Battle of Khe Sanh

Battle of Khe Sanh
Part of the Vietnam Conflict
File:KS1.jpg PAVN artillery impacts near the airstrip
Date 21 January 1968 - 8 April 1968 Location Khe Sanh, Quang Tri Province, Republic of Vietnam Result American tactical victory
Belligerents
United States	Democratic Republic of Vietnam
Commanders and leaders
Colonel David E. Lownds,	Unknown
Strength
6,000	~30,000
Casualties and losses
205 killed in action, 443 wounded, 2 missing	Unknown, estimated at 9,000+

The Battle of Khe Sanh was a battle of the Vietnam Conflict that was conducted in northwestern Quang Tri Province, South Vietnam, between 21 January and 8 April 1968. The two combatants were elements of the US IIIrd Marine Amphibious Brigade and three division-size elements of the People's Army of Vietnam or PAVN. The defense of the base and it's eventual relief were given the nickname Operation Scotland. The battle was a tactical victory for the US Marines, but its strategic implications are still shrouded in mystery.

Why Khe Sanh?

The Camp

Main article: Vietnam War

Main article: CIDG

Main article: Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Studies and Observations Group

Main article: Ho Chi Minh Trail

The village of Khe Sanh was market town situated about seven miles from the Laotian frontier on Route 9, the main east/west road which ran from the coastal region, through the western higlands, and then crossed the border into Laos. The origin of the Khe Sanh Combat Base lay in the construction by US Special Forces of an airfield in August 1962 outside the village at an old abandoned French fort. The camp then became a Special Forces outpost of the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG), which aimed at keeping infiltration along the border under surveillance and protected the local population. In November, 1964 the Special Forces moved their camp to the Xom Cham Plateau, the future site og the Khe Sanh Combat Base (KSCB). In late 1966, the Special Forces moved their camp to lang Vei.

Map of northern Quang Tri Province

In late 1967, the palteau became the location of a Forward Operations Base for the highly-classified Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Studies and Observations Group (the FOB was established in 1966 at Khe Sanh village and later moved to the French fort). From there, reconnaissance teams were sent into Laos to explore and gather intelligence on the PAVN logistical system known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The camp was permanently manned by the Marines beginning in 1967. A smaller regular Special Forces base was later constructed down Route 9 at Lang Vei, about half the distance to the border. Constructed on a prominent plateau northeast of Khe Sanh village, the Marine outpost served as the western anchor of US Marine Corps forces, which had responsibility for the northernmost Military Region of South Vietnam. Their defensive system stretched below the Demilitarzed Zone from the coast, along Route 9 to Khe Sanh.

The Border Battles

Main article: Battle of Dak To

During the second half of 1967, the North Vietnamese instigated a series of actions in the border regions of South Vietnam. All of these attacks were conducted by regimental-size PAVN units, but unlike the usual hit-and-run tactics utilized by the enemy, these battles were sustained and bloody affairs.

In early September, PAVN intensified ground probes and artillery fire against Con Thien, a hilltop stronghold in the center of the Marine's defensive line south of the Demilitarzed Zone (DMZ) in northern Quang Tri Province. Mortar rounds, artillery shells, and 122mm rockets fell randomly, but incessently upon the base. The September bombardmant ranged from 100 to 150 rounds per day, with a maximum on 25 September of 1,190. US commander in Vietnam, General William C. Westmoreland responded by launching Operation Neutralize, an aerial and naval bombardment campaign designed to break the siege. For seven weeks, US aircraft delivered from 35,000 to 40,000 tons of bombs in nearly 4,000 airstrikes. As quickly as it had begun, the PAVN effort ceased.

Combat on Hill 875, the most intense of the battles around Dak To

On 27 October a PAVN regiment attacked an ARVN battalion at Song Be, capital of Phuoc Long Province. The Norht Vietnamese fought for several days, took casualties, and fell back. Two days later, the 273rd NLF Regiment attacked a Special Forces camp near the border town of Loc Ninh, in Binh Long Province. Troops of the US 1st Infantry Division responded quickly and handed the NLF a severe drubbing during the ten-day battle. At least 852 enemy soldiers were killed during the action, as opposed to 50 US and South Vietnamese dead.

