History of Saudi Arabia

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The history of Saudi Arabia is the history of the area that is now part of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia . It goes back to the Paleolithic .

Depiction of the mosque and the Kaaba in Mecca from the 18th century

Surname

The name Saudi Arabia is derived from the ruling dynasty of the Saʿūd , who ruled the Najd since the 18th century in connection with the Islamic renewal movement of the Wahhabis and established what is now the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the first three decades of the 20th century third state establishment of the dynasty in this area.

prehistory

Eye stele from Tayma with Aramaic inscription, Tayma Museum

The area of ​​what is now Saudi Arabia has been populated since the Paleolithic. There are finds that are attributed to Homo erectus and whose age is estimated to be at least 1.6 million years. In the late Paleolithic - the climate on the Arabian Peninsula was more rainy than today - the north of what is now Saudi Arabia was populated by nomads .

The Neolithic in this area is determined by the development in the Fertile Crescent ; in the east through the cultures of Mesopotamia : Sumerians , Babylonians and Assyrians , in the west through Egypt .

Early history

Since the area of ​​today's Saudi Arabia was opened up on the one hand by the shipping routes in the west through the Red Sea and in the east through the Persian Gulf , on the other hand it was also crossed by caravan routes and was also surrounded by high cultures in the west, north and east , written evidence to this area early. This also includes the Kingdom of Midian mentioned in the Bible . Small states of the Sabaeans , Nabataeans , Ghassanids , Lachmids and Kinda and city-states like Tayma and Dedan are emerging. The first inscriptions in this area date from this period, usually in letters . Modern forms of economy, such as the monetary system , are spreading and the influence of the Roman Empire reaches the northernmost parts of what is now Saudi Arabia.

Islam

With the establishment of Islam by the prophet Mohammed , he succeeded in uniting the tribes of Arabia between 622 and 632. After his death, his successors as caliphs continued the spread of Islam and thus of Arab culture far beyond the Arabian peninsula. As early as the 8th century, the caliphate extended from Andalusia to India and Central Asia and from the Caucasus to far into the Sahara . At the same time, however, Arabia lost its political importance when the Umayyads and Abbasids moved the capital to economically more important regions in Damascus and Baghdad . Thanks to the holy places of Mecca and Medina , at least the Hejaz retained its religious and cultural significance for the Islamic world. The control of the Hashimites as sherifers over Mecca or Medina has been attested since the 10th century . In 1446 the head of the Saʿūd family at that time, Manʾ al-Muraydī as-Saʿūd, moved the focus of his activities to central Arabia. In 1517 almost the entire Arabian Peninsula was subjugated by Sultan Selim I and incorporated into the Ottoman Empire .

With the discovery of the sea ​​route from Europe to India by Portugal from the 15th century onwards, Arabia lost its function as a transit country for trade between India and the Mediterranean region .

The first Saudi state (1744-1818)

history

Flag of the first Saudi state

The first Saudi state, also called the " Emirate of Naǧd ", was proclaimed under Muḥammad Ibn Saʿūd (1726–1765) in 1744 and existed for 75 years until the Ottoman conquest under Ibrahim Pasha in 1818. This became the capital of the Sultanate in the northeast today of ar-Riyāḍ located Dir'iyya , an oasis settlement that 1446/47 of ancestors of Sa'ud clan was founded.

Dirʿiyya ruins

After internal power struggles with the al-Migin clan, which initially dominated Dirʿiyya, Muḥammad Ibn Saʿūd prevailed as the new Amīr . As the Amīr of Dirʿiyya, Muhammad Ibn Saʿūd established his status as a result of his political and military skill in defending the settlement from other Amīras and tribal confederations. Except for the privilege to receive tribute from the population, the rule and authority of the Amīr was limited locally in the 1740s. A lack of financial means and the competition with the rival tribes of Banū Ḫalid and al-Ḥasā as well as the neighboring settlement of ʿUyayna prevented political and economic expansion beyond Dirʿiyya. This changed with the conversion to the Wahhabi movement .

Mosque of Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhābs in Dirʿiyya

In 1744, Muḥammad Ibn Saʿūd allied himself with Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb , the offspring of an influential but penniless family of'Ulamā ' and a member of the Banū Tamīm tribe located in the Naǧd. The pact between the two clans was sealed with the marriage of Muḥammad Ibn Saʿūd's son ʿAbd al-Azīz and the Imam's daughter. In return for promoting and spreading his orthodox form of Islam, Muḥammad Ibn Saʿūd was legitimized as the political leader of the Muslim community. This created a quasi-tribal confederation that legitimized expansion beyond the borders of Dirʿiyya within the framework of Jihād and Daʿwa . Dirʿiyya developed into the largest and most influential city in the Naǧd and became the center for teaching the Wahhabi doctrine.

First Saudi state

By the mid-1780s, the Naǧd was completely subjugated by the Saʿūd and their allies. By 1808 the eastern areas of Kuwait followed to the northern border of Oman and the highlands of ʿAsīr in the southwest. Further efforts to expand towards the south failed because of the resistance of Yemeni tribes and the difficult terrain. It was similar in the north. In the beginning of the 19th century an expansion into the area of ​​the fertile crescent was achieved , which immediately threatened vital parts of the Ottoman Empire . However, due to the spatial distance to the capital, the establishment of a permanent presence failed. The looting of Shiite settlements in what is now Iraq , especially in the city of Karbalāʾ, which is holy for the Shiites, in 1801 and the associated devastation of holy tombs and monuments, led to the murder of ʿAbd al-Azīz Ibn Muḥammad Ibn Saʿūd in the mosque of Dirʿiyya in 1803 by a Shiite. His son Saʿūd pushed expansion efforts, especially in the west.

The ongoing campaigns of the Saʿūd, as well as the occupation of the holy places in Mecca and Medina , left the Ottoman Sultan Caliph Selim III. and Mahmud II. became aware of the imminent danger that the conquests of the Arabian Peninsula threatened Ottoman sovereignty. Weakened by the unrest in the Balkans and the war with Russia , Mahmud II did not instruct the governor of Egypt , Muhammad Ali Pasha , to intervene until 1811 . He sent in 1811 and 1813 troops over the port cities Yanbu' and Gidda on the Red Sea to the Arabian Peninsula and started together with his two sons Tousoun and Ibrahim and with the support of competing tribal federations in Ottoman-Saudi War (1811-1818) with the destruction of the First Saudi State. In March 1818, the Ottoman troops under the leadership of Muḥammad ʿAlī's son Ibrahim Pasha reached the then Saudi capital Dirʿiyya and, after very fierce fighting and six months of siege with heavy artillery , forced the surrender on September 15, 1818.

