Gao Gang

Gao Gang (2nd from right) as part of the front committee of the Pingjin campaign

Gao Gang ( Chinese 高崗 / 高岗 , Pinyin Gāo Gǎng , W.-G. Kao Kang ; * 1905 or 1902 in Hengshan , Shaanxi ; † August 17, 1954 in Beijing ) was a communist military leader during the Second Sino-Japanese War and the civil war against the Kuomintang , the strongest man in Manchuria shortly before and after the proclamation of the People's Republic of China and chairman of the State Planning Commission . He sought to overthrow Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai in the Central People's Government and wanted to take over the positions of Mao Zedong after his death. His pursuit of power brought him down in the Gao Gang Rao Shushi affair.

Political rise

Gao joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1926 and attended the Zhongshan Military Academy established by Feng Yuxiang . From 1928 Gao and his friend and foster father Liu Zhidan were given the task of infiltrating the units of the National Revolutionary Army operating in Shaanxi and Gansu . They organized the Weihua uprising and established a revolutionary base in northern Shaanxi, but they could not drive out Feng.

In 1932, Liu and Gao combined their guerrilla units with the remnants of the 24th Red Army to form the 26th Red Army. Gao was appointed political commissar of the 26th Red Army operating in northern China. Under pressure from enemy warlords, the 26th Red Army withdrew to northern Shaanxi, in an area controlled by the uninfluential warlord Jing Yuexiu . In 1935 the communists under Liu Zhidan had succeeded in establishing the Bao'an Soviet and Gao became political commissar of the front command. From summer he was also director of the political department of the 15th Army Group. Liu and Gao were able to defend this base area against attacks by Zhang Xueliang . Shortly thereafter, however, a power struggle broke out between these two local communist leaders and members of the Central Committee who had come to the Bao'an Soviet. Gao and Liu were arrested on charges of deviating from the party line. When the party leadership around Mao Zedong arrived in the Bao'an Soviet on October 19, 1935 - the Soviet had recently been designated as the target of the Long March - the release of Liu and Gao was ordered.

Gao then became one of Mao Zedong's most important allies. After Liu Zhidan's death, Gao was promoted to party secretary of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia border region - the most important communist base region at the time - and the Northwest Office of the Communist Party. Gao also sided with Mao in internal party struggles, especially in the dispute with the faction around Wang Ming and the 28 Bolsheviks in one of the first socialist education campaigns.

At the Seventh Party Congress , Gao was elected a member of the Central Committee and the Politburo . Until the end of the civil war, he was Secretary of the Northeast Office of the Communist Party, Chairman of the People's Government of Northeast China after the conquest of this region by the People's Liberation Army and Political Commissar of the Northeast Military Region. Especially after the Northeast Field Army marched off into the Pingjin campaign , he was the most powerful man in Northeast China. He achieved success in developing the economy based on the Soviet model, so that Manchuria became the starting point for the industrialization of China. In this capacity, Gao and Liu Shaoqi made a secret visit to Moscow in May 1949 to obtain Soviet loans and support in the form of supplies of materials. On this visit he offered Stalin that the Soviet Union could station more soldiers in Dalian , that China would open the port of Qingdao to the Soviet Navy, and that Manchuria could join the Soviet Union as a Soviet republic. However, Stalin rejected these proposals. He also had to deal with Soviet interests in the raw materials and railway lines in Manchuria. Gao was given the nickname "Ruler of Manchuria", which he also received when he was promoted to deputy chairman of the central people's government after the proclamation of the People's Republic of China. As political commissioner of the Northeast Military Region, in the summer of 1950 he was responsible for mobilizing the border troops and the “volunteers” who were needed in the Chinese intervention in the Korean War . It is not exactly clear whether Gao, like numerous other high-ranking politicians, opposed Chinese intervention because of the high economic burdens expected or whether he supported it. In early summer, Gao was sent to Moscow with the Chief of Staff of the People's Liberation Army, Xu Xiangqian, to negotiate the supply of ammunition and military equipment. However, Stalin wanted the Korean War to weaken China as a possible rival for hegemony in the communist camp, so the Soviets hesitated and Gao's trip brought few concrete promises. Gao's close cooperation with the Soviet Union and Stalin himself, which exercised considerable influence in Manchuria shortly after the founding of the People's Republic, made Mao suspicious. Mao accused Gao of wanting to establish his own kingdom in the northeast by pitting the Soviet Union and the Beijing government against each other.

