Magnetic express train Berlin – Hamburg

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Berlin – Hamburg high-speed maglev train was a high-speed maglev project for the line between Berlin and Hamburg in the 1990s that did not get beyond the planning phase. The project that failed in February 2000 resulted in the Metrorapid (Düsseldorf-Dortmund) and the Transrapid Munich, two further, also canceled, Transrapid regional transport projects.

Around 400 million D-Marks (around 200 million euros) were invested in the project, which was canceled after an eight-year planning phase.

course

The route should go from Hamburg Hauptbahnhof ( route kilometer 0.0) with stops in Hamburg-Moorfleet (km 7.2), Holthusen (south of Schwerin , km 99.0) and Berlin-Spandau (km 278.4) to Berlin Hauptbahnhof ( km 290.8) and run almost entirely north of the existing Berlin – Hamburg line. Between Hamburg and the Schwerin area, the route should largely be bundled with the federal motorway 24 , in the southeast section partly parallel to the existing railway line. A center distance of around 15 m was planned between the existing railway line and the high-speed maglev line.

A total of 192 km (65%) of the route should run parallel to existing traffic routes (including high-voltage lines). Compared to the travel time of an ICE 3 of 82 minutes, the Transrapid could have covered the distance without intermediate stops in a maximum of 60 minutes. Taking into account the three planned stops, the travel time would also have been 82 minutes. A top speed of 450 km / h (in metropolitan areas a maximum of 250 km / h) or 500 km / h should be achieved.

Of the 292 km of the route, 45 km should run through Schleswig-Holstein , 90 km through Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and 125 km through Brandenburg . 131 km of the 292 km should be erected on an elevated basis, the rest at ground level. In Perleberg (kilometer 166) one should depot arise in the vicinity of the two terminal stations beyond a storage and treatment facilities for five trains. The width of the traffic route should be between 10.10 and 11.40 m, depending on the speed. Nine transfer points were also planned.

The platforms should each be 130 m long and allow the use of five-section vehicles with 438 seats each in a two-class system. In 2nd class, seats 49 cm wide and 86 cm apart were provided. The central aisle should be 49 cm wide. For this purpose 55 units of the Transrapid 08 should be procured.

Hamburg section

In Hamburg the terminus was planned to be immediately south of the hall of the main train station in an elevated position between the branches to Harburg and Bergedorf, respectively. The route would have led through the Hühnerposten post office building in the direction of Högerdamm.

Section Berlin

At Berlin Central Station - according to the planning status from 1998 - the northern part of today's track 8 was to be used by the Transrapid, while the southern section was to serve as a butt track for the conventional railway. In addition, a two-lane Transrapid station was to be built at a distance of 40 m. Other considerations were to use one of the four platforms of the underground station exclusively for the (then two-lane) Transrapid. In 1996 it was planned to build a two-lane Transrapid station immediately east of the main train station (between the north-south S-Bahn platform and Humboldthafen , below Invalidenstraße ) on the minus 2 level of the main train station.

history

origin

After the readiness for use of the Transrapid maglev train had been confirmed in November 1991, the Federal Ministry of Transport had various routes examined from an economic and traffic perspective in 1992. The Berlin – Hamburg route emerged as the cheapest option, was selected for implementation and included in the federal transport infrastructure plan on July 15, 1992 . The forecasts for federal traffic route planning were based on 14.5 million travelers annually in 2010, with ten-minute intervals at peak times. After the decision to move the Bundestag and parts of the federal government to Berlin on June 20, 1991, a section between Berlin and Bonn was also examined for the 1992 Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan. This resulted in a “longer-term traffic perspective” for a later extension of the Berlin – Hamburg route in the direction of Bremen - Ruhr area - Cologne - Bonn .

In March 1993, Thyssen, Siemens, Daimler-Benz and AEG jointly presented conceivable financing concepts for a 283 km high-speed maglev line between Berlin Westkreuz and Hamburg Hauptbahnhof. The planned travel time was 53 minutes; There were no intermediate stops. 7.2 billion D-Marks (price as of 1989, value today about 6,301,211,497) were planned. A traffic volume of 14.505 million people (4.10 billion person-kilometers) per year was expected, the fare per kilometer (at the price level in 1992) should be 39 pfennigs in the first and 26 pfennigs in the second class, the operating costs were 210 Million DM per year. The concept envisaged the award of a concession for construction and operation to an industrial consortium . Deutsche Bundesbahn and / or Lufthansa were intended to be the operator.

