Objectivistic concept of probability
Theories of objectivistic probability interpret the fact that for future events or observations only the calculation of their probability is possible, but no exact, deterministic prediction, as a circumstance that is conditioned by the objective arrangement of reality, as well as the measure of this probability . The opposite class of theories, so-called subjectivist interpretations of probability, on the other hand, do not see objective facts, but facts about the observer - that which the observer considers to be subjectively probable as decisive. Variants of such subjectivist probability theories are Bayesian theory and that developed by Bruno de Finetti .
Objectivistic theories of probability
An objectivist can, but does not have to, assume that reality is deterministic , i.e. that it follows strict laws that precisely determine the occurrence or non-occurrence for every future event. Problems of the interpretation of quantum mechanics in particular give rise to such controversies .
Propensity
Karl Popper's propensity theory interprets probability as the measure in which a process tends to achieve a certain result.
Frequentism
The propensity theory can be understood as a generalization of frequentism . This interprets probability as a limit value for the relative frequency of an event.
literature
- Ian Hacking: The Emergence of Probability: A Philosophical Study of Early Ideas About Probability, Induction and Statistical Inference . Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1984. ISBN 0521318033 .
Web links
- Alan Hájek: Interpretations of Probability. In: Edward N. Zalta (Ed.): Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy .