Analytical ontology

The Analytical Ontology is a branch within the analytical philosophy . Like classical ontology , it examines the most general features and basic “components” of reality and how these “interlock”. It asks what should be accepted as fundamental types of beings (things, properties, facts, events, processes, etc.), how these are to be understood, and what are the interdependent relationships between them.

In the analytical ontology naturalistic, phenomenological and descriptive directions can be distinguished. The common feature of the positions, which are often very different in terms of content, is the use of formal aids ; some early approaches were methodologically based on an analysis of linguistic expressions and structures. It is controversial whether the basic structures found in this way reflect the structures of beings in themselves ( realistic approach) or primarily make up structures of our cognition and comprehension that are only projected onto something independent of experience ( constructivist approach).

Current analytical philosophy usually identifies ontology with metaphysics . It deals with almost the entire spectrum of classical ontological questions, which is why today a comparison of classical and analytical ontology is often questioned.

history

The beginning of analytical philosophy was initially associated with a rejection of metaphysics or ontology. This was directed primarily against idealistic systems such as those of Bernard Bosanquet and Francis Herbert Bradley . The elimination of metaphysics became a fundamental concern of analytical philosophy. Nevertheless, metaphysical elements were already hidden in their beginnings, such as in the efforts to solve the philosophical problems through a "logical syntax" of language ( Rudolf Carnap ) or through conceptual analysis. The most powerful currents of these metaphysics-critical beginnings were logical positivism in the 1930s and 1940s, and after the Second World War the "Ordinary Language" philosophy in the tradition of the late Wittgenstein.

From the early 1960s, the prejudices against metaphysics began to soften and a more open discussion of its issues developed. Most important of these were the works of WVO Quine and PF Strawson , both of whom had their roots in the antimetaphysical tradition. Strawson, a former exponent of the “Ordinary Language” philosophy, developed the project of a descriptive metaphysics with the aim of a systematic characterization of the structures and conceptual schemes in our language. Quine, which was rooted in the tradition of logical positivism, analyzed the "ontological commitments" ( ontological commitments ), which we accept, as we move in certain discourses. Strawson's approach became particularly influential in Great Britain, where the method of conceptual analysis was combined with Kant- based questions about the transcendental conditions of our speech. Quine's ideas spread to North America, where a debate arose about what ontological assumptions scientific and everyday language oblige us to make. Over time, the topics broadened and finally all classic questions of tradition were taken up again, albeit in a selective and unsystematic form.

Since the mid-1980s, a new generation of analytical philosophers has developed an increasingly relaxed approach to metaphysical questions. More extensive systematic works on metaphysical topics such as those by Roderick Chisholm , David Armstrong and David Lewis emerged . Chisholm and later Lewis distanced themselves from the Quines model and now, in the tradition of GE Moore, saw the ontological obligations established with everyday language as equal to those of the scientific language. The Australian philosopher David Armstrong, whose work on the universals problem pushed back the prevailing nominalistic consensus and enabled a new beginning of metaphysical realism, also achieved great influence.

Basic directions

Naturalistic directions

The naturalistic direction of the analytical ontology, to which u. a. Willard Van Orman Quine and Donald Davidson are to be counted, was decisively influenced by the metaphysical criticism of the " Vienna Circle ", in particular by Rudolf Carnap . Quines' starting point is the thesis adopted by Carnap that the decisive means for answering ontological questions is the choice of a suitable conceptual scheme .

For Quine, the goal of ontology is to clarify the question of what there is (“what there is”). For him, the basic conceptual framework for this clarification is provided by the physical language. It refers to physical objects ( physical objects ), which are the fundamental constituents of reality. Physical objects are characterized by their spatial-temporal arrangement. They include both the everyday things ( physical things , bodies ) and events ( events ). Since for Quine all other ways of speaking can be translated into physical language, all other types of entities can ultimately also be traced back to the basic category of "physical objects".

Phenomenological directions

The diverse phenomenological directions of analytical ontology go back to the philosophy of Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl . Basically they are critical of the efforts of naturalistic currents to want to reduce all categories to one basic category (physical or physically describable).

The intentionality of consciousness has a special place in her research ( Peter Geach , Roderick Chisholm ). According to this sub-direction, the starting point of philosophical thinking is the reflection on the thinking subject. If we want to show and understand general structures of reality, we have to ask ourselves how we as thinking subjects refer to these structures. Chisholm speaks of the "primacy of the intentional"; Without the reference to intentional faculties , the object- related reference of linguistic expressions cannot ultimately be explained at all.

Another important topic in the phenomenological direction is mereology ( Kevin Mulligan , Peter Simons, Barry Smith ). In it, following the beginnings with Brentano and Husserl and the work of Polish logicians ( Stanisław Leśniewski ), the theory of the part-whole relation is further developed.

A third concern is the creation of “categorical” ontologies ( Gustav Bergmann , Reinhardt Grossmann , Erwin Tegtmeier).

Descriptive directions

The descriptive direction of analytical ontology, also known as descriptive metaphysics , is closely linked to the work of Peter F. Strawson , who follows the descriptive approaches of Aristotle and Kant in his work. Strawson distinguishes between “descriptive” and “revisionary” metaphysics. Descriptive metaphysics represents the actual conceptual structure with which we grasp the world; revisionary metaphysics wants to replace it with a better one. The aim of descriptive metaphysics is to describe the language-invariant and timeless core of our thinking. This is the basis for every use of language as the “core for the conceptual tools”. For Strawson, the question of the fundamental structures of our conceptual system is inextricably linked with that of the fundamental structures of reality. Essential categories of our thought structure do not come to light through the mere description of the actual use of the word, but require transcendental analysis.

Questions

Epistemological Problems

Linguistic relativity and underdetermination

A fundamental question in ontology concerns the relationship between ontology and language. While in a realistic approach (e.g. Armstrong) it is assumed that beings and their basic structures are given in and of themselves and indirectly e.g. B. also reflected in basic structures of language, one assumes in a constructivist approach (e.g. Strawson) that basic structures of beings in themselves cannot be objectively grasped, but only the structures that we use for corresponding projections can be described . Such a constructivist approach is sometimes associated with the thesis of linguistic relativity , according to which different languages also imply different ontologies. With regard to the epistemological content of an ontology, a distinction must be made between the validity claim of the known and the content of the ontology. The content of the ontology can be the same from a realistic or a constructivist perspective. A realist is more likely to take the position that the content can also be recognized, while a constructivist position is more based on an intersubjective agreement.

A further problem concerns the “justification-based underdetermination ” and the low certainty of justification of ontological theories as stated by some theorists . Ontological statements therefore have a high generality character, which, however, only appears to be justified to a small extent by data. In addition, the ontology is to a high degree holistic ; That is, the correctness of individual statements can in principle only be decided within ontological overall systems, which are, however, hardly available in current elaborations.