On December 8, 1993, the Federal Cabinet voted in favor of building the line. According to the plans, the final decision should be made in early 1994, construction should begin in 1996 and the line should go into operation in 2004. A significantly higher industry contribution to the project was cited as a requirement for final government approval. The operating company (with a value of 3.3 billion D-Marks) was to be organized privately, while the federal government wanted to finance the route (5.6 billion D-Marks). Deutsche Bahn and Lufthansa were supposed to act as operators and together they wanted to pay 300 million D-Mark equity into the operating company. On March 2, 1994, the federal government decided to implement the planned maglev train. A new and upgraded route between Hamburg and Berlin, which was also being considered, was discarded, while an upgrade to 200 km / h was kept open as an option for upgrading the existing route to 160 km / h.

With the Magnetic Levitation Railway Planning Act of November 23, 1994, the Magnetic Levitation Railway Requirements Act as well as the General Magnetic Levitation Railway Act (dated July 19, 1996) and the Maglev Building and Operating Regulations of September 25, 1996, the legal basis was created. On September 23, 1997, valid from 1 October 1997, further maglev Regulation , in addition to the construction and operating regulations, the maglev noise protection ordinance and an addition to the roadway noise protection regulation comprised decided.

The project initially gave the Transrapid technology high public visibility and broad, cross-party support in parliament. The route was seen as a symbol of unity as well as the first application of an innovative technology developed in Germany with positive effects on industrial policy. This was also expressed in the establishment of a Transrapid parliamentary discussion group chaired by Hans Eichel .

planning

In 1994 a travel time (without stopping) of 53 minutes was assumed for a route length of 284 km and an operating speed of 400 km / h. The route should lead along the federal highway 24. Between the terminus of Hamburg Hauptbahnhof and Berlin Westkreuz, intermediate stops were planned in Billwerder - Moorfleet and Berlin-Spandau .

Construction costs of 5.6 billion D-Marks (around 2.9 billion euros) were planned for the route. A private company should also raise 3.3 billion D-Marks (around 1.7 billion euros) for the necessary vehicles. The company's planned equity of 1.5 billion D-Marks (around 0.8 billion euros) should therefore be provided by a holding company of industry and banks (a total of 700 million D-Marks), investors (500 million D-Marks ) as well as Lufthansa and Deutsche Bahn (a total of 300 million D-Marks). A single ticket should cost 80 D-Marks (around 41 euros), with 14.5 million passengers per year expected. The federal government expected to be able to refinance around half of the expenses for the route via user fees, but should also participate indirectly (via tax relief and investment subsidies) in the private company. The expected traffic volume of 14.5 million passengers per year would have quadrupled the number of travelers by plane and train to date in the mid-1990s. In February 1994, the transport science advisory board of the Federal Ministry of Transport criticized the concept. The 13 professors stated that the financing was not secured and that the risk participation of industry and banks was "unsatisfactory".

A consortium of Thyssen Industrie AG, Siemens, Daimler-Benz and AEG developed, with the participation of Deutsche Bank and the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, a concept for financing and private-sector operation. Of the total costs of 8.9 billion D-Marks (1993 prices), the federal government was supposed to bear 3.2 billion D-Marks - half of the travel costs. The concept was modified later (1997): According to this, Deutsche Bahn AG was to act as both the ordering party and the operator of the system, similar to the conventional new lines. The industry should make the system available to Deutsche Bahn for a fixed usage fee. The railway should therefore use the operating income to cover both the operating costs and the usage fee for the route. A third of the surplus should go to DB, industry and the federal government. The travel costs should be repaid in full in the long term.

At the beginning of 1995, the magnetic train planning company founded on October 13, 1994 with headquarters in Schwerin and offices in Berlin and Hamburg started its work. The Federal Republic of Germany (represented by the Federal Ministry of Transport), Thyssen Industrie AG, Siemens AG, AEG-Eisenbahnfahrzeuge GmbH, Dyckerhoff & Widmann AG, Hochtief AG, Philipp Holzmann AG and Deutsche Bahn AG acted as founding shareholders.

