Ukraine and the European Union

European Union Ukraine

The Ukraine is a neighbor of the European Union (EU) and is one of their possible candidate . In 2004 the then Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko announced that his country was aiming for EU membership soon. On September 9, 2008, Ukraine and the EU reached an agreement for an association agreement in Paris . In contrast to the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), however, this agreement is not necessarily the first step towards EU accession.

The official position of the European Commission reads: "The EU is striving for an increasingly close partnership with Ukraine, which aims at gradual economic integration and deepening political cooperation." Ukraine has been with the EU as a member of the Eastern Partnership and, since 2016, connected via the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA).

The European Union in Ukraine is officially represented by the European Union Delegation for Ukraine in Kiev .

history

prehistory

Eastern and southern Ukraine, conquered by Russia in the middle of the 17th century, were merged into the Russian governorate of New Russia from 1796 and came under Soviet rule after the October Revolution , which was only briefly interrupted by the German occupation. The Ukrainians of Galicia, on the other hand, had not even had two years of Soviet rule before the Second World War. This particular situation in western Ukraine made its integration into the Ukraine a problem for the Ukrainian Soviet Republic , to which it belonged from 1945 to 1991.

Much of western Ukraine belonged to Poland for a long time, from 1772 to Austria-Hungary and after the Polish-Soviet war again to Poland. The west of Ukraine has intensive contacts with Poland and tends towards a political orientation towards Europe .

The east and south of the country, on the other hand, still have a high percentage of the Russian population and this part of the country tends to maintain or strengthen its close ties to Russia. The industrialization of the Soviet Union led to a strong urbanization process in eastern Ukraine , while western Ukraine is still partly very rural today. The Ukrainian culture and language had in today's Eastern Ukraine always only a minor influence. From a religious point of view, too, there is a contrast between Eastern Ukraine, which is more atheistic or Russian Orthodox or Ukrainian Orthodox with a commitment to the Moscow Patriarchate , and the Catholic, Uniate or Ukrainian Orthodox Western Ukraine, which has a commitment to the Kiev Patriarchate .

Regarding the country's internal political orientation between “western orientation” on the one hand and close relations with Russia on the other, all presidential and parliamentary elections since Ukraine gained independence in 1991 showed a political division of the country. Ukraine's foreign policy in the first years of state independence was often described by Ukrainian politicians as "multivectoral". This policy was often perceived as inconsistent by political observers abroad. On the one hand, Ukraine and the EU strived for rapprochement with NATO and the EU as early as the 1990s in the sense of eastward expansion of the European Union and NATO's eastward expansion , on the other hand, good relations with Russia were always of elementary importance for the country (see also CIS ).

Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (1994)

On June 14, 1994, the European Union and Ukraine signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), which replaced the 1989 Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and the Soviet Union. On February 1, 1996, an interim agreement between the EU and Ukraine came into force, which in turn put the trade-relevant areas of the PCA into force.

Relationship between the EU and Ukraine during the presidency of Leonid Kuchma (1994 to 2004)

In a speech to the Parliamentary Assembly of the WEU in June 1996, then President Leonid Kuchma stated on the foreign policy orientation of his country :

“The strategic goal of our country is integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic structures. Ukraine hopes to be understood in its intention to establish a gradual, partnership-based cooperation with the EU, WEU and NATO, and to be active in shaping the new European security architecture. Our full EU membership is our priority and does not follow fashion or political romanticism, but that is our profound pragmatic decision, because it is the EU that will shape the image of Europe in the 21st century. "

- Leonid Kuchma, 1996

In June 1998 the first meeting of the Cooperation Council between the EU and Ukraine took place and on October 16, 1998 the first EU-Ukraine summit took place in Vienna. Kuchma emphasized that he expected a signal of long-term EU accession prospects for his country. Kuchma also called on the EU to start concrete negotiations with Ukraine on the creation of a free trade agreement. On December 27, 2001, the European Commission presented a strategy paper for shaping its relations with Ukraine. This included support for the country in the necessary structural and economic reforms.

