Talk:FairTax

Aftermath section

The concluding sections seemed a bit scrambled and very, very wordy and tended to be repetitive. I've condensed it considerably, hopefully without deleting information not already contained in the article. It also badly needed some subheadings to break things up. I think the latest extensive edits are excellent info but they should really be cited as the article is not sourced.Michael Dorosh 01:55, 4 June 2006 (UTC)

I've also broken up each day into subsections and considerably condensed the text - it was very conversational and wordy, though I must say the research is excellent and was a very useful contribution. There is a slight tendency to cheer for the Allies which must be removed - ie words like "luckily" etc. It is okay to say "luckily for the Allies", but to say just "luckily" is to take sides - in contravention of the Neutral Point of View policy.Michael Dorosh 03:19, 4 June 2006 (UTC)

I think the article is shaping up nicely thanks to major efforts on the part of my fellow editors in the last week or so. Would be nice to see some day by day maps or something of the sort to add some visual interest.Michael Dorosh 21:32, 5 June 2006 (UTC)

"Tactical British Victory"?

In what sense? This operation was a failure on all levels. DMorpheus 13:15, 18 June 2006 (UTC)

I think a historical source is needed for this conclusion rather than we editors doing "original research." Certainly Montgomery viewed it as a tactical victory in being 2/3 successful or whatever the quote is. His detractors tend to be less kind about the final result. Strategically it achieved little; tactically, they moved the front 50 miles or so, but at terrible cost. The main objective of the battle went unfulfilled and cost heavily. Tough call, what do the historians say?Michael Dorosh 14:55, 18 June 2006 (UTC)

I agree we editors should not be doing original research, which is one of the reasons why the 'tactical British victory' comment bothered me so much. It's ridiculous. Moving the front forward 50 miles in a very narrow salient was a *disadvantage* to 21st Army Group. Eisenhower's Lieutenants makes this point very clear, as well as noting the opportunity cost of the operation. It's in the article now.

Also, even if we agreed there was some tactical success, those were Allied successes, not just British sucesses. DMorpheus 14:06, 19 June 2006 (UTC)

Good points all around. As for the salient, does Weigley discuss the implications of holding the island during the winter, and using it as a base for the assault into the Rhineland in February? Either way, if the article discusses the result, then I agree the infobox should reflect that discussion.Michael Dorosh 14:13, 19 June 2006 (UTC)

Quite right. It was an all-or-nothing operation to gain a crossing over the Rhine: no crossing=failure; the territory captured was neither here or their. I'm not sure how people will take this, but I've amended the result to an Allied failure as I think that is the most accurate description. Victory or defeat is perhaps best left to battles where armies are swept from a field. MAG1 20:10, 6 July 2006 (UTC)

We are really splitting hairs here. The mission failed; we all seem to agree on that. The territory gained was a disadvantage to the Allies, not a neutral factor at all. The 21st Army Group *doubled* its frontage as a result of the salient. Two elite Airborne Divisions were slowly bled to help hold it; other US divisions were eventually sucked in also. It made a big difference in 21st Army Group's ability to mass combat power for any other operation. DMorpheus 20:19, 6 July 2006 (UTC)

I have to say, the position of only considering the Allied performance, and drawing from that that this operation was an 'Axis Victory' is ignoring the Germans' situation. No matter what anyone says, the Germans lost ground and sustained heavy casualties in the engagements. Regardless of how useless you think that ground was, it was lost all the same. The Germans did not manage to decisively 'defeat' the Allied forces outside of Arnhem, either, and were pressed into using troops that could have been committed to the Eastern Front. Thus, I believe that the result should be listed as 'Indecisive' or 'Inconclusive'. 68.234.47.231 02:54, 19 August 2006 (UTC)

Please read the comments above or any of the better books on this operation. It was in no way 'indecisive' - on the contrary, the operation had a huge effect on th eoutcome of the campaign for NW Europe. DMorpheus 22:50, 19 August 2006 (UTC)

Outside of Arnhem, Allied forces were not driven from the field, they did not have any massive surrender, they were not completely overrun or overpowered, the casualties did not decidedly favor the Germans, and their forces did not lose control of the bridges taken. In contrast, during the Germans' counterattack they committed troops that could have been used elsewhere, they took casualties comparable to that of the Allies, their forces were driven back or forced to surrender in many cases, and they never regained control of the lost ground. Only in Arnhem did the Germans meet with great success, and even that came at a cost for some of their best divisions at a time when quality manpower was very short (whereas the Allied elite divisions were much more replaceable). In fact, considering the casualties and the Germans' vast numerical inferiority by this time in the war, the Operation might have been something of an Allied success. However, I would definitely not classify it as such, as they did lose the British airborne. Also, I did read the above posts, and I can't agree with this more: "Victory or defeat is perhaps best left to battles where armies are swept from a field."68.234.47.231 21:41, 20 August 2006 (UTC)

It is original research to form our own judgments about the outcome. The major published work routinely describe this as an Allied loss, German defensive success, huge lost opportunity for the Allies, etc. The contention is mostly over *why* , not *what*. DMorpheus 22:57, 20 August 2006 (UTC)