The plans at that time provided for the spatial planning and planning approval procedures to be completed by the end of 1998. Before that, a state track and a private operator company should be founded. The cost of the route was calculated in 1995 at 5.6 billion D-Marks, the necessary vehicles with a total of 3.3 billion DM. Based on the previous considerations, the planning company developed an operating concept that includes regular traffic of 10 to 15 minutes at peak hours regular operation between 6:00 a.m. and 1:00 a.m. with a total of 72 trains per day and direction.

Before the regional planning procedure, various routes between the Elbe in the south and the Mecklenburg-Brandenburg lake district in the north were worked out in a preliminary procedure. The most favorable rough corridors were identified on the one hand as a route along the A 24 and, on the other hand, a route along the A 25 , the B 5 , a 220 kV overhead line and various railway lines. For further optimization, various line designs were then developed and evaluated within these two corridors over a width of more than 4 km. A peripheral stop near Hamburg (in Moorfleet, Reinbek or Geesthacht) was controversial around 1996. The option of being able to set up a large number of parking spaces spoke in favor of such a stop, but the strong focus of Hamburg on the center and the good development of the main station with S-Bahn traffic spoke in favor of such a stop.

In the more polycentric Berlin, on the other hand, 15 corridors were initially examined to develop various stops. Westkreuz, Gesundbrunnen, Lehrter Bahnhof (now the main train station ) and the Papestrasse station (now Südkreuz ) were considered as terminus stations . In addition, a peripheral stop was sought for access by motorized individual traffic. From the 15 variants, three route variants were finally developed: the western entry line provided for a route via Spandau and corresponded to the original drafts. As alternatives, a variant via Gesundbrunnen to Lehrter Bahnhof and a variant via Velten and Hennigsdorf and Westend to Papestraße station were considered. In further studies, the route via Spandau to Westkreuz envisaged in the financing concept indicated a lower number of passengers than variants via Spandau to Papestrasse or Lehrter Bahnhof; the two terminal station variants were expected to have roughly the same number of passengers, with 40,000 to 45,000 boarding and alighting passengers each day. While the variant via Gesundbrunnen was removed from the further procedure due to the less attractive traffic connection, further investigations led to the fact that the destination station Lehrter Bahnhof was preferred to the station Papestrasse. A continuation of the maglev train from Lehrter Bahnhof to Südkreuz, including an approximately 2 km long tunnel, should be kept open in the long term.

At the beginning of 1996 Dyckerhoff & Widmann withdrew from the planning company without giving any reasons. As a result, Deutsche Bahn joined the company and acquired 12.5 percent of the shares for 125,000 DM.

In the coalition agreement of the red-green federal government , 6.1 billion D-Marks (3.1 billion euros ) were earmarked for the construction of the line in 1998 . This corresponded to the cost level for the route that had been agreed in a key point paper between the federal government, DB and industry in April 1997.

An estimate by Industry and DB from late summer assumed the cost of the route to be 7.5 billion DM, whereas the vehicles required should cost only 3.7 billion DM instead of 4.4. In mid-1999, press reports assumed additional costs compared to the original level of around 1.5 billion D-Marks (around 0.8 billion euros). According to industry figures, around 8,000 jobs should be created in steel and civil engineering during the eight-year construction period, and another 4,000, particularly in the areas of vehicle construction, electronics and electrical engineering.

After a "preferential route" had been determined between the five federal states involved, the regional planning procedures began in July and August 1996 . With various changes, all five proceedings were completed by June 24, 1997. On November 7, 1997 the final route was determined. The consortium companies involved agreed on the planning company's supervisory board to run the route from Hamburg via Autobahn 1 and 24 to Schwerin. Then you should reach Berlin-Spandau via Perleberg, Nauen and Wustermark and finally the Lehrter train station. On April 8, 1998, the first of 20 plan approval procedures began for a 14 km long section southwest of Schwerin. The first planning approval decisions were expected in mid-1999 for the turn of 1999/2000, the rest should follow in 2000. The start of operations was expected in 2006.