Presidency of Viktor Yushchenko, action plan (2005), further negotiations and accession to the Eastern Partnership (2009)

After Viktor Yushchenko won the runoff election for the presidency on December 26, 2004, primarily because of his country's foreign policy course towards EU membership, the question of Ukraine joining the EU in the near future gained new momentum. In a speech to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on January 25, 2005 in Strasbourg, Yushchenko stated that the Western orientation and the associated membership in the EU was Ukraine's strategic goal. Yushchenko confirmed this in a speech to the German Bundestag on March 8, 2005:

“I hope that by 2007 we can conclude negotiations on the conclusion of a European Association Agreement that will open the way to membership… We welcome the position of our partners who are proposing to the European Union a new perspective for relations with Ukraine to work out. These are important signals - we see them as support for our plans. I am sure that Germany will not be long in coming to recognize the European perspective for Ukraine. For us, the path to the European Union opens up the possibility of realizing the full potential of our country. "

- Viktor Yushchenko, March 2005

On February 25, 2005, Ukraine and the EU signed a bilateral action plan that lasted until 2008 and replaced the 1994 partnership agreement. This action plan offered no prospect of accession, but included the convergence of the Ukrainian legal system with EU law, compliance with human rights , the creation of a market economy and stable political development. It also envisaged the start of a dialogue on the creation of a free trade area between the EU and Ukraine, although the prerequisite for this was Ukraine's admission to the WTO . Ukraine's accession to the WTO was decided on February 5, 2008 and ratified by the Ukrainian parliament on April 10, 2008.

Eastern Partnership (2009)

European Union (EU27)

Eastern partner countries

In March 2007, the first talks between Ukraine and the EU began on a new "extended agreement", which should include a free trade area and increased cooperation in the energy sector. On the whole, however, the EU remained cautious about membership prospects for Ukraine. On February 28, 2008, Yushchenko said that he expected his country's status of associated EU membership in the near future. Against the background of the Caucasus crisis , Ukraine and the EU decided on September 9, 2008 in Paris to start negotiations on a far-reaching association agreement that was originally supposed to be signed by the end of 2009. Ukraine joined the Eastern Partnership on May 7, 2009 .

“The door to the European Union is open. But the implementation of the accession criteria is very difficult. Today the EU's attention is focused on the Western Balkans. The countries in this region have made significant progress in implementing the Copenhagen criteria. When we talk about Ukraine, we have to say that no significant progress has been made here in the past five years. "

- Jerzy Buzek , President of the European Parliament, December 2009

Presidency of Viktor Yanukovych (2010 to 2014), disputes over the Ukraine-EU Association Agreement

→ Main article : Association Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine

In the presidential elections in early 2010 , Viktor Yanukovych , who was accused of systematic election fraud in the 2004 elections, was elected as the new head of state. Despite the fact that Yanukovych and his Party of Regions had expressed interest in further rapprochement between Ukraine and the EU on several occasions, the new president reversed Ukrainian foreign policy in many ways and initiated steps towards rapprochement with Russia. In April 2010, he agreed with Russia to extend the stationing of the Black Sea fleet , which is now to remain stationed on the Crimean peninsula until 2042 . According to the EU and USA , the situation of freedom of the press and human rights in Ukraine has deteriorated significantly since Yanukovych took office. The government in Washington exercised over their Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice pressure on Berlin, with special attention to the counterpart Frank-Walter Steinmeier , Georgia and Ukraine without detours quick way to NATO to allow. The membership action plan, known as MAP, which was mandatory until then, should be avoided. As a preliminary stage for possible membership, the MAP program concerns, among other things, compliance with human rights and the democratic control of the military.

Until October 2011, Ukraine and the EU negotiated the extensive association and free trade agreement . The negotiations were delayed, mainly due to reservations by several EU states about the legitimacy of the criminal proceedings against former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko .

According to Gunta Pastore, political scientist at the Latvian Foreign Ministry, “minimalists” and “maximalists” faced each other in the internal debate in the EU member states. The maximalists (Poland, the Baltic States and, to a certain extent, the Scandinavian countries and Great Britain) had urged the EU to commit to Ukraine because Ukraine played a key role for Europe. The EU should not allow Ukraine to fall under the influence of Russia. The EU should act strategically despite the lack of reform by the Ukrainian government. This stance of a harder line towards Russian influence in Ukraine had been taken particularly by the former Soviet states within the EU, and here again most strongly by Poland, "which also appeared to be the main beneficiary of the Association Agreement, as its goods are a large one Could gain market share in Ukraine. "

Pastore names Germany, France, Spain and Italy as minimalists, who have been "traditionally reserved". According to Richard Youngs, she sees the decisive aspect as the fact that the relationship between Ukraine and the most influential member states - France and Germany - has always been linked to their relations with Russia. After Barkin, Germany had tried desperately to avoid a confrontation with Russia, its “strategic partner”. The same is true, in Pastore's opinion, of France and the southern European member states. Gunta Pastore considers it possible that the negative development in Ukraine served as an excuse for some member countries to delay the signing of the agreement, which Russia has vehemently rejected. That way they could have signed profitable bilateral agreements with Russia.

End of March 2012, the EU decided the association and free trade agreement to be initialed , to retain its influence on the development in Ukraine. Thomas Vogel, parliamentary assistant to Werner Schulz , explained the area of ​​tension between Ukraine and the EU in 2012: “Despite all the apparent contradictions and sharp rhetoric against Kiev, the European Union knows about the important role of Ukraine, not only for the Eastern Partnership, but also for the geostrategic one Relationship between the EU and Russia. If the EU does not succeed in binding Ukraine politically and economically, it will inevitably move more towards Moscow, is one of the most serious arguments for a quick association. "The enormous pressure from Russia to join the customs union, which already ( 2011) signed free trade agreements with the CIS and the promise of reduced gas prices were the reason for this assumption of Russian pressure. Simultaneous accession to the Customs Union / Eurasian Union would, however, not be compatible with the planned free trade area of ​​the EU for legal and technical reasons. "Brussels knows that it offers the Ukrainian government and the influential oligarchs economic incentives and that, on the other hand, it must also support the country in negotiations with Russia."

However, it should only be signed or enacted if the Ukrainian judiciary stops taking action against Tymoshenko and other opposition politicians. The negotiated agreement itself has been described in media reports as the most far-reaching that the European Union has ever negotiated with a non-member. However, it was also pointed out that the agreement required the Ukraine to adapt, for which the country was barely equipped. At the beginning of the Lithuanian EU Council Presidency in 2013 , Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaitė stated in July 2013 that Lithuania was keen to sign the Association Agreement in November 2013 at the EU summit in Vilnius.

During a state visit by Russian President Putin to Ukraine in May 2012, Yanukovych declared his fundamental interest in cooperation with the unified economic area formed by Russia , Belarus and Kazakhstan (see Eurasian Union ). The President of the EU Commission, José Manuel Barroso , stated in February 2013 that a country could not be a member of a customs union and at the same time be in an extensive free trade area with the EU with regard to a possible customs union between Ukraine and Russia. Ukraine has to decide which path to take. In this regard, Yanukovych first stated that Ukraine's rapid accession to a customs union with Russia was not on the agenda. At the end of May 2013, the Ukrainian President announced that his country was aiming for observer status in the customs union.

In August 2013, Putin stated that if Russia signs an EU agreement, it would take “protective measures”. The import controls on Ukrainian goods were tightened by the Russian side. In this context, the Ukrainian Prime Minister Mykola Azarov called on Russia to tolerate the planned signing of the Association Agreement with the EU.

"Nobody will ruin our dream of a Ukraine of equal opportunities, of a European Ukraine."

- Viktor Yanukovych, November 2013

After months of tug-of-war over the signing, in which the EU made Tymoshenko's release from prison or the departure of Tymoshenko for medical treatment abroad a condition, the Ukrainian government decided on November 21, 2013 to “freeze” the agreement with the EU. The decision was received with surprise. According to a decree, the “suspension of the preparatory process” was ordered in order to “safeguard national security interests, revive economic relations with Russia and prepare the internal market for equal relations with the EU”. Yanukovych said that Ukraine was not changing its EU course, but that the country was striving to take its national interests into account. At the moment, Ukraine is not ready to conclude the association agreement for economic reasons, but it is possible to sign the association agreement with the EU in spring 2014. Before doing so, however, a number of current problems in trade with Russia must be resolved. Yanukovych went on to say that no one would be able to divert Ukraine from the European path. At the beginning of December 2013, Yanukovych went to Brussels, “in the vain hope of financial support for his almost bankrupt country from the EU. Only then did he go to Moscow. ”The termination of the agreement was the cause and trigger of the so-called“ Euromaidan ” demonstrations and protests , which lasted several months and were directed against the policies of the Ukrainian government and ultimately led to the overthrow of Yanukovych on February 22, 2014.

