Corruption in Sports
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The corruption in sport originally referred to any action that aims to enrich themselves by influencing of results at sporting events. Today this definition needs to be expanded to include other unethical behaviors. This includes manipulation in the allocation of major sporting events, voting on important decisions in sports organizations and the timing of betting games. Corruption in sport is not a modern phenomenon. For example, during the Olympic Games in 388 BC. Bribed competitor. More recent corruption scandals can be found in football, boxing, US college basketball as well as in Australian and English rugby.
Forms of corruption in sport
Within the sporting competition
Corruption within the sporting competition includes match manipulation or so-called match fixing and fraudulent agreements. Often this goes hand in hand with bribes and sports betting.
Outside of sporting competition
Corruption outside of sporting competitions includes corruption in the allocation of major events, corruption during the allocation of marketing rights, bribery of officials in sports associations and corruption in the area of sponsorship.
Corruption damage
Corruption creates disadvantages for other parties, so-called sacrifice costs. In relation to the award of sporting events, this means that the losing countries, i.e. the countries that have applied but are not appointed as the host, cannot achieve their image, employment and income gains. In economics, such costs are called social costs. In terms of social costs, however, not only the lost benefits of the losing countries are considered, but a comparison is made with the increase in benefits of the winning country (ultimate organizer). From an economic point of view, only the difference is included in the damage assessment. Here it can happen that the increase in benefit of the winning country is higher (or only relatively lower) than the lost benefit of the losing country. Therefore, in this case, the costs for the entire sport are also considered. Corruption misses a central point in sport - fair competition. This can result in sponsors ceasing to support the corruption affected event in the long run and viewers losing interest in the event. In order to complete the damage assessment of corruption in sport, the expenses of the perpetrators, which were necessary in the preparation and execution of their crime, must also be considered. These include, for example, bribes. In economic terms, only the difference between the increased benefit of the bribed and the loss of benefit of the bribed is taken into account.
Causes of Corruption in Sports
The principal agent theory provides an explanation for corruption in sport. Mason, Thibault and Misener used the principal agent theory to explain corruption in sport in a paper using the International Olympic Committee as an example. In this example, the IOC acts as the principal and the voting members as agents. The agents' task is to determine the host country for the next Olympic Games. There is information asymmetry ; H. the principal does not have the possibility to monitor all activities of the agents. For this reason, the officials of the applicant countries have the opportunity to bribe the agents. B. by amounts of money. Since the IOC is an amalgamation of national sports federations, all agents together form the principal. It follows from this that there is no incentive for the individual to monitor the other agents in their actions. If you did this, you would be harming yourself.
Corruption in sport can also be viewed from a sociological point of view. Media reports can reinforce a certain perspective on corruption. It can often be observed that journalists only deal with corruption to a limited extent or not at all. This can be justified by the fact that if a journalist makes negative comments about a sports club or the like in a negative way (accuses them of corruption), the club may be banned, which denies the journalist access to the sports grounds. This limits the journalist's career and, in the worst case, even ends it. While the media is not a direct cause of corruption in sport, its strategic behavior can reinforce or undermine it.
Known cases of corruption in international sport
Award of the Olympic Games
While the Olympic Games were being awarded, there were repeated allegations of corruption in which members of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) were influenced by monetary or other favors in voting on the venue. For example, the leadership of the bid committee for the 2000 Sydney Games has confirmed that it has engaged in questionable lobbying aimed at getting votes from African members of the IOC. According to reports, two members from Kenya and Uganda were offered $ 65,000 on the eve of the election.
Referee scandal in Serie A
In 2006, the Serie A referee scandal was uncovered by Italian prosecutors. Telephone calls were tapped in connection with an investigation by Juventus Turin in the 2004/05 season. It was found that the then managing director of Juventus, Luciano Moggi, had contact with referees, journalists and members of the football association who were about the selection of referees for his team's games. The selected referees should then decide in favor of his team in critical situations or even give important players a red card so that they miss the game against Juventus.
Fight against corruption
Legal situation for international sports associations
In Switzerland
Sports associations fall into the category of private bribery as they do not take on any public-law tasks. In the past, private bribery was recorded in the Federal Act against Unfair Competition (UWG) and was only prosecuted upon application. On July 1, 2016, active and passive private bribery were included as an independent criminal offense in the Criminal Code - there was talk of a "Lex FIFA" in parliament - and has since been prosecuted ex officio. As early as 2015, the Swiss Federal Prosecutor's Office had opened several criminal proceedings in connection with world football, including suspicions of improper agency and money laundering.