At the end of 1996, railway boss Heinz Dürr announced in an interview that long- distance passenger rail traffic on the existing line would be discontinued after the Transrapid went into operation. A traffic forecast in 1998 saw a traffic volume of 11.4 to 15.2 million Transrapid passengers between the two cities in 2010 . Between 6 a.m. and 1 a.m., 51 trains per day and direction should run. At rush hour, a 20-minute cycle was initially planned, which was later to be reduced to a 15-minute cycle. With the assumed passenger numbers, revenues between 800 and 950 million D-Marks per year were expected. A zero profit should already be achieved at 72 percent of the lower value of 11.4 million passengers.

At the end of 1997, the federal government pushed for construction to start before the 1998 federal election .

The project has been included in the Trans-European Networks of the European Union .

From August 6, 1998, a true-to-original Transrapid model in ICE design in Schwerin and at Hamburg Central Station advertised the project. The first groundbreaking should take place in 1998, and from autumn 1999 the start of large-scale construction in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania.

At the beginning of 1999 it became foreseeable that the planned commissioning of the line would be postponed by one year, to October 2006. The Maglev Planungsgesellschaft justified the delays with uncertainties caused by new EC environmental directives. At this point in time, the hearing in the course of the planning approval procedure was completed in one section, and the documents were available in another. The remaining 18 plan approval procedures were to be carried out in 1999. In the 1999 transport budget, 249 million D-Marks should be earmarked for the project.

In mid-1999 the award procedure for the guideway girders was in its final stage, the concrete and steel guideway components were waiting for approval by the Federal Railway Authority. The Federal Railway Authority had previously refused approval for the concrete driveway used on the Emsland Transrapid test facility due to technical defects. As a result, Thyssen developed a new steel guideway.

Failure of the project

Various reports criticized the planning in the 1990s and pointed in particular to similarly fast, but far more cost-effective solutions with new and upgraded routes of the conventional wheel-rail system . In October 1995 the group of the Greens in the German Bundestag applied for the project to be discontinued and the existing railway line to be expanded. The state of Schleswig-Holstein brought an action against the maglev train before the Federal Constitutional Court . In April 1999, figures became known that the construction of the line would cost up to 1.1 billion D-Marks more than initially planned. In addition, the number of passengers had been set too high by up to a third.

At a hearing before the Transport Committee of the German Bundestag, Transport Minister Matthias Wissmann emphasized in mid-January 1997 that there would be no "Transrapid at any price". He referred to the lack of up-to-date data on costs and revenues. The chairman of Thyssen, who coordinated the project, said the traffic lights for the maglev train were "only yellow". Without the reference route between Berlin and Hamburg, the Transrapid technology “does not stand a chance of export”. Schleswig-Holstein's Prime Minister Heide Simonis described the statements by Wissmann as an “entry into the exit” of the project. The BUND criticized in early 1997 commissioned study presented by Vieregg Rössler -Bohm , energy consumption in the transport between Hamburg, Schwerin and Berlin would be three times its current condition.

On April 25, 1997, Federal Transport Minister Wissmann presented a new profitability calculation for the project in Bonn. The project costs rose by around one billion to 9.8 billion D-Marks, the expected revenues and the planned transport service were corrected downwards. For 2010, between 11.4 and 15.2 million passengers were expected, corresponding to 2.6 to 3.5 billion passenger kilometers (previously: 4.1 billion pkm). In the mid-1990s, the number of travelers (all modes of transport) between Berlin and Hamburg was around 15 million. The proceeds (price as of 1996) were estimated at 700 to 950 million Deutschmarks annually (previously: 1.15 billion DM). The minister emphasized that after the revision of the financing and management structure that had been submitted, the signals for the route were "clearly green". He expected the creation of 18,000 jobs during the construction phase and 4,400 permanent jobs in the operating phase. Commissioning was expected for 2005 at this point in time.