Ontological obligations

According to Quine, we can also describe the ontological basic question of what there is as what must be in order for our statements to be true. Quine speaks in this context of "ontological commitments" ( ontological commitments ) that one enters when one sets up statements. In order to uncover this, however, according to Quine, it is necessary to simplify the complex structure of everyday language and transfer it to the canonical notation of predicate logic. As the core of this procedure, Quine suggests - following Russell's theory of definite description - that the proper names used in colloquial language be replaced by logical particles. Quine's classic example is negative existence assertions like the statement "Pegasus does not exist". Without transformation, this statement would be pointless, since it puts the “burden of object reference” on the name “Pegasus”, with which we would commit ourselves to the assumption of the existence of Pegasus. According to Quine, therefore, the statement “Pegasus does not exist” is to be analyzed as “There is nothing that Pegasus is” ( ). The “burden of the object reference” is transferred from the name “Pegasus” to the particle “something”, which is represented in canonical notation as a variable bound by the existential quantifier. What we accept as existing is shown in general by the values we are ready to use for the variable "x". ${\ displaystyle \ nexists x \, Pegasus (x)}$

Discussions about ontological questions thus ideally consist in the interlocutors showing which entities they accept with the help of canonical notation. According to Quine, the question of which ontology is the right one cannot ultimately be decided with the help of canonical notation. Quine suggests pragmatic criteria for the solution. Using the "semantic ascent" ( semantic ascent ) to the semantic point of view of content and replace clarified within the language which ontological assumptions afford better services for the particular purpose.

existence

In classical analytical philosophy, the question of the meaning of “existence” is often excluded or even rejected as a pseudo-question. Here it follows the tradition of Hume, for whom existence is not a predicate, since the term “existence” does not add anything to the idea of a thing.

Classical language analytical interpretations

According to Carnap and Frege, existence is understood to be the fulfillment of a propositional function. Predicates are understood as functions. If the predicate of a statement applies to the object to which its subject expression relates, then the statement is true, the function is considered “fulfilled” or “saturated”. In this tradition, the sentence “unicorns do not exist” means nothing other than that the statement function “x is a unicorn” is not fulfilled. In another interpretation, represented by Quine among others, existence is interpreted from the role of the existential quantifier in predicate logic. By existence statements one asserts or negates that there is something for which it is true that the expressions for which an existence statement is made apply to it. A well-known dictum of Quine goes: "To be seen as an entity is simply to be seen as the value of a variable". According to the standard interpretation of quantification, what is expressed with the existential quantifier concerns things and not linguistic expressions. A statement like “There is an x for which F and G applies” is not made true by linguistic expressions that can be substituted for the indefinite letter x, but by the thing itself, which has the properties F and G.

Problems of Classical Interpretations

One problem is the dictum of ontological relativity put forward by Quine, according to which we can only meaningfully assume as existent what our language obliges us to do. According to a realistic view, however, from the fact that we do not currently presuppose certain entities in our language system, we cannot conclude that these entities generally do not exist or have never existed. In order to arrive at general statements about existence, other language systems would also have to be considered. Furthermore, the time factor must also be taken into account. What form of existence do those things have that do not exist in the present, but either have existed in the past or will exist in the future? Another problem is modal speech, which Quine has no place in science. In everyday life, however, we not only talk about the latest, but also, of course, about what is possible. About what do we predict what we say about things that may not exist but could exist?

Modalities

In the philosophical tradition a distinction is usually made between the three modalities of necessity , reality and possibility . These are basically used in two different ways: as “ de-dicto- statements” they refer to sentences or propositions, as “de-re-statements” they refer to things in reality.

De dicto and de re

In classical analytic philosophy one tries to relate the modalities of necessity and possibility solely to propositions or propositions and not to entities of the world. Because “necessary” and “possible” are not understood here as modes of being, but as modes of knowledge. Saul Kripke in particular questioned this approach in the 1980s . For Kripke, when we say that the world could in some way have been different from what it really is, we are referring to the world itself and not to statements about it.

Possible worlds

In analytical ontology it has become customary since the second half of the 20th century to describe the concept of possibility with the metaphor of “possible worlds”, which goes back to Leibniz . A possible world is initially simply understood to be a way in which things could have been. One of these different versions of being able to be is characterized by the fact that it is real or actual. Opinions about the ontological status of the possible worlds differ widely. The arguments revolve primarily around the question of how the so-called "possibilia" are to be understood, as the merely possible objects that do not occur in the real world. A number of objections have been put forward to the idea that Possibilia can easily be viewed like regular objects. For Quine, the main problem with the possibilia is that they lack the criteria of identity to be able to individualize them. R. Barcan Marcus also points out that Possibilia cannot be made the subject of a referential reference. According to what is known as possibilism, as it was represented in particular by David Lewis under the designation “modal realism”, possibilia, on the other hand, are just as real and exist in the same sense as things in the actual world. Every way a world could have been is a way a world is.

Universals and individuals

The fundamental question of ontology is what actually exists or what the basic types of entities are. A historically fundamental distinction is that between universals ( universals ) and individuals or particulars , the more precise definition of which is the subject of the universals problem discussed since the Middle Ages . The universals problem has always been recognized as a problem in analytical philosophy, despite the initially metaphysical-critical tendencies, as it has made essential contributions to the fundamental debate in mathematics as well as to other epistemological discussions. Your answer depends u. a. the type of categorical ontology developed. There is a very controversial discussion about this in the analytical ontology. It is disputed how the two terms “universals” and “individual things” should be understood at all, whether one category cannot be traced back to the other and whether all entities can actually be divided into them.

Universals and Tropics

There are two competing models to explain how individual things get their properties. Realistic models assume that universals exist that represent types of properties. The most important characteristic of universals is their repeatability (“universals are repeatables”). they can be instantiated or exemplified in any number of individual things. Examples of universals are properties such as “weighing one kilogram” or “20 ° C” and relationships such as “being a meter away from”. A particular type of universals represent " types" ( kinds ) represents species are properties that are constitutive of a single thing. they are referred to by means of “ sortal expressions ” ( sortals ).

Tropical theories, on the other hand, reject the assumption that properties are repeated in different individual things. They assume that properties always exist as individual, numerically different properties. These are also called “tropes” in analytical philosophy. Tropics are particular properties ( abstract particulars ); concrete individual things are often viewed as a bundle of tropes.

Single things, substrates and bundles

According to David Armstrong, individual things are characterized by the fact that they cannot be repeated (nonrepeatables). In order to explain the identity of individual things, substrate theories compete with bundle theories. According to a substrate theory, there are properties on the one hand and something that bears the properties on the other, the substrate. Substrates are what give individual things their identity.

Substrate theories, in turn, differ in whether the objects, including some of their properties, function as substrates ( thick particulars ) or whether the substrates are understood as devoid of any properties ( thin particulars or bare particulars ).

Substrate theories, which proceed from unqualified carriers, understand them as pure "dies" ( Haecceitas ) without any properties. It is meant to express that the individuality of something lies beyond all conceptual, i.e. linguistic, descriptions. The individual thing does not necessarily have any properties; it can change any of its properties without being changed in its identity. This approach can already be found in Aristotle and was introduced into the philosophical tradition primarily by Duns Scotus .

Theories that assume a carrier with certain properties as a substrate are also called substance theories . They assume that the property bearer has certain (substantial) properties. They cannot change over time without the property bearer being “destroyed” as a result.