After the fall of Yanukovych

→ Main article : Euromaidan

As early as February 24, 2014, the EU recognized the transitional government of Ukraine as legitimate and declared that it was basically ready to sign the agreement on association and free trade with Ukraine that had already been initialed. Talks about the agreement should not resume until after the presidential elections in May 2014 , when a new government has been established in Ukraine. This decision of unreserved support for the Ukrainian transitional government has been criticized in part. Günter Verheugen considered this to be an expression of the blindness of European politicians to the tensions between eastern and western Ukraine. "Without need, the new Ukrainian government was immediately and wholeheartedly supported after Yanukovych was ousted, even though this government does not even enjoy the trust of the majority in its own country, is anti-Russian and it includes ethnic groups."

Crimean crisis

→ Main article : Crimean crisis

In connection with the Crimean crisis , the EU Commission declared on March 17, 2014 that Ukraine should become a full member of the European Union in the long term . The EU commissioner responsible for enlargement, Štefan Füle , said: "If we want to seriously change the relevant part of Eastern Europe, we should also use the most powerful instrument available to the EU - and that is enlargement." She has an "unprecedented." changing and stabilizing power ". The association agreement between Ukraine and the EU continues to be a precursor to membership, the political part of which is to be signed on March 21, 2014 during the summit of EU heads of state and government in Brussels. In September 2014, following trilateral talks, the agreement's entry into force was mutually postponed to December 31, 2015 in order to address Russian concerns.

Association Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine

→ Main article : Association Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine

→ Main article : Eastern expansion of the European Union

On March 21, 2014, the political part of the association agreement negotiated with Ukraine was signed in Brussels . The economic part, which consists of a free trade agreement , has not been signed. The reason was that in response, Russia might stop duty-free imports from eastern Ukraine , which would exacerbate the crisis in Ukraine. Factory closures and tens of thousands of unemployed in cities like Kharkiv and Dnepropetrovsk are feared . However, given its high level of debt, Ukraine was granted almost duty-free access to the EU's internal market. On June 27, 2014, the EU and Ukraine also signed the economic part of the Association Agreement. On September 16, the Verkhovna Rada in Kiev and the EU Parliament in Strasbourg ratified the agreement at the same time in a solemn ceremony. However, the agreement has yet to be ratified in all member states of the European Union. The provisional application of the economic part, in particular the application of the free trade provisions, was mutually agreed between Russia, Ukraine and the EU for December 31, 2015. Ukraine has been participating in the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) since January 1, 2016 .

Visa exemption

On the sidelines of the EU summit at the end of 2015, EU Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker recommended lifting the visa requirement for citizens from Ukraine and Georgia. On April 6, 2017, the EU Parliament voted in favor of visa-free entry for Ukrainians to the states in which Regulation (EC) No. 539/2001 (EU Visa Regulation) is valid. The visa exemption thus extends to the Schengen area , which includes the European Union apart from Great Britain and Ireland plus Switzerland and the EEA states Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein. The travel facilitation is only valid for holders of biometric passports and for trips of up to 90 days within 180 days. This freedom of travel came into force on June 11, 2017 at midnight (for Georgians on March 28), and around 600 Ukrainians took advantage of this new opportunity in the first few hours. Around one in ten out of 40 million Ukrainians already has a biometric passport. The visa exemption for short stays was adopted in Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 (EU Visa Regulation) .

Conversely, on the occasion of the Eurovision Song Contest 2005 in Kiev , Ukraine had already temporarily decreed visa-free entry for EU citizens, Swiss and Liechtenstein citizens on March 31, 2005, and on July 26, 2005 it was fixed permanently.

Economic situation

→ Main article : Ukraine

Ukraine ran into a severe financial debt crisis in 2013. The transitional government is assuming that $ 35 billion will be needed for the current year 2014 in order to remain solvent abroad. Ukraine's foreign exchange reserves had shrunk to $ 12 billion by mid-March 2014. In addition, the national debt is only $ 65 billion. However, the Bloomberg news agency assumes that half of the 35 billion dollars needed by Ukraine will be needed to refinance the school repayments, which corresponds to around 10 percent of GDP.

In 2014, Ukraine had a total of 23 billion dollars in debt with financial institutions from EU countries, mainly with Austrian and Italian banks.

In August 2016, Ukraine recovered from the economic crisis and achieved the status of 2013.