In the spring of 1999 it became apparent that the Supervisory Board of Deutsche Bahn AG would reject the company's participation in the project. An expert report, which was still unpublished at the time, showed that the number of passengers was 28 percent too high, but the construction costs were set too low. In its meeting on May 11, 1999, the Supervisory Board of DB AG requested the Management Board to submit updated figures and an assessment of the study by July 17, 1999. At the presentation of the 1998 annual balance sheet, Johannes Ludewig said that if the Transrapid failed , as part of the Netz 21 strategy, a second route between Berlin and Hamburg would have to be built to separate fast and slow traffic. At InnoTrans 1998, Ludewig emphasized that after twenty years of development it would be a shame not to build the Transrapid. You have to realize it and see what it costs.

The updated passenger forecast presented by Deutsche Bahn in the late summer of 1999 assumed 6.28 million passengers in the forecast year 2010 instead of 12 to 14 million.

Shortly before, the Magnetschnellbahn-Fahrweggesellschaft (FWG) had confirmed a cost increase for the project to over seven billion Deutschmarks. The increase was due to the price increase since 1996.

On September 16, 1999, the Federal Ministry of Transport suggested that the line should initially be single-lane. At least three two-lane intersection sections would have to be provided, an originally planned Sprinter line (without stops at subway stations) could not have been implemented. Critics complained that double-track sections with a total length that would have been almost half the length of the route would be required for even moderately stable operations. Furthermore, the travel time would have had to be increased by a quarter of an hour and the operating concept had to be changed from a 20-minute to a 30-minute cycle. In addition to the previously presented concept with stationary crossings (one of the two trains stops), a concept with flying crossings was presented at the end of 1999 , in which neither of the two crossing trains should stop. In order to further reduce costs, it was proposed in mid-December 1999 that the Holthusen stop near Schwerin should not be used. The route length would have been reduced from 292 to around 279 kilometers. Critics complained that the operating deficit would continue to rise from 63 million DM per year (single-lane with flying crossings) to 77 million DM per year.

In 1999 guarantees from individual federal states for project financing were also considered. According to media reports, it was already clear to the federal government at the beginning of December 1999 that the Transrapid project would have failed because the risks for Deutsche Bahn as the operator were too high. The federal government had already declared in the late summer of 1999 that it would not participate in the project beyond the promised 6.1 billion D-Marks. At this point in time, the cost forecasts for the route were two to three billion DM higher. In the late summer of 1999, the project was one of those that probably should not be implemented due to the federal government's austerity constraints.

At its meeting on December 1, 1999, the Supervisory Board of Deutsche Bahn rejected a decision on the project and instructed the Board of Management to examine the effects of the guarantees offered by some federal states on the profitability of the project. At the end of December 1999, the new railway boss Hartmut Mehdorn announced that there would be "definitely no Transrapid" if the state and industry did not improve their services.

At the end of 1999 there was already an alternative scenario within the railways in the event that the Transrapid project should fail. With a top speed of 200 km / h, a travel time of less than two hours should be possible, with an upgrade to 230 km / h of 90 minutes. Shortly before the project failed, there were blame and claims for damages from the industry.

On February 5, 2000, the Federal Ministry of Transport, Deutsche Bahn and the industrial companies involved decided to cancel the project. After a top-level discussion, the participants made a joint declaration that the project had failed, emphasized the importance of the Transrapid for Germany as an industrial location and agreed on the continued operation of the Transrapid test facility in Emsland . The federal government committed itself to promoting the further development of the Transrapid (especially for regional traffic). In addition, the examination of alternative routes was agreed; Feasibility studies should be submitted for decision-making within two years.

At the end of February 2000, the federal government, the federal states and the DB AG agreed to examine five alternative Transrapid projects and to decide on them within two years. Should be examined connections of the airports Munich ( Transrapid Munich ) and Berlin-Schoenefeld to the city center, a transport concept in the Ruhr area ( Metro Rapid ), a Transrapid route from Hamburg to the Netherlands as well as a link between the Frankfurt airport and the airport Hahn . These application routes were suggested by the federal states. Based on the results of the investigation, the decision was made in October 2000 to continue the Munich Airport and Metrorapid projects and to evaluate them in a feasibility study with an integrated environmental impact study. The results of this study were presented on January 21, 2002 in Berlin. The project in the Ruhr area was discontinued in 2003, the Transrapid Munich in 2008.