Well, could we at least put a note saying that the results are disputed in the information box and link to the section stating Montgomery's opinion (Reflections)? Surely Montgomery would be considered a Primary source.68.234.47.231 00:37, 21 August 2006 (UTC)

Yes, Montgomery is a primary source. So are Gavin, Ridgway, Taylor, Eisenhower, Dempsey, Brereton....all of whom were clear that this was a very damaging Allied loss. The lost strategic opportunities were by far the biggest negative outcome. Take ten major works covering this battle and all of them will have a section on the *failure* of M-G. I can't recall a single campaign history that calls this a success. So I suppose this is 'disputed' in the same sense that evolution is disputed. Actually you will find far more people disputing evolution than the outcome of this battle. DMorpheus 15:17, 21 August 2006 (UTC)

I think that Montgomery's opinion is absolutely worth noting, regardless, as it was his operation. Also, I did not say that this was an Allied success (I said it might have been, were it not for other things), but I do think that to not recognize the negative impact this had on the Germans is ignoring their desperation. Alternative plans mostly called for an assault on the Siegfried line, which would have ended in many-to-one ratios of casualties favoring the Germans, as was demonstrated during the Battle of Hurtgen Forest (which, by the way, is classified as an Allied Victory on Wikipedia despite saying this in the article: 'An American historian, who served in the Hurtgen, has described it as “a misconceived and basically fruitless battle that should have been avoided”.'). 68.234.47.231 01:15, 22 August 2006 (UTC)

No way could the words "Market Garden", "British" and "success" exist together. On the other hand, "US", "Allied" and "defeat" are also incompatible here. The 81st and 101st achieved their objectives (gloriously but overdue at Nijmegen) and held them. The Poles likewise, I don't think the withdrawal from Driel was forced. Only the 1st Airborne was actually defeated. It might be pedantic, but I think of M-G, overall, as a failure rather than a defeat of all the Allied forces. Folks at 137 12:32, 22 August 2006 (UTC)

Folks at 137 and MAG1's assessment is entirely acceptable to me. DMorpheus himself states precisely that 'Take ten major works covering this battle and all of them will have a section on the *failure* of M-G'. It seems to be a consensus. 68.234.47.231 01:47, 23 August 2006 (UTC)

I have just heard that the German took heavy casualties in Market Garden (8,000) thats false, there where much more german casualties at the Battle of the Bulge(70,000)and in Operation Overlord like (200,000), that where heavy losses. The allies in contrast took appalling losses in Market-Garden (17,000) if we consider the ratio of 1:1 in the bulge and 1:2 in Overlord.
The german army fought well considering the war was being lost by the Reich, and the allied plan was completly a surprise for Modell and Hitler. Modell was a genious preparing the defenses and calling for reinforcements in just some days. The German air force (Lufftwaffe) fought well shooting down many gliders and aircraft, much of the polish air tranported hevy guns where destroyed before reaching the drop site.

---

Operation Market-Garden or the Battle of Arhem was not a simple battle of the Western front. It was the second biggest allied massive deploment of paratroopers in open field (First D-Day) with more than 20,000 air transported personel and many comandos. The german army had their crack divitions too, including 2 SS Panzer Divitions like they allies counterpart, of the best fighting quality.
During the invasion the allies used their air armada of nearly 983 planes including 800 B-17s to destroy all the german anti aircraft positions. Making a clear way to the dakotas and the gliders. WHAT CONTINUED IS KNOW HISTORY.... Miguel

For the evaluation of Market Garden, the Germans suffered about as bad, porbbaly worse, casualties than the allies, who had a larger manpower pool. However, the Market Garden operation didn't reach its intended target, a bridge over the Rhine, thus potentially dooming the Reich in 1944, which alone would make it a strategic defeat in my eyes. And making it also a tactical defeat in my opinion, we have to look what the average casautly rates were ptherwise on the western front. I do not have the numbers, but I suspect that a 1:1 rate is quite bad for the standards set elsewhere for the allies during that stage of the war, and not doing Market Garden would have allowed more conventional operations elsewhere to be carried out sooner. For Market Garden, the invovled forces got top supplies of the overstrecthed allied logistics. Thestor 17:23, 6 January 2007 (UTC)thestor

Please dont read the paragraph above this line, it contains false info. thanks.:: —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 200.62.146.244 (talk) 16:14, 5 May 2007 (UTC).

Market was the largest airborne operation, as is made clear. (The figures for aircraft are considerably understated above). As for the surmise that Market garden robbed other Allied armies of supplies that would have allowed "more conventional operations to be carried out sooner"--doubtful. What was most needed for continued ops was fuel, the hardest to deliver and for which the least infrastructure was availble. C-47s could (and did both before and after the 9 days of Market) deliver other supplies but fuel demands were far beyond its capability.--Buckboard 07:20, 10 April 2007 (UTC)

Commanders

I'd been musing on this over the weekend since someone changed the commanders in the info box, and they've just been changed again. Technically, it's only supposed to include Army or Corps commanders, so theoretically shouldn't include Taylor or Gavin. However, I would personally prefer to see the 3 divisional commanders listed in the info box, especially as the battle was so spread out and each division was acting independantly. I was glad that someone removed references to Brereton and Ridgway though, as I didn't believe that they really exercise any control over the battle. I've shoved Urquhart in to accompany the others for the moment, but I wondered what everyone else thought about it? Oh, one other thing - should Canada be in the info box? Regards Psychostevouk (talk) 16:43, 3 August 2008 (UTC)

The OOB shows:

• 21st AG - Monty
  • 1st Allied Airborne Army - Brereton
    • I Airborne Corps - Browning
    • XVIII Airborne Corps -Ridgway
  • 2nd Army - Dempsey
    • VIII Corps - O'Connor
    • XII Corps - Ritchie
    • XXX Corps - Horrocks

Thats a total of 6 divisions involved (plus attached brigades) in the main portion of Market-Garden and a further 6 divisions (plus attached brigades) in supporting roles.

If the airborne divisional commanders are shown why not Adair of the Guards armour etc? If some Corps commanders are removed because "they [didnt] really exercise any control over the battle" then should the likes of Dempsey and Monty also be removed? The list if my understanding is correct is suppose to show the main commanders or those who played a significant role i.e. planning etc So, imo at least, it seems more approbriate to show the Corps COs and above - the OOB shows everyone else.

Oh and i agree i dont think Canada should be in there, as far as i know they had no troops attached to the 1st Airborne Division nor was any of there men attached to any Second Army units at this time.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 17:18, 3 August 2008 (UTC)

My understanding was that Brereton deferred command of the airborne operation to Browning. I also believed that Ridgway didn't go and Taylor and Gavin worked directly under Browning. My point was that just because Brereton was commander of the 1st Allied Airborne doesn't qualify him as a commander of this battle. Monty and Dempsy did exercise control over the armies they were in charge of (and Monty planned it!). My thoughts on the airborne commanders were purely because they played such a major role and acted somewhat more independently than the XXX crop divisions. I'd have thought that at least Urquharts role would come under 'significant' - though I'm fine if everyone thinks it would be more appropriate to just have Browning covering the airborne element, but I wanted to explain why I added Urquhart. Regards Psychostevouk (talk) 17:44, 3 August 2008 (UTC)

It would seem them that Monty, Dempsey, Browning and Horrocks are the men to show. It shows the top level commanders who were making the plans and giving orders etc. It would mean the infobox would be shorter (always a plus) and not going into too much detail of divisional commanders etc.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 11:52, 4 August 2008 (UTC)

I don't see how you can leave Brereton out; he was the Army commander after all. If you show Browning you're bypassing him. DMorpheus (talk) 17:01, 13 August 2008 (UTC)

I do understand your point, but by the same token you could argue that Eisenhower should be included. Including Monty would be seen as bypassing him. My main feeling though is that Brereton, whilst being commander of the airborne army, was not a commander involved in this battle. As this page is about an operation, not a unit, the commanders box should reflect the commanders of the battle. Aside from agreeing a decision about the number of lifts each day, Brereton deferred the planning and all command to Browning and was otherwise uninvolved in the operation. I have no knowledge of Browning, Monty or anyone else working with or taking orders from Brereton during the action - he was in England the whole time. Regards Psychostevouk (talk) 20:14, 13 August 2008 (UTC)

First, leaving out Ike doesn't *bypass* him because you're not skipping over him to include both those above and below him. In Brereton's case, by listing the Army Group commander (his operational superior), the other Army commander (his peer) and the Corps commanders (his subordinates) he is being skipped.

Second, Brereton's decision to do only one lift on the first day is absolutely crucial to understanding the battle; had this decision been made differently the impact would have been immense. Every single division commander in the 1st AAA asked for multiple lifts on the first day. Leaving him out as if he doesn't matter is thus a real error. His planning mistakes cost the allies dearly. Likewise, Browning's major impact on the battle was negative: his use of scarce gliders that could have been better employed carrying things besides his headquarters cost the Allies strength on that crucial first day.

As an aside I'd throw in a vote here to include Sosabowski despite his status as a mere Brigade commander. He was also the senior Polish officer and that status, not his command level, rate him a listing IMO.

Regards, DMorpheus (talk) 14:46, 14 August 2008 (UTC)

Just to address the last point, this has been discussed by pervious editors during a bit of an editwar with annon editors. Several of them believe that considering he was just that, a brigade commander, he shouldnt be in the commanders list. If he is listed the entire argument you have just made regarding Brereton could be applied. What about the senior dutch liason officers etc

Not to undermine the man, but other then being the senior Polish officer, was he more significate then any other brigade commander in the entire battle - did he play a significate role in the planning or execution of the battle?