The heaviest action took place near Dak To, in the central highlands province of Kontum. There, the presence of the 1st PAVN Division prompted a 22-day battle that saw some of the most savage close-quarters fighting of the entire conflict. Somewhere between 1,200 and 1,600 North Vietnamese troops were killed while 362 members of the US 4th Infantry Division, the 173rd Airborne Brigade, and ARVN airborne elements were killed in action. Ominously, three of the four battalions of the 4th Infantry and the entire 173rd were rendered combat ineffective during the battle.

US intelligence analysts were quite baffled by this series of enemy actions. There appeared to be no logic behind the sustained PAVN/NLF offensives, other than to inflict casualties on the allied forces. This they accomplished, but the casualties absorbed by the communists seemed to negate any gains obtained. The border battles did, however, have two significant outcomes that were unappreciated at the time - they fixed the attention of the US command on the border regions and they drew US and ARVN forces away from the coastal lowlands and cities.

The Hill Fights

The Khe Sanh Valley

Things remained quiet in the Khe Sanh area through 1966. At the insistance of General Westmoreland (and against the express wishes of General Lewis W. Walt, US Marine commander in Military Region I, who opposed occupying Khe Sanh) the 1st Battalion 3rd Marine Regiment (1/3) was dispatched to occupy the camp and airstrip on 29 September. By late January 1967, 1/3 was relieved by Bravo Company, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines. A single company was replacing an entire battalion.

On 24 April 1967 a patrol from Bravo Company became engaged with a PAVN force of unknown size north of Hill 861. This action prematurely triggered a North Vietnamese offensive aimed at taking Khe Sanh. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 9th Marine Regiment, under the command of Colonel John P. Lanigan, reinforced Khe Sanh and were given the task of pushing the North Vietnamese off of Hills 861, 881 North and 881 South. These actions were initiated by the communists in order to gain elevated terrain before the launching of the main offensive. North Vietnamese forces were driven out of the area around Khe Sanh after suffering 940 casualties. The Marines suffered 155 killed in action and 425 wounded.

The Hill Fights

In the wake of the hill fights there was a lull in PAVN activity around Khe Sanh. On 12 August, Colonel David E. Lownds took over as commander of the 26th Marine Regiment, which then took over responsibility for KSCB. Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman, Jr. relieved General Walt as commander of the III Marine Amphibious Force in June. During December there numerous sightings of North Vietnamese troops and activities in the Khe Sanh area.

The decision to hold and reinforce Khe Sanh:

"Khe Sanh could serve as a patrol base for blocking enemy infiltration from Laos along Poute 9; a base for SOG operations to harass the enemy in Laos; an airstrip for reconnaissance planes surveying the Ho Chi Minh Trail; a western anchor for defenses south of the DMZ; and an eventual jump-off point for ground operations to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail."

Westmoteland's planned three-division drive into Laos (El Paso). Brigadier General Lowell English (assistant commander 3rd Marine Division): "When you're at Khe Sanh, you're not really anywhere. You could lose it and you really haven't lost a damn thing." Westmoreland - an major battle in an unpopulated area of South Vietnam. A set-piece battle in which he did not have to search out the enemy, he was coming to him a victory of unprecedented proportions.

The decision to stay and defend Khe Sanh. Dien Bien Phu analogies. Cushman wants to stay. The infiltration plug/airmobile concept. The Marines "had neither the helicopter resources, the troops, nor the logistical bases for such operations...The weather was another critical factor because of the poor visibility and low overcasts attendant to the monsoon season made such operations hazardous to say the least."

The opportunity to engage and destroy a heretofore elusive foe with massed American firepower.

A North Vietnamese study - they would take Khe Sanh if they could, but there were limits to the prive they were willing to pay. Their main objectives were to kill American troops and to isolate them in the remote border regions.

At All Costs

The Siege

During the build-up at Khe Sanh, the North Vietnamese developed excellent defensive positions on nearby hills that had caves and former mines that were impervious to ground and tactical air attack. Within a period of just over a week two divisions of PAVN troops were mustered in the vicinity of the base and two more were within supporting distance. The 325C PAVN Division was northwest of KSCB and the 304th PAVN Division was to the southwest. The 324th PAVN Division was located in the DMZ 10-15 miles north of Khe Sanh while the 320th PAVN Division was within easy reinforcing distance to the northeast.They were supported logistically from the nearby Ho Chi Minh Trail. From these positions and from Co Roc Ridge, across the border in Laos, PAVN launched artillery, rocket, and mortar attacks on the base. They were assisted in their effort by continuing bad weather of the winter monsoon.

