User talk:Hcberkowitz/Sandbox
Submarine Platforms
Submarines are the original stealth platforms. When no more than a mast breaks the surface, they immediately become radar targets, so virtually all modern submarines will have the minimum ELINT of a radar warning receiver. Far beyond that, however, many submarines will penetrate hostile areas, raise SIGINT receiver masts, usually with some type of radar-observant covering, and listen. Especially sophisticated SIGINT submarines may tap undersea cables.
The minimum radar-warning receiver is usually a set of spiral antennas, backed with resonant cavities, whose amplitude can be compared to determine the direction of greatest signal strength. To go to the next level of sophistication, phase is considered as well as amplitude, and interferometry adds further information[1]. (Friedman2003 & p. 4)
Australia
Australia's Collins class has a SIGINT mission, emphasized when the vessels' combat system was replaced with an open-architecture surveillance system. Among the systems are the ArgoSystems/Condor AR-740. (Friedman2003 & p. 4)
Canada
Canada's acquisition of reconditioned British diesel-electric submarines (ex-Upholder class, now Victoria class) raised eyebrows of many analysts, wondering how these could have a strategic effect given the strength of Canada's southern neighbor's undersea strength. Writing in the Canadian Military Journal, an officer of Canada's maritime forces gave some subtle insights, of which submarine intelligence capabilities play a significant role [2]. "However, submarines also have a contribution to make in deterring and countering the asymmetric threats that now preoccupy Canadian/US (CANUS) planners. This is centered upon Intelligence-gathering, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) activities...possession of submarines admits Canada to that exclusive group of states participating in regulated and highly classified submarine waterspace management and intelligence-sharing schemes. The intention to re-establish a Pacific submarine presence led to the immediate cooperation of the United States in development of a west coast Waterspace Management Agreement with Canada, whereas none existed previously. Likewise, Arctic transits and deployments by allied submarines are generally first signalled when Canada’s Atlantic Submarine Operating Authority is advised of foreign submarine movement across 70 degrees North latitude. Taken together, these various factors result in a capability of strategic importance in so much as it exponentially expands the range of coercive options available to decision-makers."
As part of the upgrade of the Upholder class purchased from the UK, the Litton Marine Guardian Star is on the Victoria-class submarines (Friedman2003 & p. 4).
Chile
An advanced ARGOsystems/Condor AR-900 is aboard the French-built Chilean Scorpene-class submarines (Friedman2003 & p. 4).
China
Israeli Elbit provides the TIMNEX 4 CH ELINT/targeting set, which covers 2-18 GHz, provides radar warning, and 1.4 to 5 degree DF (depending on frequency) (Friedman2003 & p. 5).
[3].
Denmark
Danish subs have the UK Racal/Thales Sea Lion precision DF system (Friedman2003 & p. 5).
Egypt
Egyptian submarines use ArgoSystems/Condor AR-700 series SIGINT for targeting their Harpoon missiles. (Friedman2003 & p. 4)
France
Older French export submarines came with the Thales/Thompson-CSF X-band radar warning system, which is a manual analog system. The digital replacement, in French service, is the ARUR-13. It is reasonable to expect continuing upgrades from the EADS consortium.
Germany
German submarines use multiple SIGINT systems. Most basic is the DR3000U, although the Type 206A replaces it with the Ginny. The newer Type 212 submarines use FL 1800U units made by the German-French EADS consortium. These units use four spiral antennas and a radar warning receiver under a common dome, with the ELINT function covering 0.5-18 GHz in five bands. This can achieve 5-degree direction finding.
EADS (formerly DASA) also equips German submarines with the Telegon 12 HF interception and DF suite.
Greece
As with Egypt, Greece uses the use ArgoSystems/Condor AR-700 series SIGINT for targeting their Harpoon missiles. (Friedman2003 & p. 4)
Italy
Older submarines use a Elettronica BLD-727 DF, but the newer Type 212s will use German SIGINT (Friedman2003 & p. 5).
Israel
German-built Dolphin submarines in Israeli service have several missions, SIGINT being one of them. Domestic Elbit makes the TIMNEX 4 CH ELINT/targeting set, which covers 2-18 GHz, provides radar warning, and 1.4 to 5 degree DF (depending on frequency).
Netherlands
For Harpoon targeting, the Netherlands uses the ArgoSystems/Condor AR-700 series SIGINT. (Friedman2003 & p. 4)
Russia
Akula and Oscar attack submarine have Rim Hat (NATO designation) Nakat-M SIGINT, which is integrated with a Snoop Pair search radar (Friedman2003 & p. 5).