If suitable answers could be provided to these questions then i wouldnt have a problem with his inclusion and i think pervious editors, who have fought hard to keep him out, wouldnt either.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 15:17, 14 August 2008 (UTC)

If the issue is presented as "should a BDE commander be included?" the answer is obviously 'no'. I don't think Sosabowski can be described as more important than other commanders at his level - nor have I attempted to make that argument. There is also the problem that US and German Divisions didn't have a BDE level in 1944, so no US or German counterparts could be listed. So in those terms of course he should not be listed, and I've never claimed that he should.

The reason I'd say he should be listed is simply that he wore two hats, and the other one was senior Polish officer. That is, he's not merely another BDE commander in a British division; he's the senior Pole in a battle involving thousands of Polish soldiers. There is no other commander involved in this battle who led a major national contingent *and* is not already listed. Montgomery was the senior Allied as well as the senior British officer. Brereton was the senior US officer. The Dutch liaison officers were just that - liaisons - not *commanders* of national contingents. They were also relatively junior officers IIRC. The Dutch liaison to the US 82ABN DIV was a Captain, for example. I'm not going to sit here and say Captains should be listed ! ;) Regards, DMorpheus (talk) 16:17, 14 August 2008 (UTC)

If Brereton is there, its because he was the commander of the Allied Airborne Army not because he was the senior American offier involved. I hate to keep drawing people to the Operation Brevity article but it seems the best example i can keep coming up with. This battle involved a significate number of Italian soldiers, infact there actions are a primary cause for quite a bit of the frustration inflicted on the allied forces however no Italian commander is shown because none of there commanders were significate to the events.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 16:48, 14 August 2008 (UTC)

Including a name because it is that of the senior officer in a national contingent just opens a POV Pandora's box as people try to decide whether a brigadier is ok (as long as he's a substantive colonel)... but not a major....the whole thing starts to tread heavily on national sensitivities. Let's just keep it simple. Look at the overall allied involvement in an engagement, look at the command structure and have the relevant decision-makers in the box regardless of nationality. Otherwise it's going to set a nightmare precedent in other theaters where there were many more nationalities. P.S. For these reasons and not nationalistic ones: Yes Brereton should be in. Stephen Kirrage ^{talk - contribs} 16:59, 14 August 2008 (UTC)

So we're agreed on Brereton then? DMorpheus (talk) 17:05, 14 August 2008 (UTC)

I believed the call to fly one lift a day was made by Major General Williams of IX Troop Carrier Command, Brereton just agreed with it. That reduces his input significantly, and anyway that really was the extent of his involvement. Listing the entire chain of command regardless of actual input seems to defy the point of an infobox. It's there for a quick rundown on the major players. As for Sasabowski, I do feel he is relevant as the commander of one of the involved nations, but I don't feel he should be there as a Brigade commander, especially as he was attached to the British forces. Tricky one, but again his input in terms of command was minimal. Regards Psychostevouk (talk) 17:13, 14 August 2008 (UTC)

Decisive German victory?

Can this operation really be called a "decisive German victory" as in the Infobox? The German front lines were pushed back many tens of miles after all and much of the Netherlands was liberated. I am not arguing the Monty line that it was a 90% success but it was hardly a rout of the Allies. Dabbler (talk) 23:08, 6 August 2008 (UTC)

I wondered about that too. I'd have thought there was a more appropriate description, something like minor victory or perhaps something to say irrelevant victory for the allies - reflecting that although they made significant gains it wasn't for much without the Rhine crossing. Regards Psychostevouk (talk) 07:59, 7 August 2008 (UTC)

Just noticed Template:Infobox Military Conflict suggests 'inconclusive'. I like that description a lot better! Psychostevouk (talk) 08:35, 7 August 2008 (UTC)

I guess Market was an Allied success and Garden was an Allied failure. A bit complicated so inconclusive sounds fine to me. Stephen Kirrage ^{talk - contribs} 10:06, 11 August 2008 (UTC)

There's a pretty thorough discussion of this topic above, on this very talk page. "Inconclusive" is a real misreading of the evidence IMO. The Allied decision to commit to M-G instead of the other courses of action open to them had a huge opportunity cost. The mission then failed; nothing worthwhile was gained but much was lost. It was a very serious Allied defeat, and almost any history of the campaign will call it that. But see the discussion above. Regards, DMorpheus (talk) 19:38, 13 August 2008 (UTC)

I don't see that the discussion referenced above actually came to a conclusion, however, I can live with "Allied failure", but I thought "Decisive German victory" which was in place when I raised the issue was totally misleading. Dabbler (talk) 20:21, 13 August 2008 (UTC)

Same comment, here we were discussing the 'Decisive German victory'. I had read the comments above, but I agree the conclusion wasn't amazingly clear. For my part, I understand the allied failure idea, but I didn't really think this did justice to the German loss. The allies failed certainly, but the Germans didn't win as a result, and 'allied failure' doesn't really reflect this. Inconclusive seems to perfectly describe the fact that neither sides actually benefitted from the battle. I don't think its original research either as most texts discuss the German loss and its relation to the allied failure. I bcan live with allied failure though, I just don't think it reflects the entire picture as it were. Regards Psychostevouk (talk) 20:49, 13 August 2008 (UTC)

What do the historians say?