Dispositions of opposing forces, January 1968

Six men dressed in Marine uniforms were seen outside the defensive wire on 2 January. After failing to respond to a challenge, they were fired upon and five were killed outright while the sixth escaped. All five were PAVN officers, including a regimental commander. This prompted General Cushman to reinforce Colonel Lownds with the rest of 2/26. This marked the first time that all three battalions of the 26th Marine Regiment had operated together in combat since the invasion of Iwo Jima during the Second World War, As more units came into KSCB, artillery reinforcements also arrived. All told, the defenders of the Combat Base could count on fire support from 46 artillery pieces of various calibers, five tanks armed with 90mm guns, and 92 single or Ontos-mounted 106mm recoiless rifles. The base could also count on artillery support from US Army 175mm guns located at Camp Carrol. Throughout the battle, Marine artillery fired 158,891 mixed rounds during the battle.

File:Nalty.jpg

Images of the siege of Khe Sanh

On 20 January PAVN Lieutenant La Than Tonc defected at the base and laid out the PAVN plans for an attack on the base. Hills 881 South and 861 and the main base itself would be simultaneously attacked that evening. At 0030 on 21 January - right on schedule - Hill 861 was attacked by approximately 300 PAVN troops. The Marines, however, were prepared. The North Vietnamese, rocked by artillery fire, still managed to penetrate the perimeter of the defenses and were only driven back after savage close-quarters combat. Hill 881 South, for some reason, was not attacked.

The main base was then subjected to an intense artillery barrage. Hundreds of artillery and mortar rounds and 122mm rockets slammed into the base, levelling most of the above-ground structures. One of the first enemy shells set off a titanic explosion in the main ammunition dump. Many of the artillery and mortar rounds stored in the dump were thrown into the air and detonated on impact within the base. Making a bad situation worse was another enemy hit, this time on a cache of CS tear gas, which saturated the entire base.

On 22 January KSCB was reinforced by the 1st Battalion, 9th Marine Regiment. On the 27th the final reinforcements arrived in the form of the 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion, which was deployed more for political that tactical reasons.

Operation Niagara

Main article: Operation Niagara

Main article: Operation Igloo White

During January, the recently installed electronic sensors of Operation Muscle Shoals (later renamed Igloo White), which were undergoing test and evaluation in southeastern Laos, were alerted by a flurry of PAVN activity along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos opposite the northwestern corner of South Vietnam. It was due to the nature of these activities, and the threat that they posed to KSCB that General Westmoreland ordered Operation Niagara I, an intense intelligence collection effort on PAVN activities in the vicinity of KSCB.

Niagara I was completed during the third week of January, and the next phase of the operation, Niagara II was launched on the 21st, the day of the first PAVN artillery barrage. The Marine Direct Air Support Center (DASC), located at the Combat Base, was responsible for the coordination of air strikes with artillery fire. An airborne battlefield command and control center (ABCCC), in the form of a C-130 aircraft, directed incoming strike aircraft to forward air control (FAC) spotter planes, which, in turn directed them to targets either located by themselves or radioed in by ground units. When weather conditions precluded FAC-directed strikes, the bombers were directed to their targets by either a Marine TPQ-10 radar installation at KSCB or by Air Force Combat Skyspot MSQ-77 stations. This LORAN-based system could direct aircraft to their targets in inclement weather or in absolute darkness.

B-52 bomber

Thus began what many considered "the most concentrated application of aerial firepower in the history of warfare." On an average day 350 tactical fighter-bombers, 60 B-52s, and 30 light observation or reconnaissance aircraft operated in the skies near the base. Westmoreland had already ordered the nascent Igloo White to assist in the defense of KSCB. On 20 January, the first sensor drops took place and, by the end of the month, 316 acoustic and seismic sensors had been dropped in 44 strings. The Marines at KSCB credited 40 percent of intelligence available to their fire support coordination center to the sensors.

