Confirmation failure

A confirmation bias (also confirmation bias or confirmation distortion , Eng. Confirmation bias ) is in cognitive psychology to determine the tendency to select information as and interpret that they fulfill their own expectations (confirmed). The first theory about this cognitive bias comes from Peter Wason (1960, 1968).

Definition and characteristics

Until the 1960s, choosing and evaluating data to test hypotheses was a matter of philosophy of science . Wason, influenced by Karl Popper and his doctrine of falsificationism , held the view that people tend to confirm existing hypotheses. He called this strategy “ confirmation bias ” and contrasted it with a “correct” test strategy, the “ disconfirming evidence ”. In general, there is a confirmation error when hypotheses are more likely to be confirmed by the selection, remembering and interpreting of information, regardless of their truthfulness.

Wason developed several mental psychology experiments. Although many more experiments in the following years have cast serious doubt on the simple assumption of the existence of a systematic confirmatory error, the assumption that people seek to confirm their own hypotheses is not only widespread among laypeople. The confirmation of hypotheses extends to the cognitive functions of remembering, perceiving, interpreting and applying search strategies. Cognitive psychology research focuses on the selection of information.

Confirmation errors can mainly be identified if the theory to be tested is already firmly established or if the expectation to be confirmed is confirmed with a positive feeling or is worth striving for in some other way. On the other hand, a confirmation of expectations is often sought in everyday life when the expectation itself is not sought. Trope and Liberman (1996) therefore focus on the costs of incorrect decisions in their experiments. In general, people want to avoid the high costs of wrong decisions. It does not matter whether a hypothesis is to be confirmed or refuted by information.

Affirmative information is preferred if, among other things

appropriate information is better remembered,
matching information is valued higher than opposing,
Sources of information for inappropriate information are avoided.

Positive test strategy

Joshua Klayman and Young-Won Ha (1987) differentiated the general definition of confirmatory failure from what is known as positive test strategy (PTS). It is a general strategy for testing hypotheses. Only values or events are checked that have already occurred in the past or that are expected. Some authors reduce the description of a positive test strategy to the statement: "People have the tendency to only look for clues that confirm their opinion." However, research has shown that this simple statement is not tenable and a PTS only in Leads to a confirmation error in exceptional cases.

A positive test strategy is a heuristic method to limit the set of all possible examination parameters to a plausible and practically verifiable selection. Therefore it can be very effective and its application rational. In addition, the PTS also enables the tested hypothesis to be falsified. Therefore, their application does not lead to a systematic confirmation error. This only occurs if the data selected according to the PTS are a subset of the “correct” data belonging to the “correct” hypothesis. In this case, PTS repeatedly confirms an incorrect hypothesis. It has also been shown that test subjects tend to give affirmative answers. The more accurate statement is therefore: "People tend to formulate exam questions in such a way that their assumptions are confirmed if the answers are positive."

Selective remembering

Anyone who already has a firm opinion on a topic remembers both the arguments for their own position and the arguments for the opposing position after a discussion about it. There is no clear evidence that information that confirms one's assumptions is better remembered than information that contradicts one's assumptions.

literature

Hugo Mercier: Confirmation bias - Myside bias, in: Rüdiger F. Pohl (Ed.): Cognitive illusions: Intriguing phenomena in thinking, judgment and memory. 2nd Edition. Routledge, London and New York 2017, ISBN 978-1-138-90341-8 , pp. 99-114.
Fenna H. Poletiek: Hypothesis-testing behavior. Psychology Press, Philadelphia 2001.
Peter Wason: On the failure to eliminate hypotheses in a conceptual task. In: Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology , Volume 12, 1960, ISSN 0033-555X , pp. 129-140.
Peter Wason: Reasoning about a rule. In: Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology , Volume 20, 1968, ISSN 0033-555X , pp. 273-281.

Footnotes

↑ Thought Research: An Overview of Selected Idea Defects , PDF file, p. 2
^ Peter Wason : Reasoning about a rule . In: Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology , Volume 20, 1968, ISSN 0033-555X , pp. 273-281.
↑ Yacoov Trope, Akiva Liberman: Social hypothesis testing: Cognitive at motivational mechanisms. In: E. Tory Higgins, Ariel W. Kruglanski (eds.): Social psychology. Handbook of basic principles. Guilford Press, New York 1996, pp. 239-270.
^ Rüdiger F. Pohl: Cognitive illusions; A handbook on fallacies and biases in thinking, judgment and memory. Psychology Press, Taylor and Francis Group, Hove (UK) and New York 2004, p. 93.
^ Joshua Klayman, Young-Won Ha: Confirmation, disconfirmation, an information in hypothesis testing. In: Psychological Review. Volume 94, 1987, pp. 211-228.
↑ Rüdiger F. Pohl: Cognitive illusions: A handbook on fallacies and biases in thinking, judgment and memory. Psychology Press, Taylor and Francis Group, Hove (UK) and New York 2004, pp. 79-87.
^ Edward E. Jones, Rika Kohler: The effects of plausibility on the learning of controversial statements. In: Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology , Volume 57, 1959, ISSN 0096-851X , pp. 315-320.
^ Kari Edwards, Edward E. Smith: A disconformation bias in the evaluation of arguments. In: Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. Volume 71, No. 1, 1996, ISSN 0449-2935 , pp. 5-24.
↑ Charles Stangor, David McMillan: Memory for expectancy-congruent and incongruent expectancy-information: A review of the social and social development literatures. In: Psychological Bulletin. Vol. 111, No. 1, 1992, pp. 42-61.

[1] Thought Research: An Overview of Selected Idea Defects , PDF file, p. 2

[2] Peter Wason : Reasoning about a rule . In: Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology , Volume 20, 1968, ISSN 0033-555X , pp. 273-281.

[3] Yacoov Trope, Akiva Liberman: Social hypothesis testing: Cognitive at motivational mechanisms. In: E. Tory Higgins, Ariel W. Kruglanski (eds.): Social psychology. Handbook of basic principles. Guilford Press, New York 1996, pp. 239-270.

[4] Rüdiger F. Pohl: Cognitive illusions; A handbook on fallacies and biases in thinking, judgment and memory. Psychology Press, Taylor and Francis Group, Hove (UK) and New York 2004, p. 93.

[5] Joshua Klayman, Young-Won Ha: Confirmation, disconfirmation, an information in hypothesis testing. In: Psychological Review. Volume 94, 1987, pp. 211-228.

[6] Rüdiger F. Pohl: Cognitive illusions: A handbook on fallacies and biases in thinking, judgment and memory. Psychology Press, Taylor and Francis Group, Hove (UK) and New York 2004, pp. 79-87.

[7] Edward E. Jones, Rika Kohler: The effects of plausibility on the learning of controversial statements. In: Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology , Volume 57, 1959, ISSN 0096-851X , pp. 315-320.

[8] Kari Edwards, Edward E. Smith: A disconformation bias in the evaluation of arguments. In: Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. Volume 71, No. 1, 1996, ISSN 0449-2935 , pp. 5-24.

[9] Charles Stangor, David McMillan: Memory for expectancy-congruent and incongruent expectancy-information: A review of the social and social development literatures. In: Psychological Bulletin. Vol. 111, No. 1, 1992, pp. 42-61.