Elsterwerda railway accident

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View of the track field of the Elsterwerda train station with the former site of the accident

The railway accident of Elsterwerda on 20 November 1997 was an explosion - and fire disaster , triggered by a with gasoline and diesel fuel -laden train of Deutsche Bahn , which is due to speeding in the station Elsterwerda derailed because its brakes had not been correctly commissioned. Two people died and eight were injured.

Starting position

In the early morning of November 20, the KC 71153 freight train was on its way from Stendell , the transfer station of the PCK Schwedt / Oder refinery , to Nossen to the Rhäsa tank farm. In addition to the locomotive, it consisted of 22 tank cars and weighed 1,851 tons . It was planned that the train would travel with the first locomotive to Berlin-Grünau station , change direction there and receive a new electric locomotive that would take it to Riesa . Then, because the line to Nossen was not electrified, it was to receive a diesel locomotive . The train arrived late in Berlin-Grünau .

the accident

Memorial stone for the killed firefighters at Elsterwerda train station
Elsterwerda station after the renovation

Berlin-Grünau

When the new locomotive - the 155 103 electric locomotive  - was pre-tensioned in Berlin-Grünau , the driver coupled the locomotive to the train. He connected the screw coupling, but forgot to connect the hoses of the brake line of the compressed air brake and to open the corresponding stop cocks, so that the brakes of all cars could not be activated. This should have been noticed before the train left for two reasons:

  1. After coupling, the locomotive driver has to fill the brake system with compressed air until a pressure of 5  bar is reached. That takes a lot longer when the braking system of an entire train is filled than just that of the locomotive itself. The driver did not notice this.
  2. In addition, a (simplified) brake test was now required, as the coupling and coupling opened the brake system and its renewed closeness and functionality had to be checked. In Berlin-Grünau there was a train preparation service who had to hand over the necessary papers to the driver and to carry out the brake test with him. Due to the delay of the train, however, he now had to carry out the brake test on three trains at the same time. On the KC 71153, he should have checked whether the brakes on the last car were properly applied and released and whether the main air line was continuously coupled and all relevant air shut-off valves were open. He found on the last car that the brakes had not been released and attributed this to an "overloaded brake line", i. H. that the air pressure of the locomotive that had pulled the train into the station was slightly higher than 5 bar and that the pressure that the new locomotive was generating was now insufficient to release the brakes. In addition, the simplified brake test should have been canceled and a so-called "full brake test" carried out. Such a deviation must be reported to the driver in any case. The train preparer wanted to save himself the way. According to the regulations, the overloading of the braking system assumed by the train preparer would have required the manual release of the brakes on all wagons. This is done individually on each car by pulling the so-called release pull. The driver has no influence from the locomotive. At the same time, all braking devices on the wagons, including the hose connections and the air shut-off cocks at the coupling points, should have been checked by the train preparer for proper condition. Then he should have determined that the brakes were applied and released on all cars. But that didn't happen. Rather, the train preparer checked all three trains in parallel and let the compressed air escape through the release devices on the car of the KC 71153 until the brakes were released and did not continue the required “full brake test”. Based on the fact that the train preparer had released all brakes on the wagon train by hand and the main air line was not connected through the uncoupled hoses between the locomotive and the first car, from this point on there was no longer any possibility of applying the car brakes allow.

It remained a matter of dispute whether the train preparer had given the driver the signal “Braking OK” . The driver claimed it, the train preparer denied it. It is also conceivable that the driver had referred to a signal “Braking OK”, which was intended for one of the other trains. In any case, the KC 71153 received the signal "Drive!" And went on the route . It was never clarified who had reported to the dispatcher that the train was ready to run, i.e. that the brake test was also completed without any complaints and why the train preparer did not cause the train to be stopped if the brake test had not yet been completed.

Elsterwerda

The train started on the line. Since there was little traffic, he drove without having to brake until shortly before Elsterwerda. In the Hohenleipisch - Elsterwerda section, the train had also accelerated as it has a steep gradient .

Due to the delay of the train, the management had meanwhile decided to change the locomotive planned for Riesa in Elsterwerda. The dispatcher there set up the route so that the train would turn off the continuous main track onto track five of the station. Accordingly, the entry signal and the corresponding distant signal from the station signaled “Wait to stop”. This also means an upper speed limit of 40 km / h.

