Presenteeism (philosophy)

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The Presentism (engl. Presentism derived from the time stage present , of lat. Praesens at present) is a thesis within the philosophical discipline of ontology , so that part of the theoretical philosophy, which describes the general structures of reality, and within the ontology Philosophy of time . A presenter takes the thesis that only present objects and events exist. The past and the future have no real existence. The presenter must therefore explain how speaking of the past and the future can be meaningful without referring directly to existing objects. Typically, it is stated that these are references to only imagined objects, e.g. remembered or planned events. Current representatives of presenterism include u. a. Craig Bourne, Ned Markosian, and Quentin Smith.

A counter-thesis is the so-called Possibilism (even the past really exists) and the thesis of a block universe (all events exist absolutely in a four-dimensional space - time and relations of earlier and later are only owed to subjective perspectives).

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ See e.g. B. Michael C. Rea: Presentism and Fatalism (PDF; 83 kB), in: The Australasian Journal of Philosophy, introduction

literature

  • Robert Merrihew Adams : Time and Thisness , in: Peter French / Theodore Uehling / Howard Wettstein (eds.): Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11, Studies in Essentialism, University of Minnesota Press 1986, 315–329.
  • John Bigelow : Presentism and Properties , in: James Tomberlin (ed.): Philosophical Perspectives 10, Metaphysics, Blackwell 1996, 35-52.
  • Craig Bourne: A Future for presentism , Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006 Elaborated Defense of Presentism
  • Thomas M. Crisp: Presentism , in: The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2003, chap. 8, 211-245.
  • Mark Hinchliff: A Defense of Presentism in a Relativistic Setting , in: Philosophy of Science 67 Supplement. Proceedings of the 1998 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part II: Symposia Papers (2000), 575-586.
  • Mark Hinchliff: The Puzzle of Change , in: James Tomberlin (ed.): Philosophical Perspectives 10, Metaphysics, Blackwell 1996, 119-136.
  • Simon Keller: Presentism and Truthmaking , in: Dean W. Zimmerman (ed.): Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 1, Oxford University Press 2004, 83-104. Reprinted in: L. Nathan Oaklander (ed.): The Philosophy of Time: Critical Concepts in Philosophy, Routledge 2008.
  • Simon Keller / Michael Nelson: Presentists Should Believe in Time-Travel , in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2001), 333-345.
  • Storrs McCall : A Model of the Universe , Clarendon Press 1994.
  • Theodore Sider : Four Dimensionalism , Oxford University Press 2001, chap. 2.
  • Quentin Smith : Language and Time: A Defense of Presentism , Oxford University Press 1993, ISBN 0195082273 .
  • Michael Tooley : Time, Tense, and Causation , Oxford: Oxford University Press 1997.
  • Dean W. Zimmerman: Persistence and Presentism , in: Philosophical Papers 25 (1996), 115-126.
  • Dean W. Zimmerman: Temporary Intrinsics and Presentism , in: Peter van Inwagen / Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.): Metaphysics: The Big Questions , Blackwell 1998, 206-219.

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