Battle of Lorraine
| date | 20th bis 22. August 1914 |
|---|---|
| place | Lorraine , France |
| output | German tactical victory |
| Parties to the conflict | |
|---|---|
| Commander | |
| Troop strength | |
| 3 armies with approx. 500,000 soldiers | 2 armies with approx. 400,000 soldiers |
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The Battle of Lorraine took place at the beginning of the First World War in August 1914 between French and German troops in Lorraine . After the French had launched an offensive in the realm of Alsace-Lorraine in accordance with Plan XVII , the Germans started a counterattack.
prehistory
In his campaign plan of 1905 ( Schlieffen Plan ), the then Chief of the Prussian General Staff Alfred von Schlieffen had only provided a weak cover army of 4.5 army corps (9 divisions ) for the left German wing . The right wing with the main force of the German field army (36 army corps) was to advance through Belgium , then pivot south, enclose Paris and fall in the rear of the main French forces standing on the Franco-German border between Metz and the Swiss border. At that time, Schlieffen described it as the “love service” of the French when they in turn attack the left German wing and advance towards the Rhine .
Schlieffen's plan was largely adopted by his successor Helmuth von Moltke . The final deployment plan, worked out in 1912 by the then chief of the operations department, Erich Ludendorff, differed greatly from Schlieffen's original plan in essential parts. The left German wing was reinforced to 8 army corps, almost doubling the original plan. This is all the more unusual as Ludendorff planned an attack on the Belgian border fortress of Liège with partially mobilized troops as early as the first days of the war. This attack would give the French early knowledge of German intentions and make a French attack on the German left wing all the less likely.
March
The deployment of the troops began in the first days of August. In mid-August 1914, the left German wing was divided, beginning east of Metz (from north to south):
- 6th Army (Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria ) with the III. and II. Bavarian Army Corps , the XXI. Army Corps , the I. Bavarian Reserve Corps and the 33rd Reserve Division
- 7th Army (General von Heeringen ) with the I. Bavarian Army Corps , the XIV. , XV. Army Corps , the XIV Reserve Corps and the 30th Reserve Division
Opposite the German troops marched (from north to south):
- French 2 e Armée (General de Castelnau ) with the XX., XV. and XVI. Army Corps and the 68th and 70th Reserve Divisions
- French 1 he Armée (General Dubail ) to the VIII., XIII., XXI. and XIV Army Corps
- Armée d'Alsace (General Pau ) with the VII Army Corps, the 58th, 66th, 63rd Reserve Divisions and the 44th Infantry Division
course
French attack, evasion by the Germans
Contrary to the expectations of the Supreme Army Command ('OHL'), the attack by the French main forces against the German left wing was very slow and with far less strength than hoped. By the evening of August 19, the 6th German Army had evaded the French advance on the Metz- Saarburg line and was thus about 30 km behind the former German-French border. It was becoming more and more obvious that the French would not allow themselves to be drawn any deeper into the trap intended, given the German advance into Belgium and the danger it posed. However, instead of withdrawing strong German forces from Lorraine and adding them to the right German wing as a reserve, the 6th Army, to which the 7th Army was also subordinated, was deployed to attack the French in an open field battle, despite the strong numerical inferiority of the Germans deliver. After the First World War, this decision was discussed in various disputes and writings and criticized as wrong, the responsibility for it being blamed primarily on the OHL or Crown Prince Rupprecht.
Battle between Saarburg and Mörchingen
The counterattack of the German 6th Army (Rupprecht von Bayern) on the front line Mörchingen - Dieuze - Saarburg took place in the morning hours of August 20th and hit the French 2nd Army (Castelnau), which was also advancing in turn, unexpectedly. On the right wing, the Bavarian II Corps (General Karl von Martini ) pushed back the French 70th Reserve Division near Delme and took Arraincourt . Left of it stopped the Bavarian III. Corps (General Ludwig von Gebsattel ) the further onslaught of the French 20th Corps (General Foch) on the heights of Morhange. In the center of the 6th Army, the XXI. Army Corps under General Fritz von Below in frontal advance on Dieuze the French XV. Corps ( General Espinasse ) returned and quickly gained ground. The 31st Division (Lieutenant General Albert von Berrer ) stormed Vergaville and the 42nd Division (Lieutenant General Hasso von Bredow ) occupied Dieuze. On the left wing of the 6th Army, the Bavarian I. Reserve Corps (General of the Infantry Karl von Fasbender ) and the Bavarian I. Army Corps (General of the Infantry Oskar von Xylander ) broke the resistance of the French VIII. Corps (General de Castelli ) and recaptured Saarburg . The corps of General Martini, working together with the fortress reserve of Metz (General of the Infantry von Winterfeld ) , broke through the lines of the French 68th and 70th Reserve Divisions in the Nomeny area and reached the Delmer Ridge - Fresnes-en line by the evening of August 21 -Saulnois .