Occasionally, a new railway line between Berlin and Hamburg was requested in order to shorten the travel time between the two cities to around an hour. At the DB balance sheet press conference on May 10, 2000, the expansion of the existing railway line for 230 km / h (travel time: 90 minutes) was announced. The corresponding work took place between 2002 and 2004. The travel time of the ICE trains running on the route has thus been reduced from around 135 to around 100 minutes (without intermediate stops).

In his biography, the former DB CEO Mehdorn names several reasons for the failure of the project: Deutsche Bahn should have assumed all the risks, the investment risk was far too high, the assumed passenger numbers were "simply utopian". Furthermore, the lack of patency of the Transrapid traffic (transfer obligation for further trips) was a major reason for the failure of the project.

literature

Individual evidence

  1. ^ A b Rudolf Breimeier: The fast railway connection Hamburg - Berlin . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , issue 7/2000, ISSN  1421-2811 , pp. 328–335.
  2. ↑ a b c d e f Rudolf Breimeier: Transrapid Hamburg - Berlin single-track, a sensible solution? (Supplement to the article of the same name in ERI 11/1999). In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , issue 1/2000, p. 42 f.
  3. ↑ a b c d e f g h i Federal Ministry of Transport (ed.): The Transrapid is on the track: Hamburg – Berlin in an hour . Brochure (14 A4 pages), Bonn 1998.
  4. ↑ a b c d e Better plans in the closet . In: Der Spiegel . No. 44 , 1998, pp. 78 ( online ).
  5. ↑ a b c d e f g h Horst Fechner: The Transrapid - Environmentally friendly floating in the center of Berlin. In: Railway metropolis Berlin. Hestra, Darmstadt 1996, ISBN 3-7771-0264-4 , pp. 87-93.
  6. ↑ a b c d e f g h i j k l Horst Fechner: The Transrapid Berlin – Hamburg. In: The Railway Engineer . Volume 50, 1999, issue 7, pp. 12-17.
  7. ^ A b Rudolf Breimeier: Transrapid: Another project? . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , issue 11/2005, pp. 547–549.
  8. ↑ a b c Message Transrapid without a chance? In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , issue 1/2, 1998, ISSN 1421-2811 , p. 4. 
  9. ↑ Plan approval documents from 1998
  10. ↑ The foundation stone for the Lehrter station sunk - and for the Transrapid at the same time. In: LOK Report , Issue 11, 1998, p. 16.
  11. ^ Sven Andersen: Berlin - unused capacities for decades. In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , issue 10/2005, pp. 492–494.
  12. ↑ a b Hans Georg Raschbichler: Magnetic Levitation Transrapid - The Innovation in Railway Technology. In: Horst J. Obermayer (Hrsg.): International express traffic. Super trains in Europe and Japan. Franckh-Kosmos, Stuttgart 1994, ISBN 3-440-06775-0 , pp. 168-175.
  13. ^ Hans Peter Weber, Michael Rebentisch: The Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan 1992 for the rail sector. In: Railway technical review . Volume 41, No. 7/8, July / August 1992, p. 454.
  14. ↑ Magnetschnellbahn Berlin – Hamburg GmbH: Financing concepts for the Magnetschnellbahn Berlin – Hamburg. Summary. Brochure (32 A4 pages), Munich, March 1993.
  15. ↑ Message green light for the Transrapid. In: Eisenbahn-Kurier , issue 1/1994, p. 20.
  16. ↑ Michael Bauchmüller The magic formula no longer works . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , September 1, 2007.
  17. ↑ a b Transrapid in suspension . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , No. 42, 1994, ISSN  0174-4917 , p. 4.
  18. ↑ a b German Bundestag (ed.): Application (...): Stop the preparatory measures for the Transrapid and plan an ICE connection Hamburg-Berlin (PDF; 378 kB). Printed matter 13/2573 of October 10, 1995.
  19. ↑ a b Without author: Maglev connection Berlin – Hamburg . In: Baukultur , Heft 3, 1994, pp. 68-69, ISSN  0722-3099 .
  20. ↑ a b Plans for the Berlin – Hamburg maglev train . In: ZUG , No. 5, 1995, without ISSN, p. 11.
  21. ↑ Message: Transrapid: Dywidag gets out, DB AG gets in . In: Schiene , issue 2/1996, ISSN  0932-2574 , p. 13.
  22. ↑ a b Transrapid in suspension . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , No. 138, 1999, ISSN  0174-4917 , p. 1.
  23. ^ Announcement Müntefering new Minister of Transport . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , Issue 12, 1998, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 507 f.
  24. ↑ a b Report on the Transrapid model revealed . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , Issue 9, 1998, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 394.