When the driver wanted to brake for this reason, he noticed that the train had only a very low braking effect: the brake only worked on the locomotive, not on the wheels of the wagons. He notified the dispatcher in Elsterwerda about the "brake failure" by radio on the train , without the latter being able to intervene. Shortly before seven o'clock, the train drove over the distracting switch , which was only approved for 40 km / h, at Elsterwerda station at a speed of almost 90 km / h . The locomotive stayed on the track , the coupling between the train and the locomotive broke and the locomotive came to a stop 177 meters further. However, 15 tank cars derailed and 13 burned out.

consequences

Accident site

The site of the former Elsterwerda railway depot currently being renovated

For the Elsterwerda fire brigade , which was immediately alerted at 6:39 a.m. , this was the third major fire in two years. After she arrived at the scene of the accident , the first tank car exploded . The pressure wave was so strong that it opened up more cars and tore away the roof of the reception building. A light rain of gasoline was still falling a few hundred meters away. Motor vehicles passing the train station on a nearby street were pushed to the other side of the street. The locomotive shed of the depot and the locomotive 155 069 standing there caught fire . As a result of the explosion, the city ​​fire chief of Elsterwerda was killed by the collapsing farm building, another injured firefighter died five days later in the hospital. Eight firefighters and police officers were also injured. The gasoline leaking from the car immediately ignited. The extinguishing work was delayed because the fire brigade did not initially know what was burning and whether water could be used to extinguish the fire. Then there was not enough water to extinguish the fire. And finally there was still a risk of explosion.
There was a risk of explosion in the sewer system from spilled petrol. Seven intact, not derailed tankers could be uncoupled around noon and pulled out of the danger area. On the evening of the first day, after all the fires had been extinguished, the petrol was pumped out of four other unburnt cars.

The deployment of the fire brigades lasted over 34 hours. A total of 30 fire brigades with 310 fire fighters and 62 emergency vehicles were involved, the rescue service deployed 14 vehicles and two helicopters.

Judicial processing

In the spring of 2000, the public prosecutor's investigations were concluded. However, the Cottbus regional court and the local public prosecutor's office were now arguing about whether criminal proceedings should be opened at all. That finally took place against two DB employees on November 8th, 2002. Human error was found to be the reason for the disaster . Train drivers and the train preparer were sentenced to suspended sentences for their negligent behavior.

Elimination of the consequences

The badly damaged engine shed and the remains of the farm building were demolished and not rebuilt. The damage to the reception building was repaired. During the disaster, a large amount of petrol seeped away, which was still filtered out of the ground ten years after the accident.

Deutsche Bahn paid 1.2 million euros to 122 injured parties.

Trivia

Almost another disaster occurred in the late afternoon of October 11, 2018, just a few kilometers south of the accident site near the Kotschka location . A tank car filled with super gasoline from a freight train coming from Dresden caught fire due to a defective brake. The train driver who noticed the problem was able to bring the train to a stop just in time and put out the fire himself. To be on the safe side, however, the local brigades in Elsterwerda and Prösen were ordered to do security work on the scene of the accident.

Publications

Web links

Commons : Bahnhof Elsterwerda  - Collection of images, videos and audio files

Remarks

  1. ↑ Since the train was not formed in Berlin-Grünau, but had already arrived here as a closed unit, it was sufficient according to the regulations that not all wagons were checked to see whether the brakes had been released.
  2. ↑ The latter corresponds to the so-called continuity test of the main air line. The driver should have brought the driver's brake valve into the so-called final or middle position. This means that any leaks are no longer compensated for by the brake system. Now the train preparer should have opened the air shut-off valve on the main air line on the last vehicle for approx. 15 seconds. At the same time, the driver should have observed the manometer for displaying the main air line pressure and determined a pressure drop in it.
  3. ↑ Signal aspect Hl 12a.
  4. ↑ The town hall burned down in 1995 and the warehouse of a recycling company in 1997.

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Elsterwerda: Boiler train explosion in the station . Hans-Dieter Unkenstein, Lothar Zinke (112 Magazin der Feuerwehr 23 (1998)) (via www.bestpractice-feuerwehr.de and archive.org ). Archived from the original on October 10, 2008 .; there are 10 burned-out cars and two explosions (the second when the fire brigade arrives).
  2. ^ Indictment in the Elsterwerda case. In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , issue 5/2000, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 194.
  3. ↑ Suspended sentences in the process of the Elsterwerda train accident. In: Die Welt , December 17, 2002
  4. ^ Elsterwerda trial. In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , Issue 1/2003, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 7.
  5. ^ "Engine driver extinguishes fire on gasoline tank wagons" in Lausitzer Rundschau on October 11, 2018

Coordinates: 51 ° 28 '  N , 13 ° 31'  E