Current situation

The EU's imports of goods from Ukraine decreased from EUR 13.7 billion in 2014 to EUR 12.7 billion in 2015. Exports from the EU to Ukraine decreased from 17.0 to 13.9 billion EUR. On balance, the EU's trade surplus fell from EUR 3.3 billion in 2014 to EUR 1.2 billion in 2015. The EU was Ukraine's largest trading partner. It did 37.5% of its trade with the 28 EU countries. The second largest trading partner was Russia with 16.3%, ahead of China with 8.2%. By 2017, the share of trade with the EU rose to over 40 percent.

EU direct investment in Ukraine amounted to EUR 17.5 billion.

In autumn 2018, the Ukrainian parliament voted in favor of anchoring the goal of EU accession in the constitution. The constitutional court should then examine the change at a time when surveys show that 58 percent of those questioned agreed with this goal in the population. On February 7, 2019, this goal was set, along with that of joining NATO.

literature

• Peter-Alexis Albrecht u. a. (Ed.): Ukraine's own way . Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag , Berlin 2013. ISBN 978-3-8305-3271-2 (texts in German, English and Ukrainian)
• Kalman Dezseri (Ed.): Economic and political relations after the EU enlargement. the Visegrad countries and Russia, Ukraine , Belarus and Moldova , Budapest 2004.
• Anatolij Ponomarenko: The European Orientation of Ukraine. Decree of the President of Ukraine on the Strategy for Integration of Ukraine into the European Union; Partnership Agreement between the EU and Ukraine . Center for European Integration Research. Bonn 1999. ISBN 3-933307-39-2 .
• Nicole Kasper: The EU neighborhood policy as an instrument of external democracy promotion: the example of Ukraine . Universitätsverlag, Potsdam 2012, ISBN 978-3-86956-207-0 (= WeltTrends -Thesis , Volume 15, also bachelor thesis at the University of Potsdam 2011, additional online offer PDF, 76 pages, 3 MB ).
• Taras Kuzio , Hryhoriy Perepylytsya and Walter Zaryckyj: Ukraine's Integration Into Europe: Strategic and Tactical Directions. (Center for US Ukrainian Relations, December 2007; PDF, 117 kB)
• Marian Madela: The Reform Process in Ukraine 2014-2017 . Ibidem, Stuttgart, 2018. ISBN 3838212665 .
• Wolfgang Tiede and Sabina Krispenz: Ukraine on the way to the European Union? , in: Osteuropa-Recht , 6/2008, pp. 417–426.
• Inna Melnykovska and Rainer Schweickert: The motor of Europeanization: NATO and the Ukraine , in the journal Osteuropa , Berliner Wiss.-Verlag, Berlin 59/2009, pp. 49-64, ISSN  0030-6428 .
• Wolfgang Tiede and Christina Schröder: Ukraine on the way to NATO? , in: Osteuropa-Recht , 3/2009, pp. 294–304.
• Wolfgang Tiede and Jakob Schirmer: The Eastern Partnership of the European Union within the framework of Community law , in: Eastern European Law , 2/2009, pp. 184–191.
• Andreas Umland: Europe and the Ukrainian misery: Because the EU does not offer the country membership, it contributes to the chaos in Kiev. A historical mistake , in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung , November 1, 2009, p. 15.
• Wolfgang Tiede, Julia Spiesberger and Clemens Bogedain: The Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine - Setting the course on the way to the EU? , in: Critical quarterly journal for legislation and jurisprudence (KritV), 2/2014, p. 149 ff.
• Wolfgang Tiede, Julia Spiesberger and Clemens Bogedain: On the threshold to the internal market: Economic part of the association agreement between the EU and Ukraine , in: Journal for Economics and Law in Eastern Europe (WiRO), 11/2014, p. 321 ff.

Web links

Commons : Ukraine and the European Union  - collection of pictures, videos and audio files

• Surprises in Ukraine. Democracy on the decline, Russia on the advance (Science and Politics Foundation, October 2010)
• Ralf Wachsmuth: Foreign policy change in Ukraine? (August 18, 2004)
• Integration without Europeanization: Ukraine and its policy towards the European Union (PDF; 332 kB)
• Ukraine and the EU after the Orange Revolution (PDF; 74 kB)
• Will the Orange Revolution bear fruit: EU relations in 2005 and the beginning of 2006 (PDF; 381 kB)
• Yalta European Strategy . A website promoting Ukraine's accession to the EU
• de.rian.ru Delay in EU agreement “no tragedy” for Ukraine, March 28, 2013