By the end of the battle of Khe Sanh, US Air Force assets had flown 9,691 tactical sorties and dropped 14,223 tons of bombs on targets within the Khe Sanh area. Marine Corps aviators had flown 7,098 missions and released 17,015 tons. US Navy aircrews, many of whom were redirected from Rolling Thunder strikes against North Vietnam, flew 5,337 sorties and dropped 7,941 tons of ordnance on the enemy.

Not even this amount of unleashed firepower was enough to calm the anxiety of US leaders in Washington. On 1 February General Earle G. Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff raised the issue with Westmoreland of "whether tactical nuclear weapons should be used if the situation at Khe Sanh should become that desperate." Westmoreland replied that their use would probably not be required. However, he added that if situation did change dramatically "I visualize that either tactical nuclear weapons or chemical agents would be active candidates for employment." Westmoreland then established a small study group to examine the consequences of what was nicknamed Fracture Jaw. Westmoreland later wrote that "Washington so feared that some word of it might reach the press that I was told to desist.

PAVN troops move up a hillside near Khe Sanh

The Fall of Lang Vei

There had not been much activity, thus far during the battle, around the Lang Vei Special Forces Camp. That changed radically during the early morning hours of 7 February. The green berets had previously heard engine noises and spotted the signs of tank treads in the vicinity, but their warnings had been ignored, both at Khe Sanh and by higher headquarters. PAVN had not yet fielded an armoured unit during the conflict, and besides, it would have been impossible for them to get one down the Ho Chi Minh Trail without it being spotted by aerial reconnaissance.

It still came as a shock to the Special Forces troopers at Lang Vei when at least nine of "the tanks that did not exist" attacked their camp. The Soviet-built PT-76 amphibious tanks churned over the defenses, backed up by an infantry assault by the 66th Regiment, 304th PAVN Division. The ground troops were specially equipped with satchel charges, tear gas, and flame throwers. Although the camp's defenses were overrun in only 13 minutes, the fighting lasted several hours, during which the Special Forces men and Bru CIDGs managed to knock out at least four of the tanks.

Attack on Lang Vei

The Marines at Khe Sanh had a plan in place for providing a ground relief force in just such a contingency, but Colonel Lowndes, fearing a PAVN ambush, refused to implement it. The SOG personnel at FOB-3 (which had been incorporated into KSCB's defenses), were infuriated. They proposed an air assault into the beleagured camp, but Lowndes again refused. During a meeting in Saigon at 0700 the next morning, Generals Westmoreland and Cushman accepted Lowndes decision. Army Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan Ladd (commander, 5th Special Forces Group), who had just flown in from Khe Sanh, was astounded. The Marines, who prided themselves on leaving no man behind, were willing to write off all of the green berets and simply ignore the fall of Lang Vei.

He and the commander of FOB-3 proposed that, if the Marines would provide the helicopters, the SOG recon men would go in themselves to pick up any survivors. The Marines continued to oppose the operation until Westmoreland actually had to issue an order to Cushman to allow it to proceed. It was not until 1500 hours that the relief operation was launched without a hitch. Of the 500 CIDG troops at Lang Vei, 200 had been killed or were missing and 75 more were wounded. Of the 24 Americans at the camp, ten had been killed and 11 wounded.

Colonel Lowndes rubbed salt in the wounds of the Special Forces when the indigenous survivors of Lang Vei, their families, civilian refugees from the area, and Laotian survivors from the camp at Ban Houei Sane (which had also been overrun by PAVN) arrived at the gate of KSCB. Lowndes feared that PAVN infiltrators were mixed up in the crowd of more than 6,000. The indigenous soldiers, to the shock of the SOG personnel, were disarmed and turned back. The entire mob was than forced to walk, unarmed, down Route 9 to whatever safety thaey could find at Ca Lu. Colonel Ladd, back on the scene, reported that the Marines said that "they couldn't trust any gooks in their damn camp"

Logistics

Colonel Lowndes estimated that the logistical requirements of KSCB were 60 tons per day in mid-January and rose to 185 tons per day when all five battalions were in place. The greatest impediments to the delivery of supplies to the base were the closure of Route 9 and the winter monsoon weather. From the beginning of the battle until early March, low-lying clouds and fog enclosed the area from early morning until around noon. Even then, the cloud cover rarely rose above 2,000 feet, closing the airfield to all but the most intrepid aviators.