Ryan, p.450: quoting Dr. John C Warren, Airborne Operation in World War II, European theater, USAF Historical Division, 1956, p. 146: "Thus ended in failure the greatest aiborne operation of the war. Although Montgomery asserted that it had been 90 per cent successful, his statement was merely a consoling figure of speech. All objectives save Arnhem had been won, but without Arnhem the rest were as nothing. In return for so much courage and sacrfice, the allies had won a 50-mile salient - leading nowhere".

Wilmot, p. 523:

"Summing up the overall results of Market Garden, ... monty claiming 90% .... This claim is difficult to support, unless the success of the operation is judged merely in terms of the numbers of bridges captured. Eight crossings were seized but the faiure to secure the ninth, the bridge at Arnhem, meant the frustration of Montgomery's strategic purpose. His fundamental objective had been to drive Second Army beyond the Mass and Rhine in one bound."

p. 524:

"...the results of Market Garden fell so far short of what Montgomery wanted..."

"The basic reason for the failure at Arnhem..."

p. 525 footnote

"Montgomery says that "Had good weather obtained, there was no doubt that we should have attained ful success". Student, when interrogated by Liddel Hart, did not go quite so far as this, but gave the weather as the main cause of the failure".

The same sort of comments persist, no mention of defeat but of the failure of the plan. He does note on p.523 that:

"This salient, 60 miles deep, was of immense tactical value for the puropse of driving the Germans from the area south of the Mass and thus removeing the threat of an immediate counter-stroke agaisnt Antwerp"

providing a counter to the American historians comment.

Shulman, Defeat in the West p.210:

"Yet despite the inability of the Allied troops to take Arnhem, the airborne operation had acheived some useful results. It had driven a wedge between into the German northern position, thereby isolating hte 15th Army north of Antwerp from the First Parachute Army on the eastern side of the bulge. This segregation from the rest of the German front complicated the supply problem of 15th Army.... The capture of these bridgheads across the Mass and Waal also served as an important bsae for subsequent operations agaisnt the Germans on the Rhine. 'The loss of the bridges at Grave and Nijmegen was a great embarrassment to us' said eneral von Zangen of 15th Army. 'By capturing them the allies forces us to remain on the defensive in this area in order to prevent this bulge from growing. We were never able to assemble enough troops for a serious counterattack to retake Antwerp'"

He otherwise talks about the failure of this that and the other in regards to Arnhem but calls it once, the "..defeat at arnhem..".

Stephen Ashley Hart in Collosal Cracks likewises calls it a failure. While i do not rate Max Hasting as a historian, he calls Market Garden a "disaster" and seperatly a "failure". Major Ellis, the author of the British Official campaign history for NWE : Victory in the West v.II, does not nail down the operation under any heading - he admits the Germans fought well and frustrated the operation, he critises the allied plans but does not call it a defeat or a failure. He does on p. 59 call it a "..spectacular advance..." however.

To sum up, they mostly agree that the operation was a "failure" nothing else and the majoirty (3 out of 4 iirc) note that the operation was not in vain and that the ground gained was worth it even if the overall plan did fail.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 21:20, 13 August 2008 (UTC)

I agree you'll find a pretty broad consensus in campaign histories that this operation was a failure. You'll find far less agreement that it was "not in vain". Many have argued that it was actually counterproductive for the Allied cause strategically (see above with the discussion of Weigley). The ground gained was worthless strategically - it led nowhere, as Omar Bradley pointed out. It took a lot of manpower to hold onto it, robbing the 21st Army Group of unit that could have been massed for offensive use elsewhere. As it was they had to ask for additional US units just to hold what they had. So there's a school of thought that says the operation left the allies much worse off than they had been before. DMorpheus (talk) 16:22, 14 August 2008 (UTC)

I can see both points, on one hand the operation gained strategically nothing unless that final bridgehead was secured as several historians have noted. However on the other hand, historians have noted that a byproduct of all this split the German Army Group in two and made it impossible for them to conduct a significate and co-ordinated counterattack to retake possibly the most strategically valuabled target in all of western Europe - Antwerp. The aftermath section or whatever it is called should really reflect both points.

In a personal opinion, i wouldnt call the operation in vain anyway - they tried and thanks to numerous reasons failed, if we could go back and change anything i would still launch the operation although slightly modified with hindsight of course. All in all i believe it was the right thing to do.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 16:40, 14 August 2008 (UTC)

Um, that would be original research my friend. DMorpheus (talk) 16:42, 14 August 2008 (UTC)

The latter yes but not the former, i never said the latter should be included in the article, i stated that both points made by historians should be included.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 16:50, 14 August 2008 (UTC)

Ok am going to transfer some of the above into citations to suppport "Allied failure". While i cannot agree with one of the editors who keeps adding in "Axis Victory" when there are several historians who note while the operation failed it achieved other objectives such as splitting the German Army group, prevented counterattacks etc - i feel that the result is too limited.

Would something like "Allied operational failure, Market Garden however did gain a 50-mile salient, split the German Army Group and prevented future German counterattacks on Antwerp" fit much better in the info box?

