Battle of Salamis (306 BC)

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Battle of Salamis (306 BC)
Part of: Diadoch Wars
date 306 BC Chr.
place Salamis / Cyprus
output Victory of Demetrios
consequences Acceptance of the title of king by Antigonus
Parties to the conflict

Antigonids

Ptolemies

Commander

Demetrios Poliorketes
subordinate:
Antisthenes
Medios
Marsyas
Themison
Pleistias
Hegesippos

Ptolemy
Menelaus
subordinate:
Menoitios

Troop strength
according to Diodor:
Demetrios:
15,000 infantrymen
400 cavalrymen
180 warships
according to Diodor:
Menelaus:
12,000 infantrymen
800 cavalrymen
60 ships
Ptolemy:
140 warships
200 cargo ships
10,000 infantrymen

The Battle of Salamis was a military conflict that took place on and off the island of Cyprus in 306 BC. Chr. The fighting concentrated around the Cypriot city of Salamis and since they were also held both on land to water, this conflict is often referred to as "double battle".

As a military climax of the fourth Diadoch war , it is one of the most important events of the age of the Diadochs , which began on the death of Alexander the Great in 323 BC. Was followed. The victory of Demetrios Poliorketes over Ptolemaios (I) of Egypt caused his father Antigonus Monophthalmos to accept the title of king as the sole legal successor to Alexander in the world empire that he had conquered .

This battle should not be confused with the equally important Battle of Salamis in 480 BC. Between Greeks and Persians during the Persian Wars .

swell

The two main sources on the sea battle of Salamis are the report by the Sicilian-Greek historian Diodorus in the twentieth book of his universal history ( Bibliothéke historiké ) and the description of the Greek biographer Plutarch in his Vita des Demetrios Poliorketes.

background

Since the death of Alexander in 323 BC Its generals, called "successors" (Diadochi), found themselves in an incessant civil war for supremacy in its world empire. The Macedonian royal dynasty was divided, the kings Philip III. Arrhidaios and Alexander IV. Aigos were considered to be mentally weak or underage and therefore incapable of governing . In these wars, characterized by manifold coalitions, which were only interrupted by short phases of peace, in their early phase the supporters of an Alexander Reich that was concerned with unity and preservation fought against the representatives of particularist interests who intended to divide the empire in their favor.

By 306 BC The old Macedonian royal house was exterminated and the empire actually split up into several spheres of interest for the Diadochi. The most important were the Macedonia of Cassander , the Egypt of Ptolemy , Thrace under Lysimachus and Mesopotamia under Seleucus . The last warlord to be named was Antigonus Monophthalmos , who had been in power since the end of the Third Diadoch War in 311 BC. Ruled the regions of Asia Minor , Syria and Palestine . Antigonus stood out among the Diadochi because he was the only one left who sought to preserve the kingdom of Alexander under his own royal rule.

Around the year 309 BC The conflicts between the Diadochs flared up again for the fourth Diadoch war, which was waged in the constellations of the third. That is, Antigonus fought against all other Diadochi allied against him. To this end he sent in 307 BC His son Demetrios Poliorketes with a large naval power to Greece , who was able to bring almost all Hellenic Poleis under his rule, including Athens . Because Demetrios was able to put pressure on the ruling Cassander in Macedonia from Greece, the latter was temporarily neutralized for Antigonus. The latter now intended to turn against the ruling Ptolemy in Egypt, to destroy him and thus to incorporate the rich land of the Nile into the Antigonid domain. After all, Alexander had once conquered this country for his world empire, whose throne Antigonus aspired to, and the governor Ptolemy had proven to be a disruptor of the unity of the empire from the beginning.

Ptolemy had established a stable rule in Egypt in the years since Alexander's death and had established himself with a well-armed fleet and the conquest of Cyprus in 313 BC. BC secured a strong position of power at sea, with which he could exercise his influence on the coast of Asia Minor and as far as the Aegean Sea . To finally defeat this enemy, Antigonus ordered in the spring of 306 BC. His son to sail with his fleet against Cyprus.

course

Demetrios - from Athens to Cyprus

Demetrios Poliorketes. The horns on his head symbolize his closeness to the sea god Poseidon .

Demetrios immediately obeyed his father's orders and set sail from Piraeus with his fleet . With the intermediate station Caria he headed for the island of Rhodes , whose inhabitants and their fleet he could not persuade to take part in the war. During the whole time of the Diadoch Wars, the Rhodians had taken a neutral stance among the conflicting parties and, above all, were able to build up their position as an independent trading power. Their refusal to face Demetrios earned them the hostility of Antigonus, who later intended to devote himself to the island in detail.