For the bundle theory , the concrete individual thing has no carrier, but is a bundle of properties that are essential for all of them. Every concrete individual is thought of as something that is composed of complex bundles of property individuals (abstract particulars) that are held together by binding relations. Belongs initially to these binding relationships that the individual features that make a bundle, appear together, or "co-present" ( compresent ) are. According to the interpretation of the bundle theory, the fact that these properties can also occur together with other properties constitutes their contingency .

Theory types

According to David Armstrong, the different positions on the problem of the status of universals and individuals can be summarized in the following matrix:

position	Class membership criterion	Identity of the concrete individual thing	Properties of the single thing
1) Extreme nominalism	primitive (not questionable)	the concrete individual thing itself	does not exist as a separate entity
2) Similarity nominalism	similarity	the concrete individual thing itself	does not exist as a separate entity
3) Tropical theory of the primitive classes	primitive	Feature Bundle	Tropics
4) Bundle tropical theory of the similarity classes	similarity	Feature Bundle	Tropics
5) Substrate-tropical theory of the similarity classes	similarity	Substrate	Tropics
6) Tropical theory of universals	Instantiation	Substrate	Tropics
7) Bundle Universal Theory	Instantiation	Feature Bundle	Universals
8) Substrate universal theory	Instantiation	Substrate	Universals

Nominalistic theories

For nominalistic theories there are no properties as separate entities, only the concrete individual things. The most extreme theory is the theory of the primitive natural classes (1: A. Quinton). According to her, the fact that things are grouped into classes cannot be further analyzed. The classes in which the individual things are summarized have a "primitive" character; that is, they are not characterized by any properties or relationships between their elements. The similarity nominalism (2: HH Price) also does not allow any properties and relationships of the class elements, but, in contrast to the theory of primitive natural classes, states why some classes are natural. According to him, the naturalness of a class depends on the similarity between the elements.

Tropical theories

Another large group are the tropical theories. These assume that the properties of the concrete thing are determined by a separate entity, the tropics. The tropical theory occurs in four basic variations. For proponents of a tropical theory of the natural classes (3: GF Stout ), the fact that an individual object is precisely determined by the respective properties can no longer be questioned further. For representatives of a tropical theory of similarity classes, the individual properties of a concrete object are held together by a similarity that can no longer be questioned - with (5: CB Martin, John Locke) or without assumption (4: Keith Campbell, Donald C. Williams) one underlying substrate that absorbs these properties. A fourth variant combines the tropical theory with a theory of universals (6: Aristoteles, Edmund Husserl, Roman Ingarden, John Cook Wilson, Norman Kemp Smith). Its advocates assume that the individual properties of an individual object represent instantiations of universals that belong to a carrier of these properties, the substrate.

Universals theories

The third group represents the realistic theories. They assume that the individual objects themselves - not just their properties - represent instantiations of universals. The individual object is either simply identified again with the sum of its properties (7: Bertrand Russell) or a substrate is assumed to be the carrier of these properties (8: David M. Armstrong, Evan Fales, E. Jonathan Lowe).

identity

Distinctions

Ontological questions are closely related to the identity problem. A well-known dictum from Quine reads: “No entity without identity” In the analytical ontology a fundamental distinction is made between numerical and qualitative identity . In the case of numerical identity we are dealing with a relation of a thing to itself, in the case of qualitative identity with a relation between numerically different things.

Identity in the strict sense concerns concrete things. In this case, token identity is also used. In a broader sense, identity is also related to abstract things, which is called type identity .

Another distinction concerns the time aspect. Synchronous identity means the identity of an entity at one and the same point in time. Diachronic identity, on the other hand, states the identity of an entity at different points in time. This is discussed particularly intensively in the analytical ontology, because it is related to the question of whether there are things that remain identical to themselves over time, i.e. there are so-called continuants.

Synchronous identity of concrete things

Leibniz's principle is often used to assess the synchronous identity of a concrete thing . According to this, an x is identical to a y (numerically) if and only if x agrees with y in all properties. This principle is controversial, however, since some philosophers assume that it is conceivable that there are absolutely identical things that are nevertheless numerically different. An important necessary criterion of identity for concrete things is their spatial coincidence. For some theories it is even a sufficient criterion for identity. So z. For example, for some bundle theories, the spatial identity of different bundles of properties creates the identity of a single thing.

Diachronic identity of concrete things

The Endurantismus shares the common sense view that there is also by the time actual identity. He takes a three-dimensional view of things. The diachronic identity of the individual things is usually viewed as something fundamental that does not need to be traced back to anything else. Time is understood presentistically: only what is present at the moment exists real.

The Perdurantismus (represented u. A. Quine, Lewis, Sider), however, denies the identity of the individual things in time. For him, concrete things are identified alongside the three spatial dimensions through the fourth dimension , time. The concrete individual things are understood as sums or aggregates of their temporal phases ("hunks of matter"). What counts as identity in time in everyday life is, for Perdurantism, merely a kind of continuity relation between adjacent temporal phases or sections of things. Perdurantism represents an eteralistic view of time. The temporal dimension is treated like a spatial one, all moments are equally real. All things and events from the present, past and future are equally real.

Events

Since the 1960s, a discussion about the concept of the event has developed in analytical ontology, in which the question of its ontological status and its relationship to other ontological categories is in the foreground. The ontological status of events is interpreted very differently in the analytical ontology. A minority of authors also reject events as a separate ontological category.

Theories that assume events as a separate entity often justify this with an analysis of colloquial language. In this we naturally communicate not only about things and people, but also about events. So report z. B. Sports reporters not only about individual soccer players, but also about soccer games and assign or deny them certain characteristics and qualities. But if we want to designate such event statements as true or false, according to Donald Davidson we can not avoid also assuming events as their ontological truth conditions.

Things as carriers of events

Leading authors of an event ontology (Kim, Lombard, Chisholm, Davidson) are fundamentally convinced that things (“substances”) are indispensable carriers of events. According to this, events are always occurrences that happen or take place on things. Things are said to be constituent parts of events; so Kim calls things the "essences" of events.

Persistence of things as a condition of events

According to Lawrence Brian Lombard , the decisive criterion for the fact that things can be carriers of events is that they persist, i.e. that is, the events must "survive". Lombard interprets events as changes in which a thing has a property at a point in time t and not yet or no longer at another point in time t '. According to Lombard, a diachronic identity of things is necessary for this.

Lombard's Aristotelian Theory of Change

Lombard takes up the classical Aristotelian theory of change, the criteria of which he calls "The Ancient Criterion of Change". After that, a change happens if and only if (1) there is a property P, (2) an object x, (3) if there are different times, t and t 'and (4) if it is the case, that x at t has the property P and x at t 'P does not (or vice versa).
Lombard uses the classical tradition to differentiate between “substantial changes” and “accidental changes”. Both forms of change require support, characteristics and times. A thing changes accidentally if properties are exchanged on it that are not relevant to its type or variety (e.g. a green table is painted blue). The individual thing is itself the carrier of an accidental change which it must persist and “survive”. If a thing loses properties during a change that are decisive for its belonging to a certain species ( essences ), it is a substantial change. The thing can't survive this change. So the green table survives being blue, but not being transformed into a chair. He cannot therefore be the carrier of the substantial change. The carrier of substantial changes is the material ( matt ) of which the passing thing consists and from which the newly emerging thing is made. In the case of the table that becomes a chair, a certain amount of wood.