The last imam of the state, ʿAbd Allah Ibn Saʿūd , was taken prisoner in Egypt and was extradited to the Ottomans and sentenced to death by a court for “corruption on earth” , “division of Muslims” and “rebellion against the caliph” . On December 17, 1818, he was executed by sword in Istanbul . Much of his family was deported to Cairo and Istanbul. In the following year Dirʿiyya was completely destroyed by the Ottoman army, the districts of al-Turaif and Ġasiba are still in ruins today.

Imams

The second Saudi state (1824-1891)

Flag of the second Saudi state
Territorial expansion of the second Saudi state

history

The second Saudi state (1824-1891) owed its existence to the political weakness of the Ottoman Empire and the unwillingness of the Sublime Porte to strengthen the existing positions along the coast of the Persian Gulf . This second Saudi state could no longer achieve the expansion of the first and concentrated on the heartland in the Naǧd . It was characterized by severe power struggles within the family clan and competition with the Āl Raschīd clan .

Just two years after the catastrophe, Imam Mišari Ibn Saʿūd, a brother of the last Amīr of Dirʿiyya , tried to restore the state from Dirʿiyya, but failed after a few months. After the partial withdrawal of the Egyptian troops from the Naǧd as a result of pressure from the local tribes, Imam Turkī Ibn ʿAbd Allāh Ibn Muḥammad Ibn Saʿūd succeeded with a small force in taking ar-Riyāḍ south of Dirʿiyya. Thus ar-Riyāḍ established itself as the capital of the new state. Further expansions in the direction of ʿAriḍ, Ḫarǧ, Ḥuṭa, Maḥmal, Sudair and Aflaǧ followed. Unlike in the Hasa region, where power could be strengthened, the influence of the Saudi authority in Haʾil and Qāsim remained minimal.

Internal rivalries within the clan made the second Saudi state appear extremely fragile. Turkī was murdered in 1834 by Misari Ibn ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān, a distant cousin. This was executed after the reconquest of ar-Riyāḍs by his son Faiṣal, who was brought as a prisoner to Cairo as a result of the Egyptian reconquest of the Naǧd in 1838 . The Egyptians replaced him with alid Ibn as-Saʿūd, a brother of the last imam ʿAbd Allah Ibn Saʿūd of the first Saudi state. After the Egyptians were forced by external conflicts to withdraw their troops from the Arabian Peninsula in 1840 , Ḫalid was overthrown by ʿAbd Allah Ibn Ṯuniyyan. With the help of the ar-Rašīdī of Haʾil, Faisal, who was released from custody in Egypt, managed to regain his rule in ar-Riyāḍ. He named his son ʿAbd Allaah crown prince and divided his lands between him and his brothers Saʿūd and Muḥammad. After his death in 1865 there was a conflict between ʿAbd Allah and Saʿūd, which developed into a civil war. The beneficiary of these clan disputes was the former vassal of the l Saʿūd , ʿAbd Allah Ibn Rašīd.

With the clan of ar-Rašīdī, the as-Saūd became a new rival. With the help of the Ottomans, they had been able to establish an emirate in Haʾil in 1834 under ʿAbd Allah Ibn Rašīd. From 1850 on, they gradually succeeded in expanding their hegemony to all regions of the Naǧd. An alliance formed under ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān Ibn ʿAbd Allāh from the tribes of Qaṣīm and parts of the Muṭayr tribal confederation failed against an alliance of ar-Rašīdī with the Šammar, Muntafiq and Ḥarb in Mulayda in 1891. ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān Ibn ʿAbd Allāh first found refuge with the tribe of the Murra in the Rubʿ al-Ḫālī , before moving to Kuwait in 1893 under the patronage of as-Sabaḥ and a pension of 60 gold lira from the Ottoman government . After ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān had fled and ar-Riyāḍ was taken, the remaining members of the as-Saʿūd were taken to Hail as hostages.

Atlas sheet from 1883

Imams

ʿAbd al-Azīz Ibn ʿAbd ar-Raḥman as-Saʿūd
Hejaz Railway around 1920
Iḫwān cavalry

The third Saudi state: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

ʿAbd al-Azīz Ibn al-Saʿūd (1902–1953)

In 1902 ʿAbd al-Azīz Ibn ʿAbd ar-Raḥman as-Saʿūd (1876-1953) returned from his exile in Kuwait and continued his fight against the ar-Rašīdī clan. On January 15, ar-Riyāḍ was retaken, beginning a series of conquests that culminated in the proclamation of the modern Arab state as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932. An important element in the recapture of the Arabian Peninsula were the Iḫwān , Wahhabi-Bedouin troops, led by Sulṭān Ibn Baǧād Ibn Hamīd al-ʿUtaībī and Faiṣal Ibn Sulṭān al-Dwaiš.

In 1906 the Rašīdī were expelled from the Naǧd , whereupon ʿAbd al-Azīz was recognized by the Ottomans as the head of the region. This was followed by the Qa folgīm region in 1912 and 19asā in 1913. The latter in particular turned out to be extremely important in retrospect because of its rich oil reserves.

World War I and Arab Revolt

On the eve of the First World War , ʿAbd al-Azīz sent a correspondence to the Sherif of Mecca ainussain Ibn ʿAlī , Saʿūd Ibn Saliḥ as-Sabhan in ʾāʾil and Sheikh Mubārak aṣ-Ṣabāḥ in Kuwait calling for a meeting of Arab rulers. The aim was to keep the Arab rulers out of the conflict, but this failed. With the encouragement of the English and French, the Sherif of Mecca began the Arab revolt (1916–1918) against the Ottoman Empire with the aim of securing Arab independence and creating a homogeneous Arab state from Aleppo in Syria to Aden in Yemen . His troops included various Bedouin tribes from the Arabian Peninsula, but not those of the as-Saʿūd and the tribes allied with them. Reasons were on the one hand the rivalry of the Saʿūd with the sherif from the competing Hashemite dynasty, on the other hand, but also ongoing battles with the arch-rival of the Rašīdī clan in the north of the country. In a meeting with Ottoman emissaries in Burayda, ʿAbd al-Azīz allowed arms to be transported through his territory, but refused further aid for fear of the British who were in Baṣra at the time.