From Rhodes Demetrios sailed on to Cilicia , where he took on additional ships and warriors. His armed force now comprised 25,000 infantrymen, 400 cavalrymen and all kinds of military equipment on more than 110 fast triremes (three oars), 53 heavy transport ships and a large number of other smaller cargo ships. The largest warships he owned were seven oars. With this fleet he now set a direct course for Cyprus.

The field battle

Demetrios had his fleet moored directly at the tip of the Karpas peninsula near the town of Karpasia , in northeastern Cyprus. Here he let his troops go ashore and secure the landing site with a fortified camp, consisting of a palisade wall and a deep ditch. No sooner was this done than he took the nearby towns of Karpasia and Uriana by storm. He secured them and the camp with an adequate crew to march on with his main force to Salamis . This city was the largest on the east coast of Cyprus and the headquarters of the island's Ptolemaic strategos , Menelaus , who was a brother of Ptolemy himself.

Menelaus had not escaped the landing of the enemy on the island, but he and his troops had initially waited for the further course of events in Salamis. It was not until Demetrios had moved within forty stadiums of the city that he left the city walls with 12,000 infantrymen and 800 cavalrymen to face the field battle. The battle was as quick as it was clear. Demetrios routed Menelaus' troops after a short battle, killing around 1,000 of them and taking a little more than 3,000 prisoners. Menelaus now holed up with his remaining men in Salamis, had the city walls reinforced with soldiers and projectiles and tried to withstand the impending siege by means of further defensive measures.

Since the captured soldiers did not want to serve under him, but tried - albeit in vain - to flee back to their old master, and also because he did not want to deploy any forces to provide them, Demetrios instead had them transported to Syria so that his father could help them build the could be used on the river Orontes new city of Antigoneia .

The Siege of Salamis

Ancient Cyprus and its city kingdoms.

Now Demetrios was able to tackle the siege of Salamis and completely sealed off the land side of the city with his troops. However, at the same time he failed to have this measure carried out from the seaside by his fleet, which gave Menelaus the opportunity to send a message to his brother in Egypt with the request for urgent assistance. Whether this was due to Demetrius' carelessness or his calculation to lure Ptolemy out of Egypt into a decisive battle can only be speculative. In any case, he initially concentrated entirely on the siege of Salamis, where he was able to bring out his talent for city sieges, which had already emerged in Greece the year before (from which his nickname, "the besiegers", Greek Πολιορκητής / Poliorketes ) to advantage.

Demetrios had already carried catapults and ballistae of all kinds on his ships , which he now had brought to the city. He intended to expand this fleet by building more machines during the siege, for which he had engineers and specialists for wood and metal construction as well as raw materials such as iron and wood imported from Asia. With their help, he built all sorts of new equipment that had never before been seen in ancient Greece. A huge tower with a side length of 45 cubits (approx. 16 m) and a height of 90 cubits (40–42 m), divided into nine floors , became famous . On four wheels with a diameter of nine cubits, this Helepolis ("city taker") could be brought to the walls of Salamis, the lower floors of the heaviest ballistae with up to three talents , the large catapults in the middle and the highest of them housed light artillery. 200 men had to be deployed to operate this machine. Demetrios also had two large battering rams built, each with a protective shelter. On later occasions he was to build even larger towers than the Helepolis of Cyprus and thus, among other things, if involuntarily, provide the building material for the Colossus of Rhodes .

For several days Demetrios had his machines driven against the walls of Salamis, met with bitter resistance, but was finally able to shoot a breach in the city wall. That is why Menelaus carried out a failure one night by setting the machines on fire. All three could no longer be saved by Demetrios and burned down. Pounding this loss, he nevertheless continued the siege, knowing that time was on his side. Because meanwhile he had also had his fleet drawn up in front of the city.

Ptolemy was a companion of Alexander the Great and a longstanding rival of Antigonus Monophthalmos and Demetrios Poliorketes.