Three-dimensionality of things as a condition of events

For many authors, another decisive characteristic of individual things for their function as carriers of events is their spatial composition (three-dimensionality). Some authors (e.g. Hacker and Stoecker) point out that this characteristic is closely related to being diachronically identical: only if things are not extended in time can they exist as a whole at any point in time ( endurer ) be.

Although events are also spatial occurrences, according to popular opinion they have no spatial extent by themselves; rather, the spatial character of events is “borrowed” from the individual things.

Events as physical objects

Quine argues that things and events are occurrences of a single category and that their distinction is ontologically irrelevant. The background to this is Quine's assumption that physical language is the universal language for the representation of reality and that all other languages can be translated into it without losing their cognitive relevance. Corresponding to the thesis of the universal character of physical language, Quine advocates a universal “physical-object” ontology: everything there is, therefore, is physical objects . It is ontologically essential for physical objects that they are space-time units. Everything that has space-time extension, and only this, counts as a physical object. Physical objects are the "material" of four-dimensional space-time portions or regions. Things like events are in space-time, so any difference between things and events is ontologically irrelevant to Quine. With this in mind, it makes for Quine z. For example, it makes no difference whether one speaks of the head and foot as distinct parts of a person or of the first and fifth decades of life as numerically different sections.

Events as dependent entities

While Quine denies the ontological peculiarity of things in relation to events, Peter Strawson regards things as fundamental and events as entities that are dependent on them. Strawson bases his thesis on the process of identifying entities. This presupposes a knowledge of how the entity differs from everything else, what, in Strawson's opinion, is its spatio-temporal position. In Strawson's conviction, however, only things are spatially extended and have a duration in time. But since the possibility of identifying events depends on things, events also depend on things without, conversely, any kind of dependence of things on events. A particularly clear aspect of this dependence of events on things is that we cannot ascribe a spatial position to events without referring to things. If we attribute spatial properties to events, we do not predict them from the events themselves, but ultimately from their carriers, the things involved in them.

No-event metaphysics

The varieties of views that can be listed under the label "no-event-metaphysics" are very different. Above all, there are very different understandings of the consideration under which events are rejected as separate entities.

Terence Horgan advocates an eliminative theory . He assumes that the assumption of events is superfluous for dealing with current ontological problems. So z. For example, contrary to the interpretation of many event ontologists, the concept of causality cannot be analyzed as a relation between events, but as a relation between facts.

Reductionist theories take a less radical approach and try to take events seriously as phenomena, but then trace them back to entities of a different kind. These positions differ primarily with regard to the selection of the entities to which events are to be traced.
Roderick Chisholm argues that events can be completely traced back to facts. Chisholm explains this using the example of Caesar's murder by Brutus. This “event” is nothing more than the fact that Brutus murdered Caesar - and thus not different from a fact like that Socrates is mortal or the table is brown.

Facts

In the analytical ontology, the range of conceptions regarding facts ranges from strict rejection to the assumption that facts are the fundamental or even the only components of reality. Alexius Meinong can be regarded as the first real factual ontologist , who calls facts "objective". Inspired by Meinong, Bertrand Russell and then also the early Ludwig Wittgenstein made the category of facts the central category. The factual ontology is significantly deepened by Gustav Bergmann and his student Reinhardt Grossmann .
Factual ontologies have in common that they recognize not only things but also facts as entities. Otherwise there are great differences between them: in terms of the constituents they assume for facts, the interpretation of the connections between these constituents, and the ontological status of the facts.
The relationship between facts and things is also controversial. Some state of affairs ontologies ultimately attribute things to facts (e.g. Ingvar Johansson), while others see both categories as equal (e.g. Erwin Tegtmeier).

Reasons for assuming facts

Inadequacies in substance ontology

Factual ontologists criticize the Aristotelian substance ontology for the fact that only things count as actual entities in it. The importance of the category of facts was already recognized early by Aristotle in connection with the problem of truth, but in the Aristotelian tradition it was denied the status of real beings and its existence shifted into human consciousness. Linked to this is the criticism that in the substance ontology the relations between things are not taken into account properly, but are traced back to non-relational properties of things. For example, the relation “greater than”, as it is e.g. B. exists between two people a and b, cannot be traced back to size properties of a and b, because the size ratio between a and b is not recorded simply by specifying the absolute sizes.

Facts as what is primarily perceived

Factual ontologists assume that we are primarily given “complexes and relationships” in our perception. In addition, there is the consideration that for the production of relationships and complexes by the perceiving subject there must be clues in reality, according to which the subjective production is based. On the other hand, according to this view, we perceive things, properties and relationships only by means of facts in which they are included as components.

Facts as a solution to the truth problem

Another important argument for the ontological reality of facts is the problem of truth. Only with the assumption of facts can a correspondence theory of truth be represented, in which the act of knowledge corresponds to an existing state of affairs ("an act of knowledge is true precisely when the state of affairs to which it is intentionally related exists").

Components of facts

The various factual ontologies differ in which components and which connections between them they assume for facts. Alexius Meinong, for example, only allows property individuals as entities. On every two individual traits that are connected to one another by the relation of equality, an individual trait of a higher level is built up. Bertrand Russell assumes individuals as well as relational and non-relational universals as constituent parts of facts. In Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus , facts consist of "things". At Gustav Bergmann, besides individuals and universals, there are also “connectors”. Many factual ontologies differentiate between atomic and complex (molecular) facts (Russell, Bergmann). Complex issues can themselves consist of issues. The lowest unit is represented by atomic facts. The "connections" between things and their properties are also explained differently. For Bertrand Russell, relations establish the connections, while Gustav Bergmann introduces his own entity ("nexus") and for Erwin Tegtmeier the facts themselves take on the role of the connector.

Status of issues

The question of which status things can assume is controversial. For Russel, Wittgenstein and Grossmann there are only existing ones, i.e. H. existing and non-existing facts. According to this, mere conceivable facts that are expressed by meaningful but incorrect sentences have just as little being of their own as unthinkable facts expressed by meaningless sentences.
Bergmann objects, however, that false and meaningless statements cannot be put on the same level. He therefore assumes that every state of affairs still has a mode, potentiality or actuality, which is not itself part of the state of affairs, but permeates it ( permeate ). Facts expressed through incorrect but meaningful sentences do not exist, but they do exist potentially. Existing facts, on the other hand, currently exist.

Necessary facts are differentiated by many factual ontologists (e.g. Bergmann, Grossmann, Tegtmeier) into facts that are based on natural laws and those that are based on logical laws. Wittgenstein, on the other hand, only recognizes logical necessities; He shifts natural necessities into consciousness and, like David Hume, sees them as an expectation that regularity will continue.

Propositions

In modern terminology, propositions are understood as the content of speech acts, especially assertions. Proponents of the assumption of propositions point out that this content has a factual structure. The same propositions can be coupled with very different linguistic expressions (e.g. "snow is white", "snow is white"). Conversely, sentences with the same wording can also express different propositions (e.g. "Hans hits the nail on the head" as a literal and metaphorical statement). According to Russell, propositions have - in contrast to other facts - "semantic features". They are related to something extra-linguistic and bear truth values: a true proposition corresponds to a fact.