Establishment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

Flag of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

After ʿAbd al-Azīz had succeeded with the help of the Iḫwān in 1921 to finally defeat the Rašīdī, he began to extend his power to the Ḥiǧāz . When the British in 1923 withdrew its troops from the region and the Sherif of Mecca had thus lost its supporters who Iḫwān attacked the Ḥiǧāz and conquered the region in their Ǧihādzügen by the end of 1925. In that course, which was Hedschasbahn finally destroyed in its southern part . In the following years, the Iḫwān tried to extend the Wahhabi doctrine to the British protectorates of Transjordan , Iraq and Kuwait . Fearing British intervention, ʿAbd al-Azīz opposed these efforts. In addition, from 1926 onwards, the Iḫwān became increasingly uncontrollable for ʿAbd al-Azīz. They attacked innovations such as telegraph stations , cars and telephones, and began crossing the border in the Saudi-Iraqi neutral zone , which was established in 1927-28. During a congress convened by ʿAbd al-Azīz in October 1928, Sulṭān Ibn Baǧād Ibn Hamīd al-ʿUtaībī and Faiṣal Ibn Sulṭān ad-Dwaiš were branded as leaders of a revolt. In the Battle of Sabilla in 1930 the leadership of the Iḫwān was killed.

With the territorial consolidation of the Hejaz and Naǧd , ʿAbd al-Azīz proclaimed himself king of Ḥiǧāz on January 10th. In the Treaty of Ğidda of May 20, 1927, the British recognized the sovereignty of ʿAbd al-Azīz 'sphere of influence in the Naǧd and Ḥiǧāz. On September 18, 1932, ʿAbd al-Azīz merged the two regions and proclaimed the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and himself king . He thus chose - at least externally - a form of “modern” statehood for his domain.

The oil concessions

With the uprising of Iḫwān from 1927 and the declining number of pilgrims due to the global economic crisis (1929-1933), the Saudi government budget deteriorated rapidly. In addition, there were various infrastructure measures that led to the national deficit rising to 300,000 pounds. The development of a new source of income was therefore more than welcome.

As early as 1922, various efforts had been made to negotiate concessions for the development of oil in the Eastern Province. However, ʿAbdulazīz's reservations about a British mission due to colonial ambitions in the Middle East prevented this. Only after the discovery of oil in nearby Bahrain in 1932 did the Standard Oil Company of Florida succeed in obtaining a concession on May 29, 1933.

After promising geological structures had been discovered in the Eastern Province in 1935, the first test drilling began in the same year. However, it was not until Dammam No. 7 was put into operation that it was successful, after which commercial production began in 1938. The United States later received a monopoly from the Saudi king to exploit it . In 1960 the kingdom was a founding state of OPEC .

Second World War and subsequent period

Aramco headquarters in Ẓahrān

In the Second World War to Saudi Arabia acted neutral . When the Allied victory became apparent towards the end of the war , the USA was allowed to establish an air force base in Ẓahrān and to use the local ports for military purposes. This was accompanied by a rapprochement with the USA at the expense of Great Britain, which was largely pushed by ARAMCO representatives. While the king gained an important ally for the guarantee of state independence with the rapprochement with the USA, the oil concessions concluded with ARAMCO in 1933 were renewed and the construction of the Trans-Arabian oil pipeline approved. This made Saudi Arabia the first independent Arab state to have significant political and economic ties with the United States.

In 1945 the country rose to become the most important oil supplier for the economy of the western world, with an annual production volume of 21 million barrels . This marked the beginning of the country's rapid economic upswing. The majority of the population, who had been living as nomads up to now , became sedentary and pronounced urbanization began.

Also in 1945, the Arab League, a council of Arab states, was founded. The Arab League tried to prevent the founding of the state of Israel in 1948 with the Palestine War, in which Saudi Arabia was also involved. In the 1950s, the king allowed a Council of Ministers, but it only has an advisory role. Saudi Arabia repeatedly supported individual parties in civil war states like Yemen and thus came into conflict with other Arab states. In 1963 slavery was abolished, with the slaves being replaced by guest workers from neighboring Arab states as well as South and Southeast Asia and Africa . The guest workers are still an important pillar of the country's economy.

King Saʿūd (1953–1964): Political crises and rivalry with Egypt

King Saʿūd (1953–1964)

The rule of Saʿūd was marked by a series of crises. Beginning with the rise of the British-created Hashemite kingdoms in Iraq and Jordan , the Arab world saw a collapse of monarchical systems in Egypt , Iraq in 1958 and Yemen in 1962 . New ideological movements such as Baʿṯism and Pan-Arabism rivaled the Saudi claim to leadership in the Arab world. At the same time, the Middle East became a venue for the Cold War between the two new superpowers, the USA and the Soviet Union . The general revolutionary mood in the Arab world in the 1950s and 1960s contributed to internal security becoming an important issue. There has been some social and economic modernization in Saudi Arabia. Oppositionists and dissidents were persecuted under Faiṣal.

In the 1950s, a brief strategic reorientation of Saudi Arabia began under Saʿūd. With the collapse of the monarchy in Egypt and the seizure of power by the Free Officers under Ǧamal ʿAbd an-Naṣir , an important ally against the influence of the rival dynasties of the Hashemites in the newly created kingdoms of Iraq and Jordan was lost. These had come together in the Baghdad Pact between Great Britain , Iran and Pakistan to pursue common interests. To counter this, Saʿūd began an approach to Egypt under Naṣir. In addition to an imitation of the Arab nationalism represented by Naṣir, this also implied a rapprochement with the Soviet Union, then ruled by Khrushchev .

Naṣir's rising popularity in the Arab world put the Saudi royal family in distress. Not only did he force a campaign against the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood , who had close ties to the Saudis. The starting point for the rift between the two unequal allies was Naṣir's pan-Arab ideology , which exposed the grave differences between the two forms of government. In addition, the Eisenhower government urged Saʿūd to stop Saudi-Egyptian relations and offered him military and economic support to compensate.

After the formation of the Syrian-Egyptian alliance in 1958, Saʿūd commissioned the Syrian secret service officer ʿAbd al-Ḥamid as-Sarraǧ with the murder of Naṣir. The uncovering of this plot at a time when Naṣir was highly regarded in the Arab world seriously damaged the Saudi image and ultimately led to a break. A rapprochement with the Hashemite Kingdom of Iraq failed because of the military coup under ʿAbd al-Karīm Qāsim of 1958.

The Egyptian-Saudi conflict flared up again in 1962. In order to gain influence in the Arab world itself, Saʿūd founded the Islamic World League in Mecca in 1962 , which in 1970 received a permanent general secretariat under Saudi patronage. When the latter gained the upper hand with Egyptian support in the Yemeni civil war between royalists and republicans , the Yemeni Arab Republic posed an immediate security risk for the Saudi royal family. Under the decisive leadership of Saʿūd's brother Faiṣal, military support from the USA was requested on the Saudi-Yemeni border, which was preceded by a general Saudi mobilization against Yemen . In a Saudi-American naval maneuver near Ğidda , the US demonstrated its strategic interests in a monarchist Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, under President Kennedy, the new Yemeni Arab Republic was recognized in 1963, which annoyed Saʿūd and prompted him to seek rapprochement with Great Britain. Faiṣal saw the USA as the sole guarantor against the spread of pan-Arabism and socialism in the Middle East.

