Minimum affiliated winning coalition
The theory of minimal connected winning coalition was formulated in 1970 by Robert Axelrod . Assuming that parties are looking for coalition partners based on how many offices they can hold in a potential coalition government and are interested in governing with parties that are programmatically or ideologically close to them, Axelrod's concept contains Elements of both office and policy-oriented coalition theories.
The prerequisite for applying the theory is the plausibility of being able to order all parties, e.g. B. on a one-dimensional left-right axis as in the example shown with the parties A, B, C, D and E.
definition
A coalition is called connected when all parties between the leftmost and rightmost coalition party are also members of the coalition. An alliance of A, B and C would thus be a connected coalition, whereas the coalition of B, D and E would not (because the party C between B and D is not part of the coalition).
Second, it matters whether a potential coalition has a majority of the seats or not. If so, it is called a winning coalition . If one assumes a parliament with 101 seats, in which the majority is achieved from 51 seats, then in the example figure z. B. the coalition {C, D} with 52 seats a winning coalition, the coalition {A, B} with 43 seats not.
A linked winning coalition is then a coalition that fulfills both criteria, which is both linked in the sense of the above definition and can unite more than 50% of the seats. For example, the coalition {A, B, C, D} would be an allied winning coalition. No connected winning coalitions, however, are {D, E} - because there is no majority - or {A, C} - because they are not connected.
A connected profit coalition is referred to as a minimum connected profit coalition if every single party involved is required to achieve the status of connected profit coalition. In other words, if any party left the coalition, the coalition would no longer or would no longer be linked (or both).
In the example here, {A, B, C} is a minimal connected winning coalition. Parties A and C are both necessary for the majority status of the coalition, party B for solidarity. The coalition {C, D, E}, on the other hand, is not a minimal connected profit coalition. Party E is superfluous in that it is not needed to achieve a majority or solidarity. If you left the coalition, the remaining coalition {C, D} would still be an allied winning coalition.
Implications
Because parties in minimal connected profit coalitions can be required unilaterally to maintain the majority, the theory includes the element of office orientation. On the other hand, parties can only secure the solidarity of the coalition without contributing anything to maintaining the majority. This shows the policy component.
It is important that Axelrod's concept is not a refinement of the theory of minimum winning coalitions in the sense that all minimal connected winning coalitions must also be minimal winning coalitions. The above example of the coalition {A, B, C} illustrates the opposite.
swell
- Axelrod, Robert (1970): Conflict of Interest: A Theory of Divergent Goals with Application to Politics . Chicago: Markham.
- Linhart, Eric (2014): Spatial Models of Politics: Introduction and Overview. In: Linhart, Eric, Kittel, Bernhard & Bächtiger, André (eds.), Yearbook for Action and Decision Theory, Volume 8 . Wiesbaden: Springer VS, pp. 3-44.
- Saalfeld, Thomas (2007): Parties and Elections . Baden-Baden: Nomos.