It is controversial whether propositions represent their own entity. Represent a realistic interpretation and a. Bolzano and Meinong. For Meinong, propositions are “sentences in themselves” that even exist completely independently of concrete contents of consciousness. Critics like Nicholas Rescher, on the other hand, believe that propositions depend entirely on a human consciousness by their very nature. Quine rejects propositions because, in his opinion, it is not possible to indicate when sentences express the same propositions.

time

A central theme of current analytical ontology is the character of time. Important questions are how the persistence of objects in time can be conceived and whether the present is real in a special way.

Assertion of the unreality of time

The starting point for the current discussions is the essay The Unreality of Time by JME McTaggart (1908). McTaggart pursues the goal of using language analytical means to prove the unreality of time. The basis of McTaggart's reasoning is the thesis that there are two different ways in which we can relate to the position of events in time. On the one hand, we can classify them in terms of time using the terms “past”, “present” and “future”. This approach involves indexical time determinations, since it depends on the point of view of the observer which of the terms applies to an event. McTaggart calls this variant the A series . The second possibility is to relate events to one another using the terms “earlier”, “later” and “simultaneously”. The relationships between the events marked in this way are not perspective and therefore permanent, they constitute the B-series .

Taggart's attempt to demonstrate the unreality of time is divided into two parts. First he tries to show that a B-series cannot be thought without an A-series; in a second step he wants to show the contradictions of A-series. To demonstrate the first thesis, McTaggart assumes that time necessarily presupposes the occurrence of change.

If there were change according to the model of the B-series without a simultaneous A-series, change would either consist in one event ceasing to be one event and instead another one beginning to exist, or in one event turning into another transformed. However, due to the immutable places that the events have in the B-row, this is out of the question for McTaggart. An event e ₁ always follows an event e ₀ . The event e ₀ always takes the same position in the time series and never ceases to be the event e ₀ . According to the B-theory, it cannot be expressed how event e _{0 should} ever become event e ₁ .

In a second step, McTaggart wants to demonstrate why changes based on the A-series model cannot be explained without contradiction. McTaggart first states that the terms “past”, “present” and “future” are relational terms that refer to something that should not itself be within the time series. His main objection, however, is the thesis that the terms “past”, “present” and “future” are not themselves compatible with one another. Only one of the three terms can be assigned to each event, but this contradicts the A-theory, according to which the change in an event over time must be described with each of these three terms.

Defending the Reality of Time

The defenders of the reality of time are divided into two camps. One group denies McTaggart's argument that the B-series theory of time was based on the A-series theory, the other defends itself against the inconsistency of the A-series theory claimed by McTaggart.

B-series theories

For supporters of the B-series theory, time is only defined by the relationship “earlier / later”. Events are "tenseless facts". Every event has an immovable place in the time series that is independent of an observer. Past, present and future are equally real according to this view, which is why it is also called etherealism . The single things have a four-dimensional structure, i. that is, their identity is not only determined by the three spatial dimensions (length, width, height), but also by time.

Supporters of the B-series theory of the time argue that it is not events but things that are the carriers of change. Change is the event that one thing begins to exist, becomes another, and finally ceases to exist. Its continuity is that it remains similar over time; the individual sections of the changing in time object are thereby often (with the image of "space-time worm" spacetime worm called). This “space-time worm” is what defines the identity of the object ( perdurantism ).

A-series theories

For supporters of the A-series theory, time is described by the terms “past”, “present” and “future”. Events are "tensed facts" and can only be described with the help of indexical time determinations. The place of the events in the time series is dynamic and depends on the observer. Future events continually approach the present, become present, and eventually fade further and further into the past. According to this conception, the present has an ontologically excellent status, which is why it is also called presentism . The individual things have a three-dimensional structure, i. that is, their identity is only determined by the three spatial dimensions.

For supporters of the A-series theory, too, things are usually the carriers of change. Things wander through time as something that has no temporal parts of its own. Change means that the thing changes its properties in time, but remains unchanged in its substance ( endurantism ).

causality

The classic question of the relationship between a cause and its effect is also the subject of extensive controversy in analytical ontology. In dispute is u. a., what ontological status do causal relationships have (a separate entity or reducible to non-causal entities, only thought or real?), what their carriers are (events, properties, facts, etc.), what relationship they have to other ontological concepts ( disposition , Assets ) and whether they are timed.

Relata of the causal relationship

When it comes to the question of which entities are causally dependent on one another, a number of ontological categories are under discussion: events, facts, properties or propositions. The two most frequently mentioned relata are events and facts. While events are spatiotemporal particulars that can be referred to with singular terms, facts have no spatiotemporal character and are expressed in sentences. The fact that causes and effects seem to be entities in space and time speaks for the event character of causality. A problem with this view is, however, absences and omissions that cannot be interpreted according to the event model but only according to the factual model. Brian David Ellis and David Armstrong, who both accept events as causality relata, therefore dispense with a causal interpretation of absences. Phil Dowe, on the other hand, is unwilling to dispense with the causal interpretation of absences and accordingly allows not only events but also facts as causal relata.

Properties of the causal relationship

In the current discussion about the concept of causality, there is general consensus that the relationship between cause and effect is a non-symmetrical relationship. Causes have a different relationship to effects than effects to causes; they produce effects and not the other way around. Because of this non-symmetry, a temporal order of causes and effects is often assumed. Another property of the causality relationship is generally called its irreflectivity. Causes cannot be causes of themselves; That is, causes and effects must be different from one another. On the other hand, the question of whether the cause-effect relationship is transitive, i.e. That is, whether the causal relevance of a cause, which is a link in a causal chain, extends across various links in a cause-effect chain. Authors such as David Lewis and Ned Hall advocate the transitivity of the causal relationship, while Douglas Ehring and Igal Kvart, for example, take the opposite view.

In connection with causally linked entities, two principles are often mentioned, through which the behavior of the linked entities is to be regulated. The first principle is the so-called causality principle . In its weak version, it requires that effects do not occur without a cause, while the strong formulation stipulates that all events or facts have a cause. While the causality principle in its weak variant is analytically true, the strong variant claims synthetic truth, since the concept of event or fact does not include the existence of a cause. The second principle, the determinism principle, says that the same types of effects are instantiated if the cause types are the same. According to this principle, causes clearly determine their effects.

Ontological status of the causal relationship

David Hume and the Philosophical Tradition

While in the Aristotelian tradition four concepts of cause were distinguished ( material , form , effect and target cause ), since the beginning of modern times the concept of cause has been limited to that of effect cause. In the classical view before Hume, there was basically the view that the cause produces its effect by means of an inherent force, whereby cause and effect must be similar to one another. David Hume's criticism of this view forms the starting point of modern discussions. For Hume, causality is a purely psychological term. We form this based on the observation of the regular sequence of similar or similar events ( regularity theory of causality). To apply the concept of causality, the following rules must be met:

Cause and effect must be in close proximity in terms of space and time
The cause must precede the effect
There must be a constant (regular) connection between cause and effect

Critique of the Humean view

Hume's view is subject to repeated criticism in the current discussion. Basically, it is criticized that Hume's theory is self-contradicting, since it does not follow its own principles and its concepts are not derived from empiricism.
Another objection relates to Hume's concept of proceeding (2). Already Thomas Reid had thrown against Hume that it (day-night z. B.) give consecutive sequences of events without our action sequence of cause and would speak so already from a. This objection has been raised recently. a. AC Ewing connected.
The required regularity of the connection between cause and effect is also criticized. So z. For example, in historical studies, even with one-off sequences of events, causality relationships are often spoken of (“The murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand was one of the causes of the First World War”).
As a counter-concept to Hume, reference is often made to the Kantian model, who understood causality as an a priori concept of the mind, without which experience is not possible.
Some of Hume's critics deny Hume's basic assumption that causality cannot be experienced. For David Armstrong we can experience causality introspectively if our action follows our will, while for GEM Anscombe causality can also be experienced in the external perception of objects.

Defense of Humean conception

The majority of analytical philosophers defend the Humean concept of causality. The problem of singular judgments is viewed by Hume's supporters as unproblematic and interpreted in such a way that singular judgments are in principle only instances of general judgments and therefore their causality criteria can also apply.

The concept of “regularity” in Hume's approach sparked an intense discussion. John Stuart Mill works out that a regular sequence of events can only be described as causal if the sequence no longer depends on any further condition (for example, there is no causal relationship between day and night, as this depends on external conditions, the existence of the sun and the rotation of the earth, depend).

John Leslie Mackie analyzes the terms cause and effect using the pair of terms “necessary / sufficient conditions”. This analysis is "under the title INUS condition " become known: One reason is not sufficient ( i nsufficient ) but necessary ( n ecessary ) component of a complex condition which itself is not required (as a whole u nnecessary ), but sufficient ( s ufficient ). Mackie wants to express that the causes, we specify for a particular event, part of a so-called causal field ( causal field are) that we use to interpret the event. A cause is in itself an insufficient but necessary component of this causal field. Causes are always integrated into a complex of other factors, without which they cannot develop their causal relevance.

David Lewis develops a theory of counterfactual causality with which he wants to replace the concept of causal dependence with that of counterfactual dependence. An event b is counterfactually dependent on an event a if and only if a and b take place and the following applies: If a had not taken place, b would not have happened either.

literature

David Malet Armstrong : Universals: an opinionated introduction. Westview 1989, ISBN 0-8133-0772-4 At the same time a very clear introduction to the basic problems of systematic ontology.
Hans Burkhardt, Barry Smith (Eds.): Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology . Philosophica Analytica, Munich 1991, ISBN 3-88405-080-X .
Jan Faye, Uwe Scheffler, Max Urchs: Things, Facts and Events . Rodopi, 2000, ISBN 90-420-1533-0 .
Reinhardt Grossmann : The existence of the world. An introduction to ontology. 2nd Edition. ontos, Frankfurt 2004, ISBN 3-937202-38-2 .
John Heil: From an ontological point of view. Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005, ISBN 0-19-925974-7 .
Christian Kanzian: Events and other particularities. Preliminary remarks on a multi-categorical ontology. Schöningh, Paderborn et al. 2001.
Michael Loux: Metaphysics - A Contemporary Introduction. 3. Edition. London 2006.
Michael Loux, Dean Zimmerman (Eds.): The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford University Press, Oxford / New York 2003, ISBN 0-19-825024-X .
EJ Lowe: A Survey of Metaphysics. Oxford 2002.
Uwe Meixner : Introduction to ontology . Scientific Buchges., Darmstadt 2004, ISBN 3-534-15458-4 .
Edmund Runggaldier , Christian Kanzian: Basic problems of analytical ontology . Schöningh, Paderborn 1998, ISBN 3-506-99493-X .
Benjamin Schnieder: Substances and (their) properties. A Study of Analytical Ontology . De Gruyter, Berlin 2004, ISBN 3-11-018155-X .
Erwin Tegtmeier: Basic features of a categorical ontology. Things, properties, relationships, facts . Alber, Freiburg / Munich 1992, ISBN 3-495-47722-5 .

Web links

Thomas Hofweber: Logic and Ontology. In: Edward N. Zalta (Ed.): Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy . (2004).
EJ Lowe: Recent Advances in Metaphysics , Keynote at the International Conference on Formal Ontology in Information Systems , Ogunquit, Maine, October 2001.
David Manley: Introduction: A guided tour of metametaphysics (PDF; 197 kB). In: David Chalmers , David Manley, Ryan Wasserman (Eds.): Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology . Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009, ISBN 978-0-19-954600-8 , pp. 1-37.
Uwe Meixner : From the science of ontology (PDF; 2.5 MB), LOGOS, N. F. I (1994) pp. 375-399.
John Symons: A Sketch of the History and Methodology of Ontology in the Analytic Tradition ( February 5, 2009 memento on the Internet Archive ), Ms. Texas 2008

Remarks

↑ See Keith Campbell: Abstract Particulars. Oxford 1990, p. 1.

↑ See Uwe Meixner: Introduction to ontology. Darmstadt 2004, p. 11.

↑ See Meinard Kuhlmann: Article “Ontology”, in: Hans Jörg Sandkühler u. a. (Ed.): Encyclopedia Philosophy. Vol. 2, Meiner, Hamburg 2010.

↑ “Ontology” and “metaphysics” are mostly used synonymously in analytical philosophy. On the change in the concept of metaphysics in analytical philosophy cf. Michael Loux and Dean Zimmerman: Introductions . In: Michael Loux, Dean Zimmerman (Eds.): The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford University Press, Oxford / New York 2003, pp. 1-7; EJ Lowe: Metaphysics . In: Dermot Moran (Ed.): The Routledge Companion to Twentieth-Century Philosophy. Routledge, London et al. 2010, pp. 440-468.

↑ An overview of the basic trends in analytical ontology is given by: Edmund Runggaldier, Christian Kanzian: Grundprobleme der Analytischen Ontologie , pp. 17–52.

↑ See Davidson's critical reflections in: On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme. In: Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 47 (1973/74), pp. 5-20; see: Jennifer Case: On the Right Idea of a Conceptual Scheme. In: The Southern Journal of Philosophy 35/1 (1997), pp. 1-19.

↑ W. v. O. Quine: On What There Is (PDF; 2.0 MB), In: Review of Metaphysics. 2 (1948), pp. 21-38, also in: Ders .: From a Logical Point of View. 9 Logico-Philosophical Essays . Cambridge (Mass.) / London 1953, 2nd edition. 1980, p 1. ( e-text ( Memento of the original on May 28, 2015 Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link is automatically inserted and not yet tested Please review the original and archive link under. Instructions and then remove this notice. ; PDF; 186 kB). @1@ 2

^ Roderick Chisholm: On Metaphysics , Minneapolis 1989, p. 129.

^ PF Strawson: Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. Methuen, London 1959.

↑ See PF Strawson: Einzelelding und logisches Subject (German by F. Scholz), Stuttgart 1972, p. 11.

↑ "The structure [...] does not readily display itself on the surface of language, but lies submerged" (Peter F. Strawson: Individuals , London 1959, p. 10)

↑ Cf. Franz von Kutschera : Introduction to the philosophy of language. 2nd Edition. Fink, Munich 1975, pp. 289-344.

↑ See Uwe Meixner: Introduction to ontology. Darmstadt 2004, p. 12.

↑ See Uwe Meixner: Introduction to ontology. Darmstadt 2004, p. 14.

↑ Cf. Quine: Word and Object. Translated by J. Schulte, Stuttgart 1980, chap. IV

↑ On the chapter "Existence" cf. Edmund Runggaldier, Christian Kanzian: Basic problems of analytical ontology , pp. 68–79.

↑ Cf. WVO Quine: What there is. In: WVO Quine: From a logical point of view. Translated by P. Bosch. Frankfurt am Main / Berlin / Vienna 1979, pp. 9–25 (here p. 19)

↑ See Saul A. Kripke: Name and Necessity . Translated by Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt am Main 1993, pp. 45f.

↑ Cf. WVO Quine: What there is. In: WVO Quine: From a logical point of view. Translated by P. Bosch. Frankfurt am Main / Berlin / Vienna 1979, pp. 9–25 (here p. 11)

^ R. Barcan Marcus: Possibilia and Possible Worlds . In: R. Barcan Marcus: Modalities , Oxford 1993, pp. 189–213 (v. A. Pp. 206–208)

^ David Lewis: On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford 1986, pp. 1-3, 81f.

↑ See Wolfgang Stegmüller : Introduction. In: Wolfgang Stegmüller (Ed.): The universal problem. Darmstadt 1978, pp. 1-19.

↑ See EJ Lowe: A Survey of Metaphysics. Oxford 2002, pp. 347f.

^ David Armstrong: Universals: An Opinionated Introduction , Westview 1989, p. 10.

↑ Examples based on Daniel von Wachter : Things and Properties. Attempt at ontology . Röll, Dettelbach 2000, ISBN 3-89754-168-8 , p. 16.

↑ See David Armstrong: Universals: an opinionated introduction , Westview 1989, p. 63.

↑ Cf. Godehard Brüntrup : Theoretical Philosophy. Complete Media, ISBN 978-3-8312-0380-2 , pp. 49-53.

↑ Based on Daniel von Wachter: Things and Properties. Attempt at ontology. P. 25 and David Armstrong: Universals: An Opinionated Introduction. Westerview, Boulder 1989, pp. 17 and 63

^ A. Quinton: Properties and Classes. In: Aristotelian Society Proceedings. 58: 33-58 (1957).

↑ See David Armstrong: Universals: an opinionated introduction. Westview, 1989, pp. 21-38.

^ HH Price: Thinking and Experience. Hutchinson 1953.

↑ See David Armstrong: Universals: an opinionated introduction. Westview 1989, pp. 39-58.

^ GF Stout: The Nature of Universals and Propositions , British Academy Lecture, Oxford UP 1921.

↑ CB Martin: Substance Substantiated. In: AJP. 58, pp. 3-10 (1980).

↑ Keith Campbell: Abstract Particulars. Blackwell, Oxford 1990.

^ Donald C. Williams: On the Elements of Being. In: Review of Metaphysics. 7, pp. 3-18, pp. 171-192 (1953); Ders .: Universals and Existents. In: AJP. 64: 1-14 (1986).

↑ See David Armstrong: Universals: an opinionated introduction. Westview 1989, pp. 113-134.

↑ Edmund Husserl: Logical investigations. Reprint d. 2nd Edition. from 1913 (1901). 6th edition. Niemeyer, Tübingen 1980; Ders .: Ideas for a pure phenomenology. Meiner, Hamburg 1992 (1913).

↑ Roman Ingarden: The dispute over the existence of the world. Vol. I-III, Niemeyer, Tübingen 1964-1974.

↑ John Cook Wilson: Statement and Inference. 2 Vols., Oxford UP, 1926, pp. 330-353.

^ Norman Kemp Smith: The Nature of Universals (III). In: Min. 36: 392-422 (1927).

↑ See David Armstrong: Universals: an opinionated introduction. Westview 1989, pp. 132f.

^ Bertrand Russell: The Problems of Philosophy. Oxford UP, London 1912.

↑ See David Armstrong: Universals: an opinionated introduction. Westview 1989, pp. 89-101.

↑ David Armstrong: Universals: an opinionated introduction. Westview 1989.

↑ Evan Fales: Causation and Universals . Routledge, London 1990.

^ E. Jonathan Lowe: Kinds of Being: A Study of Individuation, Identity and the Logic of Sortal Terms. Oxford: Blackwell 1989.

↑ See David Armstrong: Universals: an opinionated introduction. Westview 1989, pp. 19-68.

^ Willard Van Orman Quine: Theories and Things. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1981, p. 102.

↑ Cf. Edmund Runggaldier, Christian Kanzian: Grundprobleme der Analytischen Ontologie. Pp. 93-96.

↑ Cf. Edmund Runggaldier, Christian Kanzian: Grundprobleme der Analytischen Ontologie. P. 96.

^ T. Horgan: The Case Against Events . In: Philos. Rev. 87 (1978); PMS Hacker: Events, Ontology and Grammar . In: Philosophy. 57 (1982) and Events and Objects in Space and Time. In: Min. 91 (1982)

↑ See Donald Davidson: Reply to Ralf Stoecker . In: R. Stoecker (Ed.): Reflecting Davidson. De Gruyter, Berlin / New York 1993, pp. 287-290.

↑ Cf. Christian Kanzian: Events and other particulars. Preliminary remarks on a multi-category ontology. Schöningh, Paderborn et al. 2001, p. 218.

^ Lawrence Brian Lombard: Events. A Metaphysical Study. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London / Boston / Henley 1986.

^ After Christian Kanzian: Events and other particulars. Preliminary remarks on a multi-categorical ontology. Schöningh, Paderborn et al. 2001, p. 94.

↑ Hacker: Events and Objects in Space and Time . In: Min. 91 (1982), pp. 1-19 (here p. 1)

↑ Stoecker: What are events. De Gruyter, Berlin / New York 1992, pp. 235f.

↑ Hacker: "[...] events generally have a spatial location, but do not have spatial dimensions, [...] they take place, typically, at a certain area, but do not occupy space" (Hacker: Events and Objects in Space and Time . In: Mind. 91 (1982), pp. 1–19 (here p. 9))

↑ See Jaegwon Kim: Causation, nomic subsumption, and the concept of event . In: Jaegwon Kim: Supervenience and Mind. Selected Philosophical Essays Jaegwon Kim. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge u. a. 1993, pp. 3-21 (here: 4f.); Strawson: single thing and logical subject . Reclam, Stuttgart 1972, p. 74; Simons: Parts. Clarendon Press, Oxford 1987, p. 131.

^ Quine: Word and Object . MIT - Press, Cambridge (Mass.) 1960, p. 171.

↑ See Strawson: single thing and logical subject . Reclam, Stuttgart 1972.

↑ The term comes from Irving Thalberg, z. B. in: Irving Thalberg: A World Without Events? In: B. Vermazen, MB Hintikka (Ed.): Essays on Davidson Actions & Events. Clarendon Press, Oxford 1986, pp. 137-155.