The above referances used do support this position. For example while John Warren says the sailent lead nowhere, he does not address the splitting of the Army Group or the preemptive halt to counterattacks like others do.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 09:14, 21 August 2008 (UTC)

With respect, again, I think the consensus on overall failure is extraordinarily strong. There is far less consensus on other secondary consequences of the operation. We are after all discussing the info box here, and I suggest "Allied failure" is the closest term to the historical consensus that clearly exists. Other, secondary consequences can be discussed in the article as they are now. To use a weasel word here, *some* historians would argue the salient was an allied gain; others would argue the opposite. We cannot capture all that in an info box but we can (and have) in the article itself. Regards, DMorpheus (talk) 12:27, 21 August 2008 (UTC)

I totaly agree with you that this can all be discussed in length within the article.

In fact ill add a note next to it state so, which will hopefully keep the editors who want to slap any old thing in there off all our backs.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 12:38, 21 August 2008 (UTC)

I have reviewed the above discussion, and the term "Allied Failure" just does not sit properly. I think that "Operational Failure" was a little bit better. I say this because Allied Failure is a bit vague (what has failed?), whereas Operational Failure (or "Operation Failed") indicates that the Operation (Market Garden) did not complete its objective (the seizure of Arnhem bridge). Of course, DMorpheus' statements make it sound more along the lines of a Pyrrhic "Victory" to me, in that the opportunity cost of the operation exceeded its benefits, even if Allied forces obtained (marginal) victory in the field. I will leave it for you guys to decide - I just figured I would say something about it. By the way, thank you for the quotations, EnigmaMcmxc.72.192.189.232 (talk) 07:02, 4 September 2008 (UTC)

Info box

I don't want to get into an edit war Enigmamcmxc (or a personal war at that - I have no beef with you!), so I'll discuss this here rather than on the history page! Template:Infobox_Military_Conflict clearly states that countries are to be ordered according to relevance to the battle, and having a quick look around other WWII battles off the top of my head (Okinawa, Guadacanal, Italy, Alamain, Atlantic, Dunkirk, Normandy landings, France, Bulge, Berlin) all list belligerents in order of relevance. Admittedly 2 (Invasion of Normandy and Invasion of Sicily) did list them alphabetically, but they're definately a minority. The point of the infobox is for a reader to get an immeadiate gist of the battle. Listing the belligerents in order of relevance saves the reader having to wade through the article looking for each countries contribution. Listing UK at the top makes it clear that Market Garden was a British led operation, and mainly used British divisions - not a Dutch led insurgency! On another note, there was a Dutch SS unit SS Volunteer Grenadier Brigade Landstorm Nederland loosely involved in the battle. Does anyone think it worth including them in the infobox, or would they come under Germany anyway? Regards Psychostevouk (talk) 08:32, 7 August 2008 (UTC)

This has been discussed elsewhere. Template:Infobox Military Conflict#Usage makes it clear that relevance or size of presence should be the criteria for ordering the combatants. Sicily and Normandy have been changed to reflect this. Stephen Kirrage ^{talk - contribs} 10:22, 11 August 2008 (UTC)

Yes i admit i had not been aware of this.User:EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 10:30, 11 August 2008 (UTC)

Poles against MG

No one even pointed out in the article that Polish generalition was highly against Montgomery's idea of Market Garden, Poles even made a document which pointed out in many points that Market Garden operation is impossible to make and even if the Allies will land they will pay for it in very big casualties (as they did), mainly ideas of Poles just showed stupidity of this mission... --Krzyzowiec (talk) 00:46, 7 September 2008 (UTC)

What book/document?--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 02:06, 7 September 2008 (UTC)

I'm guessing he means the commander of the Polish Brigade, whose name completely slips by me now. He argued against it repeatedly. Off the top of my head, Ryan details it in A Bridge Too Far, as does Kershaw in It never snows in September and some others I forget right now as my books are in storage. Skinny87 (talk) 20:08, 12 September 2008 (UTC)

Strategic loss to the Allied Alliance. Repercussions on Montgomerys Legacy

From the montgomery wiki entry, it is hinted that the Market Garden was not just a tactical failure, it was a strategic one as well.

See the above sections covering the outcome of the battle. Most sources state it was a failure. The battle at Arnhem for sure was a defeat however on the whole the 21st AG was not defeated in a tactical sence as it fought the German armed forces back. Strategically, some historians call it a bulge going no where while other state it cut the German army group in two and thus stoped them from mounting a earlier co-ordinated counterattack.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 09:48, 12 September 2008 (UTC)

by strategic i mean intangibles such as morale, the anglo-us alliance, proper deployment of troops with respect to an overall attack on the german line. at any rate, i agree with the wiki entry that the loss and or misappropriation of so many elite troops weakened other parts of the allied line, in particular around the ardenne, figuring significantly in the battle of the bulge. this would be called a strategic loss. --Divbis0 (talk) 17:38, 12 September 2008 (UTC)

The loss of elite troops weakened the other parts of the allied line? How can the actions by the Divisional/Corps/Army and Army Group commanders in a compeltly different sector be blamed on a whole different Army Group and an operation launched months before? 82nd and 101st Airborne were not on the line and were in reserve in December and were rushed forward to aid the defence - a few extra thousand men would have somehow made the differance? 1st Airborne division most likely wouldnt have been dispatched into the American sector anyway.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 18:20, 12 September 2008 (UTC)

From my understanding, it had a long and detrimental effect on Montgomery's legacy and reputation. It may have created a lack of confidence by his peers, leading to decreased credibility and delegated responsibility from Supreme Allied Command, and gave his many enemies fodder for attack. Also, I get the impression that the MG loss was a big factor in keeping Montgomery from earldom (although there were other issues to be sure).

