Four-dimensionalism
The four-dimensionalism is a position within the ontology and metaphysics , according to which all objects are manifested in the world not only at any time of their respective present and then consist of their (possibly) items, but also from so-called time slices ( "temporal parts" ) are constituted , each extending into the past and future of the object in question. This was illustrated with the idea of an object as a kind of “ space-time worm”.
In contrast to eternalism or the notion of a block universe , which specifically affects the philosophy of the time , four-dimensionalism is primarily a solution to problems that arise from questions related to identity . A problem that has been known since antiquity arises from the question of when exactly an object loses its identity in the face of constant change and becomes something else, or which circumstances are sufficient or necessary for this (cf. Schiff des Theseus ). From the perspective of four-dimensionalism, on the other hand, this question does not even arise, as the possibility of change on the basis of said time slices, which are assumed to be just as indispensable in the sense of the identity of each object as its individual parts manifested at any point in time of its existence , already implies becomes. Since, from the perspective of four-dimensionalism, the identity of an object cannot result from its present (spatial) constitution alone, but is also based on its (temporal) "continuation" into its past and future, a proximity to eternalism is ultimately entirely given, insofar as the idea appears implausible under the aspect of presenterism (only the present exists) or of possibilism (also the past, but not the future exists).
One of the objections to four-dimensionalism is the question of how one should reconcile seemingly static, loose and unconnected space-time foils with our everyday experience of change and dynamics in the world. An opposite position can be found in three-dimensionalism, according to which time is a completely independent dimension independent of space and, accordingly, the identity of each object would be determined solely by its constitution in the three dimensions of space at each discrete point in time of its existence, i.e. each The object is always completely given in its presence.
literature
- Theodore Sider : Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time . Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001, ISBN 978-0-19-926352-3 .
- Yuri Balashov: Persistence and Spacetime . Oxford University Press, Oxford 2010, ISBN 978-0-19-957992-1 .
Web links
- Yuri Balashov: Persistence and Space-Time (PDF; 1.1 MB): Philosophical Lessons of the Pole and Barn, in: The Monist 83 (2000), pp. 321-340
- Berit Brogaard: Presentist Four-Dimensionalism , in: The Monist 83/3 (2000), pp. 341-356.
- Claudio Calosi: Persistence and Change in Minkowski Spacetime (PDF; 125 kB)
- Sally Haslanger: Comments (PDF; 114 kB) on Sider (2001)
- Pedro Schmechtig: Time and Persistence (PDF; 126 kB)
- Achille C. Varzi: Change, Temporal Parts, and the Argument from Vagueness (PDF; 228 kB), in: Dialectica 59/4 (2005), pp. 485-498.