Super Gaggle: CH-46 helos with sling loads (top) and A-4 Skyhawk providing suppressive fire

Making matters worse, any aircraft that did brave the weather and attempted to land was subject to enemy anti-aircraft fire on its way in for a landing. Once the aircraft did touch down, it became the target of any number of PAVN artillery or mortar crews. The aircrew then had to brave the anti-aircraft gauntlet on the way out. The majority of supplies were delivered by paradrops from C-130 aircraft. The Air Force claimed that 14,356 tons were delivered to Khe Sanh by air (8,120 tons by paradrop). 1st Marine Aircraft Wing records indicated that the unit delivered 4,661 tons of cargo into KSCB.

The resupply of the numerous, isolated hill outposts was fraught with difficulties and dangers. The fire of PAVN anti-aircraft units took its toll of helicopters that made the attempts. The Marines found a solution to the problem in the "Super Gaggle" concept. 12 A-4 Skyhawk fighter-bombers would provide flak suppression for massed flights of 12-16 helicopters, which would resupply the hills simultaneously. The adoption of this concept at the end of February was the turning point in the resupply effort. After its adoption, Marine helicopters flew in 465 tons of supplies during February. As the weather later cleared in March, this amount was increased to 40 tons per day.

Final Attacks

On 23 February KSCB received the worst bombardment of the battle. During an eight-hour period the base was rocked by 1,307 enemty rounds, most of which came from 130mm and 152mm artillery pieces in Laos. Casualties from the bombardment were ten killed and 51 wounded. Two days later a patrol from B/1/26 was ambushed by a PAVN battalion. Casualties amounted to one Marine killed, 25 missing and presumed dead, and 21 wounded.

US intelligence postulated that the 304th PAVN Division was in the process of mounting an attack on the positions of the 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion, on the eastern perimeter. A sataggering amount of artillery and airstrikes were loosed on the enemy's possible routes of advance. At 2130, the attack was launched, but it was stifled by the rangers, supported by thousands of artillery rounds and air strikes. Two further attacks were halted in their tracks before the North Vietnamese finally withdrew.

Marine sniper team on Hill 881A spots a target

By mid-March, Marine intelligence began to note an exodus of PAVN units from the Khe Sanh area. The 325C Divisional Headquarters was the first to leave, followed by 95C and 101D Regiments, all of which relocated to the west. At the same time, the 304th PAVN Division withdrew to the southwest.

At 0800 on 31 march Operation Scotland was officially terminated. Operational control of the 26th Marines was passed to the US Army 1st Air Cavalry Division and Operation Pegasus commenced.

Relief and Results

Operation Pegasus

Westmoreland's planned relief of KSCB infuriated the Marines, who had not wanted to hold Khe Sanh, who had been roundly criticized for not defending it well. General Cushman was appalled by the "implication of a rescue or breaking of the siege by outside forces." 1 April 1969, two battalions of the 1st Marine Regiment headed down Route 9 from Ca Lu while elements of the 1st Air Cavalry Division began leapfrogging by helicopter down the road, air-assaulting onto key terrain features along Route 9 to cover the Marine advance. One week later, the cavalrymen linked up with the 26th Marines. The siege was over.

The 26th Marines departed, leaving the defense of the base to the 1st Marines. General Westmoreland departed Vietnam on 11 June 1968. His successor, General Creighton Abrams allowed the passage of one week before he ordered Operation Charlie, the destruction and evacuation of the KSCB. The task was completed On 5 July 1968, and Khe Sanh was abandoned.

Results and Analysis

Reasons given why Khe Sanh had lost its strategic significance and could be abandoned - the enemy had changed his tactics and reduced his forces; that PAVN had carved out new infiltration routes; that the Marines now had enough troops and helicopters to carry out mobile operations; that a fixed base was no longer necessary. The return of Marine mobility - "however, by mid-1968, although limited tactical offensives abounded, US military participation in the war would soon be relegated to a defensive stance."

File:Vo Nguyen Giap Vietnam.jpg

General Vo Nguyen Giap

Giap - "never had any intention of capturing Khe Sanh...[it] was a feint, a diversionary effort. And it had accomplished its purpose magnificently."