King Faisal (1964–1975): Beginning of the oil boom

King Faiṣal (1964–1975)
Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr
Faisal with Nasser and ʿArafāt 1970

After internal rivalries, Faisal, with the support of the National Guard and the ʿUlamāʾ, took over the official business from his brother Saʿūd, who was considered wasteful, and was crowned the new king. In the Ǧidda Agreement of 1965, Faiṣal and Naṣir agreed to end their mutual engagement in Yemen.

The outbreak of the Six Day War in June 1967 drew Egypt's attention to other scenes. Saudi Arabia took part in the Arab-Israeli conflict by sending a 3,000-strong delegation, which was stationed far from the front in southern Jordan. After the defeat of the Arab armed forces against Israel , Saudi Arabia, together with Kuwait and Libya, declared the doctrine of no peace, no negotiations with Israel and not recognizing its statehood in the Sudanese capital, Khartoum . In the period that followed, Saudi Arabia limited itself to political and financial support for states and groups that are in direct conflict with Israel. In addition, as part of a pan-Islamic policy beyond the borders of the Arab world, Faiṣal promoted Saudi Arabia's supremacy in the Islamic world by promoting religious and cultural institutions in Asia and Africa. In 1969 the Organization for Islamic Cooperation was founded in Rabat , the first meeting of which took place in Jeddah , Saudi Arabia . With Nasser's demise in September 1970, the kingdom finally lost a major political rival in the Arab world.

With the rise of the Baḥists under Aḥmad Ḥasan al-Bakr in Iraq in 1968, however, a new factor had already emerged that threatened Saudi security interests and the claim to leadership in the Arab world. The consequences were internal unrest among Saudi Baʿṯists and opposition members of the Saudi- Shiite minority in the Eastern Province, which in 1969 led to a murder plot against Faiṣal. As a result of their exposure, thousands of dissidents were arrested by the end of 1969 , while the rest fled to Egypt or Lebanon . During the 1960s, Saudi Arabia took in Muslim Brotherhood who had fled Egypt from Nasser's repressive regime. They held positions in the Saudi higher education system in large numbers.

Although his brother had given him a poorly developed country, Faiṣal benefited from the increasing income from the oil business. In 1970 the first five-year plan was initiated, which envisaged annual growth of 9.8%. Basic infrastructures such as roads, airports and ports were created and an increasing part of the population benefited from access to electricity, telephone, schools and hospitals.

Domestically, Faiṣal laid the foundations for the Saudi state of today. By his brother Halid to the crown prince said he put the vision of his father from a dynastic order of succession in which Ibn Sa'ūds sons have precedence over the grandchildren. Furthermore, Faiṣal combined the office of king and prime minister in personal union and thus disempowered the ministerial council. Princes who were particularly loyal to him were installed in important state offices, which led to a merger of the al Saʿūd clan with the state. Opposition groups, such as the Free Princes under the leadership of Talāl Ibn ʿAbd al-Azīz with their striving for a constitutional monarchy , were thus stripped of the ground. In addition, he strengthened himself ideologically by a conscious emphasis on a pious and authentic Islam and aimed against pan-Arabism according to Naṣir and an Arab socialism according to the Syrian ideologue of the Baʿṯ party Mīšīl ʿAflaq . With the establishment of the Ministry of Justice in 1970 and the construction of religiously oriented universities, the ʿUlamā 'became de facto state officials, formalizing the loose alliance between the Saʿūd and the Wahhabi clergy. Increasing oil revenues also promoted the development of a welfare state , in that the state secured the loyalty of its citizens through state employment, basic medical care, free education and granting of scholarships or even monetary gifts for wedding occasions. Princes who found no place in Faiṣal's state apparatus were granted a privileged position in the domestic economy. Common economic interests and the increase in private prosperity superimposed the genealogical and ancestry-based cohesion of the Saʿūd clan and, after the experience with the Free Princes, defused internal rivalries.

With the military setbacks of the Egyptian army during the Yom Kippur War in October 1973 and the continued support of Israel by the US and Europe, Saudi Arabia joined the embargo of the OPEC countries and began to use its oil reserves as leverage against the West . All countries that represented a pro-Israeli policy were targeted. The result was a global oil crisis , combined with an economic recession, which hit Japan and Europe in particular. Although the embargo failed to achieve its goal of bringing Jerusalem back under Arab sovereignty, Wahhabi Saudi Arabia gained prestige in the Muslim world through its pioneering role in oil diplomacy. The downside was a shaken relationship with the US as its main ally. Despite the rapid modernization of the country, Saudi Arabia was heavily dependent on US support for security-related issues and technical support. When the United States made it clear that it viewed Israel and Iran as its main allies in the Middle East, in 1974 it threatened to leave OPEC and increased oil production while maintaining the previous pricing policy. This step was rewarded with a rapprochement between the USA and various bilateral agreements.

The two decades after the 1973 oil crisis brought Saudi Arabia great prosperity and political power. Economic reform measures could be further intensified by the high oil revenues. Domestically, secular and religious oppositional groups led to new crises, while foreign policy the invasion of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan brought Saudi Arabia closer together with the USA. The invasion of Kuwait by the former ally Iraq and the Islamic Revolution in Iran promoted this strategic cooperation.

Faiṣal's reign ended in 1975 with his murder by his nephew Faiṣal Ibn Musāʿid Ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz as-Saʿūd, whose father Ḫalid was shot in 1965 while leading a demonstration against the introduction of television.

King Chālid (1975–1982): Uprising in Mecca

King Chālid (1975-1982)
Captured occupiers of the Great Mosque

Relations with the United States were further strengthened under Chālid , which, however, earned him increasing criticism from religious circles for its pro-Israel policies. In November 1979, these disputes culminated in the occupation of the Great Mosque in Mecca under the leadership of Ǧuhaymān ibn Muḥammad al-ʿUtaibī and Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd Al-Qaḥṭānī. The main points of criticism of the rebels, who were descendants of an Iāwān tribe and were active in the Saudi Muslim Brotherhood , were, in addition to the conquest of Saudi princes in the Ḥiǧāz , the un-Islamic conduct of the ruling family and relations with the USA.

Further social tensions took place two weeks after the suppression of the uprising in the Eastern Province . Due to the marginalization of the Shiite minority within Saudi society under the prevailing Wahhabi doctrine and motivated by the Iranian revolution of 1979, demonstrations took place in the Shiite stronghold of Qaṭīf. After the suppression of the protests by the National Guard and the Shiite leaders went into exile, Ḫālid promised reforms.