Monty already had enemies and had been at him since the beginning of the fighting in NW Europe. That and as you put it the "possability" of other negative effects on his character i dont think have relevance here. Thats my 2 cents, others may disagree with that position however.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 09:48, 12 September 2008 (UTC)

As for Montgomerys personally, ie, his other problems, you can read those on his wikipedia entry, and so i agree they dont need to be put in here. That is not my point. My point is that the MG failure had repercussions on Montgomery's career, perhaps limiting his responsibility in future engagements. Is there any doubt that this is the case? If not, then The black mark against such an important allied general, with resulting decrease in trust and confidence, would then be a costly strategic outcome of the MG operation, and should at least be mentioned. --Divbis0 (talk) 17:38, 12 September 2008 (UTC)

Is there any citation which supports this position? Market Garden appears to have had no impact on his carrer since he became the Chief of Imperial General Staff.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 18:20, 12 September 2008 (UTC)

I'm hardly a supporter of Monty, but it cannot be said that Market-Garden did anything to limit his reposibilities. Churchill still had complete faith in him, as did Alan Brooke. He went on to command British forces and American during the Battle of the Bulge and then launched the largest airborne operation in history, Operation Varsity. He had no black mark against him in terms of his career; he may have been extremely unpopular, but his career wasn't limited. Heck, he went on to command NATO after the war. Skinny87 (talk) 19:58, 12 September 2008 (UTC)

Perhaps of greater importance, the failure led to multiple finger pointing and blaming, thus widening the rift between the british and US command, and threatening the crucial alliance that proved to be the backbone of the ultimate allied victory of WWII. Also, from the Battle of the Bulge wiki entry, it discusses how the Germans where aware of this rift, and one of the strategic goals of The Battle of the Bulge was to heighten the tensions to a point where the Anglo-US alliance broke (hence they drove in near the corp boundary between the two). So it seems that the loss of MG may have played a role in Germanys strategic planning as well.

If there is a source which states such a position add it in, although i doubt the alliance would have ever broke - they would have just got rid of the problem as am sure they threated Monty with (iirc over him badgering Ike all the time).--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 09:48, 12 September 2008 (UTC)

Sure. first, its mentioned on the wikipedia's own entry under "battle of the bulge". Also, it was discussed extensively in BBC's "Battlefield" documentary series, episode 6, "the battle for the rhein" (excellent--check it out). Also, here is one of many historical mentions: http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/battle_of_the_bulge.htm. from these articles and documentaries, there seems to be a consensus by historians that hitler was quite aware of "the growing rift" between US and British military leadership, greatly exascerbated by the public bickering that followed the MG failure, and besides taking antwerp, his hope was to use the bulge to finish off the alliance with a strategic split down the us/british corp lines. whether or not Hitler's strategic goal was sound or even reasonable is a matter of POV (i happen to agree with you--hitler was a strategic idiot, but that just my opinion). A preponderance of historians think that Hitler believed this possible, and designed the ardenne offensive with that goal in mind. Thanks for responding by the way. --Divbis0 (talk) 17:38, 12 September 2008 (UTC)

I am not particularly expert in this field, so I'll let other, wiser historians make the changes or not. I just thought it would be worth a mention, at least :-) --Divbis0 (talk) 00:42, 12 September 2008 (UTC)

Firstly, our Bulge article is rife with inaccuracies and errors, so I wouldn't quote it as historical evidence. Secondly, that website says nothing of the sort about splitting the allies apart politically or anything of the like. I fail to see any 'historical consensus' that Hitler was attempting to break the allies apart politically - indeed the only idea related to that I can think of is the plan for Watch on the Rhine to drive a wedge between US and British forces to drive for Antwerp. Who are these historians who have an apparent 'preponderance'? Skinny87 (talk) 20:04, 12 September 2008 (UTC)

well, there is a two hour 1994 bbc documentary "the battle of the rhine". (wiki: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battlefield_(documentary_series)#Series_One, or from IMDB: http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0120926/) or you can try http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/battle_of_the_bulge.htm. there are many others to list, just check out the bibliography above ( aka 6th floor depository)--Divbis0 (talk) 05:39, 13 September 2008 (UTC)

