Material constitution

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In modern philosophical ontology, material constitution denotes the relationship between a thing and what makes that thing what it is, what it constitutes. For example, a statue is materially constituted by the clay that forms it. This ontological dependency often relates, but not only, to dependence on material constituents.

According to standard conceptions of constitution, the relation of constitution is not to be equated with that of identity , in particular because it has a different nature: The relation of constitution is non- reflexive (clay is not constituted by clay) and asymmetrical (the constitution of the statue by clay implies not the constitution of clay by the statue). Constitution is also transitive : if, for example, the statue is constituted by clay and clay, the statue is also constituted by clay, among other things.

Constitution and characteristics

If you ask yourself what it means that clay constitutes a statue, the simplest answer would be that clay and statue are ontologically the same, i.e. the statue would be nothing more than clay in a certain spatial arrangement. This is also obvious if one takes standard theories of part-whole relations (so-called mereology ) as a basis: If two objects have all spatiotemporal parts in common, they are also identical as a whole, at least this is what mereology requires axiomatically (so-called extensionality principle) . Indeed, theorists such as Donald Baxter and David K. Lewis have considered the composition of the parts to be identical to the resulting whole, that is, they have argued that composition is identity (not just causation).

Despite this mereological point of view, the meaning of the words “clay” and “statue” seems to be different. Statues and heaps of clay seem to have fundamentally different properties, whereas identical objects have all properties in common. Different assignments of properties are already known from mereology, for example a diamond is assigned the property of being transparent, while its parts ( carbon atoms ) are not translucent. Most philosophers now assume that the transparency of the diamond can be explained by the properties of the carbon atoms and the laws of optics, i.e. the property can be explained reductively (by tracing back to a description in an ontologically more fundamental vocabulary that can explain all properties that are discussed in the surface vocabulary).

Constitutional theorists, on the other hand, explain that such a reduction is not possible, since the different properties, to which modal properties also belong, exist according to the matter ( de re ) and not only lie in the manner of the description ( de dicto ). For example, a pile of clay can survive a change in shape (it remains a pile of clay) that a statue cannot (it ceases to be a statue). Because of these different properties, the material constitution cannot be understood as the identity of the object with its components. The statue and the clay pile are ontologically something different. However, this argument is also controversial.

In addition to those already mentioned, non-reductive constitutional theories represent, for example, EJ Lowe , Peter Simons , Judith Jarvis Thomson and David Wiggins .

Open questions and applications

Open questions in the debates about the concept of constitution are whether it is really different from ontological identity and what is necessary and sufficient for a thing to constitute a thing other than this or as of a certain type. For example, modal criteria and those of spatiotemporal coincidence and mereological or compositional structure are discussed. One possible explanation is, for example: constituted objects of a certain class are objects for which it is true that they necessarily result when objects of a constituent class are combined in a certain way. For example, if you work clay in a certain way, a statue will necessarily result.

Such questions have become fundamental to many ontological debates, for example about the concepts of person and spirit. For example, one can argue that the mind is materially constituted by the body. If one differentiates between material constitution and identity, then body and mind would not be identical and the mind could consequently not be reduced to the body. At the same time, however, the mind would remain constituted by the body, which is why such a position must be distinguished from typical dualisms . In the philosophy of mind, such approaches can be viewed as variants of the emergence theory.

For example, for the reconstruction of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity , attempts were made to borrow from theories of material constitution.

See also

literature

  • Lynne Rudder Baker : Persons and Bodies . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000
  • Dies .: On Making Things Up Constitution and its Critics, in: Philosophical Topics 31 (2003)
  • Jeff Brower and Michael C. Rea: Material Constitution and the Trinity , in: Faith and Philosophy 22/1 (2005), 57-76.
  • EJ Lowe: The Problem of the Many and the Vagueness of Constitution , in: Analysis 55 (1995), 179-82.
  • Michael C. Rea (ed.): Material Constitution , Lanham 1997
  • Ders .: Constitution and Kind Membership , in: Philosophical Studies 97 (2000), 169–93
  • Christof Rapp : Metaphysics: An Introduction . CH Beck Verlag, Munich 2016, ISBN 978-3-40666796-1 , pp. 93-107.
  • Dean W. Zimmerman : Theories of Masses and Problems of Constitution , in: Philosophical Review 104 (1995), 53-110

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Cf. for example Ryan Wasserman: The Constitution Question , Noûs 38 (2004), 693-710, here n. 7 and others.
  2. ↑ So Baker 1997. Michael C. McRea et al. Consider constitution to be symmetrical. For a discussion of the problem cf. also Luke Potter: Sameness Without Identity  ( page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as broken. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. ? The Meta-Ontological Costs of an Accidental Sameness Solution to the Problem of Material Constitution@1@ 2Template: dead link / webspace.utexas.edu  
  3. ↑ Robert A. Wilson, for example, gives a detailed discussion: The Transitivity of Material Constitution (PDF; 302 kB), in: Nous vors. 2008
  4. ↑ In addition: Achille Varzi:  Mereology. In: Edward N. Zalta (Ed.): Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy .
  5. ↑ For a discussion of this problem cf. István Aranyosi: Composition as Causation ( Memento of the original from September 8, 2008 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link has been inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / philrsss.anu.edu.au
  6. ↑ Such arguments can be found, inter alia, in Mark Johnston: Constitution is Not Identity , Mind 101 (1992), 89-105
  7. ↑ A more extensive criticism can be found in Harald Noonan's : Constitution is identity - response to Mark Johnston. In: Mind 101 (1992)