In geopolitical terms, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the first Gulf War (1980–1988) created new threats to the security of Saudi Arabia. Iran posed a danger insofar as thousands of Iranian pilgrims to Mecca every year threatened rhetoric directed against the West to spread to Saudi Arabia, thereby threatening the legitimacy of the Saʿūd. In addition, Iran, as a regional power, had ambitions for Bahrain to the east. Iraq under Ṣaddām Ḥusain, in turn, had ambitions for Kuwait, which is also to the east. Although the Baʿṯist regime in Iraq was seen as a danger, Saudi Arabia supported it in the war against Iran with generous financial aid amounting to billions. Due to common security concerns of the Gulf states, the Gulf Cooperation Council was founded in Abū Ẓaby in May 1981 together with Kuwait , Bahrain , Qatar , the United Arab Emirates and Oman . The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan since 1979 reignited fears of communist danger. Together with the USA, Saudi Arabia supported the Afghan mujahideen with weapons, money and those willing to fight. In addition, the establishment of Wahhabi madrasas in Pakistan was accelerated, in which a large number of Afghan fighters received their religious instruction. After the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, the Saudi volunteers from this conflict caused serious security problems for the Saudi government with their ideas of a true Islamic state and the lack of employment prospects.

King Fahd (1982–2005): Wars in the Gulf, Islamist opposition and terrorism

King Fahd (1982-2005)

Ḫālid was followed by King Fahd in 1982 , who established the Sudayrī Seven as a political heavyweight in Saudi politics. Falling oil revenues led to a slowdown in modernization in the 1980s and the cost of living increased. In order to avoid the introduction of taxes and the resulting unrest, higher fees for residential permits and exit visas were decided for the foreign guest workers, who already made up a third of the total population. The introduction of a saudification of the labor market in the five-year plan from 1985 to 1989 has not yet reached the level it has at the present time. As a result of the economic crisis of the 1980s, the social differences in Saudi society intensified.

Saudi Arabia's military deficits became apparent in the Second Gulf War with the occupation of Kuwait (1990/91) by neighboring Iraq. Saudi Arabia had to forge an alliance with the United States under the umbrella of a multinational reaction force to protect itself and drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait. Saudi Arabia paid almost 40% of the cost of the war . However, the stationing of numerous American troops in the country led to a legitimation crisis for the royal family. Particularly conservative religious circles criticized the immense expenditure, which nevertheless led to the economic crisis of the 1980s and, in view of the superiority of the Iraqi army, to equip a military that was not prepared for an emergency. In September 1990, the director of the prestigious Meccan Umm-al-Qurā University, Safar al-Hawālī, presented the later Grand Mufti ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Ibn Bāz with a letter in which he expressed that the West was an even greater evil than Iraq . ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Ibn Bāz legitimized the jihad against Saddam Hussein in a fatwa in January 1991 with the help of non-Muslims. But liberal forces also used the liberal phase of the 1990s to express their opinion in public and in the media. In November 1990, a group of women drove their cars into the center of ar-Riyāḍ to protest the ban on women driving.

The political leadership responded to the protests of the opposition Sahwa group with the March reforms in 1992. These included:

  • An-Niẓām al-Asāsī li-l-Ḥukm: A kind of basic law based on Islamic principles and an Islamic monarchy as a form of government, which defines the tasks and rights of the state
  • Maǧlis aš-Šūrā: An advisory assembly , consisting of 60 members personally appointed by the king plus a chairman with only an advisory function
  • A law for the administrative administration of the provinces, which divided the kingdom into 14 provinces with respective governorates and districts with their own jurisdiction and thus strengthened the central power in the province

With the implementation of the reforms, a series of arrests began in 1992–1994, particularly aimed at extremely conservative, fundamentalist dissidents. These included the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights ( Laǧna ad-Difāʿ ʿan al-Ḥuqūq aš-Šarʿīya ) and the Movement for Islamic Reform (a l-Ḥaraka al-islāmiyya li-l-Iṣlāḥ ). After an uprising in the conservative stronghold of Buraida in 1994 under Safar al-Hawālī and Salmān al-ʿAuda, the arrests were intensified. Another prominent example of such groups was ʾUsāmah Ibn Muḥammad Ibn ʿAwaḍ Ibn Lādin with his Committee for Consultation and Reform (Haiʾa an-Naṣīḥa wa-l-Iṣlāḥ).

Destroyed building after the Chobar attack

In the mid-1990s, discontent about the American presence was directed against American military and civilians. In November 1995, a bomb attack was carried out on a National Guard facility in ar-Riyāḍ where American military advisers were staying. In June 1996, there was a bomb attack near the Ḫubar towers near Ẓahrān . In 2000, a bomb exploded on the USS Cole in the Yemeni port of Aden .

Following the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York on September 11, 2001 , Saudi Arabia was increasingly exposed to allegations of supporting terrorist groups. Of the 19 attackers on September 11, 15 came from Saudi Arabia. Semi-official foundations and members of the royal family are also suspected of having financially supported al-Qāʿida . Funds from Saudi Arabia also flow to extremist organizations such as the Hamas movement in Israel / Palestine.

Crown Prince ʿAbdullāh and George W. Bush

In 1995, Crown Prince ʿAbd Allah von Fahd took over the affairs of state after he suffered several heart attacks. However, as the son of an ar-Rašīdī woman, the Sudayrī brothers Nāyif and Salman caused him difficulties . ʿAbd Allaah pursued a policy of light reforms when he took office and distanced the country from the USA. During the third Gulf War (2003), Saudi Arabia refused to allow the US to use its military bases on Saudi soil, which led to a further cooling of relations with the US. The headquarters of the US troops was therefore relocated to Doha ( Qaṭar ). Nevertheless, from 2003 onwards there were more bomb attacks on Western facilities in the country. They went to the account of the Al-Qaeda organization on the Arabian Peninsula , which was influenced by the ideology of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisīs . In 1989 he had declared takfīr against Saudi Arabia.

King ʿAbd Allaah (2005-2015)

King ʿAbdullāh (2005-2015)

When Fahd died in 2005, ʿAbdullah officially ascended to the throne. During the reign of ʿAbdallāh , Saudi Arabia lost some of its influence in the Arab world. This looks like everything from the traditional strategic relations with the USA in the context of the third Gulf War in Iraq to the crises in Afghanistan , Lebanon , Tunisia , Egypt , Yemen , Bahrain , Syria , the ongoing humanitarian emergencies in the Palestinian Territories and the Gaza Strip The country faced new challenges both inside and out. While Iran and Turkey are contesting Saudi Arabia's role in the Arab world in terms of foreign policy , a steadily growing population and a lack of internal prospects lead to calls for civil society reform.

