Dispositional property

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In ontology and philosophy of science in particular, the dispositional property ( disposition ) is the ability or ability of an object (including a person) to behave in a certain way. If one only thinks of more permanent, specific or innate dispositions, one also speaks of disposition, disposition, tendency or inclination.

On dispositions relate dispositional expressions , dispositional predicates or disposition terms . The opposite of the concept of disposition is the concept of observation .

For example, the property “fragile” can be analyzed as the tendency of an object to break when it is exposed to relatively little force. In more recent systematic philosophy, the use of the concept of disposition has been proposed to deal with a wide variety of problems, including explanations of human behavior and thinking or assumed properties such as colors, aesthetic or value properties. In addition to the suitability of such analyzes in detail, there is also some controversy. a. how the concept of a disposition is to be analyzed in general and to be distinguished from other classes of properties; how dispositions relate to their material basis (such as the atomic structure of a fragile vase), whether they can be consistently reduced to it or whether there are ontologically independent dispositions that may be independently causally effective; whether dispositions are intrinsic properties at all or even completely.

Differentiation of dispositional and other properties

The classic counter-concept to dispositional properties is the concept of manifest properties. These describe a state that exists at the time the statement is made.

Dispositions cannot be observed directly, only their manifestations or e.g. B. structural properties of the object that cause manifestation under certain circumstances.

Difficulties in defining dispositional properties

In logical empiricism in particular , the question was discussed whether and how dispositional properties can be defined in such a way that the analysis only refers to properties that are manifest, directly observable or at least better understandable in their nature. At first glance, analyzes that work with conditionalities seem obvious, such as:

x is water-soluble if and only if: if x is immersed in water, x dissolves.

The difficulty here is that (after the definition of the meaning of the “material implication ”) a statement “if A, then B” is already true if A does not hold. From “x is not immersed in water” already follows “If x is immersed in water, x dissolves”. This results in the undesirable consequence that everything is water-soluble that has not previously been immersed in water.

An alternative definition (in the form of a so-called conditional definition ) looks like this:

If x is immersed in water, then the following applies: x is water-soluble if and only if x dissolves.

Here the interchangeability of the definiendum “x is soluble in water” and the definition “x dissolves” is made dependent on the fact that x was immersed in water. According to this definition, however, nothing can be said about the water solubility of x as long as x has not been immersed in water, the statement "x is water-soluble" is then undecidable . However, this also has consequences that violate our intuitions. It follows from this that we cannot say of a lump of sugar that has never been immersed in water that it is soluble in water.

The closest thing to intuition is probably a definition in terms of a counterfactual implication

x is water-soluble if and only if: if x were immersed in water, x would dissolve.

A counterfactual implication, that is, a statement of the form “If A were the case, B would be the case”, however, has the disadvantage of vagueness (language) , its meaning is not precisely defined (in contrast to the material implication).

The impossibility of tracing dispositional concepts back to observation concepts prompted Carnap to introduce them with the help of conditional definitions. In the case of conditional definitions, however, the defined expression can only be eliminated if the condition is met. With this, Carnap's program to reduce all concepts to observation concepts failed. From a realistic perspective, it is accordingly emphasized that the natural sciences often use dispositional terms, but their applicability is usually not tested, but rather is inferred from belonging to a species, so that the natural sciences cannot limit themselves to what is directly perceptible to the senses.

literature

  • Rudolf Carnap : Testability and Meaning , in: Philosophy of Science 3 (1936), 419-471 and 4 (1937), 1-40.
  • David Kellogg Lewis : Counterfactuals , Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1973.
  • Stephen Mumford : Dispositions , Oxford: Oxford University Press 1998.

Web links

See also

Individual evidence

  1. ^ After E. Kanterian: Analytical Philosophy. Campus, Frankfurt a. M., 2004, p. 90
  2. ↑ See Walther, Philosophisches Argumentieren (1990), p. 218
  3. ↑ Walther, Philosophisches Argumentieren (1990), p. 218
  4. ↑ Fara, lc
  5. ↑ See e.g. BEJ Lowe: A Survey to Metaphysics , Oxford: OUP 2002, 302f
  6. ↑ Essler / Martínez: Grundzüge der Logistik I. 4. Aufl. (1991), p. 235, according to which terms of disposition as "concepts that are assigned to objects (or a class or a tuple of objects) through the results of tests" To be defined.
  7. ↑ Cf. Gabriel, Gottfried: Definitions and Interests. Frommann-Holzboog, Stuttgart 1972 (problemata, vol. 13), p. 56 f.
  8. ↑ Example: The dispositional property of the fragility of glasses is not determined by their breaking, but by their (specific) glass property.
  9. ^ So Schöndorf, Harald: Attachment. In: Brugger / Schöndorf (ed.): Philosophical dictionary. Alber: Freiburg, Br .; Munich 2010.