Kilo export diesel-electric submarines have the NATO Squid Head/MRM-25 ESM, which includes IFF.
South Africa
The domestic Avitronics firm installs the Shrike ESM system, covering 2-18 GHz, as does the Israeli Elbit TIMNEX 4 CH ELINT/targeting set, which provides radar warning, and 1.4 to 5 degree DF (depending on frequency) (Friedman2003 & p. 5). The CelsiusTech-Grintek Ewation partnership probably will provide systems as well.
South Korea
These have GTE/Israeli SIGINT (Friedman2003 & p. 4)
Spain
Spanish boats have the domestically produced Indra BLQ-355, which may have been exported (Friedman2003 & p. 5). With its participation in the EADS consortium, Spain obtains access to new technologies. Spain appears to be developing a coordinated SIGINT approach using submarine, ship, and aircraft platforms.
Sweden
For Harpoon targeting, the Netherlands uses the ArgoSystems/Condor AR-700 series SIGINT. (Friedman2003 & p. 4)
Taiwan
Israeli Elbit provides the TIMNEX 4 CH ELINT/targeting set, which covers 2-18 GHz, provides radar warning, and 1.4 to 5 degree DF (depending on frequency) (Friedman2003 & p. 5).
United Kingdom
EADS (formerly DASA) also equips British submarines with the CXA(2) HF interception and DF suite. Racal/Thales makes the UAP precision DF system.
Several submarines have a COMINT system made by US Southwest Research, under the US code name CLUSTER SENTINEL, probably a joint US-UK effort.
United States
US submarines are believed to have infiltrated the territorial waters of potential opponents to raise slim antennas and collect radio SIGINT US submarines made extensive clandestine patrols to measure the signatures of Soviet submarines and surface vessels [4]. Various submarines, including the USS Parche and USS Halibut, from the early seventies onwards, reportedly tapped Soviet copper and optical undersea cables, using divers, probes from the main vessel, or remotely operated vehicles [5]
All US submarines, as new construction on the Virginia class submarines and retrofitted to the Improved Los Angeles class submarines will receive an upgraded Electronic Support suite, designed as a minimally manned, passive receiving system capable of detection, acquisition, identification, and localization of a variety of signals of interest[6]. ES contains the AN/BLQ-10 SIGINT system, which gives detection, emitter location and MASINT identification, direction finding, and strategic intelligence support. It was first implemented in 2000 and should be in all US submarines by 2012 [7].
ES is not limited to the AN/BLQ-10 alone, but a major improvement in receiving, with an expected 200% improvement in performance with the Type 18I periscope and Integrated Electronics Mast (IEM), especially in the littorals. Completing the current ES concept is the AN/ULR-21 CLASSIC TROLL system that increases the probability of SIGINT intercept by 500%, supporting tactical and national requirements {Harv | Fages2000}}.
- ^ Friedman, Norman (February 2003). "Up Periscope, Up Antenna: Hunter-Killer Submarines increasingly are Hunter-Gatherers of Intelligence" (PDF). Journal of Electronic Defense. Harpoon Waypoint. Friedman2003. Retrieved 2007-10-08.
- ^ Craven, Michael (Winter 2006–2007). "A Rational Choice Revisited -- Submarine Capability in a Transformational Era" (PDF). Canadian Military Journal. pp. 21–32.
{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: date format (link) - ^ Fisher, Richard Jr. (November 22nd, 2005). "Growing Asymmetries in the China-Japan Naval Balance". International Strategy & Assessment Center. Fisher2005. Retrieved 2007-10-08.
{{cite web}}: Check date values in:|date=(help) - ^ Sontag, Sherry (1999). Blind Man's Bluff: The Untold Story of American Submarine Espionage. Harper Torch. ISBN 006103004X.
{{cite book}}: Unknown parameter|coauthors=ignored (|author=suggested) (help) - ^ "Submarine cable interception". Political and Social Issues in Digital Interactive Media: Lecture 4 - the Big Brother on Menwith Hill. Talinn University. TalinnPSI. Retrieved 2007-10-05.
- ^ Fages, Malcolm I (23 March 2000), (statement to )Senate Armed Services Committee Seapower Subcommittee on Submarine Warfare Systems for the 21st Century, Fages2000
{{citation}}: line feed character in|title=at position 48 (help) - ^ "Navy ISR", Sea Power, Jan 2006, NISR