In the context of the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan, relations with the United States deteriorated when it was found that more than 120 detainees in Guantánamo Bay were Saudi citizens. The transferred prisoners were then integrated into a rehabilitation program in Saudi Arabia, which has improved mutual relations since 2007. With a never-ending conflict in Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia found itself in a dilemma. While Iran was gaining more and more influence in Afghanistan through the building of schools, economic investments and the establishment of political contacts, Saudi Arabia was denied this because of the alleged relations between the Taliban and al-Qāʿida. In response to a request from Hamid Karzai , a secret diplomacy under Turki Ibn Faiṣal and with the help of the Pakistani secret service ISI succeeded in organizing the host for a negotiation between representatives of the Karzai government and the Taliban in Mecca in November 2008 . Despite the negative outcome of these negotiations, Saudi Arabia was able to record a success as the host.

Arabic spring

Nāyif Ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz as-Saʿūd

The aftermath of the Arab Spring presented a challenge to Saudi Arabia that the Arab world had not seen in half a century. In particular, the regional trend in neighboring countries towards political participation through elections and democratic institutions, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist groups, put the Saudi claim to rule with its consciously emphasized Islamic symbolism to the test. By combining political Islam with democratic elements, the Saudi system of government lost its uniqueness as a real Islamic state in the region. In addition, questions of succession to the throne following the death of Crown Prince Nāyif in Geneva in summer 2012 and increasing protests on the part of liberal but also conservative circles in the country made it difficult to find a solution to the questions of a changing society.

After the self-immolation of Muḥammad al-Būʿazīzī on January 4, 2011, the Saudi officials distanced themselves from the events in Tunisia. Former President Zayn al-ʿĀbidīn was offered political asylum, which has shaped the relationship to Ḥarakat An-Nahḑa Al-Islāmiyya by ongoing tensions up to the present time. The first visit by the Tunisian Prime Minister Ḥammādī al-Ǧibālī therefore took place late in February 2012.

The events that led to the overthrow of President Muḥammad Ḥusnī Mubārak were also viewed with skepticism. With its overthrow, not only did one lose an important ally in the Arab world, the Saudi-Egyptian relations were publicly criticized for the first time. Since April 2011, protests have been held in front of the Saudi embassy in Cairo, which, following the arrest of the Egyptian lawyer Ahmad al-Ǧizawī in Saudi Arabia, led to the brief closure of the embassy and consulates in Alexandria and as-Suwais a year later. However, the political rise of the Muslim Brotherhood was viewed particularly critically. In addition to the charge of promoting the radicalization of their own population and rapprochement with rival Iran , there was particular fear of exporting this Islamic-inspired ideology to the Gulf states .

ʿAlī ʿAbd Allāh Ṣāliḥ

While the Libyan revolt and the overthrow of the hostile regime of Muʿammar al-Qalichenāfī were calmly awaited , special attention was directed to the events in neighboring Yemen. Since Yemen has always been considered a security risk, a network based on patronage was established as early as the 1930s with various political and tribal actors . While under President ʿAlī ʿAbd Allāh Ṣāliḥ a joint action against the Shiite rebel groups under ʿAbd al-Malik al-Ḥūṯī in the north of the country and al-Qāʿida fighters in the south united the two countries, the events in 2011 split the political leadership in Yemen and created a situation of uncontrollability through the looming danger of civil war. To counter this, Saudi Arabia, with the help of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) , forced an agreement that provided for the abdication of āliḥ in favor of Vice-President ʿAbd Rabbuh Manṣur Hādī as compensation for the impunity of Ṣāliḥ. However, the GCC initiative failed because of the complexity of the various institutional and political problems. While the power struggle between the political actors of the time of Tāliḥ continued, the north and south of the country remained unstable and the economic prospects remained hopeless. Due to the lack of a general solution strategy for the structural problems of the Yemen, the Saudi efforts were limited to financial compensation to the various political actors in order to prevent the Yemen from drifting further into an uncontrollable chaos.

Bahrain is a special case in which Saudi Arabia intervened directly and without negotiations. After the al-Ḫalīfa family found themselves in increasing distress as a result of the demonstrations in March 2011 , Saudi Arabia sent a 1000-strong force as part of the Gulf Cooperation Council to suppress the Shiite uprising. As a result of the intervention, the Bahraini government advocated a union of the Gulf States, but this was rejected by Kuwaiti government representatives in February 2012.

Saʿūd Ibn Faiṣal Ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz as-Saʿūd with Condoleezza Rice

In the wake of the civil war in Syria , Saudi Arabia adopted official rhetoric directed against President Baššār Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad in February 2012 . During an international conference of the Friends of Syria in Tunis , Foreign Minister Saʿūd al-Faiṣal said it was a good idea to arm the Syrian insurgents. The biggest concerns, however, were a turn in favor of Iran, after the political turn in Iraq in favor of Shiite rule under Nūrī al-Mālikī was seen as a heavy blow to the strategic interests of the Sunni-dominated Gulf states. In addition, there was the increasing unrest in the Shiite strongholds of the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, which are said to have important connections to important Shiite regime critics in Syria. For fear of a strengthening of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria on the one hand, and a strengthening of radical groups such as Ǧabha an-Nuṣra, who sympathized with al-Qāʿida, as well as the tolerable experience of supporting jihadist Salafist forces as active critics of the Saʿūd 's claim to leadership on the other Side, the focus was on supporting moderate groups. Finally, in April 2013, Jordan officially agreed to the transfer of arms deliveries from ar-Riyāḍ via Amman to Syria worth a billion dollars. In the Muslim Brotherhood in particular, one sees an adversary on the level of political Islam who, due to its popular ideology and distinctive form of organization, could also become a serious threat in one's own country.

Domestic political challenges since 2010

Despite increasing oil revenues and extensive investment programs in education, infrastructure and welfare, Saudi Arabia is faced with the problem of a rapidly growing population. While an elite class of entrepreneurs with ties to the royal family benefited from this trend, it failed to create sufficient employment opportunities for the majority of the young population. Almost 40% of the Saudi population between the ages of 20 and 24 is unemployed today. With a rate of 64.6% as university graduates, women are particularly affected. The resulting lack of prospects and the limited economic opportunities resulted in several reform calls from liberals, conservative-religious, women and non-Saudis.

In the climate of the Arab Spring, there were several public protests and petitions in Saudi Arabia from 2011. After a self-immolation in Şāmita and street demonstrations in Ğidda in January 2011, protest marches followed in Qaṭīf, Hufūf, al-ʿAwāmiyya and ar-Riyāḍ. The protests in Qaṭīf intensified in 2012 when the Shiite cleric Nimr Bāqir an-Nimr was arrested by security forces on July 8, 2012 during an exchange of fire. Already in 2009 he called for the secession of the oil-rich Shiite region. On the other hand, there were more moderate responses from liberal and conservative intellectuals in the form of various petitions. While the Declaration on National Reform (Ilān watani lil-Islaḥ) advocated a constitutional monarchy with a federal orientation, Towards a State of Institutions and Rights (Naḥwa Daulat al-Ḥuqūq wa-l-Muʾassasa) presented itself with an Islamic rhetoric. In addition, the Salafist Ḥizb al-ʿUmma al-Islāmī and its demand for the release of prisoners formed the first opposition party in 2011. In mid-2011, a group of women led by Manāl aš-Šarīf demanded the right to drive.