Cumulative friendly casualties for Operation Scotland, which began on 1 November 1967 were: 205 killed in action, 1,668 wounded, and 25 missing and presumed dead. PAVN - 1,602 bodies counted, but the total was probably between 10,000 and 15,000. Estimates of PAVN losses, however, were almost exclusively gathered by indirect means: sensor readings, sightings of secondary explosions, reports of defectors or POWs, inference or extrapolation.

On a strategic level, it drew American attention away from PAVN buildups elsewhere, although this appears to be true of both sides. As the preperations for the battle took place during late 1967 and January 1968, the US military focused on winning a decisive victory. Intelligence suggesting that PAVN was planning a large scale offensive throughout South Vietnam was largely ignored. Although the Tet Offensive ended for the PAVN/NLF in military defeat, for the US it was a political disaster.

One argument leveled by Westmoreland at the time (and often quoted by historians of the battle) was the fact that only two Marine regiments were tied down at Khe Sanh compared with several PAVN divisions. Yet the statement never moved on to the next logical level. By the end of January 1968, Westmoreland had moved half of all US combat troops - nearly fifty maneuver battalions - to I Corps.

Commandant of the Marine Corps Wallace Greene (l), III MAF Commander Robert Cushman (c), and General William Westmoreland (r)

Hanoi may indeed have been planning to emulate Dien Bien Phu. General Creighton W. Abrams, (who replaced Westmoreland) as US commander in mid-1968, has suggested that it would have taken longer to dislodge the communists at Huế if PAVN had committed the three divisions at Khe Sanh to the battle there. To refute that opinion, Marine General Rathvon McC. Tompkins, commander of the 3rd Marine Division, pointed out the key fact that refuted such a belief: PAVN troops had never threatened the Combat Base's sole source of water, a stream less than 500 meters from the base. Had they contaminated the stream, the airlift would never have been able to provide enough water.

The significance of the battle and of its impact on American public opinion continues to be debated. In the end, the battle was a critical part of the war, highlighting the need on both sides for development of new military tactics. Khe Sanh itself was abandoned on 23 June. The abandonment was the result of a change in strategy. concurrent with the departure earlier that year of U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. But in the post-Tet period, the US was unlikely to launch such an effort.

Sources

Unpublished Government Documents

Published Government Documents

• Nalty, Bernard C. Air Power and the Fight for Khe Sanh. Washington DC: Office of Air Force History, 1986.

• Schulimson, Jack, Leonard Blasiol, Charles R. Smith, and David A. Dawson, US Marines in Vietnam: The Defining Year, 1968. Washington DC: US Marine Corps History and Museums Program, 1997.

• Shore, Captain Moyars S., III, The Fight for Khe Sanh. Washington DC: US Marine Corps Historical Branch, 1969.

• Van Staaveren, Jacob, Interdiction in Southern Laos, 1961-1968. Washington DC: Center of Air Force History, 1993.

Biographies

• Westmoreland, William C. A Soldier Reports. New York: ,1976.

Secondary Sources

• Dougan, Clark, Stephen Weiss, et al, Nineteen Sixty-Eight. Boston: Boston Publishing Company, 1983.

• Maitland, Terrence, Peter McInerney, et al, A Contagion of War. Boston: Boston Publishing Company, 1983.

• Morocco, John, Thunder from Above: Air War, 1941-1968. Boston: Boston Publishing Company, 1984.

• Murphy, Edward F., The Hill Fights:The First Battle of Khe Sanh. New York: Ballentine Books, 2003.

• Palmer, Dave Richard, Summons of the Trumpet. New York: Ballentine Books, 1978.

• Pisor, Robert, The End of the Line: The Siege of Khe Sanh. New York: Ballentine Books, 1982.

• Prados, John and Ray W. Stubbe, Valley of Decision: The Siege of Khe Sanh. Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991.

• Stanton, Shelby L., The Rise and Fall of an American Army:US Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965-1973. New York: Dell, 1985.

External links

• Pbs.org - the Siege of Khe Sanh (extensive information on the battle)
• Vietnam-war.info - the Siege of Khe Sanh (mainly details of battle)
• US Government produced film on The Battle of Khe Sanh