International
At the international level, there are some agreements that help fight corruption:
- OECD Convention: The OECD Convention against Bribery of Foreign Public Officials is an agreement signed by 38 countries, which aims to guarantee fair competition for globalized markets. With the help of the agreement, public officials in international business transactions can be legally prosecuted for corruption. However, according to the OECD Convention, officials from international sports federations cannot be punished because they do not hold any office in the area of legislation, administration or justice of a state.
- Council of Europe Convention: With the help of the Criminal Law Convention of the Council of Europe , the active bribery of public officials and private bribery are to be combated. The Council of Europe Convention obliges countries to implement specified anti-corruption standards. Since international sports organizations are organized under private law, no public officials can be prosecuted according to the Council of Europe Convention. However, corruption in the course of major events organized by international sports associations can be punished.
- UN Convention: The United Nations Convention against Corruption is the first agreement that sets global standards for combating corruption. However, it does not include regulations for international sports federations.
None of the three international conventions explicitly regulate corruption in international sports associations and how their officials are to be criminalized. The fight against corruption in international sports associations requires the development of international standards.
Countermeasures
When fighting corruption, the basic principle is that the measures only make sense as long as the costs are not higher than the benefits. Measures against corruption are rarely analyzed in economic terms; mostly only the effectiveness and ineffectiveness of certain measures are considered. One of the easiest ways to counter corruption is through transparency. The more transparent the sporting event, the lower the likelihood that corruption will occur. Transparent is characterized by the simplicity and traceability of a sport. For example, with automatic timing in a 100m sprint, it is much more difficult to act corruptly than in a sport where the outcome is related to the discretion of a referee. Measures have already been introduced to reduce the possibility of corruption in sports that require a referee. Examples include the international amateur boxing association, which prescribes five referees , and the DFB , which analyzes its referees using video analysis.
Other measures taken are not effective from an economic point of view or their effectiveness is at least questionable. For example, the IOC has reduced the terms of office of its members, introduced age limits and decided that an executive committee should pre-select the candidate cities for hosting the Olympic Games. In addition, IOC members are not allowed to visit the candidate cities before the election. The first two measures are considered reasonable measures with low costs. The introduction of an executive committee is to be viewed critically. The committee has only a few members and is therefore generally prone to corruption. The travel ban must also be viewed critically from an economic point of view. Although this measure prevents a corrupt personal relationship between the two parties (decision maker and applicant), it leads to fewer opportunities for information. Limited information represent high costs in the economy. For this reason, a measure that entails lower costs would be more suitable. From an economic point of view, a more suitable measure could be auctioning the sporting event.
See also
Individual evidence
- ^ A b c W. Andreff: Corruption in Sport. In: Terri Byers: Contemporary Issues in Sport Management: A critical introduction. Sage, 2016, ISBN 978-1-4462-8219-9 , pp. 46-66.
- ↑ a b W. Maennig: Corruption in international sport: economic analysis and possible solutions. In: Quarterly issues for economic research. (Duncker & Humblot). Volume 73, No. 2, 2004, pp. 263-291.
- ↑ a b c d Transparency International Switzerland: Corruption in Sport. Dossier. Bern 2013.
- ^ DS Mason, L. Thibault, L. Misener: An Agency-Theory Perspective on Corruption in Sport: The Case of the International Olympic Committee. In: Journal of Sport Management. (Human Kinetics). No. 20, 2006, pp. 52-73.
- ↑ D. Numerato: The Media and Sports Corruption: An Outline of Sociological Understanding. In: International Journal of Sport Communication. (Human Kinetics). No. 2, 2009, pp. 261-273.
- ↑ a b c Combating corruption and manipulation of competitions in sport. Report in fulfillment of Postulate 11.3754 of the Commission for Science, Education and Culture of the Council of States of June 28, 2011, 2012.
- ^ G. Moser: Corruption in Sport: Possibilities and Limits of Knowledge Transfer from Economic Analyzes. Thesis. University of Bayreuth, 2007.
- ↑ W. Maenning: On the Economics of Doping and Corruption in International Sports. In: Journal of Sports Economics. (Legend). Vol. 3, No. 1, 2002, pp. 61-89.