Directive 2014/59 / EU (settlement directive)

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Directive 2014/59 / EU

Title: Directive 2014/59 / EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 laying down a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891 / EEC and Directives 2001/24 / EC , 2002/47 / EG, 2004/25 / EG, 2005/56 / EG, 2007/36 / EG, 2011/35 / EU, 2012/30 / EU and 2013/36 / EU as well as the regulations (EU) No. 1093/2010 and (EU) No. 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council
Designation:
(not official) 		Settlement Policy
Scope: EEA
Legal matter: Capital market law , competition law
Basis: TFEU , in particular Article 114
Procedure overview: European Commission
European Parliament
IPEX Wiki
To be
implemented in national law by: 		January 1, 2015
Reference: OJ L 173 of June 12, 2014, pp. 190-348
Full text Consolidated version (not official)
basic version
The regulation must have been implemented in national law.
Please note the information on the current version of legal acts of the European Union !

The resolution directive (complete Directive 2014/59 / EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of May 15, 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms , abbreviation BRRD from English Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive ) is a directive of the European Union for the harmonization of restructuring and resolution instruments to rescue ailing credit institutions, which was enacted as part of the so-called European banking union .

background

In the wake of the financial crisis that had been going on since 2007, credit institutions that had run into trouble were repeatedly rescued using public funds. In order to avoid such rescue operations in the future and to be able to process banks without the use of public funds, resolution mechanisms have been developed in the EU. Two legislative projects have been initiated to implement it: On the one hand, a resolution directive that applies to all EU member states, which harmonizes the restructuring and resolution instruments across Europe, but leaves their application in the responsibility of national resolution authorities (in Germany the Federal Financial Market Stabilization Agency ); on the other hand, a regulation on the establishment of a uniform resolution mechanism (SRM abbreviation for Single Resolution Mechanism ). The latter is based on the instruments of the resolution directive and complements the uniform banking supervisory mechanism adopted by the ECB (SSM for Single Supervisory Mechanism ). The systemically important banks of the euro area, as well as any member states from outside the euro area that join voluntarily, i. H. All banks that are subject to the uniform supervisory mechanism under supervisory law are also subject to the SRM, an institutional mechanism with a resolution authority at European level and a uniform resolution fund. The national funds made available to the resolution fund will be gradually pooled over a transitional period of eight years.

Core elements

The guideline harmonises the handling of reorganizations (English recovery ) on their own by the credit institutions concerned and the resolution (English resolution ) under the direction of the responsible supervisory authority. Triggers for a settlement under the guideline are:

  • An institute is failing or is likely to fail. With this criterion, in addition to the bank's over-indebtedness and solvency, there are also violations of the requirements attached to a permanent license, for example a loss that uses up a significant part of its own funds. Unless specific exceptions apply, the “default” or “probable default” criterion is also considered to be met if an institution receives extraordinary financial support from public funds.
  • There is no reasonable prospect that alternative measures by the private sector or regulatory authorities can avert the failure.
  • The settlement is in the public interest. Within the scope of this criterion, a comparison is made with insolvency proceedings: A resolution process is only in the public interest if it is necessary and proportionate to achieve one or more resolution goals and the liquidation of the institution in insolvency proceedings would not enable these goals to the same extent. In the event of an emergency, it must be checked every time whether an insolvency or liquidation procedure should be carried out. In the liquidation process, no creditor may be worse off than he would be through an insolvency (English no creditor worse off ).

The resolution tools defined in the directive are:

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