# Objectivistic concept of probability

Theories of **objectivistic probability** interpret the fact that for future events or observations only the calculation of their probability is possible, but no exact, deterministic prediction, as a circumstance that is conditioned by the objective arrangement of reality, as well as the measure of this probability . The opposite class of theories, so-called subjectivist interpretations of probability, on the other hand, do not see objective facts, but facts about the observer - that which the observer *considers* to be subjectively *probable* as decisive. Variants of such subjectivist probability theories are Bayesian theory and that developed by Bruno de Finetti .

## Objectivistic theories of probability

An objectivist can, but does not have to, assume that reality is deterministic , i.e. that it follows strict laws that precisely determine the occurrence or non-occurrence for every future event. Problems of the interpretation of quantum mechanics in particular give rise to such controversies .

### Propensity

Karl Popper's propensity theory interprets probability as the measure in which a process tends to achieve a certain result.

### Frequentism

The propensity theory can be understood as a generalization of frequentism . This interprets probability as a limit value for the relative frequency of an event.

## literature

- Ian Hacking:
*The Emergence of Probability: A Philosophical Study of Early Ideas About Probability, Induction and Statistical Inference*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1984. ISBN 0521318033 .

## Web links

- Alan Hájek:
*Interpretations of Probability.*In: Edward N. Zalta (Ed.):*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy .*