Railway accident at Eckwersheim

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Map of the LGV Est européenne . The scene of the accident is just north of Vendenheim.
Map of the connection of the east end of the high-speed line to the existing line network. The accident site is near the southern canal bridge.

The TGV accident at Eckwersheim on the afternoon of November 14, 2015 was the worst accident involving a TGV since the French state railway SNCF started operations in 1981 and the first with a larger number of fatalities. Eleven people died when a test train at a Hochtastfahrt on the not yet opened the east, the second phase of construction of the new building - high-speed line LGV Est at excessive speed in a curve derailed .

Starting position

Infrastructure

The accident site is near Eckwersheim in Alsace at the Vendenheim junction , where the new double-track LGV Est européenne line joins the existing Paris – Strasbourg line . The new line is the easternmost construction section of the high-speed line from Paris to Strasbourg, which was due to go into operation on April 3, 2016, and is equipped for track changing operations. As is common in Alsace in contrast to the rest of the French network, the existing line is operated in right-hand traffic. Here it runs parallel to the Rhine-Marne Canal .

The high-speed section ends at route kilometers 403,809. To the east there is a right-hand bend in the direction of Strasbourg, which is designed for a maximum speed of 160 km / h. The beginning of the bridge - the reference point for the following accident - is at km 404.200 (around four hundred meters away). In the area from kilometers 404,000 to 404,400, the embankment rises by three meters, the right -hand bend has a radius of 945 m with a superelevation of 163 mm.

The line is equipped with the TVM 430 train protection system. This allows only a few fixed speed levels.

vehicle

The accident vehicle with construction number 744 belongs to the Dasye generation and was equipped with POS power units for traffic in eastern France and southern Germany. The train went under the train number no. 814521 from the west end of the new line in the connecting curve to the existing line. 53 people were on board, including four children between the ages of 10 and 15, contrary to the regulations. There were seven people in the driver's cab instead of the four allowed.

Test program

Numerous test drives were planned for the commissioning of the eastern section of the Paris – Strasbourg high-speed line. More than 200 such test drives had already taken place since September 28, 2015. In doing so, high-speed trips usually also take place with 10 percent exceeding of the later permissible maximum speed. In order for such journeys to take place, the ETCS level 2 train protection , which prevents excessive speeds from being driven during scheduled operation, is partially switched off.

In the accident area with a maximum permissible speed of 160 km / h, a maximum speed of 176 km / h was exceptionally permissible for a high-speed drive that was supposed to exceed this value by 10%. The installed train control systems ETCS Level 2 and TVM 430 had to be switched off for these journeys at speeds above the scheduled maximum speed.

the accident

Image of the beginning of the bridge: (1) right intact concrete parapet, (2) destroyed left concrete parapet, (3) demolished pantograph and (4) associated substructure, (5) demolished bogie on the left bridge girder

According to the preliminary investigation report, the test train left Meuse station on schedule at 2:28 p.m. on the right-hand track while switching between platforms. At 14:48 he drove into the new section at the Baudrecourt junction . At 3:05 p.m. the train disappeared from the block in front of Signal 701 (Signal Carré 701) at the end of the high-speed line. The crew of the signal box noticed the sudden disappearance on the display, found that the train was completely derailed and alerted the emergency services.

The train derailed in the curve in front of the southern bridge over the Rhine-Marne Canal. According to the preliminary investigation report, the first signs of derailment can be seen about 200 meters from the bridge. There are traces of a wheel rim on the upper edge of the rail . About 100 meters before the bridge, the ballast of the superstructure was then driven over outside the rail. These tracks come from the derailing rear bogie of the front powered end car . It swerved to the left in the right-hand bend and detached itself from the following car. It was then torn off the power end, bored into the bridge girder and remained there. The rear part of the powered end crashed against the concrete parapet in front of the canal bridge girder and then against the bridge girder. In the process, the power end's transformer was badly damaged, the oil of which was released explosively and ignited. Parts of the powered end are distributed on the driveway, the rest (with the driver's cab) passed the bridge, finally rolled down the embankment at the end of the bridge and came to a stop about 150 meters behind the beginning of the bridge. The following six cars derailed before the bridge and shot past her due to the considerable remaining speed and inertia . This was enough to carry it completely across the canal. In the event of an impact, the bogies came loose, some of the wagons landed about 130 meters away, others in an area only about 80 meters away from the beginning of the bridge, between the two embankments of the two separate tracks that were about 90 meters apart. The two following cars, which were running in front of the rear powered end car, crashed into the embankment of the canal. The car that ran in front of the rear power car had the most fatalities. The rear power car fell into the canal.

After evaluating the two ATESS black boxes recovered after the accident , which also recorded the actual speed, the braking process had been initiated, but was about a kilometer or 10.2 seconds too late. After evaluating the black boxes, the actual speed at the entrance to the curve was 265 km / h, where the train should only have driven 176 km / h, and was 89 km / h too high. At the time of the derailment, the evaluation showed a speed of 243 km / h - that was 67 km / h too much. Investigations of the driver's cab showed that at the time of the derailment all brake systems were fully activated, but the emergency switch was not activated.

The technical result found was confirmed by the interrogation of the two locomotive drivers who survived: The on-duty locomotive driver in the driver's cab in the front was instructed from the rear test control station to initiate braking from 330 km / h to 176 km / h at route kilometers 401. Originally, however, route kilometers 400 were planned. The reason given for the change was that in previous test runs a speed of 160 km / h had already been reached after 2 kilometers. Based on these findings, the staff believed that they were completely within the possible scope in order to be sufficiently braked well before the curve (after route kilometers 404). The start of braking, which was offset by one kilometer, ultimately resulted in a time difference of 12 seconds. The train was still traveling at 265 km / h when it entered the curve designed for 160 km / h.

consequences

Rescue work after the accident (looking south).
Rescue work after the accident (looking north)

Immediate consequences

11 people died in the accident; 37 others were injured, 12 of them seriously. Some of the children on the train were slightly injured. Two of the dead were escorts and not railway workers.

Investigations

Ségolène Royal , Minister for the Environment, Sustainable Development and Energy, her State Secretary for Transport and the Maritime Economy, Alain Vidalies , the President of the SNCF , Guillaume Pepy , and the SNCF Réseau , Jacques Rapoport, arrived at the scene of the accident a little later. Pepy announced three investigations: an internal SNCF investigation, which has already begun, a technical investigation by the Bureau d'Enquêtes sur les Accidents de Transport Terrestre (BEA-TT, the investigation authority for land traffic accidents ) and the criminal investigation by the public prosecutor. The prosecutor was able to question the slightly injured train driver about the accident. He stated that he had observed the intended speed of 176 km / h. The public prosecutor's office is also investigating whether the fact that instead of the permitted four people there were seven in the driver's cab contributed to the accident. The train driver, Beimann and one other person who was in the driver's cab at the time of the accident were suspended from duty by the SNCF.

The minutes of the interrogation of the train drivers were not published at the time of the report in “Le Parisien” in March 2016. Because of the verbatim quotation and precise information on the investigators, it is assumed that the source is a leading investigator - accordingly, investigations into violation of official secrecy were initiated. (according to the French Code of Criminal Procedure §11-1)

Longer term consequences

Due to the accident, the opening of the new line, originally planned for April 3, 2016, was postponed to July 3, 2016. However, since the track at the scene of the accident was still closed, it was only possible to drive on a single track on an approximately 20-kilometer section until it was fully operational when the timetable changed on December 11, 2016.

Speculation

The accident occurred one day after the terrorist attacks in Paris , but a connection could quickly be ruled out, as was the possibility of an object on the track that was initially speculated about. Investigators initially reported that the train was traveling at 350 km / h at the time of the accident.

literature

  • François Dumont: Déraillement sur la LGV Est. The SNCF Sous le choc de la catastrophe. In: La vie du Rail 3316 (01/2016), pp. 4–10.
  • Patrick Laval: Le constat et le questiones. In: La vie du Rail 3316 (01/2016), p. 11f.

Web links

Commons : TGV accident at Eckwersheim  - collection of pictures, videos and audio files

Remarks

  1. ↑ From kilometers 404,000 to 404,400 the dam rises from five to eight meters (according to the accident report).
  2. ↑ The concrete parapet of the canal bridge overturned as a result of the impact.
  3. ↑ The destruction corresponds to an impact speed of 220 to 240 km / h (according to the accident report)

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ a b c d e TGV accident in Alsace . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International . No. 1 , 2016, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 13-15 .
  2. ↑ a b c d e see preliminary investigation report 2015-AS-67 of the SNCF of 19 November 2015
  3. ↑ NN: Phase 2: 106 km entre la Lorraine et l'Alsace. In: La vie du Rail 3316 (01/2016), p. 11.
  4. ↑ Accident near Strasbourg: There were also children on board the derailed TGV. In: Spiegel Online . November 15, 2015, accessed January 28, 2016 .
  5. ↑ a b c d e Bärbel Nückles: TGV accident: Wasn't the train too fast after all? In: Badische Zeitung . November 16, 2015, accessed November 16, 2015 .
  6. ↑ a b c d e Accident during TGV test drive: express train braked too late. In: Spiegel Online. November 19, 2015, accessed January 28, 2016 .
  7. ↑ a b c d e f g La rame TGV roulait trop vite à 243 km / h au lieu de 176 km / h. In: L'Alsace . SAS Société de Publications L'Alsace, November 19, 2015, accessed on January 28, 2016 (French).
  8. ↑ a b Accident delays opening of the TGV Est. In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung. November 16, 2015, accessed January 28, 2016 .
  9. ↑ a b c d Mike Bent, Jaromir Pernicka: TGV Test Train Derails On LGV Est. In: Railvolution 6/15, pp. 36–37.
  10. ↑ Bärbel Nückles: Strasbourg: TGV derailed near Strasbourg: 12 dead during test drive. Badische Zeitung , November 16, 2015, accessed on November 16, 2015 . Photo from the beachhead. Active image server from Online Verlag GmbH Freiburg. Aerial photo of the scene of the accident. on France 3 Alsace, November 14th 2015.
  11. ↑ Un freinage tardif à l'origine de l'accident du train qui a déraillé à 243 km / h (French) . In: Dernières Nouvelles d'Alsace , November 19, 2015. 
  12. ↑ mr: Miscalculation probably led to the TGV accident. In: Eisenbahn-Revue International 5/2016, p. 239.
  13. ^ Accident du TGV Est: une erhur humaine et tragique . Le Parisien. 5th March 2016.
  14. ↑ Dumont: Déraillement , p. 4.
  15. ^ François Dumont: Systra et la SNCF durement frappés . In: La vie du Rail 3316 (01/2016), p. 13.
  16. ↑ Hervé de Chalendar, Jean-Marc Loos: Une rame d'essai à TGV Deraille Eckwersheim: 10 morts, 40 blessés. L'Alsace , November 14, 2015 (French)
  17. ↑ Déraillement d'une rame TGV à Eckwersheim. France 3 Alsace special , November 15, 2015; from minute 5:00 (French).
  18. ↑ a b Le train ne roulait qu'à 176 km / h, pas de mineurs tués. L'Alsace, November 16, 2015, accessed November 17, 2015 .
  19. ^ Le conducteur du TGV accidenté nie tout excès de vitesse. Reuters France, November 16, 2015, accessed November 17, 2015 .
  20. ↑ https://accident-tgv.com/2016/03/07/violation-secret/
  21. ↑ Code de procédure pénale - Article 11-1
  22. ↑ mr: Second stage of the LGV Est in operation. In: Eisenbahn-Revue International 8–9 / 2016, p. 415.
  23. ^ Frank Schoch: Rapidly from Strasbourg to Paris. In: Black Forest Messenger. Retrieved August 26, 2016 .
  24. ↑ a b Bärbel Nückles: Deadly end of a test drive. In: Badische Zeitung. November 16, 2015, accessed November 17, 2015 .

Coordinates: 48 ° 41 '24.57 "  N , 7 ° 42' 19.43"  O