Attack by the German 7th Army
The attack by the German 7th Army extended the German attack southwards - from Saarburg to Lützelhausen . The attack on the Donon , the northern summit of the Vosges , with which it was hoped to have a flank effect on the French 1st Army (General Dubail), initially failed with heavy losses. The German XIV. Army Corps (General of the Infantry Ernst von Hoiningen ) fought its way victoriously on the left wing of the 7th Army via Blâmont to Baccarat . Army Corps (General of the Infantry Berthold Deimling ) Badonviller . The XIV. Reserve Corps (General of the Artillery Richard von Schubert ), which had already been exhausted by the previous fighting in Alsace, gained hardly any land gains in the advance on Saint-Dié .
At noon on August 22nd, the French broke off the battle and began to retreat to the fortress chain Nancy - Épinal . The Bavarian II. Army Corps and the XXI. Army corps pursued the French on the line Lunéville - Blainville - Gerbéviller - St. Pierremont , south of it the corps of Generals Karl von Fasbender and Oskar von Xylander pushed the French XV. Corps (General Taverna) returned to the Avricourt - Blâmont - St. Pole line.
Aftertaste
Instead of finally pulling out the majority of the Crown Prince's troops and leading them to the right wing, where they would still have arrived in time before the start of the Battle of the Marne , the Supreme Command of the 6th Army ordered the fortress chain in front of Nancy - Épinal to be closed break through. This seems all the more astonishing since before the war it was considered impossible to break through this chain of fortresses and for this reason the violation of Belgian neutrality was first considered.
The German 6th Army pursued the French 2nd Army in the direction of the Meurthe , but was in turn defeated on August 25 by a strong counterattack by the French XX. Corps under General Ferdinand Foch surprised. The attempt of the 6th Army to break through the gap between the fixed place Épinal and the fixed place Toul in the battle of the Trouée de Charmes and thus to catch the French 3rd and 4th armies in the rear failed. The following Battle of Grand Couronne (4 to 13 September 1914) brought the German advance finally to a halt and led here to trench warfare .
rating
The battle of Lorraine has often been cited as a prime example of the superiority of the German soldier. Despite poor leadership, these vastly superior French elite units would have defeated in a frontal battle and forced to retreat.
More than the carefree and fearlessness of the Germans, other, more tangible factors are likely to have contributed significantly to this dubious victory. At the beginning of the war, the French field artillery only had low-level field cannons , but only a few high- speed cannons ( howitzers ) that could be used to attack concealed targets (especially machine gun nests) in archery. Like numerous other innovations, these guns were introduced in the German army during the Schlieffen era and made a significant contribution to the efficiency of the German army. Also not to be underestimated were the comfortable field-gray uniforms of the Germans, which, compared to the uncomfortable, brightly colored uniforms of the French, could not be clearly identified as a goal. In addition, the French leadership had shown no intention of fighting the battle through to the decision, but ordered the withdrawal as early as midday on August 20th. In fact, the battle was a tactical victory for the Germans, but it would only have gained strategic importance if at least one of the two armies was withdrawn from the left wing of the German army immediately after the beginning of the French retreat and the right wing, on which inevitably the Decision had to be made, would have followed. The breakthrough through the fortress line, however, had to fail. In fact, from the end of August a small French cover force was sufficient to neutralize two strong German armies. This was one, if not the decisive factor in the French victory in the Battle of the Marne.
Varia
The so-called “ Cross of Saarburg ” , a floor cross standing in Buhl-Lorraine , on which the cross was shot away by a grenade on August 20, 1914, is reminiscent of the “Battle of Saarburg” , which was part of the Battle of Lorraine , but the figure of Christ is upright stopped. It therefore became a popular postcard and flag motif.
literature
In German language
- Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria: My War Diary (3 vols.). Edited by Eugen von Frauenholz . Mittler, Berlin 1929
- The battle in Lorraine and in the Vosges 1914: The baptism of fire of the Bavarian Army (2 vol.) Ed. By the Bavarian War Archives, based on the war files of Karl Deuringer, Schick, Munich 1929.
In French
- Philippe Orain (Ed.): Les champs de bataille Alsace Moselle. Les combats des Vosges , pp. 55-133. Guides Touristique Michelin, Boulogne-Billancourt 2013. ISBN 978-2-06-717985-1
- Jacques Didier: Échec à Morhange. Août 1914, la bataille de Lorraine . Ysec, Louviers 2014. ISBN 978-2-84673-195-9
Web links
- Pierre's Western Front Page: South of Metz - German Bunkers-Fortifications (private homepage in English with photographs of former German and French positions; last checked on July 11, 2015)
Individual evidence
- ↑ Dieter Storz, 'This trench warfare and fortress war is hideous' . On the fighting in Lorraine and the Vosges in the summer of 1914 , in: Hans Ehlert, Michael Epkenhans , Gerhard P. Groß, " Der Schlieffenplan ", p. 161ff. Schöningh, Paderborn 2006 (2nd, complete edition 2007).
- ↑ Konrad Krafft von Dellmensingen : The Bavarian Book of World Wars , Chr.Belser, Stuttgart 1930, p. 35