Social ontology
The social ontology is a mainly philosophical sub-discipline that deals with the ontology , ie the study of the nature of social facts is concerned, in other words those features of reality that are based on human interaction. Examples of social entities are organizations like universities or states, or institutions like money, marriage or property. One focus is the question of the existential status of communal actions and social facts. The central question of social ontology is: "What is our social world made of?"
research object
Social ontology examines the mode of being and the structure of “social facts” . The existence of such facts, such as the fact that a piece of paper is a $ 20 bill, cannot easily be explained by observer-independent facts such as its physical or chemical composition. A distinction can be made between a basic reality , the physical, biological or spiritual reality of individuals and social interactions as well as the ontological status, i.e. the mode of being, of collective actors.
Central questions
In terms of method, social ontology asks the question: Do other ontological categories have to be introduced to describe social reality , or can our social reality be described using the known (but therefore no less controversial) categories? Can social properties have a causal effect? Can laws of social reality (if they exist) be traced back to the laws of individual psychology?
With reference to the debate on free will , the question arises to what extent social structures, or our social reality, shape or determine our behavior and our actions.
Also of great importance is the question of what social norms are and how they are applied. This question can often not be separated from the question of the status of standards in general. However, it is specifically about norms that influence or even direct the actions of groups and societies.
Basic positions
Within social ontology there is a tension that shows itself in two mutually exclusive positions:
According to ontological individualism , there are only individuals. One can only speak of a social reality if it can be reduced to an individual reality. In this case one speaks of a reductive ontological individualism. Eliminative individualism denies the existence of any social entities.
According to ontological collectivism , social entities really do exist and must be assigned their own ontological status. This collectivism is also often referred to as holism and claims that our social reality goes beyond our individually constituted reality.
Representative
By Wilfrid Sellars linguistic analysis of We-sets the foundation has been laid for the modern social ontology. With this debate the concept of we- intentionality was introduced, which is widely discussed to this day. We-intentionality, so the advocates, is the most basic form of community. By committing to a common goal, two people structure their actions in such a way that it is no longer possible to speak of two individual actions (or chains of actions), but of a common action. Associated with this phenomenon are questions about common knowledge, common intentions, and common or shared beliefs. The work of David Lewis , Margaret Gilbert , Raimo Tuomela and John R. Searle were particularly influential here .
Margaret Gilbert developed a holistic theory that she calls "Theory of Plural Subjects". Plural subjects are social groups that act “as a unit”. It thus ties in with the work of Georg Simmel , who saw the consciousness of individuals merge into one unit.
Raimo Tuomela developed a theory that can be understood more individually. For Tuomela, we-intentions are the condition for collective action. They develop in a process that “includes making explicit or implicit agreements” (Tuomela 1995, p. 425).
John R. Searle divides the world into raw facts and social facts. For the latter, collective intentionality is always necessary. For Searle, however, the institutional facts are particularly interesting, which makes Obama President of the United States, for example . This fact, which can only be understood institutionally, can be explained with three concepts: (1) collective intentionality, (2) assignments of functions and (3) constitutive rules. Functional assignments are typical human actions: A colored paper note is given the function of being money. In order for this function to remain valid, one needs constitutive rules of the form "X is considered Y in context C". According to his own claim, he overcomes the separation between ontological individualism and ontological collectivism, since he distinguishes between epistemic and ontological objectivity. A banknote is then epistemically objectively a banknote, ontologically objectively a piece of paper.
literature
- Ludger Jansen: Groups and Institutions. An ontology of the social . Springer VS, Wiesbaden 2017, ISBN 978-3-658-12129-7 .
- Kirk Ludwig, Marija Jankovic (Eds.): The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality . Routledge, London 2018, ISBN 978-1-138-78363-8 .
- Hans Bernhard Schmid, David P. Schweikard (ed.): Collective intentionality. A debate on the fundamentals of the social . Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 2009, ISBN 978-3-518-29498-7 .
Web links
- Brian Epstein: Social Ontology. In: Edward N. Zalta (Ed.): Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy .
- International Social Ontology Society. Retrieved August 19, 2019 .
Individual evidence
- ↑ See John Latsis: Social Ontology . In: James D. Wright (Ed.): International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences. 2nd edition, Elsevier (announced for 2015)
- ↑ Searle: Some basic principles of social ontology . In: Schmid and Schweikard: Collective intentionality . Suhrkamp, 2009, p. 504 ff.
- ↑ Searle: Some basic principles of social ontology . In: Schmid and Schweikard: Collective intentionality . Suhrkamp, 2009, p. 504.
- ↑ Searle: Some basic principles of social ontology . In: Schmid and Schweikard: Collective intentionality . Suhrkamp, 2009, p. 506.