Peak of power in Beijing

In November 1952 Gao - like all the chairmen of the regional party offices, because Mao wanted to prevent the emergence of local centers of power - was transferred to Beijing. Among the politicians brought to Beijing, Gao was given the highest post because he was close to Mao in many political views. He was appointed chairman of the powerful State Planning Commission, although Stalin rejected the rapid construction of socialism that Gao and Mao envisioned. Gao was now sixth in the hierarchy of the Communist Party. In the years that followed, Mao sometimes criticized Gao's left-wing radicalism, vacillating between the moderate and radical positions. In the fall of 1951, Gao persuaded Mao to take action against the capitalists of China, even though Mao's concept of the new democracy envisaged using their services in building up the Chinese economy. Mao Gao also had his back against criticism from Liu Shaoqi when it came to the collectivization of agriculture in Manchuria. Gao's proposal to rotate the post of chairman among the party's top officials was rejected by Mao.

In March 1953, following the debate about Bo Yibo's tax concept, the government was reshaped, and the ministries of industry passed from the responsibility of Zhou Enlai to Gao's sphere of influence. In the summer of 1953, Gao chaired a conference on economic and financial issues, in which he sharply attacked Bo, but de facto targeted Liu Shaoqi. No one in the moderate camp knew whether Gao was doing this on Mao's behalf, but after Mao asked the conference participants to openly resolve conflicts, it was clear that Mao did not want to depose Liu and Zhou. It was agreed to reject Bo's tax concept and estimate the building of socialism at 15 years or more.

Gao Rao affair

Despite Mao's clear testimony, after this conference, Gao tried to ally with other high party members such as Chen Yun , Lin Biao , Peng Dehuai , Huang Kecheng and Deng Xiaoping . Rao Shushi allied himself with Gao on the assumption that Gao would succeed Mao Zedong at the head of the party and state. At the same time, Gao Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai spoke badly, Gao promised Rao the posts of Zhou Enlai after the intended government reshuffle and claimed those of Liu Shaoqi for himself. Mao ignored warnings from Mao, as Mao was privy to his frustration with the economic approaches the moderates exchanged with Gao. In a Politburo meeting on December 24, 1953, Mao attacked Gao and Rao sharply, accusing them of partisan activities. In February 1954, for example, a conference to strengthen the unity of the party took place in which Liu Gao and Rao attacked without naming them. Two commissions were set up, one of which was to investigate the Gao Gang affair under Zhou Enlai and the other to investigate the Rao Shushi affair. The commission revealed that Gao had been giving secret information and allegations about Chinese party officials to Stalin since 1949. Among other things, he had accused Mao of anti-Soviet and right-wing Trotskyist tendencies. A report that Gao had sent to Stalin via Ivan Vladimirovich Kovalev , Stalin had passed on to Mao during his visit to Moscow. In 1952, Gao had made such accusations against Pavel Yudin . Zhou's report came to the conclusion that Gao was a bourgeois individual careerist who was in fact an agent of the bourgeoisie . He was a traitor to the fatherland and morally decadent - Gao was known as a womanizer .

Gao and Rao lost their posts, Gao's last public appearance was on January 20, 1954. On February 17, 1954, Gao attempted suicide with a weapon that his bodyguard was able to prevent. On August 17, 1954, he killed himself by overdosing on sleeping pills. It is likely that Gao felt betrayed by Mao because he believed he had Mao's support to the last. It is possible that Mao viewed him as a traitor and that it was not until Stalin's death in March 1953 that Mao made it possible to get rid of him as Stalin's informant. In March 1955 he was posthumously expelled from the Communist Party. The Gao Rao affair is considered the first power struggle within the Communist Party leadership after the proclamation of the People's Republic of China. Unlike many other fallen politicians, Gao was never rehabilitated.

literature

Frederick C. Teiwes: Politics at Mao's court: Gao Gang and party factionalism in the early 1950s . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 1990, ISBN 0-87332-590-7 .
戴茂林, 赵晓光 (Dai Maolin and Zhao Xiaoguang): 高岗传 (biography of Gao Gang) . 陕西人民出版社 (Shaanxi People's Publishing House), Xi'an 2011, ISBN 978-7-224-09634-7 .

