Bargaining theory by Komorita and Chertkoff

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The negotiation theory and Komorita Chertkoff (Engl. Bargaining theory of coalition formation ) to the psychologist Samuel Shozo Komorita (1927-2006) and Jerome (Jerry) M. Chertkoff (1936), both then at the Indiana University , is a 1973 published Bargaining Theory to explain the formation of coalitions and the distribution of the proceeds among the members through negotiations . The essentials of forming a coalition are the negotiations. The participants in the negotiations only partially know the strengths and weaknesses of their own and other parties ( limited rationality ), but have a certain foresight about the course of the negotiations.

The theory was developed and verified from the observation of players who had to form coalitions in various situations in order to maximize their profit from the game. Similar to previous theories such as the theory of domination , theory of minimal resources ( Lloyd S. Shapley and Martin Shubik ), theory of minimal power ( William Anthony Gamson ), the negotiation theory of Komorita and Chertkoff predicts a greater willingness to negotiate with weaker players , because they also have a lower profit expectation and thus make fewer claims on the income. This is accompanied by an effect that can turn a strength into a weakness, namely if a potentially strong partner does not receive any coalition offers because coalitions with weaker partners are also promising and at the same time allow greater profit prospects. In the argument about earnings, the weaker parties will cite the principle of equality, while stronger partners will overemphasize the performance share. Initially the return will be roughly in the middle between the two claims, later the distribution will change until the maximum return is reached that a partner in another coalition could achieve.

Most coalition theories consider only a few factors, such as two or three parties, to explain the phenomenon. Although the results show correlations, they are not sufficient for an explanation. Komorita and Chertkoff combine several factors and thus achieve a significant improvement in predictability in coalition negotiations.

literature

  • S. Komorita, JM Chertkoff: A bargaining theory of coalition formation. In: Psychological Review. 80, 1973, pp. 149-162.

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ a b c d e f R. Hansmann, H. Crott: negotiation theory from Komorita and Chertkoff . In: MA Wirtz (ed.): Dorsch - Lexicon of Psychology. 2016, accessed November 5, 2016.
  2. ^ A b c Hans W Bierhoff, Dieter Frey: Handbook of social psychology and communication psychology. Hogrefe Verlag, 2006, ISBN 3-8409-1844-8 , p. 737.
  3. ↑ Lloyd S. Shapley, Martin Shubik: A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System. In: American Political Science Review. 48, 1954, pp. 787-792.
  4. ^ William Anthony Gamson: Experimental Studies of Coalition Formation. In: Advances in Experimental Social Psychology. Academic Press, New York, December 1, 1964. doi: 10.1016 / S0065-2601 (08) 60049-0
  5. ^ A b Günter Wiswede, Mathias Gabriel, Franz Gresser, Alexandra Haferkamp: Social Psychology Lexicon. Walter de Gruyter, 2004, ISBN 3-486-81564-4 , pp. 290/292.
  6. ^ A b Holly Arrow, Ruth Bennett, Scott Crosson, John Orbell: Social Poker: A Paradigm for Studying the Formation of Self-Organized Groups . (= Technical Report No. 99-01). Institute of Cognitive & Decision Sciences, University of Oregon.
  7. ^ A b Edward J. Lawler, George A. Youngs, jr .: Coalition Formation: An Integrative Model. In: Sociometry. Vol. 38, no. 1, 1975, pp. 1-17.