ʿAbd Allaah responded to these internal developments with a series of social and institutional reforms. In 2006, the King ʿAbd Allāh Scholarship Program was an extensive state-funded grant that was intended to enable students to study at Western universities. Important posts in the education sector were filled with new liberal personalities. In February 2009, ʿAbd Allāh's half-brother Faiṣal was appointed Minister of Education and Nūra Bint ʿAbd Allāh al-Fāyiz as his deputy. Non-religious subjects became compulsory at Islamic universities. In order to create more perspectives for the Saudi women, new universities were founded and new job opportunities were created. The critical dependence on oil revenues in view made him pursue an economic reform policy. These included the withdrawal of state regulatory measures, the admission of foreign investments and moderate privatizations. He also replaced key positions within the religious police , such as ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Humāyūn, with moderate candidates and had them severely restricted in their powers after increased attacks on women and expatriates.

On the one hand, ʿAbd Allaah's approach to the various groups prevented the consolidation of a unified national Saudi opposition, on the other hand, Wahhabi circles increasingly distanced themselves from some reforms. Thus remembered Sheikh Nasr al-Umar to the dependence of the Saud on the goodwill of the spiritual and threatened at the same time in a further deviation from the principles Wahhabee, with mobilization against the government.

List of kings

See also

literature

  • Uwidah Metaireek al-Juhany: Najd Before the Salafi Reform Movement: Social, Political and Religious Conditions During the Three Centuries Preceding the Rise of the Saudi State. Ithaca Press 2002.
  • Madawi al-Rasheed: A History of Saudi Arabia . 2nd edition Cambridge University Press , Cambridge 2010, ISBN 978-0-521-76128-4 (hardback) or ISBN 978-0-521-74754-7 (paperback)
  • Madawi al-Rasheed: Contesting the Saudi State. Islamic Voices from a New Generation. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2007.
  • Madawi al-Rasheed: Saudi Arabia: local and regional challenges. In: Contemporary Arab Affairs, 6: 1, pp. 28–40, Roudledge, London 2013.
  • Fahd A. al-Simari: The Beginnings of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In: Roads of Arabia - Archaeological Treasures from Saudi Arabia. [Exhibition catalog]. Ed .: Museum for Islamic Art - State Museums in Berlin. Berlin 2011, ISBN 978-3-88609-721-0 , pp. 282-287.
  • Ayman al-Yassini: Religion and State in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Westview Press, Boulder 1985.
  • Jörg-Dieter Brandes: ... with saber and Koran. Saudi Arabia, or the rise of the Saud royal family and the Wahabi people. Stuttgart 1999. ISBN 3-7995-0094-4
  • James Buchan: Secular and Religious Opposition in Saudi Arabia . Croom Helm Ltd., Beckenham / Kent 1982.
  • Thomas Hegghammer: Jihad in Saudi Arabia. Violence and Pan-Islamism since 1979. Cambridge [u. a.]: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2010.
  • Michael Heim: The dead sheikh in the Saud household. The fateful history of Wahhabism. In: Blätter für Deutsche und Internationale Politik 10/2004, pp. 1262–1269.
  • Philip K. Hitti : History of the Arabs . Macmillan, London 1970.
  • Joseph A. Kechichian: Islamic Revivalism and Change in Saudi Arabia: Juhaymān al-ʿUtaibīs “Letters” to the Saudi People. In: The Muslim World. Vol. 80, pp. 1-16, 1990.
  • Joseph Kostiner: On Instruments and Their Designers: The Ikhwan of Najd and the Emergence of the Saudi State. In: Middle Eastern Studies. Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 298-323, 1985.
  • St. John Philby: Sa'udi Arabia . London 1955; New edition: Beirut 1968.
  • Joseph Kostiner: The Making of Saudi Arabia 1916–1936. Oxford University Press, NY 1993.
  • Ulrike Freitag : Helpless Representatives of the Great Powers? Western Consuls in Jeddah, 1830s to 1914. In: The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History. Vol. 40, No. 3, pp. 357-381, 2012.
  • Ulrike Freitag: The City and the Stranger: Jeddah in the 19th Century. In: Ulrike Freitag et al. (Ed.): The City in the Ottoman Empire. Migration and the making of urban modernity. Routledge, London 2011, pp. 218-227. ISBN 978-0-415-58363-3
  • Ulrike Freitag: The German Contribution to Knowledge of the Historical Heritage of Jeddah, and to Urban Preservation in the Middle East. In: The Saudi Commission for Tourism and Antiquities: Research & Heritage: Research papers on Architectural Heritage. Riyadh 2011, pp. 42-53. ISBN 978-6-03-802267-2
  • Ulrike Freitag (Ed.): Saudi Arabia - A Kingdom in Transition? Schöningh, Paderborn 2010. ISBN 978-350-67693-2-9
  • Guido Steinberg: Saudi Arabia - Politics, History, Religion. C. H. Beck, Munich 2004.
  • Guido Steinberg: The Wahhabi Ulama and the Saudi State: 1745 to the Present. In: Aarts / Nonneman: Saudi Arabia in the Balance - Political Economy, Society, Foreign Affairs. Hurst & Co., 2005.
  • Alexei Vassiliev: The History of Saudi Arabia. New York 2000, ISBN 0-8147-8809-2
  • James Wynbrandt: A Brief History of Saudi Arabia. 2nd ed., NY 2010.
  • Mai Yamani : Cradle of Islam: The Hijaz and the Quest for an Arabian Identity. Tauris, London 2004.
  • Bernard Haykel: Saudi Arabia and Qatar in a Time of Revolution. CSIS - Middle East Program, Gulf Analysis Paper 2013. [1]

Web links

Commons : History of Saudi Arabia  - Collection of pictures, videos and audio files