Individual evidence

1. ↑ ^{a b} Tagesschau : EU and Ukraine are approaching September 9, 2008
2. ↑ "The EU is seeking an increasingly close relationship with Ukraine, going beyond mere bilateral co-operation, to gradual economic integration and a deepening of political co-operation." European Commission / External Relations / Ukraine ( Memento from April 22, 2010 in Internet Archive )
3. ↑ The role of the EU delegation , on the delegation's website; accessed on January 29, 2015
4. ^ Andreas Kappeler: Brief history of the Ukraine . CH Beck, Munich 2000 (2nd updated edition), ISBN 3-406-45971-4 , p. 224
5. ↑ Heiko Pleines (Ed.): The Ukraine between East and West. Foreign policy and cultural orientations ( memento of October 10, 2012 in the Internet Archive ), Research Center Eastern Europe at the University of Bremen, October 2008 (PDF; 1.2 MB).
6. ↑ Christian Wehrschütz : The Ukraine and the European Union - a relationship with considerable frustration tolerant , published September 1999
7. ↑ Ukraine: "We consider ourselves Europeans" . In: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung . January 25, 2005
8. ↑ "Speech of the Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko in the German Bundestag" on March 9, 2005 ( Memento from March 16, 2014 in the Internet Archive )
9. ↑ “Negotiations on Ukraine's accession to the EU could begin in 2010” ( Memento from September 27, 2007 in the Internet Archive ), Cafebabel.com , October 17, 2005.
10. ↑ “EU and Ukraine begin cooperation talks ” ( Memento of December 27, 2007 in the Internet Archive ), EurAktiv . March 6, 2007.
11. ^ RIA-Novosti: Ukraine expects the status of an associated EU member February 28, 2008
12. ↑ "Ukraine has not made any significant progress towards rapprochement with the EU" . In: Deutsche Welle . December 10, 2009
13. ↑ Stefan Kornelius: “The last stand: The Bush administration takes another field against Russia - and shoots at the allies” , sueddeutsche.de, May 10, 2010.
14. ↑ NATO threatens a new dispute. In: sueddeutsche.de . May 17, 2010, accessed October 13, 2018 . 
15. ↑ ost-ausschuss.de: agreement brings to Ukraine reforms . Press release, December 19, 2011, accessed January 6, 2012.
16. ^ Gunta Pastore: The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement prior to the Vilnius Eastern Partnership Summit. Baltic Journal of European Studies Tallinn University of Technology ( ISSN  2228-0588 ), Vol. 4, No. 2 (17) October 2014 http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bjes.2014.4.issue-2/bjes-2014-0012/bjes-2014-0012.xml "In the EU debate, a group of 'maximalists' — the Eastern European Member States, Poland, the Baltic countries, to some extent the Nordic countries and the UK — pushed for the EU's engagement in Ukraine. They argued that Ukraine is a key for Europe. Therefore the EU should not isolate it, allowing it to fall under Russia's influence. The EU should act strategically and engage in Ukraine despite Yanukovych's lack of reforms. Especially, the former Soviet countries among the EU Member States insisted on a tougher line towards Russia's influence in Ukraine. The most prominent role was adopted by Poland. Poland also seemed to be the main beneficiary of the AA, as its goods would be able to gain a strong market share in Ukraine. "
17. ↑ (cf. Youngs, Richard (2011), “EU Policy on Ukraine during and since the Orange Revolution: 'A door neither closed nor open',” in Daniel C. Thomas (ed.) Making EU Foreign Policy: National Preferences, European Norms and Common Policies, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 32)
18. ↑ (see Barkin, N. (2014), 'Russia ties compound German dilemma in Ukraine Crisis,' Reuters, 3 March 2014. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/03/usukraine -crisis-germany-idUSBREA2215120140303 )
