Semantic relativism

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The semantic relativism or meaning relativism states: The same concept can in various subjects and / or different at different times meanings have.

terminology

Expressions and thought categories

The word “term” is often understood in the sense of a linguistic expression . When Hans says: “The bank is closed”, then the word “bank” in his mouth at this point means financial institution . When Fritz says: “I sat down on the bench,” the word “bench” at that point in his mouth means public seating for several people (or something like that).

Under this interpretation of the term “concept”, semantic relativism is a truism - no one has ever doubted it.

In cognitive science and philosophy , the word “term” is often used in a different sense. Then either a mental or an abstract entity is meant that can only be expressed through linguistic expressions, but is itself something other than an expression. If you understand the word “concept” in this way, you can comment on the above example as follows: Hans and Fritz use the same expression , but they use different concepts . Instead of “concept” one can also say “conceptual category” here.

One view of concepts in this sense is that what makes two mental or abstract entities the same concept is simply that they have the same meaning. When Hans says: “The financial institution is closed” and Fritz says: “The bank has an ATM”, then they use the different expressions “financial institution” and “bank” to express the same term when these words are the same in their respective mouths Have meaning.

Under this interpretation of the term “concept” and with the aforementioned conception, it is logically impossible that one and the same concept could have different meanings in different subjects and / or at different times - because it is only the same if it has the same meaning.

Meaning, conception and reference

To understand semantic relativism, it is useful to make a few more distinctions:

1. By "meaning" is meant the relationship of a concept (i.e. an expression or a category of thought) to the thing or class of things it actually designates or singles out - i.e. H. which actually fall under this term and to which it is therefore applicable . These “things” are referred to here as the referents of the respective term.

2. The “meaning” in this sense should not be confused with the conception (the ideas) that the respective users of a term have of its speakers. Such concepts are expressed, among other things, in the things to which the subjects concerned usually apply the term and which definitions they would accept for it .

There is no doubt a connection between the meaning of terms and the conception of the users of these terms by their respective speakers. How this connection looks and, above all, how close it is, is controversial.

3. Instead of “conception of” one often also says “concept of” in everyday language. One should not confuse conceptions in the sense introduced here with terms in the sense of expressions or conceptual categories.

4. Both linguistic expressions and conceptual categories can be applied to things. Hans thinks, for example, that this is what he sees in front of him, a bank was. So he applies the term <bank> (the term he sometimes expresses with the word “bank” and sometimes with the word “financial institution”) to what he sees in front of him. Assume that the supposed bank is actually an insurance company. In this case, Hans applies the term <bank> (erroneously) to insurance. One can also say that he will take with the term <Bank> on an insurance terms .

The question of the meaning of a term - what does the term pick out in general, what things fall under it? - should not start with the question of its relation - to what does a subject apply it in a specific situation, which thing (or which things) does the subject subsume under this term? - be confused.

Variants of semantic relativism

Operationalism

A relevant variant of semantic relativism is operationalism - the thesis that terms for measured quantities (such as weight, volume, pH value, etc.) are defined by the method (i.e. the measuring operations) with which they are determined.

According to this position, the meaning of <pH value> or “pH value” in chemistry changed when it was decided to use electrodes instead of litmus paper strips to determine the pH value. According to the operationalist position, the new procedure is not better or worse than the old one, but it determines something different, since the methodological operation is different.

Kuhnianism

A generalization of this thesis for scientific terms as a whole is made by Thomas S. Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions . In his view, the meaning of scientific terms is generally determined by the theories currently being held by the scientific community about what those terms mean. Of course, the theories not only make statements about how something is to be measured, but also about what properties it has.

When one switched from the theory that the earth was flat to the theory that the earth was a sphere, according to this view the meaning of <earth> or “earth” changed. Accordingly, the two theories do not contradict each other, but rather they refer to different things. So there has actually been no change in the theory about the earth , but just the subject has been changed.

Note that this is a completely different position than that the shape of the earth itself has been changed by the change in theories. It is also a completely different position than that the earth is both a disk and a sphere (see: Ontological Relativism ).

Definition theory and use theory of meaning

Semantic relativism in the sense described is a consequence of what is known as the definition theory of meaning , which states: terms are (generally) defined by the beliefs of the person who uses these terms. The meaning of terms therefore depends solely on the conception of the respective users of the speakers of these terms.

Meaning relativism also follows from at least some variants of the use theory of meaning - the thesis that the meaning of terms is determined by their use.

Whether semantic relativism follows from use theory depends on how it is meant. If it only says that the term <bank> means financial institution exactly when it is used with this meaning, then of course the meaning relativism does not follow. And it does not follow even if the theory of use merely says that the term <bank> means financial institution exactly when it is applicable to financial institutions and only to these .

Sapir-Whorf hypothesis

A very different kind of meaning relativism is the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis . It says: Speakers of different languages ​​have fundamentally different terms in the sense of conceptual categories.

This is not the thesis that utterances in one language can only be inadequately translated into other languages. It is also not the thesis that different subjects, different terms of certain things have , in the sense that they have of the same things quite different ideas. Rather, the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis states that the repertoire of conceptual categories differs from the speakers of different languages.

In its most radical form, the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis implies that the thoughts of speakers of different languages ​​can never have the same content (refer to the same thing). Someone who does not speak German cannot, for example, have the thought of expressing the speaker of German with the sentence: "It is raining", because he does not have the appropriate conceptual categories.

Behind the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is the observation that both the vocabularies and the grammars of the languages ​​spoken in the world (currently over 6000) differ greatly. For example, not every language has a counterpart for the German expression “rain”. Based on the assumption that people acquire concepts in the first place by learning a language, it is concluded that the users of different expressions would have to have completely different conceptual categories at their disposal.

In the cognitive sciences today, the opposite assumption is usually made: in order to be able to acquire a language at all, one must have conceptual categories in advance.

This view is only compatible with a moderate form of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, according to which people acquire only a partial repertoire of their conceptual categories by learning a language (or other socialization influences). Thus, for example, not everyone can have the thought that physicists express with the sentence: “An electron has flown through the cloud chamber”, because not everyone has the conceptual category <electron>. However, some cognitive scientists would deny that you absolutely have to know a word like "electron" in order to be able to think this thought.

swell

  1. ↑ JA Fodor: Concepts. Oxford University Press, Oxford 1998.
  2. ^ S. Soames: Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century. Volume 2, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ 2003.
  3. ^ H. Putnam: Representation and Reality. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA 1988.
  4. ^ T. Kuhn: The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1963.
  5. ^ H. Putnam: Representation and Reality. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA 1988.
  6. ^ BL Whorf: Language, Thought and Reality. MIT-Press, Cambridge, MA 1956.
  7. ^ J. McWhorter: The Power of Babel. WH Freeman, New York 2002.
  8. ^ M. Bowerman, S. Levinson (Eds.): Language Acquisition and Conceptual Development. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003.

See also