  25. ^ The route of the Transrapid leads via Schwerin . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , No. 257, 1997, ISSN  0174-4917 , p. 6.
  26. ↑ News update shortly . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , Issue 6, 1998, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 228.
  27. ↑ Message: Transrapid should replace InterCity . In: Schiene , ISSN  0932-2574 , issue 6/1996, p. 14.
  28. ^ Transrapid report a year later . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , Issue 3, 1999, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 59.
  29. ↑ Report on the 1999 transport budget . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , Issue 9, 1998, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 338 f.
  30. ↑ a b Report Transrapid route more expensive . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , Issue 7/8, year 1999, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 284.
  31. ↑ Ade Transrapid message ? . In: Eisenbahn-Kurier , No. 321, June 2001, ISSN  0170-5288 , p. 5.
  32. ↑ A slight chance . In: Der Spiegel , issue 4/1997, p. 37.
  33. ↑ Message: Transrapid is about to collapse . In: Schiene , ISSN  0932-2574 , p. 18.
  34. ^ Announcement Klimakiller Magnetbahn . In: Schiene , Issue 2/1997, ISSN  0932-2574 , p. 16.
  35. ↑ Transrapid forced to float . In: Schiene , issue 3/1997, ISSN  0932-2574 , pp. 15-17
  36. ^ Message Transrapid on the dump . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , issue 6, year 1999, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 227.
  37. ↑ Message “Showdown” for the Transrapid? . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , Issue 7/8, year 1999, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 284.
  38. ↑ Message lunch on the stage . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , Issue 12, 1998, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 523.
  39. ↑ a b Report on Transrapid future still unclear . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , issue 9, year 1999, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 339.
  40. ^ Rudolf Breimeier: Transrapid Hamburg - Berlin single lane, a sensible solution? In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , issue 11, year 1999, ISSN  1421-2811 , pp. 458-460.
  41. ^ Rudolf Breimeier: A single-track economy version of the Transrapid project Hamburg - Berlin . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , issue 2/2000, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 58 f.
  42. ↑ Bahn Supervisory Board stops “Stuttgart 21” . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , No. 279, 1999, ISSN  0174-4917 , p. 25.
  43. ↑ Announcement Billion Holes . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , issue 10, year 1999, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 401.
  44. ↑ Notification No decisions . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , issue 1/2000, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 2.
  45. ↑ “We don't hang the millstone Transrapid around our necks” . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , No. 303, 1999, ISSN  0174-4917 , p. 28.
  46. ↑ DEUTSCHE BAHN: Faster to Berlin? In: Der Spiegel . No. 46 , 1999, pp. 115 ( Online - Nov. 15, 1999 ).
  47. ↑ a b Transrapid report failed . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , issue 3/2000, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 98.
  48. ^ Off for the Berlin-Hamburg route . In: Der Spiegel (online edition), February 5, 2000, accessed on August 14, 2009.
  49. ↑ Report Transrapid alternatives . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , issue 4/2000, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 147.
  50. ↑ a b Feasibility study for maglev lines . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , Issue 3/2002, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 153.
  51. ↑ Report polemics instead of objectivity about the Transrapid? . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , issue 7/2000, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 302.
  52. ^ Announcement The balance sheet press conference on May 10, 2000 . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , issue 7/2000, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 303.
  53. ↑ Hartmut Mehdorn, Hugo Müller-Vogg: "I never wanted to be a diplomat". An interview with Hugo Müller-Vogg . 1st edition, Hoffmann and Campe, Hamburg 2007, ISBN 978-3-455-50047-9 , p. 125.