Ptolemy - from Alexandria to Cyprus

In the meantime Ptolemy had received his brother's message and had set out for Cyprus with his naval forces from Alexandria . With him he led a larger land force with which Salamis should be horrified from land. Instead of sailing directly to Salamis, he first docked in Paphos on the west coast, where he was joined by several ships from his Cypriot vassal cities. With a force of 140 war-capable ships, the largest of which were quinquerems (five-oars) and the smallest quadrirems (four-oars), and more than 200 transporters, he then sailed to Kition (Latin Citium, today Larnaka), from where he took some troops moved overland to Salamis, which should signal his brother's arrival. Ptolemy hoped that his brother would make his 60 ships anchored in the port of Salamis ready for action, which should increase their fleet to a total of 200 warships. From Kition, Ptolemy set his fleet on march to Salamis in a hurry, hoping to reach the city before Demetrius' fleet and to be able to unite with his brother's ships. Because he wrongly believed that Demetrios' fleet was not near the city, but still at its landing site.

According to Plutarch, Ptolemy to Demetrius have asked to leave the island an ultimatum that countered the counter-offer to let Ptolemy unscathed if it's cities, he Corinth and Sicyon aushändige. Demetrios immediately handed the siege over to one of his officers in order to quickly prepare his fleet for combat, which had meanwhile been reinforced by seven Phoenician ships.

Battle formation

Demetrios was the first to reach Salamis with his fleet, whose port exit he immediately blocked in order to block Menelaus' ships from leaving. He also had his cavalry take up position on the shore in order to rescue castaways who were swimming ashore if necessary. When Ptolemy's fleet came up the Cypriot coast from the south, Demetrios drove towards him. To guard the harbor he left ten five-oars under the command of Antisthenes .

A little south of Salamis, Demetrios had his fleet, probably 180 ships in total, set up for battle. He put his entire offensive power into his left wing, which he divided into two lines of battle. He entrusted the front line with the Phoenician and Attic capital ships to the command of the Medios of Larissa , while he himself intended to lead the rear line with 20 ships. In the center he positioned his light ships and on the right wing again heavier ships for flank protection.

After Ptolemy had waited in vain for his brother's ships for some time, he decided to take a quick course for the city at night in order to surprisingly enter the port of Salamis and there to unite his fleet with that of his brother. But when morning came he noticed that Demetrios was already waiting for him with his fleet fully prepared for battle. So he prepared for the decisive battle, positioning his largest warships on the left wing, which he wanted to command himself. His transport ships should position themselves at an appropriate distance behind the line of combat ships.

The battle formation according to Diodorus:
cypriot coast right wing
(Hegesippos and Pleistias)
Center
(Themison and Marsyas)
left wing
(Demetrios and Medios)
several ships
(unknown number)
light ships
(unknown number)
10 six-oars and 10 five-
oars, 7 Phoenician seven-oars and 30 Attic four-oars
heavy ships
(unknown number)
several ships
(unknown number)
several ships
(unknown number)
left wing
(Ptolemy)
center right wing

The naval battle

As is customary before every battle, the heralds of both warring parties prayed to the gods for the victory of their side. When the two fleets were only three stadia apart, Demetrios had the battle opened by raising his golden shield.

First, the enemies fought each other by shooting arrows and throwing stones from their ballistae. After the ships hooked into each other, the boarding battle was resumed, with the regular warriors being reinforced on both sides by the rowing crews of their ships. As is customary in ancient naval warfare, extensive use was made of the ramming spurs . According to Diodorus, Demetrios fighting on board one of his seven oars is said to have defended himself extremely bravely against his enemies after his three bodyguards had been eliminated by a majority of opponents. Finally he succeeded in smashing the formation on his left wing of Ptolemy's right on the opposite side, sinking his ships, capturing them or driving them to flight. This gave him the tactical advantage, as he could now use his wing to encompass the center of the opponent in his now open flank. Demetrios had enough ships on his wing to make this encircling movement so far-reaching that the transport ships of his opponent located at some distance could also be detected. With his center following the movement, he set out to push Ptolemy's fleet against the coast of Cyprus, which amounted to a fatal blow.

Although Ptolemy on the other side was also able to victoriously fight his opponent on his left wing, he recognized the impending development in which his fleet was being pushed to the coast with increasing inability to maneuver. In addition, their formation was in the process of disintegration, as Demetrios could roll up their row from the right flank with his wing. Aware of the impending defeat, Ptolemy took flight to Kition with his admiral ship and ultimately left Demetrios a clear overall victory in this most important naval battle of the Diadoch Wars.

Almost at the same time, the 60 ships of the Menelaus under the command of the Menoitios succeeded in breaking through the port blockade. However, they only reached the theater of war after the end of the battle and therefore returned immediately to Salamis.