^ Terence Horgan .: The Case Against Events. In: K. Lasati, AC Varzi (ed.): Events, Dartmouth, Aldershot u. a. 1996, pp. 243-262.

^ Roderick Chisholm: Person and Object. A Metaphysical Study. Allen and Unwin, London 1976.

↑ Alexius Meinong: About assumptions , Leipzig 1910.

^ Bertrand Russell: Logic and Knowledge. , London 1971.

^ Ludwig Wittgenstein: Tractatus logico-philosophicus. London 1922.

^ Gustav Bergmann: Realism. A Critique of Meinong and Brentano. Madison 1967; New Foundations for Ontology, Madison 1992.

^ Reinhardt Grossmann: The Categorial Structure of the World. Bloomington 1983.

↑ As an introduction to factual ontologies in analytical ontology cf. Edmund Runggaldier, Christian Kanzian: Basic problems of analytical ontology. Pp. 198–218, Erwin Tegtmeier: matter / facts. In: New Handbook of Basic Philosophical Concepts. Alber, Freiburg 2011, pp. 1905-1919.

^ Ingvar Johansson: Ontological Investigations. London 1989.

^ Erwin Tegtmeier: Principles of a categorical ontology. Things, properties, relationships, facts. Alber, Freiburg u. Munich 1992, pp. 67, 144.

↑ Erwin Tegtmeier: thing / facts. In: New Handbook of Basic Philosophical Concepts. Alber, Freiburg 2011, p. 1905.

↑ See Kenneth Russel Olson: Facts . In: Burckhardt / Smith (Eds.): Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology. Munich / Philadelphia / Vienna 1991, p. 270.

↑ Erwin Tegtmeier: thing / facts. In: New Handbook of Basic Philosophical Concepts. Alber, Freiburg 2011, p. 1914.

↑ Erwin Tegtmeier: thing / facts. In: New Handbook of Basic Philosophical Concepts. Alber, Freiburg 2011, p. 1911.

^ Erwin Tegtmeier: Principles of a categorical ontology. Things, properties, relationships, facts. Alber, Freiburg u. Munich 1992, p. 178.

↑ Cf. Nuchelmans: States of Affairs. In: Hans Burkhardt, Barry Smith (Eds.): Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology . Philosophica Analytica, Munich 1991, pp. 858–861 (here p. 858)

↑ Cf. Edmund Runggaldier, Christian Kanzian: Grundprobleme der Analytischen Ontologie. P. 215.

↑ Cf. Nuchelmans: States of Affairs. In: Hans Burkhardt, Barry Smith (Eds.): Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology . Philosophica Analytica, Munich 1991, pp. 858–861 (here p. 859)

^ Rescher: The Ontology of the Possible. In: Michael J. Loux (Ed.) (1979): The Possible and the Actual . Cornell University Press, Ithaca / London 1979, Chapter 8

↑ Quine: Two dogmas of empiricism. 1979.

↑ JME McTaggarts: The Unreality of Time . In: R. Le Poidevin, M. MacBeath (Eds.): The Philosophy of Time. Oxford 1993, pp. 23-34 (first published in 1908 in Mind magazine). German: The unreality of time . Translator: Andrew Libby, Mike Sandbothe. In: Walther Ch. Zimmerli, Mike Sandbothe (ed.): Classics of the modern philosophy of time. Knowledge Buchges., Darmstadt, 1993, pp. 67-86.

↑ This is a widespread assumption in the philosophical tradition. See e.g. B. Michael Loux: Metaphysics - A Contemporary Introduction. 3. Edition. London 2006, p. 207, the u. a. Aristotle: Physics IV.10 (217b32-218a29) cited

↑ See Michael Loux: Metaphysics - A Contemporary Introduction. 3. Edition. London 2006, p. 213.

↑ Introducing the following Michael Baumgartner: Causality. In: New Handbook of Basic Philosophical Concepts. Alber, Freiburg 2011, pp. 1263-1275.

^ BD Ellis: Truth and Objectivity. Oxford 1990.

^ D. Armstrong: The Open Door: Counterfactual versus Singularist Theories of Causation. In: H. Sankey (Ed.): Causation and Laws of Nature. Dordrecht 1999, pp. 175-186.

^ Phil Dowe: A Counterfactual Theory of Prevention and 'Causation' by Omission. In: Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 79 (2001), pp. 216-226.

^ ^A ^b David Lewis: Causation . In: Journal of Philosophy. 1973, 70, pp. 556-567.

^ N. Hall: Causation and the Price of Transitivity. In: Journal of Philosophy. 97 (2000), pp. 198-222.

↑ D. Ehring: Causation and Persistence. Theory of Causation. Oxford 1997.

↑ I. Kvart: The Counterfactual Analysis of Cause. In: Synthesis. 127 (2001), pp. 389-427.

↑ Cf. Michael Baumgartner: Causality. In: New Handbook of Basic Philosophical Concepts. Alber, Freiburg 2011, pp. 1267f.

^ David Hume: Treatise of Human Nature. ed. of LA Selb-Bigge, PH Nidditch. Clarendon Press, Oxford 1978 (1740), Volume I, p. 173.

↑ See Michael Loux: Metaphysics - A Contemporary Introduction. 3. Edition. London 2006, p. 193.

^ Thomas Reid: Essays on the Active Powers of Man. Essay 4. In: R. Beanblossom, K. Lehrer (Ed.): Thomas Reid: Inquiry and Essays. Hackett, Indianapolis 1983 (1788).

^ AC Ewing: The Fundamental Questions of Philosophy. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London 1951, Chapter VIII

↑ Example after Michael Loux: Metaphysics - A Contemporary Introduction. 3. Edition. London 2006, p. 192.

^ Z. BAC Ewing: The Fundamental Questions of Philosophy. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London 1951, Chapter VIII

↑ See David Armstrong: A World of States of Affairs , Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1997, pp. 319–328.

^ GEM Anscombe: Causation and Determination. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1971.

^ Michael Loux: Metaphysics - A Contemporary Introduction. 3. Edition. London 2006, p. 195.

^ JS Mill: A System of Logic. London 1843.

↑ See JL Mackie: Causes and condition . In: Amer. philos. quart. 2 (1965), pp. 245-264; The cement of the universe. A study of causation. Oxford 1974.

[1] See Keith Campbell: Abstract Particulars. Oxford 1990, p. 1.

[2] See Uwe Meixner: Introduction to ontology. Darmstadt 2004, p. 11.

[3] See Meinard Kuhlmann: Article “Ontology”, in: Hans Jörg Sandkühler u. a. (Ed.): Encyclopedia Philosophy. Vol. 2, Meiner, Hamburg 2010.

[4] “Ontology” and “metaphysics” are mostly used synonymously in analytical philosophy. On the change in the concept of metaphysics in analytical philosophy cf. Michael Loux and Dean Zimmerman: Introductions . In: Michael Loux, Dean Zimmerman (Eds.): The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford University Press, Oxford / New York 2003, pp. 1-7; EJ Lowe: Metaphysics . In: Dermot Moran (Ed.): The Routledge Companion to Twentieth-Century Philosophy. Routledge, London et al. 2010, pp. 440-468.