Signaling (behavioral biology)
The term signaling is used to study communication between individuals. A central question here is under what circumstances signals can be honest or dishonest.
Signaling theories are also used in economics, see principal-agent theory # Problems that arise .
history
Early behavioral biologists like Nikolaas Tinbergen assumed that honest signals are widespread in nature and that natural selection produces honest and inexpensive signals. This was the dominant view until Richard Dawkins and John Krebs argued in 1978 that honest signals need to be rare because the interests of two individuals are never exactly the same. Instead, signals are the result of an arms race between manipulative senders and suspicious recipients. That idea was very influential. On the other hand, Amotz Zahavi suggested in 1975 that honest signals are possible if they are accompanied by high costs for the transmitter ( handicap principle ). Zahavi's theory was controversial; alongside Dawkins and Krebs, Maynard Smith had argued against it a few years earlier . Many biologists were skeptical of Zahavi's theory, since frugal individuals could forego costly signals and instead use resources for reproduction.
This controversy continued for some time in biology. The economics was due to the use of models while far ahead. In the 1970s, for example, the plausibility of Thorstein Veblen's idea of validity consumption , an expensive and therefore honest signal, could be shown. Jack Hirshleifer suggested in 1977 that the model of expensive signaling should be imported into biology. The biologists Alan Grafen , Charles Godfray, and Andrew Pomiankowski later proved that Zahavi's approach could work.
honesty
The goal of signaling is often to build trust. However, the signals of trustworthiness, efficiency, productivity, or reproductive potency can be deceptive; They can be perceived as credible (English: honest ) or implausible ( dishonest ). The signal does not have to match the internal setting of the signal transmitter, which the receiver often recognizes. Where the necessary “vocabulary” of signaling is not mastered, where false or incomplete signals are sent, it can easily appear that something is being simulated that is not there. This exposes the signal generator to the impression of dishonesty. But also excessive effort, i. H. Overdriven and too "loud" signals, e.g. For example, appearing in a luxury limousine and wearing an overpriced business outfit when advertising for a customer can easily give the customer the impression that something is being faked.
So honest signals don't have to be costly. Maynard Smith showed that if there was a sufficient overlap of interests, there was no reason for dishonest signals. But even in conflict situations, honest, low-cost signals can be evolutionarily stable . Understatement strategies can also be interpreted as a form of signaling, so that the customer should be shown that one shares their values such as economy, informality, etc.
Examples
When a male woos a female, are his signals a reliable indicator of his quality, or is he exaggerating to win over the female who would be won over by another male if there were honest signals?
If an animal is giving off aggressive signals in a conflict, is the strength of those signals a reliable indicator of the likelihood of attack, or is it an exaggeration to deter the other animal?
When an offspring asks their parents for food, does this reflect their real needs or exaggerate in order to get more food?
literature
- William A. Searcy & Stephen Nowicki: The Evolution of Animal Communication: Reliability and Deception in Signaling Systems . Princeton University Press, 2005. ISBN 0-691-07095-4 .
- John Maynard Smith & David Harper: Animal Signals . Oxford University Press, 2003. ISBN 0-19-852685-7 .
Web links
- Honest Signaling Theory , Introduction
Individual evidence
- ↑ a b c Richard McElreath & Robert Boyd : Mathematical Models of Social Evolution: A Guide for the Perplexed . University of Chicago Press, 2007. ISBN 0-226-55826-6 . Chapter 5: Animal Communication.
- ^ Matthias Hahn: Trust from the point of view of signal theory , GRIN e-Book 2002.
- ↑ Hanno Beck: The everyday economist , Frankfurt a. M., 2nd edition 2004, p. 36 ff.