Losses and booty

According to Diodor's account, Ptolemy had lost a large part of his fleet, as his opponent was able to capture 8,000 men distributed on more than 100 cargo ships, 40 combat ships fairly intact and another 80 in a damaged state. On the other hand, Demetrios is said to have lost only 20 warships. Plutarch gives different information about the losses and claims that Ptolemy was only able to save eight of his ships, which the historian Werner Huss considers to be reasonably reliable. In addition to a large number of ships and prisoners of war, Demetrios also fell into the hands of the war chest as well as women, friends and family members of the Ptolemaic who had traveled with him. Among them were the well-known hetaera Lamia , who later made Demetrios his lover, and Leontiskos, a son of Ptolemy.

As Plutarch in particular mentioned several times, the longstanding opposition between Ptolemy and Demetrios was characterized by fairness , humanity and mutual respect . When the old Alexander veteran Ptolemaios had given a lesson to the young Demetrios a few years earlier in the battle of Gaza (312 BC) , he unconditionally returned all of the captured men and friends, as well as the captured entourage. Demetrius was able to retaliate for this only a little later by immediately releasing the captured men of Ptolemy after his victory at Myus (spring 311 BC). Even after Salamis Demetrios remained true to this attitude and sent the prisoners and the looted goods back to Egypt, except for 1,200 looted armor, which he gave to the people of Athens as a gift. He had the fallen opponents buried together with his own. A few years later, Ptolemy would have the opportunity to repay these gestures.

consequences

After Ptolemy fled to Egypt after his defeat, Menelaus capitulated and handed Salamis over to Demetrios. He and his men were given safe conduct to be able to leave for Egypt as well. As a result, following the order of the day, the kings of the other island cities also switched to vassalage to Demetrios, with the whole of Cyprus being under the control of the Antigonids. Since Ptolemy had lost almost his entire fleet, he lost his previously held naval power in the eastern Mediterranean, which was now in turn taken by Demetrios. He immediately sent the message of victory to his father, who was in Antigoneia, Syria, via Aristodemus of Miletus . Antigonus took the victory of his son as a divine sign, which he interpreted as legitimizing his claim to the succession of Alexander. In a ceremony he tied a diadem around his head and from then on regarded himself as the rightful king of the world empire conquered by Alexander. At the same time he also sent a diadem to Demetrios, who was thus raised to his fellow king.

The victory of Salamis, however, did not result in the voluntary submission of the last independent diadochs to the Antigonid rule; instead, Cassander, Lysimachus and Ptolemy intended to continue their resistance against Antigonus. In order to maintain his kingship, he had to continue the war to a final victory, for which, among other things, a direct attack on Egypt was necessary. But that failed until the spring of 305 BC. Despite a combined offensive on land and sea in adverse weather conditions and the annual flood of the Nile , Ptolemy was barely able to maintain his rule in Egypt. He and the other diadochi then also assumed the title of king and thus rejected the claim to sole rule of Antigonus. Demetrios then sailed back to Greece, taking up the siege of Rhodes on the orders of his father , the capture of which ultimately failed just like that of Egypt. For several years Antigonus fought against the other Diadochi for the Alexander empire , until it was with him in the battle of Ipsos in 301 BC. BC found its final end.

The rule over Cyprus contributed significantly to the survival of Demetrios as "sea king" in the time after Ipsos. It was not until 295/94 BC. Ptolemy succeeded in the reconquest of Cyprus, which is now up to the cession to Rome in 58 BC. Belonged to the Ptolemaic Empire .

Artistic reception

The Nike of Samothrace in the Louvre Museum, Paris.

In older art historical research, Otto Benndorf in particular took the view that the Nike of Samothrace , one of the most famous sculptures from the Hellenistic period, was a consecration gift ( anathema ) from Demetrios Poliorketes to the shrine of the Kabir deities on the island of Samothrace , in memory of his victory at Salamis. The coinage of Demetrios is used as the basis of this theory. His belief that he was favored in battle by the influence of Nike ( Greek  Νίκη ) is testified by her representations on many of his coins, which show the goddess of victory standing on the bow of a ship with wide open wings, blowing a trumpet and holding a signal mast. The reverse of the coins in question always shows a Poseidon ready to throw his trident with the imprint ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ ΔΗΜΗΤΡΙΟΥ (German: Basileus Demetrios ), occasionally supplemented with a depiction of the star of Vergina . Demetrios first had these motifs struck on his coins in Salamis on Cyprus, but later also in the mints of Pella and Amphipolis when he was King of Macedonia. During his reign (294 to 287 BC) he was able to commission the Nike statue for the nearby sanctuary of Samothrace. It also showed the goddess standing at the bow of an ancient ship with flared wings in the airstream.