I am going to bow out of this discussion, mainly because I just noticed that most of this OpMG wiki entry seems to have been taken from one source, John Frosts book. This is the second entry in the bibliography above (aka 6th floor depository). But I did find the "6th floor depository" section a wonderful source of info. Also thanks for your stimulating arguments. take care. --Divbis0 (talk) 04:45, 13 September 2008 (UTC)

Relying on historical documentaries and random websites probably isn't the best way to learn about a subject, no offense. Actual, quantifiable books by serious historians are always better sources, and after reading thriugh a few books on Market-Garden by Kershaw and Hastings (It Never Snows In September & Armageddon:Battle for Germany 1944-1945), I can't see anything on Hitler attempting to divide the Allies politically. Skinny87 (talk) 09:48, 13 September 2008 (UTC)

Just to note the "6th Floor Book Depository Building" was just a piss take nickname so i could copy and paste all books which had not been used within the article i.e. not citations supporting they had been used as a source. The facts may be that someone originally did copy large chunks of one of those books however they have never used inline citations to support this so there is no point having any of them there until.

I also have to agree with Skinny, websites and documatries are not the west source of information. Ive seen enough documantires which give out dodgy information, them and websites on the whole never really tell you were they have gathered such information increaseing the fact there unreliablness.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 12:11, 13 September 2008 (UTC)

Failed operation

From the 1st paragraph: "Operation Market Garden.. was an Allied military operation..". Wouldn't it be relevant to add the operation failed? Maybe something like "..was a failed Allied military operation..". Thanks Kvsh5 (talk) 18:21, 8 October 2008 (UTC)

It's not always appropriate to put black and white judgements into an article. It's very easy to want to do this, but it's not helpful. It makes us try to put everything into a box, and that's not what encyclopedia articles are for.

Did Market Garden fail? It didn't do everything it set out to do, but it seized two bridges and captured a lot of ground. If the criteria of success is doing everything it set out to do, then the Normandy landings were also a failed operation (virtually none of the assigned objectives were achieved on day 1). Let's also remember that objectives are not always assigned on the basis of "do this or it will be a failure". Football teams, for example, usually start a seaons with an objective of winning every game. That doesn't mean they are a failure if they don't do that. So let's not simplify things more than we have to. DJ Clayworth (talk) 18:26, 8 October 2008 (UTC)

The info box is there to provide the information requested at-a-glance. As far as the outcome goes, that has been discussed ad nauseum. The parallel with Normandy is perhaps instructive: the normandy landings accomplished the main objective (securing a lodgment) despite the fact that not all secondary missions were accomplished. The opposite is true of M-G: the main objective (a bridgehead across the Rhine) was not achieved, and the achievement of many secondary objectives is irrelevant in that context. The negative effects on the 21st Army Group are also discussed above. Regards, DMorpheus (talk) 17:12, 9 October 2008 (UTC)

Aftermath section

It seems that the whole section is poor, it is riddled with POV and uncited comments rather than facts, where these have been flagged no one seems to want to fix them. How can XXX Corps not advancing fior 18 hours be "alleged"? It either happened or it didn't. DMorpheus deletion of one paragraph made me go back and look at the whole section and his comments (Dubious, uncited, POV) can be applied to a lot of it. Dabbler (talk) 19:29, 9 October 2008 (UTC)

Yeah, the entire article can be described as 'Uncited, POV, Dubious', and I have long-term plans to clear it up. But there are too many editors and IPs who just add random stuff that doesn't get reverted to make it a viable Airborne Warfare project for me at the moment. When I do start the re-write, I don't intend to do it alone, it's too big for that; it'll need to be a team effort. Skinny87 (talk) 19:40, 9 October 2008 (UTC)

German victory

Is anyone else bothered by the result in the info box? "Allied operational failure" seriously?. Everyone knows it was a German victory, shouldnt you have to rewrite all other military victories as "German operational failure" for example? Besides i think the quotes and refrences to "Allied operational failure" are vauge. Anyone else have an opinion on this? --Nirvana77 (talk) 13:14, 10 October 2008 (UTC)

This has been covered multiple times - the historical consensus is on an Alied Operational Failure, as whilst the primary Allied objectives were not achieved, some secondary ones were. Hence the title. Please don't change it. Skinny87 (talk) 13:32, 10 October 2008 (UTC)

I wont change it unless people agree with me that it should be changed. I think it can be misleading to just have "Allied operational failure" and the fact that they were denied their objectives makes it a German victory, maybe there could be some sort of compromise? But if everyone likes it the way it is i wont touch it, but i dont think that's the situation. --Nirvana77 (talk) 13:55, 10 October 2008 (UTC)

You will note in one of the above discussions the opinions of several historians have been quoted.

None of them describe the German actions to the entire operation as any sort of victory and all talk of an operational failure on the allied part - not being able to cross that final brigde to complete the mission.

To sort of sum up, the allies failed on there overall objective - the overall operational failure; tactically they beat the German Army bar at Arnhem; strategically split the German Army Group. It not as simple to say the Germans won and the Allies lost or vice versa.

For the moment it seems the best we can have until the article has been really worked over to give a more clear picture of events and with the bais and dodgy info removed.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 15:40, 10 October 2008 (UTC)