Rationalization cartel
A rationalization cartel is a cartel that is intended to lead to rationalization, i.e. cost savings, in the participating companies. Examples are joint procurement or joint sales by several companies, or a joint taxi call center for different taxi companies.
This form of cartel is considered - at least potentially - economically useful if the rationalization achieved by the cartel is so great that it outweighs the restraint of competition associated with the cartel.
history
The term rationalization cartel came up in the early 1950s on the occasion of the discussion about the new West German cartel law ( GWB ). As early as the 1890s, however, the older scientific cartel theory had identified various rationalization effects through more closely structured cartels, in particular through industrial syndicates , and since the 1920s the special "rationalization measures" of a number of industrial cartels, which were used to " normalize , typify , Specialization "of production led.
Regulations in the GWB until 2005
A rationalization cartel was in the German law against restraints of competition (GWB) of the versions up to 2005 an organizational constellation between entrepreneurs, which could be approved according to §§ 2, 3 and 5 (old) because of its positive effects on the market.
With a cartel, two or more competing companies generally agree on measures that (partially) restrict competition between them and which therefore initially fall under the general prohibition of cartels in Section 1 GWB.
Compared to the monopoly cartel, which is harmful to customers, i.e. the other side of the market, the rationalization cartel is characterized by the fact that it improves the efficiency or profitability of the companies involved (e.g. in technical, business or organizational relationships) and thereby benefits the consumer generated.
A rationalization cartel could therefore be exempted from the general prohibition of cartels according to Section 5 upon application ( prohibition with reservation of permission ). This presupposes that the "success in rationalization ... is in an appropriate relationship to the associated restriction of competition" and that no dominant position is created or strengthened. Price agreements or joint sales or procurement facilities are only permitted if the rationalization purpose cannot be achieved in any other way.
The subcases are regulated separately:
- of the standards and types cartel (Section 2 (1) GWB), agree with the company to only
produce according to uniform standards or types (classes), - of the conditions cartel (Section 2 (2) GWB), agree on uniform terms and conditions with the company
- of the specialization cartel (§ 3 GWB), with which companies divide the different types of a product group among themselves (e.g. light trucks - heavy trucks).
Regulation in GWB from 2005
With the revision of the GBW in 2005, §§ 2 and 3 have been changed and §§ 4 to 18 are no longer applicable, which means that the special regulations on rationalization cartels are no longer applicable. However, the general clause of Section 2 (I) (new) still provides a means of approving 'useful' cartels. Rationalization cartels are suitable to fit under the present blanket provision.
literature
- Theodor Becker, The importance of rationalization on cartel formation, Erlangen 1932.
- Wolfram Eckstein, Business Criteria for the Assessment of Rationalization Cartels, Cologne 1966.
- Jacob Herle / Max Metzner, production funding through cartels, Berlin 1929.
- Günther Luxbacher, mass production in the global cartel. Incandescent lamps, radio tubes and the rationalization of the electrical industry up to 1945, Berlin 2003
- Metzner, Max, Cartels as carriers of rationalization. A collection of materials, Berlin 1955.
- Bruno Schoenlank, Die Kartelle, in: Archive for social legislation and statistics, 3 (1890), pp. 489-538.
Individual evidence
- ^ Benno Scholz, The cartel problem in the new economic constitution, Diss. Cologne, Düsseldorf 1939, p. 26.