19. ^ Gunta Pastore: The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement prior to the Vilnius Eastern Partnership Summit. Baltic Journal of European Studies Tallinn University of Technology ( ISSN  2228-0588 ), Vol. 4, No. 2 (17) October 2014 http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bjes.2014.4.issue-2/bjes-2014-0012/bjes-2014-0012.xml "On the other side in the EU debate were the 'minimalists' — Germany, France, Spain, and Italy. The southern countries were traditionally reluctant. The crucial aspect here is the fact that the relations between Ukraine and the most influential EU Member States — France and Germany — have always been attached to their relations with Russia (Youngs, 2011, p. 32). Germany has been desperate to avoid confrontation with Russia, its strategic partner (Barkin, 2014.) The same applies for France and the southern Member States. It cannot be ruled out that for some Member States the negative trends in Ukraine served as an excuse to delay signing the AA, which was strongly opposed by Russia. This way they could ease profitable bilateral deals with Russia. Reluctance of these states was reflected in the balanced EU policy vis-à-vis Ukraine. "
20. ↑ http://www.laender-analysen.de/ukraine/pdf/UkraineAnalysen103.pdf , Thomas Vogel: How next? The association agreement of the EU in the area of ​​tension between business and human rights, Ukraine-Analyzes NR. 103, May 8, 2012
21. ↑ Nikolas Busse : Association Agreement: EU approaches Ukraine . In: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung . March 29, 2012
22. ↑ EU and Ukraine The double dilemma ; The March 26, 2013 standard
23. ↑ Yanukovych sends a signal to the EU ; Wiener Zeitung from April 8, 2013
24. ^ Lithuania as an EU bridge builder , Lausitzer Rundschau from July 1, 2013
25. ↑ Yanukovych invites Putin to Chernobyl on RIA Novosti on May 15, 2012.
26. ↑ Ukraine does not want to commit to the EU , Der Westen from February 25, 2013
27. ↑ Yanukovych: No talk of Ukraine joining the customs union immediately , voice of Russia on March 4, 2013
28. ↑ Ukraine with One Leg in Putin's Customs Union , Die Welt, May 29, 2013
29. ↑ Putin's “Trade War” against Kiev , Die Presse, August 20, 2013
30. ↑ Azarov: Moscow must accept Ukraine's rapprochement , Die Presse, August 28, 2013
31. ↑ EU loses battle for Ukraine , Die Presse of November 21, 2013
32. ^ "President Yanukovych does not rule out the conclusion of the association agreement with the EU in spring 2014" ( Memento of December 3, 2013 in the Internet Archive ), NRCU , November 28, 2013.
33. ^ RIA Novosti, November 25, 2013
34. ^ ^{A b} "Verheugen on EU Russia Policy: Why Helmut Schmidt is wrong" , Spiegel Online , May 19, 2014.
35. ^ EU recognizes the disempowerment of Yanukovych , RIA Novosti website from February 24, 2014
36. ↑ Enlargement Commissioner Füle wants to admit Ukraine into the EU , Die Zeit of March 18, 2014
37. ^ "Free trade agreement with Ukraine: EU wants to accommodate Putin" , SZ online , November 19, 2014.
38. ↑ http://eeas.europa.eu/ukraine/assoagreement/assoagreement-2013_en.htm
39. ↑ Ukraine has to pay full price for gas , SRF on March 21, 2014
40. ↑ tagesschau.de : Closer to the West
41. ↑ Ratification of the EU-Ukraine Agreement , article in the NZZ from September 16, 2014
42. ↑ EU Commission recommends the end of the visa requirement for Ukraine and Georgia. Süddeutsche Zeitung , December 18, 2015, accessed on August 26, 2020 . 
43. ↑ EU Parliament approves visa-free entry for Ukraine Die Welt from April 6, 2017; Retrieved April 6, 2017
44. ↑ EU visa exemption for Georgia comes into force RT Deutsch from March 28, 2017; accessed on June 11, 2017
45. ↑ Visa exemption with EU for Ukraine in force orf.at June 11, 2017, accessed June 11, 2017.
46. ↑ Visa regulations, return agreements and the Ukrainian refugee and asylum policy (PDF), ukraine-analyzes No. 32 of December 11, 2007
47. ↑ Goldman Sticks to Ukraine Currency Rout Call: East Europe Credit Bloomberg LP of February 25, 2014
48. ↑ Who will save Ukraine from bankruptcy? ZEIT Online v. 4th March 2014
49. ↑ Ukrainian Economy Grows Most Since 2013, Though Misses Forecasts
50. ^ "European Union, Trade in goods with Ukraine", p. 8 ( Memento from December 21, 2016 in the Internet Archive )
51. ↑ European Commission, Trade Policy Ukraine
52. ↑ Ukraine is driving forward plans for EU membership , NZZ, September 21, 2018, page 2
53. ↑ Ukraine writes accession to the EU and NATO as goals in the constitution , NZZ , February 7, 2019