Dutch auction

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The Dutch auction (English. Auction Dutch , and Dutch auction ) is a form of auction with falling prices (reverse auction). At a Dutch auction, the seller makes an offer for sale and specifies a starting price. In the course of the auction, gradually lower prices are given, i. H. the selling price for the item decreases with increasing duration. The first prospective buyer who agrees will be accepted at the current price. The longer the prospective buyers wait, the lower the price.

features

Dutch auction: The falling purchase price becomes visible when the clock hand turns

The advantage of the Dutch auction is the speed of processing. In contrast to a normal auction, the auction item is sold faster because the decision is already made with the first approval of an interested party. The interested parties cannot react to each other, bidding battles are excluded. Thus, large quantities of auction goods can be sold in a short time.

At Dutch auctions, potential buyers are under great pressure to make decisions. If a prospect is tacting and waiting for a cheaper price, the chances are high that the ticket will be sold to a competitor who will grab it faster.

Differences to contract auctions

Compared to order auctions , which are also reverse auctions, they only have in common the principle of falling bids. The differences are that in contract auctions

  • Work orders and services are requested
  • usually only a single auction item (a single order) is auctioned
  • the sellers submit bids while the prospective buyer waits until the end of the auction
  • the providers react to each other and can undercut each other
  • the auction lasts for a longer period of time
  • the lowest possible price is sought

literature

  • Cornelia Schaf: Contests and other aleatoric stimuli in advertising . Kovač, Hamburg 2006, ISBN 978-3-8300-2237-4 , p. 238 .

Individual evidence

  1. S. Kusic: Privatization in the Transformation Process, Springer-Verlag, 2013, p. 102.
  2. C. Scott: Due Diligence in Practice, Springer-Verlag, 2013. p. 122.
  3. N. Fischer: Auction Theory - An Analysis of the European UMTS Licensing, 2004, p. 66.