Web links

Commons : Gao Gang - collection of images, videos and audio files

Individual evidence

↑ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f Joseph KS Yick: Gao Gang . In: Leung, Pak-Wah (Ed.): Political leaders of modern China: a biographical dictionary . 1st edition. Greenwood Press, Westport, Conn. 2002, ISBN 0-313-30216-2 , pp. 45-46 .
↑ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e Susan M. Puska: Gao Gang . In: Xiaobing Li (Ed.): China at War - An Encyclopedia . ABC-CLIO, 2012, ISBN 978-1-59884-416-0 , p. 133-135 .
↑ ^a ^b ^c ^d Christopher R. Lew and Edwin Pak-wah Leung: Historical dictionary of the Chinese Civil War . 2nd Edition. Scarecrow Press, Lanham 2013, ISBN 978-0-8108-7874-7 , pp. 73-75 .
↑ James Z. Gao: Historical dictionary of modern China (1800-1949) . Scarecrow Press, Lanham 2009, ISBN 978-0-8108-4930-3 , pp. 131-132 .
↑ ^a ^b Alexander V. Pantsov and Steven I. Levine: Mao: The Real Story . Simon & Schuster, New York 2007, ISBN 978-1-4516-5447-9 , pp. 391-394 .
↑ ^a ^b Alexander V. Pantsov and Steven I. Levine: Deng Xiaoping, a revolutionary life . Oxford University Press, New York 2015, ISBN 978-0-19-062367-8 , pp. 154-155 .
↑ ^a ^b Alexander V. Pantsov and Steven I. Levine: Deng Xiaoping, a revolutionary life . Oxford University Press, New York 2015, ISBN 978-0-19-062367-8 , pp. 158-161 .
↑ Lawrence R. Sullivan: Historical dictionary of the Chinese Communist Party . Scarecrow Press, Lanham 2012, ISBN 978-0-8108-7470-1 , pp. 110-111 .
↑ Alexander V. Pantsov and Steven I. Levine: Mao: The Real Story . Simon & Schuster, New York 2007, ISBN 978-1-4516-5447-9 , pp. 404-405 .

personal data
SURNAME	Gao Gang
ALTERNATIVE NAMES	Kao Kang
BRIEF DESCRIPTION	Chinese Communist Party official
DATE OF BIRTH	1902 or 1905
PLACE OF BIRTH	Hengshan , Shaanxi
DATE OF DEATH	17th August 1954
Place of death	Beijing

[Yick45–46-1] ↑ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f Joseph KS Yick: Gao Gang . In: Leung, Pak-Wah (Ed.): Political leaders of modern China: a biographical dictionary . 1st edition. Greenwood Press, Westport, Conn. 2002, ISBN 0-313-30216-2 , pp. 45-46 .

[Puska133–135-2] Susan M. Puska: Gao Gang . In: Xiaobing Li (Ed.): China at War - An Encyclopedia . ABC-CLIO, 2012, ISBN 978-1-59884-416-0 , p. 133-135 .

[Lew73–75-3] Christopher R. Lew and Edwin Pak-wah Leung: Historical dictionary of the Chinese Civil War . 2nd Edition. Scarecrow Press, Lanham 2013, ISBN 978-0-8108-7874-7 , pp. 73-75 .

[Gao131–132-4] James Z. Gao: Historical dictionary of modern China (1800-1949) . Scarecrow Press, Lanham 2009, ISBN 978-0-8108-4930-3 , pp. 131-132 .

[Pantsov391–394-5] Alexander V. Pantsov and Steven I. Levine: Mao: The Real Story . Simon & Schuster, New York 2007, ISBN 978-1-4516-5447-9 , pp. 391-394 .

[pantsov154–155-6] Alexander V. Pantsov and Steven I. Levine: Deng Xiaoping, a revolutionary life . Oxford University Press, New York 2015, ISBN 978-0-19-062367-8 , pp. 154-155 .

[pantsov158–161-7] Alexander V. Pantsov and Steven I. Levine: Deng Xiaoping, a revolutionary life . Oxford University Press, New York 2015, ISBN 978-0-19-062367-8 , pp. 158-161 .

[Sullivan110–111-8] Lawrence R. Sullivan: Historical dictionary of the Chinese Communist Party . Scarecrow Press, Lanham 2012, ISBN 978-0-8108-7470-1 , pp. 110-111 .

[Pantsov404–405-9] Alexander V. Pantsov and Steven I. Levine: Mao: The Real Story . Simon & Schuster, New York 2007, ISBN 978-1-4516-5447-9 , pp. 404-405 .