Constructive empiricism

The constructive empiricism is a modern brand of empiricism . Its founder is Bas van Fraassen , who founded constructive empiricism in his monumental work The Scientific Image ( 1980 ). With the attribute “constructive” van Fraassen wants to express that science is not an activity in the sense of a discovery of the truth, but rather a construction to ensure empirical adequacy . Van Fraassen describes this with reference to Pierre Duhem as “to save the phenomena”.

Empirical adequacy, agnosticism and goal of science

Representatives of constructive empiricism are agnostic towards the theoretical terms of a theory ( atom , gene , etc.). Everything a constructive empiricist believes in are observations that can be made with the naked eye (sometimes with the help of instruments).

Constructive empiricism is the thesis that the natural sciences aim exclusively at constructing empirically appropriate theories that correspond to empirical adequacy . Acceptance of a theory does not imply the belief that the theory is true in all respects, only that it is empirically appropriate.

According to Van Fraassen, the scientist does not accept a theory because he believes in its truth, but only because he believes in its empirical adequacy. The motives of the individual are irrelevant. Just like, for example, the goal of a chess game can be determined by mating the opponent. Individual motives such as B. Addiction to fame, banishing boredom, etc. then do not play a role.

Semantic interpretation of theories

In contrast to logical positivism and instrumentalism , van Fraassen wants the statements of a theory to be understood literally. A theory that says the universe is made up of atoms and a theory that says the universe is a continuum can never be equivalent. Not even if they are supposed to explain the same observations. However, this is exactly what the positivist and the instrumentalist deny. In this respect, van Fraassen agrees with scientific realism . The statements of a theory are semantically either true or false (either the universe consists of atoms, or of a continuum). However, van Fraassen denies that clarifying this question is the goal of science. Van Fraassen says he is agnostic about this question . The only thing that counts is the empirical adequacy of the theory.

In contrast to scientific realism, van Fraassen avoids the problem of the underdetermination of theories by evidence with the strategy just described . For the constructive empiricist, all empirically equivalent theories are equal. The scientific realist, on the other hand, must have additional criteria such as simplicity, explanatory power and the like. Ä. try to justify the decision for or against one theory or the other. Van Fraassen pejoratively describes these criteria as metaphysical baggage , which can be dispensed with for a philosophical understanding of science.

Pragmatics of Explanations

Van Fraassen regards explanations , simplicity and other values ​​as nothing more than pragmatic dimensions, which can play a decisive role in the selection of theories, but are only secondary to the empirical adequacy of the theory. Van Fraassen believes that empirical adequacy is a prerequisite for explanation. Explanation is then something of an unnecessary, but pleasant bonus. Here, of course, van Fraassen clearly differs from the realists.

Web links

• Bradley Monton and Chad Mohler:  Constructive Empiricism. In: Edward N. Zalta (Ed.): Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy .

Individual evidence

1. ↑ “ Science aims to give us theories which are empirically adequate; and acceptance of a theory involves as belief only that it is empirically adequate. This is the statement of the anti-realistic position I advocate; I shall call it constructive empiricism. “From B. v. Fraassen: The Scientific Image. Clarendon Press, 1980, p. 12.