After extensive research, this theory is now largely rejected. Especially because Samothrace was under the rule of his enemy Lysimachus during Demetrios' lifetime , it seems rather unlikely that he could ever erect a sign of his victory there. Instead, the creation of the sculpture is associated with the victory of Antigonus II Gonatas in the sea ​​battle of Kos (around 263 BC) or even with that of the white Kleitos in the sea ​​battle at Amorgos (322 BC).

literature

Remarks

  1. Diodor , Bibliothéke historiké 20, 46–53; Plutarch , Demetrios 15-16.
  2. Diodor, Bibliothéke historiké 20, 46, 5.
  3. Diodor, Bibliothéke historiké 20, 46, 6.
  4. ^ Diodor, Bibliothéke historiké 20, 47, 1.
  5. Diodor, Bibliothéke historiké 20, 47, 2.
  6. ^ Diodor, Bibliothéke historiké 20, 47, 3.
  7. Diodor, Bibliothéke historiké 20, 47, 5; Plutarch, Demetrius 15, 1f .; on this W. Huss: Egypt in the Hellenistic Period 332–30 BC Chr. Munich 2001, p. 182.
  8. Diodor, Bibliothéke historiké 20, 47, 8.
  9. Diodor, Bibliothéke historiké 20, 48, 1-3.
  10. Diodor, Bibliothéke historiké 20, 48, 4-8.
  11. The number of 140 ships is reported not only by Diodor, Bibliothéke historiké 20, 49, 2, but also by Polyainos , Strategika 4, 7, 7, while Plutarch, Demetrius 16, speaks 1 of 150 warships of Ptolemy.
  12. Diodor, Bibliothéke historiké 20, 49, 1-6.
  13. Plutarch, Demetrius 15, 2.
  14. The Phoenician ships may have been commanded by Philocles, who later became king of the city of Sidon. See. Jakob Seibert: Philocles, son of Apollodorus, King of the Sidonians. In: Historia, Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte Vol. 19, No. 3, 1970, pp. 337-351.
  15. Diodor, Bibliothéke historiké 20, 49, 5; on this W. Huss: Egypt in the Hellenistic Period 332–30 BC Chr. Munich 2001, p. 183.
  16. Diodor, Bibliothéke historiké 20, 50, 1.
  17. The number of 108 ships handed down in the Diodor text (Diodor, Bibliothéke historiké 20, 50, 2) is often (for example by W. Huss: Egypt in Hellenistic Time 332–30 BC Munich 2001, p. 183, note 687) has been corrected to the number of 180, which is considered much more likely. The latter value coincides with the number given by Plutarch ( Demetrios 16, 2).
  18. Diodor, Bibliothéke historiké 20, 50, 3-6
  19. On the battle line-up see also Plutarch, Demetrius 16, 1–2; on this W. Huss: Egypt in the Hellenistic Period 332–30 BC Chr. Munich 2001, p. 183.
  20. For the battle report see Diodor, Bibliothéke historiké 20, 51, 1–52, 6; Plutarch, Demetrius 16, 2.
  21. Diodor, Bibliothéke historiké 20, 52, 6.
  22. Plutarch, Demetrius 16, 2-3; on this W. Huss: Egypt in the Hellenistic Period 332–30 BC Chr. Munich 2001, p. 183, note 692.
  23. Plutarch, Demetrius 16, 3–4; Justin , Historiarum Philippicarum libri XLIV 15, 2, 12.
  24. Plutarch, Demetrius 17, 1; Justin, Historiarum Philippicarum libri XLIV 15, 2, 12. Diodorus did not mention these generosities.
  25. ^ After the reconquest of Cyprus by Ptolemy in 295/94 BC The family of Demetrios fell into his hands, which he immediately released.
  26. Diodor, Bibliothéke historiké 20, 53, 1-2.
  27. ^ W. Huss: Egypt in the Hellenistic Period 332–30 BC. Chr. Munich 2001, p. 184.
  28. Otto Benndorf, Alexander Conze, Alois Hauser: New archaeological investigations on Samothrace. Vol. 2, Gerold u. a., Vienna a. a. 1880, pp. 54-56.
  29. Edward T. Newell : Coinages of Demetrius Poliorcetes. Obel International, Chicago 1978, ISBN 978-0-916710-36-1 .
  30. AW Lawrence: The Date of the Nike of Samothrace. In: The Journal of Hellenic Studies . Vol. 46, 1926, pp. 213-218.