called. "
However, elsewhere Kant insists that practical freedom is dependent on transcendental freedom:
“It is easy to see that if all causality in the world of the senses were merely nature, then every event would be determined by another in time according to necessary laws; and consequently, since phenomena, insofar as they determine the arbitrariness, must make every action necessary as their natural result, the abolition of transcendental freedom would at the same time destroy all practical freedom. For this presupposes that, although something did not happen, it should have happened, and that its cause in the phenomenon was not so determining that there was no causality in our arbitrariness, independent of those natural causes and even against their violence and Influence to produce something that is determined in the order of time according to empirical laws, therefore to start a series of events completely by itself. "
The contradiction can be resolved by assuming that for Kant practical freedom is ultimately dependent on transcendental freedom, but only practical freedom is relevant for practice. This interpretation is also confirmed elsewhere by Kant (cf. KrV, B 831). According to Kant, one sees oneself in action as free and has an immediate experience of freedom. Whether one is actually free in action, however, depends on whether the condition of transcendental freedom is fulfilled.
literature
- Kant, Immanuel: Critique of Pure Reason (various editions, cited as KrV according to the original page numbers of the second edition)
- Kant, Immanuel: Critique of Practical Reason (various editions)
Web links
- Freedom of the will , article in Rudolf Eisler's Kant-Lexikon , textlog.de
- Immanuel Kant , article by Ansgar Beckermann on philosophie comprehensive
Individual evidence
- ↑ On this interpretation, cf. Thomas Cobet: Husserl, Kant and the practical philosophy: Analyzes of morality and freedom , p. 121f