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Philipp Drechsler: Palaeolithic - Neolithic: Natural and cultural area. In: Roads of Arabia - Archaeological Treasures from Saudi Arabia. [Exhibition catalog]. Ed .: Museum for Islamic Art - State Museums in Berlin. Berlin 2011, ISBN 978-3-88609-721-0 , pp. 59-65.
  2. ^ Ute Franke: Between Euphrates and Indus: the Arabian Peninsula from 3500–1700 BC Chr. In: Roads of Arabia - Archaeological Treasures from Saudi Arabia. [Exhibition catalog]. Ed .: Museum for Islamic Art - State Museums in Berlin. Berlin 2011, ISBN 978-3-88609-721-0 , pp. 78-88.
  3. ^ Ute Franke: Between Euphrates and Indus: the Arabian Peninsula from 3500–1700 BC Chr. In: Roads of Arabia - Archaeological Treasures from Saudi Arabia. [Exhibition catalog]. Ed .: Museum for Islamic Art - State Museums in Berlin. Berlin 2011, ISBN 978-3-88609-721-0 , pp. 73-82.
  4. ↑ Daniel Thomas Potts: The old Arabia in historical sources. In: Roads of Arabia - Archaeological Treasures from Saudi Arabia. [Exhibition catalog]. Ed .: Museum for Islamic Art - State Museums in Berlin. Berlin 2011, ISBN 978-3-88609-721-0 , pp. 87-101.
  5. ↑ Laila Nehmé: The Nabataeans in northwest Arabia . In: Roads of Arabia - Archaeological Treasures from Saudi Arabia. [Exhibition catalog]. Ed .: Museum for Islamic Art - State Museums in Berlin. Berlin 2011, ISBN 978-3-88609-721-0 , pp. 137-143.
  6. ↑ Arnulf house manager: The ancient Tayma ': an oasis in the contact area of ​​cultures . In: Roads of Arabia - Archaeological Treasures from Saudi Arabia. [Exhibition catalog]. Ed .: Museum for Islamic Art - State Museums in Berlin. Berlin 2011, ISBN 978-3-88609-721-0 , pp. 103-123.
  7. ↑ Said al-Said: Dedan: Treasures of a brilliant culture . In: Roads of Arabia - Archaeological Treasures from Saudi Arabia. [Exhibition catalog]. Ed .: Museum for Islamic Art - State Museums in Berlin. Berlin 2011, ISBN 978-3-88609-721-0 , pp. 125-153.
  8. ^ Michael Marx: Writings and Languages ​​of Arabia - a tour . In: Roads of Arabia - Archaeological Treasures from Saudi Arabia. [Exhibition catalog]. Ed .: Museum for Islamic Art - State Museums in Berlin. Berlin 2011, ISBN 978-3-88609-721-0 , pp. 181-193.
  9. ^ NN: Objects Mada'in Salih . In: Roads of Arabia - Archaeological Treasures from Saudi Arabia. [Exhibition catalog]. Ed .: Museum for Islamic Art - State Museums in Berlin. Berlin 2011, ISBN 978-3-88609-721-0 , p. 148.
  10. ↑ Madawi al-Rasheed: A History of Saudi Arabia . Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2002, p. 16.
  11. ↑ Madawi al-Rasheed: A History of Saudi Arabia . Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2002, p. 18.
  12. ↑ Al-Simari, p. 284.
  13. ↑ Hans Jansen : Mohammed. A biography. (2005/2007) Translated from the Dutch by Marlene Müller-Haas. CH Beck, Munich 2008, ISBN 978-3-406-56858-9 , p. 83 f.
  14. ↑ James Wynbrandt: A Brief History of Saudi Arabia , 2nd ed. NY 2010, p. 190.
  15. ↑ Madawi al-Rasheed: A History of Saudi Arabia . Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2002, pp. 103-104.
  16. ↑ James Wynbrandt: A Brief History of Saudi Arabia. Infobase Publishing, 2nd ed., NY 2010, p. 195.
  17. ↑ Alexei Vassiliev: The History of Saudi Arabia . NYU Press, NY 2000, p. 387.
  18. ↑ See al-Rasheed: Contesting the Saudi State. 2007, p. 66.
  19. ↑ Alexei Vassiliev: The History of Saudi Arabia . NYU Press, NY 2000, p. 393.
  20. ↑ Cary Fraser: In Defense of Allah's Realm: Religion and Statecraft in Saudi Foreign Policy Strategy , in: Rudolph / Piscatori: Transnational Religion and Fading States. Westview Press, Oxford 1997, p. 222.
  21. ↑ James Buchan: Secular and Religious Opposition in Saudi Arabia , in: Niblock: State, Society and Economy in Saudi Arabia. Croom Helm Ltd., Beckenham / Kent 1982, p. 122.
  22. ↑ Ayman al-Yassini: Religion and State in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Westview Press, Boulder 1985, p. 124.
  23. ↑ Madawi al-Rasheed: James Wynbrandt: A Brief History of Saudi Arabia. 2nd edition NY 2010, p. 245.
  24. ^ Greg Mortenson: Three Cups of Tea: One Man's Mission to Fight Terrorism and Build Nations-- One School at a Time . Penguin Group, London 2006.
  25. ↑ Madawi al-Rasheed: A History of Saudi Arabia . Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2002, p. 148.
  26. ↑ Madawi al-Rasheed: A History of Saudi Arabia. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2002, p. 150.
  27. ↑ Madawi al-Rasheed: A History of Saudi Arabia . Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2002, p. 166.
  28. ↑ Wording of the law on the American embassy website of Saudi Arabia ( Memento from August 28, 2012 in the Internet Archive )
  29. ↑ Madawi al-Rasheed: A History of Saudi Arabia . Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2002, pp. 176-184.
  30. ↑ James Wynbrandt: A Brief History of Saudi Arabia , 2nd Edition NY 2010, p. 263.
  31. ↑ Joas Wagemakers: A quietist Jihadi: the ideology and influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi . Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge [and a.], 2012. pp. 120-138.
  32. ↑ F. Madawi al-Rasheed: Saudi Arabia: local and regional challenges. Contemporary Arab Affairs, 6: 1, 2013, pp. 33–34
  33. ^ F. Gregory Gause: Saudi Arabia in the New Middle East. Council on Foreign Relations Special Report No. 6, 2011, p. 18.
  34. ↑ Foreign Policy: Saudi Arabia Is Arming the Syrian Opposition.
  35. ↑ Jordan to spearhead Saudi Arabian arms drive.
  36. ↑ Emirates 24/7 News: 43% of Saudi youth are jobless
  37. ↑ a b tradingeconomics.com: Unemployment with tertiary education female in Saudi Arabia.
  38. ↑ Jadaliyya.com: A Call From Saudi Intellectuals to the political leadership.
  39. ^ Translated version of the Declaration on National Reform by the blogger al-ʿUmra.
  40. ^ Human Rights Watch: Saudi Arabia: Free Cleric Who Backs Change.
  41. ↑ Bikyamasr.com: Saudi crackdown against Islamic Omma Party. ( Memento of May 8, 2012 in the Internet Archive )
  42. ↑ Website of the group (Arabic)