Rule consequences

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The term usually consequences (Engl. To follow [obey] a rule ) is a language-philosophical term which in the language philosophy of the late Wittgenstein plays an important role systematically. Since the late 1970s, the problem of following the rules has moved into the center of interpretive interest in Wittgenstein's philosophical investigations and has replaced the question of the impossibility of a private language.

In the view of the late Wittgenstein there is no abstract standard behind the individual uses of the word, which could be called a rule and would determine this. Rather, in Wittgenstein's view, the correct use of words, the correct observance of a rule, is determined by practice itself, which then also expresses the meaning of a word.

According to Wittgenstein, the meaning of a word does not contain two different components that could be described as a rule and its application, but is exhausted in its use. Knowledge of the rule is shown in the correct use of words. This in turn is a criterion for a correct understanding of the rule.

literature

  • Andrea Birk: Rules . In: Historical Dictionary of Philosophy Vol. 8, pp. 464-465
  • G. Baker / PMS Hacker: Language, sense and nonsense: A critical investigation into modern theories of language . Oxford 1984
  • G. Baker / PMS Hacker: Skepticism, rules and language . Oxford 1984
  • G. Baker / PMS Hacker: Wittgenstein, rules, grammar and necessity . Oxford 1988
  • J. Bouveresse: La ?? force de la règle: Wittgenstein et l'invention de la nécessité . Paris 1987
  • SH Holtzman / CM Leich: Wittgenstein: To follow a rule . London 1981
  • Saul Kripke : Wittgenstein, On rules and private language . Oxford 1982
  • N. Malcolm: Wittgenstein on language and rules . Philosophy 64 (1989) 5-28
  • D. Pears: Rule-following in Philosophical investigations . Graz Philosophical Studies 33/34 (1989) 249–261.
  • Klaus Puhl: Sequences of rules . In: Eike von Savigny (ed.): Ludwig Wittgenstein. Philosophical Investigations . Akademie Verlag GmbH, 2nd edited edition Berlin 2011, pp. 91–109
  • Joachim Schulte: Seguire una regola: Nuovi studi su Wittgenstein . Lingua Stile 17 (1982) 497-512
  • SG Shanker: Skeptical confusions about rule-following . Mind 93 (1984) 423-429
  • Wolfgang Stegmüller : Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein's late philosophy: attempted comment on an attempted comment . Kröner, Stuttgart 1986

Remarks

  1. ↑ See Klaus Puhl: Rule sequences . In: Eike von Savigny (ed.): Ludwig Wittgenstein. Philosophical Investigations . Akademie Verlag GmbH, 2nd edited edition Berlin 2011, pp. 91–109 (here: p. 91)